CC BY
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АРИДНЫЕ ЭКОСИСТЕМЫ, 2005, том 11, №26-27
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ВОДА И БУДУЩЕЕ БАССЕЙНА АРАЛЬСКОГО МОРЯ
© 2005 г. Ф. Миклин
Географический отдел, Западный Мичиганский университет MI 49008 Каламазу, США
Чистая вода неотъемлемый элемент для выживания природы и общества. Она приобретает особое значение в аридных регионах земного шара. Одна из наиболее напряженных ситуаций в использовании этого ресурса сложилась в бассейне Аральского моря в Центральной Азии, где есть и хорошо увлажненные горы и обширные пустыни. Семь стран делят воды двух крупнейших рек: Амударьи и Сырдарьи, являющихся единственными источниками пресной воды. Из-за интенсивного развития орошения в пяти странах, которые в прошлом входили в состав СССР (Казахстан, Узбекистан, Киргизстан, Таджикистан и Туркменистан), расходуется более 90% водных запасов, главным образом для выращивания хлопка и риса. Уменьшение речных потоков и высыхание Аральского моря, куда впадают эти реки, стало причиной ряда серьезных проблем для окружающей среды и людей, включая разрушение доходной отрасли -рыболовства. Пыльные бури, поднимающиеся со дна высохшего моря, негативно отражаются на прилегающую территорию, изменяя климат вокруг бывшего побережья, начиная от морского берега до континентальных массивов. Все это ведет к прогрессирующему опустыниванию и связанной с ним экосистемной деградации дельт обоих рек, в особенности Амударьи, и к ухудшению здоровья и благосостояния населения обитающего в так называемой «зоне бедствия».
Пять государств бассейна Аральского моря, вышедших из Советского Союза, прилагают огромные усилия для решения вопросов в управлении ресурсами пресной воды. Эти страны создали межгосударственные организации для решения этой задачи через региональное сотрудничество, совместные научные исследования и финансирование.
Международное сообщество в сотрудничестве с региональными организациями оказывают существенную финансовую помощь, усиливая техническую оснащенность. Самыми важными и срочными задачами на сегодняшний день являются:
1) Проведение переговоров и подписание взаимно-приемлемых соглашений (включая Афганистан) о разделе потока Амударьи и Сырдарьи. Это является неотъемлемой существенной и устойчивой частью программы восстановления региона.
2) Применение технических, институционных и доступных экономических средств для улучшения орошаемого земледелия и сохранения воды.
3) Меры направленные для сохранения существующей части Аральского моря и дельтовых экосистем, что позволит облегчить положение населения в «зоне экологического бедствия». Успешное выполнение этих задач - главное условие в решении проблем окружающей среды, роста экономического и социального благосостояния, включая политическую стабильность в регионе.
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE ARAL SEA BASIN © 2005. Philip Micklin
Dept. of Geography Western Michigan University MI 49008, Kalamazoo, USA
Introduction
Water is biologically and physically essential to all life on earth (Micklin, 1996). Without an abundant supply in the liquid and gaseous state, plants, animals, and soils would neither have originated nor evolved to the complexity we find today. Although human physiological requirements are only a
few liters of drinking water per capita, modern nations use prodigious quantities of this ubiquitous but precious substance. Fortunately, fresh water is a renewable resource, but in parts of the Globe, particularly the arid regions, anthropogenic actions have pushed usage to or beyond sustainable limits. Furthermore, competition among and within nations for fresh water, already a widespread problem by the end of the 20th Century, promises to become even more pervasive and acute in the new Millennium (Gleick, 2000).
Rivers, and groundwater, are the two major fresh water resources. Use of water from large rivers is particularly contentious because they not only pass through multiple regions within one country, but also frequently are shared between two, or among several, countries. According to the Transboundary Fresh Water Disputes Database project at Oregon State University, there are around 261 international rivers covering nearly half of the globe (www.transboundarywater.orst.edu). Five or more countries share 13 of these basins and 9 or more countries 4 (Fredericks, 1996). Competition for control and use of the flow of international rivers can lead to serious conflict among nations. Indeed, the fear of "water wars" has been postulated, by some, as one of the most serious threats of the 21st century (Wolf, 1998). However, shared rivers, if managed in a mutually agreed upon manner that is perceived as reasonably equitable by all riparians, can also be forces for cooperation among nations.
The purpose here is to examine the key problems of water resources' management in the Aral Sea Basin of Central Asia. Water is critical in this largely arid zone as irrigated agriculture remains the dominant economic pursuit. However, this activity has strained the basin's key fresh water resources, the Amu Dar'ya and Syr rivers, to the breaking point. Exacerbating matters is the sharing of these watercourses by multiple countries, which has lead to sharp differences among the riparians as to what constitutes an equitable water use allocation system. Excessive Irrigation has also resulted in the desiccation of the Aral Sea, accompanied by a plethora of negative human and ecological consequences.
The Aral Sea basin and its Water Resources
The Aral Sea Basin lies in the heart of Central Asia (Fig. 1). It covers a vast area, estimated at near 1.8 million km2.(Tsentr, 1991, p. 4). The watershed includes territory of seven states: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Iran. Lands that now constitute five of the seven basin states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan) were part of the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, from the late 19th century until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Eighty three percent of the basin was situated in the Soviet Union and over 90% of river flow came from its territory. Afghanistan and Iran control the residual portion of the watershed. A reasonable estimate of the basin population in 2004 is 53 million.
Fig. 1. The Aral Sea Basin of Central Asia
The central government of the Soviet Union made all critical water management decisions for the portion of the Aral Sea Basin it controlled until the USSR collapsed in 1991. The Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Minvodkhoz) in Moscow settled disputes among the republics over allocation and sharing of water from the international rivers. (Kilinskiy and Sheynin, 1986). The Soviet Union paid little heed to Afghan and Iranian water management views or interests. After the shattering of the USSR in 1991, the situation changed dramatically. The Aral Sea Basin and its water resources no longer were controlled by one super power. Suddenly, seven, states, five of which were new, shared the management responsibilities.
Geography and demography, however, condition some states to have much more interest in water management issues within the basin than others. All of Tajikistan and its population lie within the watershed, as do 99% of the territory and people of Uzbekistan. The basin accounts for close to 80% of Turkmenistan where nearly all its people live. Over 70% of Kyrgyzstan is in the basin and more than half its people reside here. Hence, these states have the paramount stake in basin-wide water management issues. Kazakhstan has 13% of its territory and 15% of its population in the watershed whereas Afghanistan has 40% of its area in the basin with 33% of its population there. They also have a significant interest in how basin water resources are handled. Iranian concerns with water issues are minimal as only 2% of its territory, located in the extreme northeast of the country, is in the basin and a minute portion of the national population (probably less than 1%) lives here.
The Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya
The Amu Dar'ya 1 is the premier river of the Aral Sea Basin. It flows nearly 2400 km from the glaciers and snowfields of the Pamir Mountains of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan across the Kara-Kum desert into the Aral Sea. The river, or its major tributaries, course along the borders and across four states: Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Fig. 1). Average annual flow from the drainage basin is around 79 km3, including 62 km3 from the Amu Dar'ya and 17 km3 from several other rivers that terminate in the desert before reaching the main stem of the Amu. The Amu Dar'ya is "exotic", i.e., essentially all its water originates in the Pamir Mountains, but is substantially diminished crossing the Kara-Kum desert to the Aral. Tajikistan contributes 80% of flow generated in the Amu Dar'ya basin, followed by Afghanistan (8%), Uzbekistan (6%), Kyrgyzstan (3%) and Turkmenistan and Iran together around 3% (most of which is formed in Iran) (McKinney and Akmansoy, 1998; ICAS, 1996, chapter 6)
The Syr Dar'ya with a length of 2,500 km originates in the Tyan' Shan Mountains, to the north of the Pamirs. Glaciers and snowmelt are its chief sources of water. The river flows from Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan, then across a narrow strip of Tajikistan into Uzbekistan, and finally across Kazakhstan and into the Aral Sea. Average annual discharge of the Syr Dar'ya, is 37 km3. Kyrgyzstan contributes 74% of river flow, Uzbekistan 11%, Kazakhstan 12%, and Tajikistan 3%. This river also has an "exotic" character.
The rivers of the Aral Sea Basin provide on an annual average basis around 116 km3. Estimates of usable groundwater range from 13 to 17 km3/yr (Micklin, 1991, p. 99; Dukhovnyy and Sokolov, no date, p. 3). Thus, potentially usable water resources may be as much as 133 km3. On a per capita basis (assuming a 2004 basin population of around 53 million), they equal 2,509 cubic meters/person, which is substantial. However, the per capita figure hides the sharp spatial discontinuities of the region in terms of where flow is generated and where people live and use water most heavily. In hydrologic/geographic terms the region may be divided into two zones. First is the flow-generating, sparsely inhabited, upstream mountains, where water use is low. Occupying only 20% of the basin, it generates 90% of the flow for the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya (Matmakanov, 1996, pp. 5-7). Second are the downstream arid plains (covering 80% of the basin), where most of the populace resides along and near the rivers and major canals. It is here that most of the water is withdrawn, and whose indigenous water resources are far less than use. The deficit in the plains is, of course, covered by outflows from the well-watered mountains.
1 Dar'ya in the Turkic languages of Central Asia means river.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, occupying the core of the Aral Sea Basin mountain zone are "water rich". The former supplies 55% of average annual basin river flow and the latter 25%, for an aggregate contribution of 80%. Water withdrawals for the two countries together in 1995 were only 16% of the total. These states are large net donors to basin water supplies. Afghanistan is also a net donor as it provides about 5% of Aral Sea Basin river flow, but had withdrawals in 1995 that were likely not more than 1% of the total (World Bank, p. 16).
On the other hand, the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are "water poor" and large net consumers of basin water resources. Situated primarily on the arid plains of the Central Asian deserts, they contribute only 14% of Aral Sea Basin river flow. These nations accounted for 83% of estimated basin withdrawals of 111 km3 in 1995. Uzbekistan contributes 8% of basin flow but its withdrawals in 1995 were 52% of the total. Turkmenistan contributes essentially no flow but is a major consumer accounting for 20% of withdrawals in 1995. Kazakhstan contributes 4% of aggregate basin flow, but 13% of the flow for the Syr Dar'ya while withdrawing 10% of basin totals in 1995. Iran contributes about 3% of basin flow and consumes, at most, 1%.
Sufficiency of Renewable Water Resources
As noted above, a reasonable estimate of average annual renewable water resources, both surface and ground, is 133 km3. We can add to this an estimated 40 km3 of flow that has been withdrawn but returned to river channels or dumped into closed depressions in the deserts to evaporate to give an upper limit of more than 170 km3/yr. as the potentially usable water resources in the basin (ICAS, 1996, Chapter 6). .From 1990 to 1995, annual water withdrawals ranged from 111 km3 to 126 km3 (Dukhovnyy, 1993, p. 56; ICAS, 1996, Chapter 7, tables 7.1 and 7.2). Comparing withdrawals with potential supply suggests that there is plenty of water to go around for all basin countries and users, now and for the foreseeable future.
The situation, unfortunately, is more complex and less sanguine. First, we must subtract unavoidable flow losses such as filtration from riverbeds, evaporation from reservoirs, and evapotranspiration from phreatophytes. These may run to 16 km3 annually for the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya (Micklin, 2000, p. 10). Second, river flow is uneven on an intra- and inter-annual basis. To harmonize water demand with river flow, large dams and reservoirs are built to store water during high flow periods (spring and early summer) and years for use during summer low flow periods of high demand and low flow years (Micklin, 1991, pp. 4-7). However, attempting to store all the seasonal surplus flow, and especially the surplus flow in high water years, for times when flow is low and demand is high lacks both economic and environmental justification (Collier et al, 1996; Micklin 1996).
Seasonal and multiyear storage dams and reservoirs have been built on both the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya. This has increased the ensured yield of water, a measure of availability in a low flow year (which, statistically speaking, occurs on average once in ten years) to 79 km3 for both river basins. The amount of water that is available in the low flow years is, in fact, most crucial for water resource management. It is more indicative of the state of water resources in arid regions such as the Aral Sea Basin than the average annual figure, which is over-weighted by the high flow years, much of whose flow neither can be stored nor used.
In light of the above (and realizing that low flow years usually occur in cycles in arid regions rather than being randomly distributed) the water supply vs. use situation for the Aral Sea Basin looks much less favorable. Taking the 79 km3 figure for a low flow year and subtracting "unavoidable" losses of 16 km3, leaves only 64 km3 as the potentially usable resource. Adding return flows of 40 km3 and groundwater additions of 17 km3, to this gives a total available resource of 121 km3. This figure falls within the range of withdrawals for the period 1990-95. Actually, during low flow periods, withdrawals from the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya in the downstream net consuming countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are, of necessity, substantially reduced. It is during these cycles (most recently 1999-2001) that tensions rise between the upstream and downstream states and among the downstream nations over the allocation to each of a reduced water supply.
The Aral Sea Problem
Further exacerbating the water situation in the Aral Sea Basin is the plight of the Aral Sea. Located amidst the great deserts of Central Asia (Fig. 1), this lake is fundamentally dependent on flow from the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya to maintain its size and ecological integrity. Kazahstan and Uzbekistan are riparian on the Sea proper, with each possessing an approximately equal length of shoreline. The entire Aral coastline within Uzbekistan lies within that nation's Karakalpakstan Republic. A terminal lake, it has surface inflow but no surface outflow. Therefore, the balance between inflows from the two rivers and net evaporation (evaporation from its surface minus precipitation on it) fundamentally determine its level. Over the last 10,000-15,000 years, the sea's level has fluctuated as much as 40 meters (Micklin, 1991, p. 42-43; Kes' 1978).2 For the initial period of instrumental observation (1911-1960), annual inflow and net evaporation averaging near 55 km3 and level variations were less than one meter. (Bortnik and Chistyaevaya, 1990, p. 36; Micklin, 1994).
The Aral Sea, according to area, was the world's fourth largest inland water body in 1960 (Micklin, 1991, pp. 42-54). With salinity around 10 g/l it was inhabited by twenty indigenous fresh water species. The sea supported a major fishery and functioned as a key regional transportation route. The extensive deltas of the Syr Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya sustained a diversity of flora and fauna. They also supported irrigated agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and trapping, fishing, and harvesting of reeds, which served as fodder for livestock as well as building materials.
Over the past four decades, primarily as a result of growing irrigation, the sea has steadily shrunk and salinized (Figure 2, Table 1). The Aral separated into two water bodies in 1987 - a
Fig. 2. The Changing Profile of the Aral Sea
small Aral Sea in the north and a large Aral Sea in the south. The Syr Dar'ya flows into the former, and the Amu Dar'ya into the latter. Between 1960 and January 2004, the level of the small Aral fell by 13 meters and the large Aral by 23 meters. The area of both seas taken together diminished by 75 % and the volume by 90%. Salinity in the small sea is estimated to have doubled whereas in the large sea it has
2 The major level changes prior to 1960 resulted from diversion of the Amu Dar'ya westward so that it flowed into the Sarykamysh hollow (and sometimes farther through the Uzboy channel to the Caspian Sea after it overtopped Sarykamysh) rather than the Aral Sea. These diversions resulted from natural events (sedimentation of the bed and subsequent breaching of the rivers left bank during spring floods) and from advertant human actions (destruction of
dikes and levees, built to keep the river flowing to the Aral, during times of conflict).
increased by seven to over 10 fold. Within a few years the large Aral is will ivide into three parts - a "deep" western lake," shallow" eastern lake, and small northern lake.
The desiccation of the Aral Sea and associated degradation its two influent rivers has had severe negative impacts (Micklin, 2000, pp. 13-23). Besides the consequences for the sea proper, a zone around the waterbody of several hundred thousand square kilometers with a population of several million has also been damaged. (Khvorog, 1992). The Republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan and portions of Kzyl-Orda Oblast in Kazakhstan, have suffered the most harm. Dashauz Oblast in Turkmenistan has been substantially impacted. The territory suffering significant impacts, however, is a small part of each country's area and contains a minor portion of its population. The other states of the Aral Sea Basin are distant from the zone of intense effects; they have suffered no demonstrable harm from the drying of the sea.
The substantial Aral fishing industry in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan collapsed by 1983 as the commercially important indigenous species disappeared from the sea owing to rising salinity and loss of shallow spawning and feeding areas (Micklin, 2000, p. 16; Micklin, 1991, pp. 49-50; Williams and Aladin, 1991; Zholdasova et. al., 1998; Ptichnikov, 2002). However, all of these still survive in the deltaic lakes and Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya rivers. A few of the introduced salt-tolerant fishes remain, mainly in the much less saline small Aral, but these will soon vanish from the large Aral Sea as salinity continues rising. The loss of the fishery through tens-of-thousands out of work.
The rich and diverse ecosystems of the Amu Dar'ya delta have suffered particular harm (Micklin, 1991, pp. 50-52). Greatly reduced river flows through the delta, the elimination of spring floods, and declining ground water levels have resulted in spreading desertification . Halophytes and xerophytes are rapidly replacing endemic vegetation communities (Novikova, 1996). Expanses of unique tugay forest that formerly stretched along all the main rivers and distributary channels have been devastated3. These zones are habitat for a diversity of animals, including 60 species of mammals, more than 300 types of birds and 20 varieties of amphibians.
Desiccation of the delta has significantly diminished the area of lakes, wetlands, and their associated reed communities. Between 1960s and 1980s, the area of lakes in the Amu Dar'ya delta is estimated to have decreased from 49,000 to 8,000 km2 and the area of reeds from 500,000 ha to as little as 1,000 ha (Chub, 2000, Fig. 3.3, p. 125; Palvaniyazov, 1989) 4 These zones provide prime habitat for a variety of permanent and migratory waterfowl. A recent report notes that of 282 bird species formerly observed in the Amu Dar'ya wetlands, around 30 have disappeared and some 88 are listed as rare (UNESCO, 2000, pp. 44-46).
Irrigated agriculture in the delta of the Amu Dar'ya has also suffered from reduced river flow of elevated salinity, caused by return flows from upstream irrigation (World Bank, 1998, pp. 3-5). Application of such water to crops lowers yields and contributes to rising ground water levels and secondary soil salinization (Bucknall et al, 2003, pp. 8-12). Livestock raising in the delta and desert regions adjacent to the Aral Sea has suffered from degradation of pastures and replacement of natural vegetation suitable for grazing by inedible species.
Strong winds blow sand, salt and dust from the dried bottom of the Aral Sea, now largely a barren, salt covered desert with an area near 50,000 km2, onto adjacent lands. Satellite images reveal major salt/dust plumes extending 200 to more than 500 km, allowing dust and salt to settle over a considerable area adjacent to the sea in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree, in Turkmenistan (Micklin, 1991, pp. 48-49; Glazovskiy, 1990, pp. 20-23; Ptichnikov, 2002). The most seriously affected areas are the Ust-Urt Plateau to the sea's west and the Amu Dar'ya delta at the south end of the water body (Bortnik and Chistyaevaya, 1990, p. 27, Fig. 2.7). Salt and dust settle on natural vegetation and crops in the Amu Dar'ya delta, killing them or retarding their growth. These materials also contribute to respiratory illnesses, eye problems, and possibly esophageal cancer (Abdirov et. al, 1993; Tursunov,
3 According to Novikova (1996), a Russian expert, whereas Tugay covered 100,000 ha in the Amu Dar'ya delta in 1950, it shrank to 52,000 ha by the 1970s and to only 15-20,000 ha by the mid-1990s.
4 However, in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, significant efforts were made to restore wetlands and their reed communities and to improve habitat conditions (Chub, 2000, p. 125).
1989). More recent field work reveals salt and dust from the dried bottom (and from irrigated farmland in regions adjacent to the Aral Sea) is laced with pesticides and heavy metals (O'Hara et. al., 2000).
Owing to the sea's shrinkage, climate has changed in a band up to 100 km wide along the former shoreline in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Micklin, 1991, pp. 52-53; Glazovskiy, 1990, pp. 19-21). Maritime conditions have been replaced by more continental and deseritic regimes. Summers have warmed and winters cooled, spring frosts are later and fall frosts earlier, humidity is lower, and the growing season shorter. Uzbekistani climate experts believe that the increase in the levels of salt and dust in the atmosphere are reducing solar radiation reaching the surface and, thereby, photosynthetic activity as will as increasing the acidity of precipitation (Chub, 1998).
The population living in the "ecological disaster zone", particulary in Karakalpkstan, suffers acute health problems (Micklin, 1992; Medicins sans Frontieres, 2000; UNESCO, 2003, pp. 36-43). Some of these are direct consequences of the sea's recession or environmental pollution as mentioned above. However, the most serious health issues are directly related to 'Third World' medical, health, nutrition and hygienic conditions and practices. Bacterial contamination of drinking water is pervasive and has led to very high rates of typhoid, paratyphoid, viral hepatitis, and dysentery. Tuberculosis is prevalent as is anemia, particularly in pregnant woman. Liver and kidney ailments are widespread; the latter is probably closely related to the excessively high salt content of much of the drinking water. Medical care is very poor, diets lack variety, and adequate sewage systems are rare.
The most ironic and dark consequence of the Aral's shrinkage is the story of Vozrozhdeniya (Resurrection) Island. The Soviet military in the early 1950s selected this, at the time tiny, isolated island in the middle of the Aral Sea, as the primary testing ground for its super-secret biological weapons program (Bozheva et. al., 1999; Wijinsema, 2000;). From then until 1990, they tested various genetically modified and "weaponized" pathogens there. These programs stopped with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, but, allegedly, decontamination measures were incomplete. By 2001, the formerly small island grew into a huge peninsula and united with the mainland. If, as believed, weaponized organisms survived, they could escape to the mainland via infected rodents or terrorists might gain access to them. The U.S. has committed $6,000,000 to help the Government of Uzbekistan kill any surviving organisms (Science Scope, 2002).
If from 1911-1960, discharge to the sea from the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya averaged 55 km3/yr., for the 1980s, it had fallen to 6 km3 (Hydrologic data, 1984-2003). The period 1990-98 was characterized by a cycle of above average flow years with estimated inflow to the sea for this period averaging 14-15 km3. Severe drought affected the flow generating mountains of the Aral Sea basin from 1999 through 2001 (Agrawala et al, 2001). Average annual inflow to the Aral Sea for this period was probably no more than 2 km3. Assuming continuation of the pattern of recent basin withdrawals, it is likely that average annual inflow to the sea in the near-term future will not be more than 10 km3.
Thus, to restore the Aral to its size during the first six decades of the 20th century would require raising average annual discharge to the sea by approximately 45 km3, or 450 percent, bringing total inflow to 55 km3. This would necessitate a larger decrease in upstream withdrawals to compensate for natural losses of the net additions to flow before they reached the sea. Assuming these at 14%, an additional 7 km3 reduction would be required for a total of 52 km3. That such a lowering of upstream use (47% of 1995 withdrawals) could be attained in the foreseeable future without causing economic and social havoc for the main irrigating countries of the basin seems remote. Even to stabilize the sea at its January 2004 size of 17,158 km2 would require an inflow increase to around 14 km3, 40% above the 10 km3 future average annual figure cited above. Upstream withdrawals would need to be reduced an additional 0.6 km3, for a total of approximately 14.5 km3. During the higher flow period of 1990-1998 there was insufficient discharge to stop the sea's recession. In dry cycles (e.g., the 1980s and 1999 through 2001), practically no water reached the sea and desiccation proceeded alarmingly rapidly.
In light of the above discussions, it is manifestly clear that exploitation of water resources in the Aral Sea Basin has been pushed far beyond the level of sustainability. This begs several interrelated questions. (1) What could be done to increase water availability in the Aral Sea Basin and what are the main impediments to this? (2) What is the status of interstate management of the key shared water resources, the Amu Dar'ya, Syr Dar'ya, and Aral Sea? (3) What has been the role of foreign aid donors
in improving the water management situation in the Aral Sea Basin? (4) What does the future of hold for water management in this region?
Enhancing Water Availability
From the early 1970s to mid-1980s, the Soviet government proposed diversion of massive flow from Siberian rivers into the Aral Sea Basin as the panacea for solving water shortage problems (see Micklin, 1991, pp. 66-68 and Timashev, 2003 for discussion of this proposal). The project was on the brink of implementation when stopped by the Gorbachev regime. Although this grandiose scheme continues to be discussed and promoted by high governmental officials in Central Asia and some water management specialists and scientists in Russia and Central Asia, implementation in the foreseeable future, if ever, for a variety of reasons, including costs, environmental consequences, and political realities are slight ("Considering the revival..." 2003). Other measures could be implemented such as more use of groundwater, local rainwater harvesting and storage that could add somewhat to water availability.
However, substantial water savings are only obtainable from irrigated agriculture, which encompasses around 7.9 million ha in the Aral Sea Basin. Irrigation accounts for 92% of withdrawals and an even larger share of consumptive use (Ruziev and Prikhod'ko, 2002;).5 . It is irrigation that has depleted the flow of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya and led to the great reduction in discharge of these rivers to the Aral.
A substantial reduction in the area irrigated could save much water, but is highly unlikely. All the basin states except Kazakhstan plan to continue expanding irrigation; mainly to meet the food needs of a growing population (ICAS, 1996, Chapter 6; Antonov, 1996). Major savings, therefore, depend on improvements in use efficiency and replacement of highly water consumptive crops with lower-use varieties. Net water savings from substantial technical improvements in irrigation could range from 12 to 27 km3 annually. But, such a program would take decades to implement and to reach even the lower figure would cost in the neighborhood of 16 billion in U.S. dollars. This is far beyond the willingness and ability of the basin states, in combination with international donors, to pay. Exacerbating matters is the worsening technical condition of irrigation systems in the basin. (See Micklin, 2002 and Bucknall, 2003 for a more detailed discussion of these issues).
Switching from high water use crops (rice and cotton) toward lower (grains, vegetables, melons, fruits, and soy beans) would be a relatively low cost means of reducing water use. In fact, the reason irrigation water withdrawals in the basin reportedly declined from 109 to 92 km3 between 1990 and 1997, while the irrigated hectarage grew nearly 10%, can be largely attributed to the conversion of some cotton growing fields to grains (mostly winter wheat) (Dukhovnyy and Sokolov, no date, pp. 7-11). However, there are limits to such a program as the two primary irrigating nations (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are intent on keeping cotton as a major crop since it plays a key role in earning foreign currency.
Economic reform, land reform and institutional change in irrigated agriculture could also improve matters. Of primary importance would be irrigation water pricing, privatization of land, and giving rights of self-governance and responsibility for management of on-farm and inter-farm irrigation systems to farmer-irrigators by establishing water user associations (WUAs) (Information 1996-97). Kazakhstan and particularly Kyrgyzstan, have taken some serious steps in these directions. Tajikistan is beginning efforts whereas in Uzbekistan there is talk but not much meaningful action to implement such policies. Turkmenistan has done practically nothing. Among the key obstacles are governmental resistance, opposition from the former collective (now cooperative) farms and local officials, fear of land speculation and exacerbating rural underemployment and unemployment, an inappropriate structure of water management and distribution agencies, lack of means to measure water deliveries to
5 Withdrawals are a measure of the total water taken from sources (rivers and groundwater) for irrigation. Consumptive use is a measure of the water that is withdrawn that is lost to evaporation (from conveyance canals and fields) and transpired from or incorporated into crops. The difference between the two is termed return flow. Return flow includes filtration from canals, filtration from fields, and surface runoff from fields. Part of return flow ultimately reaches the river from which taken or adds to groundwater while another portion runs off into desert hollows to form lakes (the water from these is lost to evaporation
farmers, and the impoverished state of the farming economy. (see Micklin, 2000, pp. 54-67, Butterfield, 2002, Bucknall, 2003, and Wegerich, 2004 for a detailed discussion of these issues).
The major burden in reducing irrigation water usage must rest on Uzbekistan as it has the largest irrigated area and accounts for the majority (54%) of irrigation withdrawals in the Aral Sea Basin. Turkmenistan, second in irrigated area and water withdrawals (22%), could also make substantial contributions to water savings. The remaining states that were part of the USSR (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) could make significant, but much smaller contributions. Afghanistan and Iran withdraw very little water from the basin.
Interstate Management of the Amu Dar'ya, Syr Dar'ya and Aral Sea
Realizing they needed institutional mechanisms for the management of interstate water resources in the post-Soviet era, the Aral Sea Basin republics of the former Soviet Union signed an agreement in February 1992 on the joint management and protection of interstate water resources (ICWC,1997, pp. 48; Dukhovnyy and Sokolov, no date, pp. 12-15; UNESCO 2000, pp. 51-55). The agreement created an Interstate Commission on Water Coordination (ICWC).
The Commission meets several times each year to decide interstate water management policy issues, to set the allocation of water for the up coming hydrologic year (October through September) among the republics and to the Aral Sea and its deltas based on forecasts of water availability. The allocation scheme essentially continues the distribution formula in place during the last years of the USSR. Determination of operating regimes for the reservoirs along the interstate rivers was also placed on the ICWC. Inter-republic water management disputes are to be decided by the Commission. The ICWC consists of a Secretariat, Scientific Information Center, and the basin management authorities or BVOs.6 for the Syr Dar'ya (in Tashkent, Uzbekistan) and Amu Dar'ya (in Urgench, Uzbekistan). The BVOs are the bodies charged with managing and monitoring the allocations made by the ICWC to member states.
The water-sharing scheme is heavily tilted toward irrigation and the interests of the downstream riparian states. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan receive the largest shares from the Amu Dar'ya whereas Uzbekistan and Kazahstan are allocated the lions share of the withdrawals from the Syr Dar'ya (Micklin, 2000, Table 6). The upstream flow generating states are given the residual. The ICWC allots the residual flow of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya to the Aral Sea region. Earlier, the Aral Sea region did not have a specific allocation. During very dry periods, such (e.g., 1999-2001), the ICWC makes across the board (percentage) reductions in allocations (MKVK, 2002a, 2002b).
Tajikistan and particularly Kyrgyzstan, have complained about the allocation scheme. Their mountain territories generate 80% of the flow in the basin of the Aral Sea, yet their allowed withdrawals are miniscule compared with the share assigned to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Furthermore, to serve irrigation, most of the flow must be accumulated in reservoirs on their territories and released during the growing season, restricting the ability of these countries to generate winter hydroelectricity. This is a particularly serious problem for Kyrgystan since it has faced chronic winter energy shortages after independence, as deliveries of coal (from Kazakhstan) and gas (from Uzbekistan) have been frequently interrupted. In Soviet times these deliveries were guaranteed by the central government.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and especially Uzbekistan want to see the existing allocation schemes and operational regimes continued (Micklin, 2002, Pannier, 2000, Krutov and Lennaerts, 2000; Gleason, 2001; "Considering the revival." 2003 ). On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want considerably more of the flow allocated to them (so they can expand irrigation) and more freedom to generate winter hydropower. Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly violated winter release limits at the huge Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn, the chief tributary of the Syr Dar'ya, reducing water available during the following summer season for downstream irrigation. It also has caused winter flooding in
6 This acronym is from the Russian title of these organizations, Basseynovoye vodokhozyaystvennoye ob "yedinennoye, which means Basin water management association
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, forcing emergency diversion of flow, which should go the Aral Sea, to the huge, artificial Lake Arnasay in the desert.
There are also allocation conflicts among the downstream states. The most serious is the disagreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Kara-Kum Canal. Under construction since the mid-1950s, the almost 1400 km long canal is allocated 13 km3 annually from the Amu Dar'ya (Hannan and O'Hara, 1998). This facility irrigates almost one million ha in Turkmenistan and is the source of municipal water supply for the capital of Ashgabat. The Turkmen government considers the canal fundamental to national survival and is intent on lengthening it and irrigating even larger areas. On the other hand, the Uzbek government views the unlined Kara-Kum as a manmade river flowing through the desert that loses huge amounts of water to filtration. Owing to lack of maintenance, the canal is rapidly deteriorating, which further increases water losses from it.
In March 1993, the presidents of the five republics established the Interstate Council on the Problems of the Aral Sea Basin (ICAS) and an International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) (Agreement, 1993; UNESCO, 2000, pp. 51-52). The major responsibility of ICAS was to facilitate assistance from the World Bank and other international donors (Micklin, 1998, pp. 406-409) whereas IFAS was charged with collecting revenue from each basin state for financing of rehabilitation efforts. ICAS was abolished in 1997 and its functions assumed by a restructured IFAS.
International Donor Efforts
Since the breakup of the USSR, international aid donors have played a major role in promoting cooperation in the management of the international water resources of the Aral Sea Basin (Micklin, 1998). In the early 1990s, The World Bank formulated an Aral Sea Basin Assistance Program (ASBP) to be carried out over 15 to 20 years with a cost that could run to nearly $500 million.. The Bank encouraged the basin states to create ICAS and IFAS and has worked with and through these organizations to realize the ASBP. Afghanistan was invited to join the ASBP but did not respond to the overture (World Bank, 1998, p. 9).
The latest aspect of the Bank funded effort, supported through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), is the Water and Environmental Management Project (World Bank, 1998, pp. 19-34). At a cost of $21.5 million , the project started in 1998 and finished in 2003. In line with a new emphasis on regional responsibility for the ASBP, the Executive Committee of IFAS managed the program, with the Bank playing a cooperative/advisory role.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the Environmental Policy and Technology (EPT) project, running from 1993 to 1998, which financed measures to improve drinking water supplies in the Amu Dar'ya delta, aided in the formulation and implementation of regional water management policies and agreements, and provided advice on water management issues to specific governments (Micklin 1998). Perhaps its most important accomplishment was helping the states riparian on the Syr Dar'ya reduce tensions over the proper operation of the Toktogul dam and reservoir on that river (Micklin, 1998). USAID initiated a new effort in 2001 known as the Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) (for information, see the project website at www.nrmp.uz). This is a 5-year effort focusing on providing assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent Tajikstan, to improve management of water, energy, and land. As part of the water component, the NRMP is continuing the earlier work to enhance interstate cooperation and sharing of the Syr Dar'ya' flow.
The European Union (EU) began major aid programs for the Aral Sea Basin states in 1995 (Micklin, 1998). Key objectives have been to assist the five former Soviet republics to develop policies, strategies and development programs for utilization, allocation and management of the water resources of the basin; and to assist at the regional level with the establishment of the institutional structure for allocation and management of interstate waters.
The United Nations has been providing assistance on the Aral Sea Crisis since 1990 when it formed a joint UNEP (United Nations Environment Program)/Soviet working group on the Aral (Micklin, 1998). UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) funded a research and monitoring program for the near Aral region from 1992-1996 focusing on the Syr Dar'ya and Amu
Dar'ya deltas (UNESCO, 1998). UNICEF (United Nations Childrens' Fund) launched the Aral Sea Project for Environmental and Regional Assistance (ASPERA) in 1995. UNDP (United Nations Development Program) has worked to strengthen regional organizations (ICAS and IF AS) and promoted sustainable development to improve conditions for the several million people in the disaster zone closest to the Aral Sea. UNDP also convened the International Conference on the Sustainable Development of the Aral Sea Basin in September 1995, which led to the signing by the five Central Asian presidents of a declaration on the sustainable development of the Aral Sea Basin. The five Presidents reaffirmed the sustainable development goals in the 1999 Ashgabat Declaration (UNESCO, 2000, p. 53).
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been active in Aral Sea region activities through its Scientific and Environmental Affairs Division. It has sponsored several workshops with Aral Sea themes as well as long-term aid projects aimed at improving indigenous scientific research and environmental monitoring capabilities in the Aral Sea region (Micklin and Williams 1996). (For more information on NATO funded efforts see NATO/OTAN, 2003, pp. 153-154 and 189-190, SfP 974101 website at http://sfpp.nm.ru and SfP 974357 website at http://www.icwc-aral.uz).
The Future
What does the future hold in terms of water resource management for the Aral Sea Basin and what may be some key ramifications of the manner in which this resource is handled? The Aral Sea Basin has considerable freshwater resources. However, taking into account natural variability of these rivers' discharge and the associated problem of storing surplus flow and the situation of the Aral Sea, there is no doubt basin water supplies are substantially overexploited, particularly during cycles of low-water years.
The key problem is irrigated agriculture. Substantial water savings must come from improvements in this sector. Without these, growth of irrigation and other water uses not only will be difficult, but also contribute to conflict as the basin states compete to maximize their share of the resource. Implementation of water-saving improvements in irrigation are key not only to economic and social improvement but would be a fundamental means of promoting cooperation in water management among the basin states and avoiding conflict. Large-scale technical rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation systems is of fundamental importance, but would be exceptionally costly. Implementation of such efforts in the near term seems remote. Crop substitution is a much cheaper route to significant water savings. Yet, if done on a scale large enough to have a significant effect on water use, would force a sizable reduction in cotton production, the chief export crop for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Adoption of fundamental economic and institutional reforms within irrigated agriculture has great promise to improve this sector and save water. Meaningful irrigation water pricing, privatization of land on the Western model, and granting rights of self-governance and responsibility for management of irrigation systems to farmer-irrigators are the most needed steps (Micklin, 2000, pp. 54-67; Bucknall 2003; Horinkova and Abdullayev, 2003). Melding traditional methods of small-scale irrigation with modern irrigation technology could be part of this program.
Progress has been made in the reform effort. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have abolished State and Collective farms, are implementing true privatization of land and the placing of agricultural decision-making in the hands of farmers and have introduced irrigation water pricing. Uzbekistan has ended the State Farm system, given more freedom to the Cooperatives, allowed forms of quasi-private farming and abolished state orders for all crops. Tajikistan has stated an intention to convert State and Collective farms to Cooperatives and to encourage private sector agriculture. Except for Turkmenistan, the former Soviet republics are pursuing creation of agricultural water user associations (WUAs) (Baxter, 2002).
Nevertheless, huge obstacles remain. Farmers are impoverished and cannot pay more than a token charge for water. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are facing significant opposition from rural constituencies to agricultural reform. Land in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remains state property (Butterfield, 2002). Both governments still exert strong control of agriculture and water management, reminiscent of the former Soviet system. In fairness, The Uzbekistani leadership has articulated some legitimate reasons and concerns for going slow on reform related to protecting the interests and welfare of the rural
population in densely settled regions, avoiding excessive land speculation and 'land grabs' by the rich, trying to avoid ethnically-based conflicts over land and water as have occurred in the Fergana Valley, preserving prime agricultural land from conversion to non-agricultural uses, and protecting the state monopsony (one buyer) on cotton - that government's main source of foreign exchange.
Corruption and patronage remain endemic, society-wide problems. These hinder reform efforts in the agriculture and water management sectors as they divert funds from their most productive uses, discourage reform efforts at the local level, hinder competent, but not politically connected, people from advancing in the agriculture and water management institutional structure, and make access to land and water more dependent on bribes, connections, and cronyism than ability to use these resources most productively (Bucknall, 2003). Prospects for mitigating the situation in the near term appear rather dim.
Population growth and anthropogenically induced climate change are likely to worsen an already difficult water resource situation. Basin population could easily grow to 60 million by 2020, a 13% increase over today. The need to provide employment and food for a significantly larger population is a rationale for a substantial increase in irrigation that could use up water saved from implementation of improvement measures. Global climate warming, according to most experts, is likely already underway and will increase in magnitude with time. The prevailing wisdom of local experts is that a general warming of 0.5 to 3.5 centigrade degrees is possible in different regions of the Aral Sea Basin by 2030 compared to the base period of 1961-1990 (Chub, 2000, pp. 62-106). This would lead to longer, hotter summers with increased crop water needs and heightened irrigation requirements. The flow of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya could be somewhat increased by enhanced precipitation and melting of glaciers, but is unsustainable as the rate of melt of the glaciers would exceed their replenishment (Chub, 2000, pp. 106-115).
How the basin states approach sharing the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya is crucial to whether conflict or cooperation will be the dominant theme in future management of these international rivers. Inherent water management conflicts exist between the upstream and downstream states as the former are net providers of water and the latter are net users. Furthermore, the upstream states benefit from operating the large hydroelectric stations on their territory to maximize winter hydropower production, which is counter to the interests of downstream irrigating states that need maximum releases during the summer. Serious differences also have developed between downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Kara-Kum Canal.
Two other factors make matters worse. The period from independence in 1991 through 1998 was one of higher than average river flow (Micklin, 2000, p. 21). This instilled in the basin states a false sense of water availability and security. The subsequent inevitable shift back toward average or below average hydrologic conditions has meant higher water needs coupled with less water availability (Agrawala, 2001; "Drought", 2000; The International, 2001; Krutov and Lennaerts, 2000). This has heightened tensions among the basin states. Furthermore, the basin states overestimate their rightful share of water resources. When summed these exceed any reasonable estimate of the usable basin-wide resource (World Bank 1996, p. 15; ICAS, 1996, chapter 6).
On the other hand, the five basin states that were formerly part of the USSR have continued working in a cooperative spirit (through the ICWC) to annually share the waters of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya. Even during the recent drought, when substantial reductions in allocations were necessary, this process did not breakdown (MKVK, 2002a, pp. 9-18; 2002b, pp. 10-28). There was controversy and exceeding of water withdrawal limits by some states, but the most egregious violations were intrastate (particularly in Uzbekistan) as opposed to interstate. (Wegerich, 2001).
The Aral Sea's desiccation continues. Environmental and human related problems in the surrounding 'disaster zone' remain serious. Provision of sufficient inflow to stabilize or raise the level of the southern Large Sea in the south appears, at best, a distant hope. The water sharing agreement signed among the former republics of the USSR allocates water for preserving a remnant Amu Dar'ya delta and some minimal inflow to the sea proper. Even this modest goal is difficult to meet, particularly in dry years (MKVK, 2002a, p. 11-13; 2002b, pp.17-24).
The situation is not entirely bleak. At reasonable effort and cost, the level of the northern, Small Aral can be raised several meters and salinity lowered to a point where indigenous species would return from the Syr Dar'ya River and associated deltaic lakes, stimulating the partial restoration of the former commercial fishery (Micklin 2003). Such a project with a price tag of $84 million, funded by the World Bank, is underway. Also, the efforts underway since the late 1980s to stabilize, and in some cases improve, the ecological and human welfare situation in the Amu Dar'ya delta, for example, have made a positive difference and should be continued. There is even some hope for the Large Aral. The Amu Dar'ya could be redirected into the western, deeper section, freshening it and some ecological and economic value. However, this would entail complicated and expensive engineering may not be justified economically or environmentally7
The five Central Asian states deserve great credit for establishing regional institutions to deal with questions of basin wide concern. Although these institutions have not been able to satisfactorily resolve the most critical interstate water management conflicts or the fundamental problems related to the Aral Sea, they have focused attention on these and served as a forum for reasoned discussion of these matters as well as acting as a safety valve to diffuse tensions over water management issues among the states. The international donor community has provided valuable aid and assistance to these efforts.
Nevertheless, fundamental improvements need to be made in both the regional organizations and in the donor approach to providing assistance. Clarification of the responsibilities and functions of the regional agencies is of primary importance. IFAS (The International Fund for The Aral Sea) needs to receive more support from the five member countries in terms of financing, recognition of its interstate status, and supplying it with qualified personnel. Afghanistan must be included in negotiations on management of the Amu Dar'ya. Afghanistan provides about 8% of that river's flow and has the right under international water law to considerably increase its withdrawal from it.
International donors need to improve their operations. Of primary importance is improved cooperation among the major players (World Bank, U.S., European Union, and, more recently, the Asian Development Bank). Talk abounds of "working together", but this author's experience working in the donor community in Tashkent during the late 1990s suggests such rhetoric is more good intentions than reality. One means of promoting such a goal would be creation of a "Council of Donors" that would meet regularly to discuss the activities of the different donors, resolve disputes, and facilitate field-level coordination and cooperation. Implementation of donor aid programs needs to be accelerated. Expensive feasibility and planning studies drag on and on without tangible results that make a difference in the lives of the region's people..
Another problem is that the donor community may, inadvertently, be developing an "international welfare mentality" among the aid recipients in the Aral Sea Basin. Frequently regional, national, and local institutions in Central Asia approach international donors seeking funding for what are worthwhile endeavors but should really be funded from within the region. Often, it is not a case of lack of money but of governmental choices about spending priorities (e.g., precedence of grandiose public buildings and monuments in the capital cities over new hospitals, clinics, and drinking water supply facilities in the Aral Sea disaster zone). This is helped along by a pervasive attitude that the Aral Sea situation is a 'world problem' and that the international community has a moral and ethical obligation to help solve it.
Finally, what about the global importance of water and its management in the Aral Sea Basin? Should nations outside Central Asia and the international community be concerned? Environmental security is gaining increasing recognition as a force affecting national and regional stability. The desiccation of the Aral Sea is very serious for the people living near the sea but this issue little threat to the stability of the two states subject to substantial impacts (Kazahstan and Uzbekistan) for the simple
7
It might well make sense to let the Large Aral continue to dry and salinize. Brine shrimp (Artemia) have been discovered in the western part of the water body. When salinization here exceeds 100 g/l, which should occur in the near future, these organisms, whose eggs are a very high value fish food, should proliferate, possibly making commercial exploitation viable. A consortium of companies based in Belgium is investigating the commercial viability of Artemia in the Large Aral (Pala, 2003).
reason that the "disaster zone" around the sea constitutes a small portion of the territory of these nations and only minor parts of their populations live there. Furthermore, the sea and deltaic zones are in no way crucial to either country's economy. Arguments that the ecological effects of the sea's drying have any significant global environmental ramifications seem exaggerated.
On the other hand, management and sharing of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya could lead to serious problems as these rivers are vital to the five basin states that were formerly part of the USSR and to Afghanistan. As pointed out by Wolf (1998), disputes over water rarely lead to the much feared "water wars". Of much greater concern for the Aral Sea Basin is that disputes over water interacting with other interstate, and frequently interrelated, issues such as ethnic clashes and boundary disputes could trigger isolated armed conflict leading, perhaps, to war (International, 2002).
There is reason for optimism. First, that the five former republics of the USSR, which control and use most of the water in the basin, have a long history of unified management of the resource and since independence have continued to cooperate bodes well for the future. Secondly, rationality argues for the basin states to continue cooperation and compromise in managing and sharing their transnational water resources as this will benefit all stakeholders. Thirdly, there is real hope that strengthened regional water mangement organizations in concert with the international donor community can substantially improve the interstate water sharing agreements and bring them more into line with international water law, which is fundamentally based on the principle of "equitable and reasonable use" (Wouters 2000; Corriia, 1999). Such an accomplishment would greatly ease interstate tensions. However, this would require allocating more water to upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, substantially reducing irrigation water use to make this possible, and bringing Afghanistan into the water sharing agreement.
Uzbekistan is critical. As the most populous, militarily and politically powerful, economically developed, geographically strategic and heaviest irrigating state in the basin, the course it follows will likely have the determinant influence on the success, or lack thereof, of cooperative management of transnational waters. If this state focuses excessively on aggressive, national self-interest in water management, as it has been wont to do in the past, efforts towards the more effective management of national and transnational water resources will founder and peaceful relations among basin states will be placed in jeopardy.
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