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1HISTORICAL SCIENCES
TREATY OF BERLIN 1878 AND ITS CONSECUENCES FOR RUSSIA
Iskenderov P.A.
Senior researcher at the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, candidate of historical sciences. M.A. in History from New York University
Abstract
The Congress of Berlin of 1878 was one of the most important event in modern European history. It opened a new chapter in the Balkan as well as in Europe as a whole. Russia was one of the principal international actors during that time. And decisions made in Berlin were of special importance for her.
Keywords: Congress of Berlin, Treaty of Berlin, Russia, Balkan Peninsula, Balkan Wars, World War I. Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France, Ottoman Empire, Far East, international relations
Congress of Berlin of 1878 was one of the most important models in the context of international peacekeeping. The Great Powers tried to solve Balkan problems using modern frames and principles for the first time. The history of the Treaty of Berlin was the mixed history of mutual successes and crucial mistakes.
Treaty of Berlin sheltered from prying eyes bidding negotiation and mutual concessions. The problem of Bulgaria understandably emerged in the center of discussions. That state in its "San Stefano" boundaries could become a regional "heavyweight". That was not in the interests not only of England and Austria-Hungary but also of other Balkan countries. Athens, Bucharest, and Belgrade reacted negatively to the terms of the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty between Russia and Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Russia risked to remain with a single (albeit powerful) ally but it the same time to gain in the Balkans hostile unit of Serbia, Romania and Greece. Just the same bloc 35 years later put Bulgaria to the brink of military disaster during the Second Balkan war of 1913. The Great Powers took part in the Congress of Berlin "for the discussion of the stipulations for the preliminary treaty concluded at San Stefano between Russia and Tukey" - the Colfax Chronicle wrote on June 15, 1878, and that was generally right.
The Congress of Berlin constituted the international forum who only testified previously achieved decisions as a result of gigantic preparatory work. Each of the Great Powers were preparing by their own way. But all of them attached the same great importance to forthcoming solutions, going far beyond the Balkan Peninsula.
The immediate forerunner of the Treaty of Berlin can be considered English-Russian Memorandum signed in London on 30 may 1878. That document had to formalize the revision of the most controversial provisions of the San Stefano Treaty extended the frontiers of the Bulgarian Principality. In exchange for this, and for the refusal of a number of territorial gains on the Caucasian front, Russia has secured the support of England to the other provisions of the San Stefan. The final result of a complex game of British diplomacy was the acquisition by England of the right to occupy the strategically important island of Cyprus - which was provided by secret Treaty of London with the Ottoman Empire on June 4, 1878. That document contained a
provision about the British promotion to protect Ottoman possessions in the Caucasus, but in the same time recognized the transfer to Russia of Batum, Ardagan and Kars. Agreement between Great Britain and Aus-tro-Hungary fixed joint political line at the upcoming Congress of Berlin. It became the final document that determined the decisions adopted later in the capital of Germany. Both powers agreed to block Bulgarian expansion to the south of the Balkan mountains. In addition, Austria-Hungary has secured British support for her plans to occupy of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
To prevent the emergence of the regional superpower in the Balkans - that principle became key point to the vast majority of participants of Congress of Berlin. And the Congress accomplished this task. Moreover, even after the Second Balkan war of 1913 the same Great Powers tried to moderate the excessive appetites of the victorious anti-Bulgarian Balkan allies. They were aware that peace and stability in the Balkans could be undermined by excessively increased and in the same time by humiliated countries and peoples. The role of Bulgaria in World War I has only confirmed this thesis.
In this context one should agree with Russian diplomatic representative to Montenegro N.A.Obnorsky who was totally against the very existence of powerful Balkan states. In February 1913 he prepared a diplomatic report entitled "Russia and the Balkan Problem". Obnorsky described two possibilities in the Balkans. First option - creation of unique state of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro under the "patronage" of Russia. That option would be contrary to Russian interests because it can cause problems in multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian Empire, stressed Obnorsky. Second option - weak Balkan states still preserve their contradictions between each other but also under Russian "patronage". Such option would be better for Russia, according above-mentioned diplomat. Obnorsky thought dangerous collapse of the "status quo" in the Balkans, because "Greater Bulgaria" or "Greater Serbia" will be Russia's regional rivals.
Obnorsky's points of view were challenged by Russian Vice-Consul in Vlora and representative in the International Commission for Albania A.M.Petryaev -who supported creation of united Yugoslav state including Serbian areas of Austria-Hungary. Such a state
could be populated by 14 million people and possess Adriatic Sea harbors.
One should agree that among the Great Powers Russia for a long time was a supporter of integrity of Ottoman Empire. As The New York Herald rightly wrote on July 12, 1878, Russian emperor Nicholas I in the 1850s "stated clearly his own opinions of the condition of the Ottoman Empire and of the necessity the great Powers were under of providing against the event of its actual collapse".
Treaty of Berlin was actually the first document in the diplomatic history of the world prescribed international legal support for the rights of national minorities providing creation a number of national independent states in the Balkans. Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin directly obliged Romania to ensure equal rights to the Jews. That was directly related to the "Jewish question", which was and still is considered particularly relevant for the Balkans.
It should be stressed that the weakness and inconsistency of the decisions of the Berlin Congress, in turn, was a consequence of attempts to draw on the Balkans balanced picture - including the definition of boundaries. The Balkans is one of the classic regions of the world where borders drawn on the basis of ethnic principle, cannot solve the ethnic problems, but only establish new "time bombs". After all, these ethnic boundaries are very often arbitrary. The does not take into account ethnic "overlapping", complex process of ethno-genesis and existing the nations divided by internal and external natural, political, economic, ethnic and religious boundaries and other lines.
From this point of view the Congress of Berlin was an example of artificial and conscious "Balkanization from above" when from one Bulgaria two Bulgarian states were made and their boundaries are artificially narrowed at the expense of Macedonian land; when Serbian ethnicity were divided to three parts; when national-state integration aspirations of the Albanians were not taken into account at all.
As a result of above-mentioned attitudes, approaches and speculations the Great Powers made in the Balkans a mosaic of independent, self-contained, occupied and other states, territories, provinces and regions. Simultaneously - in the best traditions of geopolitics - they took care of keeping intact the "Holy of holies" - the transport routes. The main water artery - the Danube - was declared neutral and free to shipping. The passage of warships through the Black Sea Straits were still forbidden, and even passed on to Russia port of Batum has received the status of Porto Franco (free shopping haven) and was to be used exclusively by merchant ships.
Congress of Berlin also became a starting point for growing American interests in the Balkans. Initially US policy in the Balkans "to some extent proceeded from similar assumptions and principles associated with "Splendid Isolation" of Great Britain". However, by the beginning of the World War I, the Balkan direction in American foreign policy began to acquire self-importance.
After Congress of Berlin Balkan countries had to use all their efforts in the filed of economic development of acquired territories. They had to overcome financial-economic impact of the three-year international crisis, to find solutions for accumulated political issues and new transnational disputes. Serbian government called that "consolidation of military conquest". But those problems still are not solved till today.
Two powers who did not take part in actual hostilities - Great Britain and especially Austria-Hungary -have acquired main benefits - including territorial ones - from the Balkan crisis. Habsburg Monarchy were able to catch very important strategic provinces - Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sancak of Novi Pazar. She also got permission to keep military garrisons and to construct railways and other objects of military and civilian infrastructure. In 1914 Austro-Hungarian expansion towards the Balkans became one of the roots of World War I.
The rise of Hungarian nationalism also was the direct result of occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary. Slav elements had to disturb the equilibrium between the Magyars and the others. the French diplomat Melchior de Vogue wrote on October 10, 1878:
"Particularly in Hungary the dissatisfaction caused by this 'adventure' has reached the gravest proportions, prompted by that strong conservative instinct which animates the Magyar race and is the secret of its destinies. This vigorous and exclusive instinct explains the historical phenomenon of an isolated group, small in numbers yet dominating a country inhabited by a majority of peoples of different races and conflicting aspirations, and playing a role in European affairs out of all proportions to its numerical importance or intellectual culture. This instinct is today awakened and gives warning that it feels the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a menace which, by introducing fresh Slav elements into the Hungarian political organism and providing a wider field and further recruitment of the Croat opposition, would upset the unstable equilibrium in which the Magyar domination is poised".
In the same time 1878-1914 were the years of the economic rising of Germany as well as the USA - and simultaneous "sunset" of Britain. In 1880 British industry production composed 28% of the world one, German - 13% and American - 28%. Already in 1900 the figures become different: England - 18%, Germany -16%, the USA - 31%.
But in 1878 the Great Powers did not take into account such horrific scenarios. They started to form their own political and military blocks. Franco-Russian military alliance formed in 1892 was one of them. It formally had defensive character as an answer to Triple Alliance. But one should agree that just such alliance caused negative consequences for Russia.
First of all, Russia felt herself free for expansion in the Far East. Franco-Russian alliance in fact "has untied Russian leaders' hands for expansionist politics in the Far East that finally ended with the tragedy of Russo-Japan War of 1904-1905".
By that time Great Britain concluded an agreement with Japan. That document has a goal among others to
prevent Russian warships to go through Black Sea Straits to Pacific. Japanese diplomatic representative in London asked Britain Foreign Minister Sir Henry Charles Keith Petty-FitzMaurice about possible reaction to Russian fleet activities in the Straits - and received the answer that there is no any signs of such opportunity.
First Russian Revolution of 1905 was also an indirect result of Franco-Russian military alliance.
The principal decision about re-orientation of Russian foreign policy from the Balkans to the East was made in the middle of 1890s by Foreign Minister A.B.Lobanov-Rostovsky. He declared that "we have to put the Balkans under a "glass cap" till we solve much more urgent issues". Those issues he saw in the Far East
- like Minister of Finance S.Y.Vitte, author of the project of Trans-Siberian railway. Russia's "Eastern Course" demanded to keep good relations with Ottoman Empire and to block any attempt to separate her. And that course was actual till the Russo-Japan War of 1904-1905.
Secondly, Saint Petersburg had to take into account French attitudes towards the Balkans - and that attitudes were quite far from Russian interests. Namely Paris tried to keep distance from the Balkan issues and stressed the necessity to preserve "sustainable Turkey". Such contradictions were possible visible during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. In 1914 Russia by herself tried to improve the relations with Turkey. Minister of Foreign Affaires S.D.Sazonov stressed in his report to Russian parliament (Gosudarstvennaya Duma) that Russia seeks to develop "neighborly relationship" with Turkey that could secure stability in the Black Sea, in the Middle East as well as in the Balkans. Sazonov's speech received quite positive reaction in Istanbul - but generally Turkey had already drifted towards Germany and Triple Alliance.
Thirdly, France used agreement with Russia for colonial expansion in Madagascar and Tropical Africa
- and that was one of the main causes of World War I.
Fourthly, Balkan states started to look for alliances in achieving their own political and - especially - expansionist goals. Political influence beyond the European borders also became under discussion. Future Yugoslavia's role in the Non-aligned movement to a very significant extent was the result of the processes in Europe in 1878-1914.
Fifthly, the Great Powers almost failed to create workable conditions for economic development in the
Balkans as a key mean to promote regional stability. Moreover, just in the Balkans such attempts usually meet with serious obstacles and contradict with the well-known theory of S.Lipset about economic development as a key way to establish and reinforce democracy.
AJ.P.Taylor was to some extent right when wrote: "If the treaty of San Stefano had been maintained, both the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary might have survived to the present day. The British, except for Bea-consfield in his wilder moments, had expected less and were, therefore, less disappointed. Salisbury wrote at the end of 1878: "We shall set up a rickety sort of Turkish rule again south of the Balkans. But it is a mere respite. There is no vitality left in them".
But history cannot be repeated. "Balkan knot" became very important factor of the international relations in Europe be the 1910s. In 1912 and 1913 Austro-Serbian contradictions on Albanian issues twice threatened peace in Europe. And in 1914 Balkan shots finally provoked a great war. Peace keeping in the terms of the Congress of Berlin definitively failed.
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