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Yuldash Yusupov,
Ph. D. (Hist.)
TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC LIFE OF MODERN BASHKORTOSTAN
The Muslim umma is divided into two main systems by their world outlook on the territory of the CIS, They are called conditionally Sufi and Wahhabi. We must distance ourselves from the lay belief circulated by incompetent journalists that Wahhabi ideology is extremist, while Sufi ideology is loyal to the powers that be. Attitude to supreme power should not be a yardstick in determining these trends. Adepts of Sufi and Wahhabi can come out as both supporters and oppositionists to the state and secular Russian society. In the early 1990s the separatist strivings of J. Dudayev found support, above all, among the traditional Chechen Sufi Tariqat, which later entered into conflict with Islamic fundamentalists (Wahhabi). The Daghestani Wahhabi did not render support to the units commanded by Hattab and Basayev which invaded their republic in August 1999. Finally, Wahhabism is the official ideology of Saudi Arabia, which does not support terrorism. Accusations of extremist activity are hurled on both representatives of Sufi Tariqats and Wahhabi jamaats.
Sufism is divided into several major trends and some of them are well-known in Bashkortostan. This division is connected, primarily, with the system of tutorship. The Russian institutions of muftis are positioned as proponents of "traditional Islam," and they often use Sufi terminology, Sufi customs and habits, principles of Sufi education, outward appearance. Mufti institutions regularly hold international symposium and conferences where they confirm Sufism as traditional Islam.
The division into loyal Muslims and extremists passes along the line between Sufism and Wahhabism in the world religious practice. 18
It would seem that the principal argument between ideologists in the questions of Allah' qualities has a rather passive response among rank-and-file Muslims. In essence, contradictions in commentaries to the Koran are consequence rather than a source. More popular are arguments in the sphere of behavior and prayer practice. The Wahhabis are against pilgrimages to the tombs of saints, which they regard as worship of the dead. They are even against celebrating the Birthday of Prophet Mohammed. The Wahhabites see their main task in fighting for purification of Islam from various alien "admixtures" based on cultural, ethnic or other specific features of some or other Moslem peoples.
There are the concepts of the Koran and Sunna in Islam. The Koran contains universal world outlook postulates, and the Sunna, or the system of knowledge about the life of the Prophet, is used as the guide for prayers and models and behavior. Both the Sufi and Wahhabi maintain that following the Sunna of the Prophet perfects worship. However, the difference between Wahhabi and Sufi is that both of them draw information about the Sunna of Mohamed from different sources. Moreover, the difference between the sources is conditioned by the system of transmitting information. We think that the reason for contradictions between these two trends of one religious system lies in this sphere.
According to Sufi, Sunna is the tradition of tutorship. Mohammed is the main tutor and the sheikhs living in our time are in possession of knowledge which they pass from generation to generation from the time of the Prophet.
For Wahhabis the main source and guarantee of the preservation of Sunna are tales (hadis), written down at one time, about the life of Mohammed and his associates.
The greatest importance for Sufi is the sanctity of man guaranteed by his behavior, whereas for Wahhabi - the sanctity of the hadis proved by scholars.
In other words, differences between Wahhabi and Sufi lie practically on the same plane - in their understanding of the Sunna and religion as a whole. Due to this they are competitive, and in the sphere of world outlook these systems are irreconcilable. However, in practice, especially at a local level, we can observe their variability and even mutual complementariness. There are quite a few other factors, apart from information ties with Sufi or Wahhabi centers, which are conditioned by regional specific features.
Among them is the ignorance of parishioners, even in the very elementary questions. Then there are ethnic stereotypes. Even the most well-informed Wahhabis from among Bashkirs, do not wish to build social systems isolated from the national tradition and try to integrate in civil institutions of Bashkir society.
Bashkir Muslims of Wahhabi trend do not want to build independent "ahlyu Sunna" structures, as the case has been in the Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other regions. However, they actively participate in the socio-political life of the republic and try to penetrate legal mufti systems and Bashkir secular organizations, both government and public. Moreover, Bashkir Wahhabis account for a considerable part of Bashkir Muslims. Although they look down upon mufti institutions, they well realize their significance in the republic and continue to strive for participation in this institution of power.
The most active part of Wahhabi Bashkirs comes from youth organizations of the national movement. Kuk Bure, the Union of Bashkir Young People, is staffed by active Wahhabi Muslims in the capital of the republic Ufa. Nationalist leaders often succeed in drawing Muslims to participation in various functions under nationalist and secular slogans. R. Khamitov noted it in his report to the State Assembly in December 2010: "We see that today nationalists merge
with religious extremists. Previously nationalist and religious extremist movement existed separately, today they are drawing closer".
The mufti institutions proved too weak in the educational and theological spheres. They were supposed to be the main proponents of Russian "Sufism".
The confrontation between the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Wahhabis bears not so much an ideological character as a political one, which could be regarded as struggle for resources plus commercial interests and personal dislike.
The Wahhabi community is facing an alternative. Either it will become closed within its own framework, or will integrate in the secular social system, thereby becoming an inalienable part of Bashkir nationalism. Both variants are possible.
The integration of Wahhabi Muslims in the social sphere will be accompanied not only by Islamization of nationalists themselves, but also by the creation of integrated structures in national public organizations. At present the role of the "gatherer" of Bashkir Muslim communities is claimed by the Shuro formed in the autumn of 2010.
The mufti institutions of Bashkortostan also await reforms in religious policy.
Taking into account a considerable role of Wahhabi Muslims in Bashkir society, the exclusively anti-Wahhabi position of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the republic of Bashkortostan will gradually change. It will become more tolerant toward them and even draw some of them to the Board's work. All the more so since quite a few Wahhabi Muslims have a good knowledge of Arabic and are able to work in this field not only with the mufti institution, but also with the Ministry of Education. Wahhabi Muslim-businessmen are ready to cooperate with local administrations, for instance in organizing hajj.
According to another scenario, the mufti institutions all over Russia will be united under the aegis of one body. Judging by everything this body will be the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims. The local Islamic educational centers and institutes in neighboring regions will take measures to upgrade the teaching staff of educational centers in Bashkortostan and those beyond the Ural Mountains. The first step in this direction will be the creation of an Islamic Academy, which means that the religious sphere will be unified.
The merger of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims will deal a blow at the interests of Bashkir Wahhabi Muslims. There will hardly be any possibility of their cooperation with the mufti institution (even at the level of a dialogue). In general, the process of solution of the "Muslim question" in the Republic of Bashkortostan is rather complex and slow. But its solution will result in that the Muslim umma of Bashkortostan will acquire more authority and support.
The interaction of state power and Muslim leaders can yield definite positive results. If secular society continues to adhere stubbornly to anti-Wahhabi or other positions, rejecting part of Bashkir society, the autonomous jamaats will imbibe elements which may subsequently have a negative effect on stability in our region.
It is necessary to take into account the fact that the Muslim umma itself develops rather spontaneously. The mufti institutions in the republic have no real levers of power among Muslims. Alternative leaders opposed to mufti institutions are disunited and weak. However, work could be facilitated due to the existence and functioning of public institutions in the Muslim medium which could find a compromise between our umma and the rest of society on the most urgent problems.
"Perspektivy modernizatsii traditsionnogo obshchestva",
Ufa, 2011, pp. 428-435.
