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Tedo JAPARIDZE
Ph.D. (Hist.), Ambassador, Alternate Director General, International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)
(Athens, Greece).
THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION: THE EYE OF THE EU’S NEXT POLITICAL STORM OR THE SHINING SEA OF STABILITY?
A b s t
In a region as large and as complex as the territory that surrounds the Black Sea—a region beset by the cross currents of divisive geography and more divisive historic conflict—the building of partner-country capacity and regional security cooperation is a difficult proposition at best. Yet much has already been done in the region to create the conditions for such cooperation to occur. Taking the next step to create regional stability and security will require the area’s nations to reassess the common threat they face and what nation-
r a c t
al security really means. Success will mean looking forward toward the future and what unites them instead of backward toward the past and what divides them. How will the European Union (the EU) with its new initiatives—the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)—and other Black Sea regional actors be able to cooperate with each other in order to increase the prospects of that area’s security and its sustainable development which happen to be (though not all regional actors agree with that notion)
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the ICBSS or any other organization or government.
the two sides of one and the same coin: the regional stability. So what does fate have in store for the entire Black Sea region: to be the eye of the EU’s next political storm or the shining sea and area of stability? So in this text I would like to share some of my personal thoughts with you and talk specifically and more broadly about the wider Black Sea area and
Europe, the prospects of their interaction, about some strategies and synergies that intersect each other, about some images that, while clashing with each other, have an impact on some political as well as public opinions—as far as some experts like to say, perceptions or misperceptions nourish or even re-shape in many ways the existing reality.
What We Are: A Region, a Strategic Space, a “Corridor” or an Area?
At the outset, I would like to reflect briefly (as I did many times before1) that when trying to define an issue or a problem, it would be worthwhile to start by looking at what it is not, before trying to describe what I believe it is. And in this connection, it seems to me that even these geographic, geopolitical or geo-economic methodological notions may matter for the prospects of the EU-wider Black Sea area relationship and still be an appropriate subject for our polemical analyses.
Neither the wider Black Sea area nor the BSEC (as its institutional configuration) is an alternative to the EU, even though, for example, one of the main goals of the BSEC, in common with the EU, is to boost economic cooperation within a defined geographical area. I see the EU and the Black Sea area in general and specifically the BSEC in terms of a solar system in the making; the Sun in this case is clear, but the exact orbits of some of the surrounding planets are still in a state of flux. Nor is the BSEC an economic competitor and would be in the foreseeable future; if anything, it should be seen as a complementary economic partner and resource. Nor is the BSEC a nascent political union. More than far from that. Unfortunately, even just the opposite. The long-term strategic goals and aims of the BSEC member states are simply too complex and contradictory for that and the economic and political gravitational pull of the EU is too great for such a conclusion.
One could even go so far as to argue that the wider Black Sea area is not even a “region,” in the sense that Scandinavia, say, is perceived clearly as a “region.” But nor, as some analysts try to describe the wider Black Sea area, is it simply a “periphery,” “black hole” or “the Bermuda Triangle” through which a space traveler might pass or, worse, just even disappear on the way to somewhere else.
I would agree with the few of those who define this area as a “strategic corridor” and a “strategic space,” sharing, perhaps, in terms of external perception, many of the same characteristics that “Central Asia” evokes. The wider Black Sea area has only recently emerged as a critical node in the strategies of some regional states in the territory of the former Soviet space, including the Russian Federation and traditional littoral countries like Turkey, Rumania or Bulgaria. More than that, the entire area has become integral to the evolving policies and strategies of the states of the Eastern Mediterranean; to a new and vital Russia, which has a crucial role to play throughout the Wider Black Sea region; to the Caucasus (and specifically to Georgia and its Black Sea costal zone) and the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia in general; to the Middle East; and, of course, to Europe. And it is obvious that where all of these dynamics converge, the interest from the United States, now with a larger presence
1 See: T. Japaridze, “The Black Sea Region: Meaning and Significance,” American Foreign Policy Interests, No. 29, 2007, pp. 113-125.
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in the Middle East and Central Asia and specifically on the northern shores of the Black Sea than in the past, cannot be far behind, if in fact it is not already far ahead.
The Wider Black Sea region (the “Region”) lies at the crossroads of European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern “security frameworks”—in a broader and multi-functional notion of the term which embraces political, economic, environmental, cultural and many other ingredients of the contemporary concept of stability and security paradigm. But while geographically located at the edge of each, the Region not only has never been at the center of any of these frameworks but has not even become a supplemental component in any of these strategic constructions.
Wider Black Sea Area-EU Interaction Gambit
Let us focus now on the wider Black Sea area-EU interaction prospects and try to explore how the wider Black Sea area should fit this new strategic landscape vis-à-vis the EU? There have been certain formidable steps made in this interaction and certain synergies have been identified and some constructive dialog has been initiated, although these dynamics need some concrete results and strategic direction and vision. What needs to be done to add some value to that process and make it irreversible and mutually beneficial?
To answer this, one first has to put oneself into the EU’s shoes, so to speak, and look at the area and the BSEC, its only full-fledged institutional mantra, from the perspectives of Brussels. To some extent, there is a deep-seated wariness, not about the region per se but about the individual BSEC countries. This wariness stems, in part, from the internal politics of the EU itself, and from other seemingly endless debates on whether the “wider” or “deeper” direction the EU should take.
In some quarters, the EU periphery, despite the fact that Rumania and Bulgaria have become members of the European Union, is still psychologically seen as a problem-ridden distraction that can no longer completely be ignored, but which can be contained or dealt with on an individual state basis in the form of aid and technical assistance. If I may be cynical for a moment, this was the rationale behind the Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or even those newly born EU initiatives such as the BSS and the EaP.
But even in more “enlightened” circles of the EU, there is a distinct wariness. It stems, in part, from the fact that there is simply so much to do within the current enlarged EU and in dealing with the new member countries, as well as with bigger strategic issues such as trade, relations with the U.S., Russia and so forth. But within this camp there is a definite sense that more should be done, if only out of self-interest (always the best political motive, I believe, because it is inherently sustainable). They understand the growing energy importance of the wider Black Sea area to the EU. They can read a map and instinctively know that chronic instability and economic malaise on its borders is a dangerous combination. But this camp does not know what to do, and fears failure.
I realize that such an assessment may appear harsh and pessimistic. But perhaps the seeds of our regional strategy can be discerned in it as well, because ultimately, it is events on the ground, both political and economic, such as, for example, an expanding and inter-connected energy and transport infrastructure, that will drive and shape EU’s policy toward the Region.
There is a military concept known as “getting within your opponent’s decision cycle.” I am not suggesting that there is a confrontational charge between the EU and the wider Black Sea area or BSEC, in particular. But I think the concept is relevant here. For example and purely in my personal opinion, a BSEC engagement strategy that is built around serving the self-interests of the EU stands the greatest chance of success. And, ironically, it would also serve the best interests of BSEC member
states, those that are candidates or future candidates for accession and those that may never be considered for that status.
The EU, irrespective of whether it is motivated by fear of further expansion of instability on its own borders or, for example, of possible energy disruptions or any other strategic or tactical reason, would need to format anew or recalibrate these new relationships in the wider Black Sea area. The BSEC, only in case if it is reformed properly and recalibrated accordingly to fit the new strategic realities within the region and beyond it, can help deliver those relationships and the tangible, practical projects and initiatives. And just like events, no one can predict where these relationships might lead, but both sides need to probe and innovate in this regard. In this case, the axiom that a journey is more important than the destination, or in corporate-speak, the process is more important than the product, is paramount. Precisely because the EU is becoming a bit too much cautious an actor in the wider Black Sea area, it needs the BSEC to be more capable. The Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)—the new EU initiatives in the wider Black Sea area—are a sort of prelude for the regional actors to become themselves more inventive and resolute.
I said it a couple of times and want to repeat it once time: if the BSEC were high-tech company, I would see it as some sort of Cisco Systems producing the routers that convey the ideas, issues and trends concerning the ENP around the Region and between the wider Black Sea area and the EU. In high-tech speak, it would provide the high-level “connectivity” which the EU needs urgently.
But it must also influence and produce the “content” that will help dispel any misconceptions, prejudices and fears that the EU may harbor about the region. We all need to focus not only on the purely political and technical side of the accession equation but also deal effectively and early enough with perceptions and prejudices. It will pay a price for that for some time to come.
In short, the wider Black Sea area’s potential and the BSEC’s capacity must be seen in Brussels as an essential enabler of all the EU programs that can help deliver the relationships and programs it will need to be effective from an EU perspective. In so doing, the BSEC, for example, does not “sellout” its role of promoting the self-interest of its members, but quite the opposite. It actually positions itself to enhance that responsibility.
The Tumultuous Beginning
So where are we now regarding the prospects of EU-the Black Sea area relationship? As acknowledged in A Comparative Analysis of the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership—a background paper prepared recently by the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)2 —the BSS initially constituted an attempt by the EU side to create a complementary format to the already existing European Neighborhood Policy, the EU-Russia format and membership negotiations with Turkey. But following the Five Day War between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, as that paper admits, the Polish-Swedish proposal initiated the EaP as a solid framework for multilateral cooperation. Despite the fact that the re-emergence of both the BSS and the EaP is a positive development for the entire wider Black Sea area and the BSEC as a natural and potential partner of those formats, the local regional experts and pundits express their clear skepticism in regard to both initiatives. They expound on the parallelism and overlap between the BSS and EaP, particularly in regard to the potential for contribution, impacts and implications for the BSEC. The ICBSS comparative background paper exerts itself to dissipate those negative sentiments toward the BSS and the EaP, exploring in full detail the pros and cons of those new set-ups for the all-inclusive and sustainable economic development of the entire Black Sea area.
2 See: Ya. Tsantoulis, “Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres or Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?” Policy Brief, No. 12, February 2009, ICBSS.
In 2006, I raised some “strategic questions” regarding the operational capacity and the prospects of the BSEC, confident that appropriate and adequate answers to them could have made the wider Black Sea area’s rapprochement with the EU more realistic and pragmatic.3 Regrettably, it seems that I was slightly naive in this regard: despite the visible activities within the BSEC itself as well as certain interest from the EU side and the introduction and promotion of the above-mentioned BSS and EaP documents—and numerous meetings and discussions—the outcomes are minor and insignificant. Debates and their results have more to do with procedures and insignificant accomplishments, rather than provide viable, practical and productive conceptual solutions.
Therefore, almost four years later and with some positive legacy of interaction between the BSEC and the EU, I would like to revert to my previous observations, suitably recalibrating and readjusting them. I shall attempt to interpret them through these new prospects and dynamics, in the hope that in the near future the EU-BSEC interaction will come to be on the right track and that the BSS and EaP will lead the wider Black Sea area toward realistic and pragmatic developments. But up to this moment, it seems that the relationship between the EU and the Wider Black Sea region is still an appropriate subject for critical analysis.
Why do I say this? The never-ending debate over “equal partnership” between the EU and the BSEC deviates from the proper and adequate discussions about the real issues and problems and blurs the strategic focus of the BSEC decision-makers, unnecessarily irritating EU bureaucrats.
A New Role for the BSEC: Be Complementary and Proceed Ahead Resolutely
There are more drastic challenges than those existing in the wider Black Sea area and within the BSEC itself. So what role, for example, should the BSEC play in harnessing the forces of globalization that its member states, seeking to increase capacity, should understand and accommodate? That globalization will grow in coming years and decades, will become more diverse, broad-based and potent as well as at the same time more individualized is a given fact, in spite of its economic, cultural and political dislocations. More than that—as Moisés Naím, editor-in chief of the Foreign Policy Magazine put it—the growing number of actors empowered by globalization has the potential and capacity to cause large-scale damage and substantial loss of human lives, and the ongoing and escalating economic crises may sharpen desperation and lead to violence. Some governments might be more tempted to exploit international conflicts and disputes to distract their impoverished populations from those dire circumstances.4
And the wider Black Sea area is so greatly plagued with those low-intensity conflicts, disputes, external or internal luring developments. Consequently, the challenge for the entire wider Black Sea area and specifically for the BSEC is how to exploit the benefits of globalization, while at the same time preserving and promoting the unique characteristics of individual economies and societies in the face of seemingly overwhelming forces, as well as in some “smart power” way to avoid its negative after-shocks and malaise. The EU, as an organization more capable and of greater experience in this connection, through the implementation of the BSS and EaP, may become the most reliable partner of the BSEC—and mutually beneficial—if of course these prospects are not marred by pointless discussions that serve only to satisfy some bureaucratic ambitions and ego so typical of any international organization.
3 See: T. Japaridze, The BSEC: A Roadmap to Relevance. Polemical Reflections, Annex 2 to the Progress Report of Secretary General of the BSEC PERMIC.
4 See: M. Naim, “Think Again: Globalization,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2009.
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For the BSEC, I think, there are several distinctive roles. The first is to help member states identify and understand the underlying technological, economic and commercial trends that intertwine to produce “globalization,” and to what extent such developments may influence their economies and cultures. This would be a relatively high-level exercise which would fit well within the Davos-style meeting format. The key here is not to have airy, academic debates on the rights and wrongs of globalization, but to confine it to a level where its consequences, and thus any consequent opportunities, are identified in a strictly Black Sea context. I think that the EU, with its invaluable experience and legacy in this domain, may provide the necessary experience and expertise for the entire BSEC area. If properly formatted, the BSS and the EaP would be perhaps useful in this regard as well. The BSEC is also a natural vehicle through which to identify and communicate the mainly economic and business opportunities that globalization can spawn. A vivid example is that the Turkish construction company Tekfen was awarded the 2004 Environmental Prize by the International Pipelines Contractors Association for its practices during the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) terminals at Sangachal and Ceyhan.
I once admitted that the developments within the BSEC are too often left in the hands of “experts.” But most of those “experts” have never set up a business or met a payroll. Investment bankers are often seen as the storm troopers of globalization. One idea would be to send EU-based investment bankers for some three-to-six months to particular regions of individual BSEC members. There they would meet their regional partners and could look at opportunities to create businesses that would serve niche markets in Europe. Not all would work; maybe most would not. It does not matter. It is the process of harnessing globalization to produce tangible benefits that counts. The Harvard Business School cannot teach a course along such lines.
Another example could be direct BSEC participation in nascent plans of some multinational corporation working in the Black Sea region for long-term engagement with civil society and other influential, non-government actors in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey as it happened during the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the South Caucasus gas pipeline (SCP), the main regional energy projects. This strategy is directly related to globalization. Acting as a neutral facilitator of such a process would be a natural role for the BSEC, and it would be well placed to inform more widely about the impacts (positive and negative), problems and strengths of such strategies, not only within the region but in the EU and beyond.
In short, the BSEC needs to use its regional outlook to foster what could be called a high-level globalization early warning system, and communicate its views as widely as possible. At the lower level, it needs to promote and participate in practical projects that creatively seek to harness the more positive benefits of globalization, and to communicate the results as widely as possible. The Black Sea region has become a strategic energy corridor to Europe. As admitted above, the inauguration of the BTC oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline serve not so much the United States, one of its main backers, but European refineries and drivers. They were built to European technical, environmental and social standards by a largely Black Sea workforce with the help of mainly European engineers and experts.
New projects to link natural gas pipelines from our region to the main European gas grid will bring additional sources of supply from the Caspian, and perhaps beyond, into European homes and factories, thus diversifying and helping to secure vital sources of supply. That is how the BSEC will become an “enabler” of EU needs and in this way the BSEC will, someday in the future, become an equal partner with the EU. The BSEC should act smarter! As Mark Medish, a distinguished American analyst correctly noted: “Those who believe that the South will ineluctably overwhelm the North, or that the East is destined to rise at the expense of the West, are indulging in almost Manichaean forms of regional pride and mercantilism.”5 At times, some political or bureaucratic “Manichaean bacilli”
5 M. Medish, On-line Debate with Kishore Mahbubani on the Future of “Brand America,” The Economist, 20 February, 2009, available at [http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/257].
of old-fashioned rigidness and dogmas are still verifiable in the wider Black Sea area and specifically within the BSEC. These infect the prospects for positive and productive discourse among the BSEC member states, some of whom are trying to tackle with the post-modern threats and challenges with outdated modern instruments, concepts and perceptions/misperceptions, thus blurring the strategic focus of regional decision-makers and experts, and hindering them from comprehending existing realities as well as upcoming prospects, including the region’s relations with the EU.
Some look at the Black Sea region as a political and economic “black hole” or a “grey zone” of instability. I see it instead as a potentially vibrant market of more than 150 million people. I see it as a producer, consumer and exporter of much needed resources. I also see it as a source of a new generation of entrepreneurs, inspired by the European model. But my vision depends on partnership and cooperation.
At a time when an established Europe engages in an inevitably introspective debate on future enlargement, we must not lose sight of the very real and tangible benefits that can flow now from stronger engagement between Europe and the Black Sea region, especially in the economic area.
Time for Reflection and Reconfiguration
As I mentioned earlier, the recently expanded and introduced European policies (the ENP, the BSS, and the EaP) are the main vehicles for direct engagement between the EU and Black Sea states without a direct commitment to eventual accession of some BSEC member states. That policy is still evolving. But even before the French, Dutch and Irish referendums cast such uncertainty over future relations, I detected some disquiet about the policy from within the Black Sea region. Some complain that these new formats are too prescriptive, too presumptuous, too “top-down” and far too detailed. Some cynics in the region even suspect that it is just a bureaucratic ploy to formally engage the entire region with the EU, as well as to keep some “noisy” countries quiet, those that might otherwise be lobbying more vociferously for membership.
None can predict the outcome of the present political debate within the EU. Perhaps, as some commentators have suggested, the pushing of the political pause button on future enlargement will become permanent. Perhaps it is only a temporary and tactical pause to allow the political fall-out to settle. We have to await events as Europe continues what is likely to be a prolonged period of reflection. But a pause for political reflection should not become an excuse for a lack of engagement, especially in the economic sphere. In fact, it may be argued that a political pause makes it even more imperative to increase engagement between Europe and the Black Sea region. Our economic interests are inextricably intertwined, irrespective of our political future. We are prisoners of our geography. So let us focus on economic cooperation, where we both have a clear and long-term strategic interest. We may need to use that pause for our own interests and instead of being critical of the BSS and EaP, we could take the initiative from the EU and offer our European partners some interesting projects and ideas. As I mentioned above, for example, regional business needs to be given a direct role in the ENP, the BSS or the EaP. Perhaps we should form a broad business coalition between Black Sea and European companies interested or active in the region. It would not only help individual countries to better understand and influence those new European initiatives, it could also tackle issues which are common to most countries in the wider Black Sea area. Aside from energy developments, direct flows of foreign investment into the Black Sea region are lamentably low by international standards (they are low even in the Black Sea energy sector, according to some experts) and much of the investments that have been made can be attributed to the fact that the recipient countries were among those engaged in the EU accession process—Rumania and Bulgaria.
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Such a business coalition could tackle impediments to increased investment, by lobbying and encouraging individual states to lower or remove structural barriers to trade. It could also help to create inclusive business networks throughout the region that would bring together all interested companies and business managers, including those from the four unrecognized entities in our region. That too must surely be in the long-term interests of Europe. Why not enrich the BSS and the EaP menu with this kind of proposals? It could help foster a better economic climate overall by helping countries to enact policies that encourage much informal and unregulated economic activity to shift into the formal sector. The widespread informal economies in many of our member states have provided a lifeline to many people in recent years. As flourishing as they may be, they also provide a fertile ground for corruption and rob the states of much-needed revenues that could be harnessed for development.
On the energy front, the BSEC could form a joint pipeline working group with the EU to help ensure that a steady increase in capacity is available for our own growing consumption as well as that of Europe as a whole.
A security dimension is also needed, one that underpins greater economic efforts, as stability is a prerequisite for development. Again, this is perhaps best done through a joint mechanism tied to the ENP, the BSS or the EaP. More than that, the EU should be more clear-cut and nuanced regarding its new initiatives, specifically the BSS and the EaP. Some BSEC countries, covered by those initiatives, perceive those major EU programs in the wider Black Sea area with some unhidden skepticism, describing them as bearing a certain semblance of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) format—only with the EU in the helm of it instead of Russia, as in the case of the CIS. Moldova’s former president Voronin admitted that, for example, the EaP seems just as “some far away European prospect” whereas, according to him, Moldova has accomplished much more complex and comprehensive agenda toward the EU integration on an individual basis.6
Other critical or skeptical voices in this connection are surfacing within the BSEC space, including e.g. experts and pundits who try to interpret those new EU initiatives—and specifically the EaP—as some hostile attempt to “encircle Russia” or even isolate it. It has to be understood that these are not only wishful but even unwise conclusions and perceptions due to some well-known strategic considerations. First, it would be impossible to “encircle” Russia, one of the most powerful and capable BSEC member states. This is not only to be seen with respect to the Black Sea area but far beyond. Any, even hypothetical, “endeavor” to follow this path is just programmed to fail and the bearer of such a strategy will not be able to collect any merits in respectable circles. All sides are interested in a positively engaged Russia, within the wider Black Sea area and outside of it. This specifically counts for its relationship with Europe, which has repeatedly been declared by EU leaders. But what is obvious as well is that Russia, as well as some other regional big players, needs to identify more precisely the substance of its “Good Neighborhood Policy.” It is indeed possible that Russia could evolve its own version of that strategy, as Turkey is currently trying to do with its proposal of the Platform for Stability and Cooperation in the region.
So the EU needs to work more resolutely and seek innovative ways in order to be more informative with all regional actors in this regard. Without any doubt the perception and therefore the regional public opinion in part will be shaped by such a smart as well as concerted approach.
How to Be Relevant and Mutually Beneficial
We have a vision in common with the EU. The building blocks of that vision are primarily economic at this stage and the BSS and the EaP both address these concerns. It is surely in the interests
1 See: Kommersant, 1 March, 2009.
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of both Europe and the Black Sea region that the BSS and EaP should serve as a two-way street in this regard. It is the process of engagement, not necessarily the product, which is so crucial at this time. We at the BSEC are willing to work together on tangible, practical and pragmatic projects that are in the interest of both Europe and the Black Sea region.
We also sincerely hope that the commitments the EU has made to the BSEC through the BSS and the EaP will remain in force and are fully implemented by both sides. We also hope that the BSEC will be more innovative in this connection. Within the BSEC there are some countries that could even attain EU standards and criteria in the foreseeable future. The allure the EU holds for those countries serves as an impetus for internal transformation and re-adjustment. For that category of countries, now more than ever, we need not only to maintain the momentum of engagement, but to accelerate it. And we need to do it now. The BSS and the EaP are the most appropriate formats for that engagement, as far as these initiatives
(i) emphasize interaction within global capital markets, and different patterns and models of all-inclusive economic development,
(ii) promote economic cooperation throughout the wider Black Sea area and
(iii) will encourage further confidence among the regional actors, and enhance their stability and security.
But there are some unanswered questions on the ground and the first among them are on the regional security issues and dilemmas, and we need to find answers to them or at least to identify and qualify them accordingly.
On the Regional Security Risks, Dilemmas and the Existing Mechanism in the Wider Black Sea Area. What is Needed To Be Done?
As I admitted above, in today’s intensely competitive international economic environment, the concepts of “development” and “security” are intertwined and can no longer be viewed as separate subjects which are the case for the existing Black Sea internationally formatted organizations. They try to operate within their own institutional framework, do not communicate or exchange data or even debate or discuss some “interdisciplinary” issues and problems. They exist within their institutional, political vacuum and that, by the way, makes Europeans more than cautious, specifically when they come close to the unresolved or evolving security dilemmas of the wider Black Sea area.
So we need to concentrate a bit on those issues and try to look at them through the regional lenses but as well projecting those developments, risks, challenges and the capacity to tackle with them on a broader strategic landscape.
As I acknowledged it earlier, the Black Sea area vividly demonstrates in all its complexities the problems with which we are confronted (and sometimes confounded) in so many troubled regions of the world today. What is more, at certain levels of analysis, we will see that this region is at the same time the font of many of the difficulties that we face and is also a principal artery through which so many of the problems with which we are concerned today are transmitted to the wider world.
As a region, it has a surfeit of security challenges stemming from unresolved regional conflicts, frozen conflicts, energy supply, illicit trafficking, and of course, the neighboring conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These challenges are exacerbated by multiple borders, difficult terrain, and the presence of unsecured highly radioactive sources, well-established smuggling channels and terrorist activities.
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Both intelligence and law enforcement sources indicate that there is substantial North-South trafficking in different devices with sophisticated components, taking place in areas such as the Northern Caucasus (and then through Georgia maybe), and as noted, subsequent delivery to Iraq or Afghanistan.
All my experience tells me that there can be a direct correlation between the success and failure of such a venture and the level of intimacy of international cooperation which can be brought to bear on it. The central question for us is, “will this complex region become a gateway or bottleneck to stability and security?” Given that security and stability are a necessary condition for sustainable and irreversible economic development, the challenge to us is to fit and adjust existing mechanisms to the current trends and developments in the region and beyond it and then, ideally, to reach beyond them, to further develop overall cooperative mechanisms.
For example, the crippled state of the utterly mismanaged conflict resolution processes in my part of the world. This region is filled with live conflicts, frozen conflicts, border conflicts, economic conflicts, and social disintegration in certain areas. And because violence loves a vacuum, consequently through it flow weapons, terrorists, drugs, and vulnerable energy supplies—in short, all the things that produce a prime testing and transit ground for political and military movements on the one hand, and specific armed tactics and weaponry, on the other
At the outset, I would like to pose a slightly rhetorical question: Are there any existing unified and functioning regional security mechanisms in the wider Black Sea area? Our conclusion, sadly, is that there are none: even under the NATO umbrella. And although the absence of a formal security arrangement is not necessarily catastrophic, the fact that they do not belong to NATO or any other regional framework forces the regions and countries into a sort of insecurity grey area—hence their particular vulnerability to conflict and exploitation. I would also agree that in an environment of reduced resources and increased risk, no country, by itself, can significantly reduce the multiple and translational threats which everyone faces. The point is that these threats are not just to individual countries, but, because the region is a major transit area, they are contagious threats, which flow out to infect the wider world.
What brings us back to the concept of developing effective networks of cooperative, mutually supporting and integrated structures to detect and interdict terrorist traffic and people, weapons, and its criminal lifeblood, drugs and the precursor chemicals?
Obviously, high on the worry list are WMD Terrorist threats, but increasingly moving up the list are IED exchanges of materials and knowledge. These issues are of utmost interest for the entire international community, and first of all for the European one, which sits right at the adjacent distance from that vibrant area and some parts of which are currently formal components of the EU and the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
Given that no country in the region has the resources, or possibly even the will to take on this burden for itself, the answer must lie in building partner-country capacity and regional cooperation. And we all know that this can only be done through the creation of an effective integrated structure.
If we were to draw an inventory regarding the existing security mechanisms in the wider Black Sea area, the depressing truth is the list would be shockingly short: BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony, SECI, maybe GUAM, and by all means, BSEC. By the way, I still keep saying that the BSEC has an unused potential and capacity to become more actively involved in the regional security equations. And by doing so, has a direct impact on the wider security problems, an essential component of which is the sustainable and all inclusive economic development.
In my view, there has been a major change in how external actors perceive our region and the resultant recalibration of the notion of security and development in general as it applies to the region. This is partially because the content and context of the wider notion of global security have changed dramatically at every level. This notion has become both more complex and much more multi-facet-
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ed: its facets are now interdependent, interconnected, and intertwined. As statesmen and practitioners, we are all still going through a painful adaptation to this reality.
In this new reality, we are all training ourselves to see the links between different levels of analysis and understand their meanings. Weapons are the products of conflict. Conflicts are the products of, and causes of, change. And the change is endemic and accelerating in Global Society.
Increasingly, we know we must conceptually integrate. Consider, for example, the effect of floods and draughts caused by global warming on a region plagued with protracted conflicts, filled with some uncontrolled and partially lawless territories and prone to be a hotbed of development of asymmetric threats.
To those of us who have been charged, at either a national state level or within the international organizations, with planning for these eventualities and moderating these strains, this poses two pressing questions, “Have we done enough? “Could we have been more successful?” With hindsight, reviewing my time as Foreign Minister of Georgia and as General Secretary of the BSEC Secretariat, I might say “yes, we have done a lot,” but the world has changed, the notions and the context of politics and the policy-making have changed and what has remained unchanged are the mindsets and perceptions and that is why the notions of development and security have been interpreted differently by almost all regional actors. They have their own traditions and practices and they pursue their own strategic goals and agendas. So we live in a post-modern world with new kind of threats, challenges and risks whereas the mindsets and the existing mechanisms to tackle with these threats are just modern or even pre-modern in some regional countries.
So we need first to specify exactly the space in which we live, the threats and risks which we encounter, and the instruments we have in our possession with which to operate. This then lets us isolate the contagions which we might spread to the wider community. This process also helps us to raise, for example, the consciousness of the European and the NATO communities with respect to our problems and opportunities, and to bring closer together the regional actors, and also helps us all to focus on the threats, problems and opportunities which confront us and, through us, impact on the wider worlds of both the West and the East.
There is a tendency amongst some in our area deliberately to focus upon the easiest and most acceptable topics such as economic development whilst, at the same time, to ignore the political and security problems which beset us all. This narrow focus is, of course, self-defeating, as there can be no adequate economic process without a parallel process of resolving the political and security problems which we confront. It is abundantly clear that inflows of foreign direct investment into the wider Black Sea area are low, largely because there is no comprehensive mechanism for managing these continuing conflicts and disputes and hence providing security. This low investment, of course, creates a feedback loop of further insecurity which proliferates instability. Good politics makes good economics and vice-versa. Political stalemate invites economic stagnation, which fosters disintegration and conflict.
So it is particularly appropriate that today we go beyond the existing regional security mechanisms and focus instead our attention upon the complexities of these problems and try to identify a broader context in which we will need to discuss, operate, and hopefully resolve these pressing and shared foreign and security policy challenges and concerns. And starkly, if our region cannot become a more integrated, dynamic, political and economic region, it will remain an area congenial to terrorists and favored by asymmetric warriors. A grey area, through which can transit (in all directions) dangerous, determined people and their innovative weapons, a bacillus which can infect both East and West.
These threats and risks move with frightening speed, and infect people, countries, and continents at great distances. And the wider Black Sea area is the heart through which these viruses get pumped. None of us alone can succeed in tackling these problems at the regional, international or global level. Too often, in my region, we try to do just that.
Our drive must therefore be to bolster regional cooperation based upon the mutual assessment of threats and opportunities, and to create effective (that means not bureaucratic) regional structures for
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
coming to grips with the problems and seizing the opportunities presented. If we do not, the viruses spilling through this region will continue to have an accelerating and deathly effect on conflicts way beyond our region. We do not need anything as drastic as a heart transplant, but nor do we need anything as minor as a pacemaker. What we do need is a stronger, healthier heart. But that’s not only a workload for the regional actors to accomplish. That needs some concerted actions and engagement of some joint capacity of the EU and NATO and it would be more than desirable if Russia joins that endeavor. But we need to forward some clear-cut messages about our aspirations and problems and in that regard, I think that our immediate addressee should be Europe, our immediate neighbor and maybe a future partner.
Some Message for Europe: It is Time to Be More than Just “Visible Mais Absent”
Since the referendums in 2005 in France and the Netherlands, there has been an avalanche of debate about the future of Europe. That debate must necessarily be centered within the European Union. But that debate, and the actions and policies that eventually emerge from it, will have a profound and fundamental impact on the future of the wider Black Sea area.
In recent years, Europe has made some brave, bold and controversial moves, and none were so brave, bold or controversial, as it turns out, as the last enlargement to incorporate 10 states in Central and Eastern Europe. That enlargement, and the prospect of future enlargement into the Balkans, is said to have been a factor behind the rejection of the European Constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands.
The popular fear of a wave of immigration—or “social dumping,” as some have termed it, from East to West may certainly have played a part. The perception of the supposed threat posed by low-wage “Polish plumbers,” “Turkish kebabci,” “Georgian nannies” or “Moldovan mechanics” seems to have struck a sensitive public chord. And as every politician knows only too well, “perceptions are reality.”
So if recent events suggest that the perception in certain Western European states is that economic and social threats emanate from the east, what is the perception when one looks at developments in Europe from that very region?
Many commentators have emphasized that the last EU enlargement has been perhaps the most successful European policy since the 1950s, when the first moves to create a European entity cemented the reconciliation of France and Germany. Perhaps that is only a perspective of Europe’s political and media elites. But it certainly worked in the accession states, where the prospect of EU membership clearly underpinned the peaceful transformation of former communist economies, and helped to introduce and entrench democratic values.
That enlargement did partially affect the Black Sea region. But the next one—if there is a next one—will fully affect the region. Of the 12 member states of BSEC, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria are the EU members. Accession talks with Turkey were renewed in the end of 2008. Serbia is covered by a broader EU commitment to the Western Balkans. Ukraine has made no secret that it sees its future in Europe. So too has my own country, Georgia. All BSEC states that are not on a direct accession path are subject to the still-evolving ENP that seeks to reward, in some still ill-defined way, the countries that embrace “European norms and values.” The only exception is Russia, which one could argue already has a “special” strategic relationship with Europe.
It is perhaps ironic that, at a time when many people in what I will call “established Europe” are so disenchanted with the European project, its allure and attraction continue to exert such power and influence over EU’s Near Abroad.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Let me, as an example, talk about my own country. Georgia has never appeared on any list for accession. Yet the European flag flies alongside Georgia’s national flag in front of Parliament and other public buildings. We can do so because it is also the official flag of the Council of Europe, of which we are a member. But that flag does not fly there to impress visiting European officials and politicians to support Georgia’s hopes. It is no publicity or public relations stunt. It flies there because it serves as a psychological anchor in a country which has been wracked by civil war and economic collapse.
The ENP and its follow-up—the EaP—is necessarily a bilateral affair between Brussels and individual Black Sea countries. But it should mix a regional dimension as well and the BSS is the first cautious step in that direction though the BSS itself also needs to be much more inter-active, and involve a cross-section of the societies involved, and especially the business community, both from within the region and more widely in Europe. If the referendums in France and the Netherlands have taught us anything, it is that policies and programs that are the exclusive preserve of political elites are always at risk of a popular backlash. As I have already mentioned, this is forcing Brussels to at least take a political pause with respect to the European Union’s enlargement. And this will only raise the significance of the further development of economic relations between the Black Sea countries and the EU. This breathing space will leave room to propitiously decide the fate of the unity between Europe and the Black Sea area, as well as the Black Sea area’s affiliation with Europe and the European civilization. I described above the ways this cooperation might be built in the current conditions. And I also mentioned how pointless and even detrimental political speculations on this account are.
But nevertheless I must still ask one question that goes beyond the bounds of purely economic cooperation and economic pragmatics. I noted that most people in the wider Black Sea area are allured with the engagement by the EU, and some regional actors are sort of irritated in this regard. It would be understandable, but what is the substance of Russia’s, Turkey’s, Greek’s “Good Neighborhood Policy” in the wider Black Sea area if that policy exists at all?!
That all of us in both Europe and the wider Black Sea area are facing uncertain and perhaps even irrational times is patently obvious, while the outcome is clearly not in sight. So perhaps we should not spend too much of our time speculating on end-games or future political structures and relationships. There are more than enough pundits, analysts and commentators who will happily and freely do that job for us.
But I can’t help but to observe that from my perspective, “the wish to belong to the democratic community of Europe has been a powerful factor for both change and stability in Europe. Membership of the EU played an important part in the consolidation of democracy, first in southern Europe and then in central Europe. Not many revolutions are entirely peaceful and few result in stable democratic outcomes.” Those words, by the way, are not mine, but were written by Javier Solana, former EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The old “Iron Curtain” never quite killed the hopes of millions of people in Eastern Europe. But if a Euro-Curtain dividing haves and have-nots were ever to descend over the wider Black Sea area, I fear that it could.
The people of the wider Black Sea area understand perfectly well why the current circumstances may have compelled Europe to push the pause button; but to pause, at least according to my Oxford Dictionary, does not mean “to stop.” And there is no pause button when it comes to the desire of millions of people in the wider Black Sea area for peaceful reform, democracy, stability and security, the very things that Europe so eloquently stands for, and which it has so successfully cultivated across other parts of the continent. So pause if you must, but as you pause, please bear in mind that in a potentially volatile region such as ours, with its unresolved conflicts and still emotionally raw ancient rivalries, there are always forces at play whose only desire is to push the rewind button of history.
It would be ironic. No, that is not the right word. It would be tragic if one day a common European defense and military policy should emerge not in response to crisis and disasters in faraway
places in Africa or Asia, but as an urgent need to patrol Europe’s “frozen frontiers” and to contain chaos and instability in its Near Abroad. So our message to Europe and specifically to the EU is: It is time to be more than just “Visible Mais Absent.” It is time to be visible and relevant. But it is also time for the Black Sea regional actors to be realistic and innovative. If these two vectors intersect and fit each other, then that synergy may produce some real, practical and feasible results and not only for some organizations or countries but for the peoples of the wider Black Sea area and far beyond.
So let us not be consumed by specific structures, outcomes or end-games. Let us just get on with the job. Let us embark on the journey. And who knows, we may all be pleasantly surprised when we arrive at our eventual destination.
Jannatkhan EYVAZOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
IRAN’S SECURITY INTERESTS AND
GEOPOLITICAL ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL EURASIA
Abstract
The author investigates the specifics of Iran’s geopolitical activity in Central Eurasia in the post-Soviet period. What are the central security interests be-
hind Iranian policies? What urges Iran to act at the supra-regional level? What tactics does it employ? These and other related topics are discussed in detail.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Geography, history, and ethnic and confessional affiliation tie Iran to Central Eurasia.1 The death of the Soviet Union made the region doubly important for the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). On the one hand, the IRI was finally freed from a much stronger power center: from that time on the
1 Here and elsewhere I rely on the concept of Central Eurasia and Central Europe formulated by Eldar Ismailov, according to which Central Eurasia includes three post-Soviet regions: Central Europe (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); the Central Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia); and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) (for more detail, see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st
Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
