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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Vladimir EVSEYEV
Ph.D. (Technical Sciences), Senior Fellow at the Center for Social and Political Studies (Moscow, the Russian Federation).
THE U.S.-IRI RELATIONS IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT
Abstract
The author concentrates on American-Iranian relations during the Obama presidency and their impact on security in the Central Caucasus; he also closely examines Iran's bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the economic, political, and military spheres.
He reveals that the intensity of the American-Iranian confrontation and the regional security level are two sides of the same coin. This conclusion is based on the author's analysis of the current state of and the future prospects for the Iranian nuclear file; the achievements and limitations of Ira-
nian and Armenian cooperation; the problems in the relations between Baku and Tehran; and the future of Iranian-Georgian relations.
He demonstrates that Iran has failed to extend its influence in the Central Caucasus, so has fallen short of a status equal to that of Russia and Turkey; however, it managed to prevent becoming isolated from the north. He reveals that Georgia and Azerbaijan run the risk of being drawn into an armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran, which means that the Central Caucasian countries should avoid allied relations with any of the conflicting sides.
66 HHSHAfflCABffiS&HLOBALnHAHI^RI volume 6 issue 2 2012
Introduction
During the last few decades, the United States has been concentrating on the Central Caucasus,1 a bridge of sorts between Europe and Central Asia (a veritable treasure-trove of natural riches), and the rapidly destabilizing Middle East. Fully aware of the transportation value of the sub-region, the Americans have been building up their influence by skillfully playing on the contradictions between the Central Caucasian states and the Russian Federation, as well as those among the Central Caucasian states themselves. Today, the U.S. has become the main extra-regional force and cannot be treated lightly. Although it has managed to reduce Moscow's influence in the sub-region, the U.S. has been unable to push it out altogether. In the 1990s, Ankara was actively used as a vehicle for promoting American interests in the region. Turkey itself tried to dominate in the sub-region, but its limited resources and internal contradictions proved too high a barrier (today Israel has been assigned the role of America's agent).
The Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated no mean skill when tapping the advantages of the Soviet Union's disintegration: it actively built up its presence in the Central Caucasus. For geopolitical and also historical, cultural, and religious reasons, it first turned its attention to the Azerbaijan Republic, however the Azeri elite, under the strong influence of Turkey, vehemently resisted the Iranian zeal. The tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh pushed Baku even further from Tehran. It failed to become an intermediary between the warring sides and later moved closer to Armenia, one of the two conflicting countries. This added strain to bilateral relations, which remain as tense as ever today.
In view of the above, the Iranian leaders promptly moved toward closer economic relations with Armenia; there is information that Erevan and Tehran entered a confidential agreement on mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the sides. The already functioning transportation corridor (highways and a gas pipeline) alleviated Armenia's economic blockade (the bulk of goods is delivered across Georgia); there are plans to add a railway and an oil pipeline to the already existing transportation facilities. Recently, Iran and Georgia stepped up their cooperation and even introduced a visa-free regime on their borders.
Washington is worried: the Iranians are making skillful use of the fact that the Americans, bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, have diverted their attention to the Middle East and pushed the Central Caucasus to the margins. Eleventh-hour corrections to U.S. foreign policy changed nothing. It proved impossible to isolate the IRI from the north, mainly because of the still pending conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. If the Iranian nuclear crisis deepens and develops into an armed clash, Washington will be confronted with new problems. The Central Caucasus will be in even greater danger: it has several zones of tension in its own territory (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Osse-tia, and Abkhazia). A long war with Iran (an alternative that cannot be excluded if the U.S. decides to use force to close the Iranian nuclear file or is prompted to do this by Israel's air strikes) will inevitably draw the neighboring states into the instability zone. In the West, however, this prospect is not seriously considered, which threatens, at least, the oil and gas transportation routes across the Central Caucasus.
American-Iranian Relations under the Obama Administration
After coming to power early in 2009, the new U.S. administration headed for better relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In May, President Obama informed Iran that by the end of 2009 he
1 Here and elsewhere the Central Caucasus is referred to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
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would like to detect some progress in curtailment of the uranium enrichment program; he was not specific—no deadlines were set. At the same time, the American president was obviously prepared to take measures, up to and including sanctions, if it turned out that Iran remained deaf to the calls of the international community.2
The American administration used the time left until the presidential elections in Iran scheduled for June 2009 to gather information in order to readjust its foreign policy course accordingly. This was a logical step: the U.S. Senate was still discussing the key figures to be appointed to the U.S. Department of State; on the other hand, the elections in Iran could have replaced Mahmud Ahmadine-jad with Mir-Hossein Mousavi. If elected, the latter would not have been able to stop the nuclear program, but he could have retreated from certain positions. The election results produced a contradictory effect: on the one hand, they bared a split of sorts among the Iranian elite (which meant that the conservatives were no longer omnipotent). On the other, the doctored results sent a wave of popular indignation through the country's largest cities. Washington's comments were restrained, but the American leaders condemned the undemocratic nature of the June elections.
In September 2009, Tehran revealed that a third uranium enrichment plant was being built at Fordu near the Shi'a holy city of Qom—this did nothing to improve the relations between the two countries. Since the Additional Protocol of 1997 to the Safeguards Agreement had expired, the states were no longer duty bound to inform the Agency well in advance of the construction of nuclear facilities, or of considerable amounts of low-enriched uranium (LEU) stored in the territories and of the developed uranium enrichment infrastructure. This fed suspicions that the Iranian nuclear program was not as peaceful as Iran claimed it to be.
It was thought that October 2009 brought a U-turn in the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis: the U.N. SC permanent members, Germany and the IRI, met for the first time; IAEA inspectors could visit the new nuclear facility in Fordu, while Tehran formally agreed to send out 80% of its LEU to obtain nuclear fuel for Tehran's research reactor. Later, however, the top figures in Iran's executive and legislative power branches retreated. Washington's response was predictable: new international sanctions. On 9 June, 2010, the U.N. SC passed Resolution 19293; it was the sixth resolution on the Iranian nuclear file and the fourth that introduced political, financial, and economic sanctions against the IRI.
Later, the U.S. continued the Iranian policy started by President George W. Bush, viz. gradually toughening sanctions. Since the U.N. SC did not support this course, the U.S. and its allies introduced unilateral sanctions. Tehran's hardly consistent position, which it demonstrated at the talks in Istanbul late in January 2011,4 only encouraged this.
In the spring of 2012, the situation with the Iranian nuclear file changed radically.
■ First, conservatives who supported Ali Khamenei, the country's spiritual leader, carried the parliamentary elections with over 60% of the votes.5 The spiritual leader became even more active. In mid-April 2012, during another round of talks in Istanbul on settlement of the Iranian nuclear crisis, Tehran agreed to limit the uranium enrichment process (the enrichment from 3.5 to 19.8% for U-235). It would have been much wiser to suspend the process: a country that has accumulated 110 kg of nuclear material, enough to keep Tehran's research reactor busy for the next 20 years, hardly needs more uranium enriched to 19.8%. This step, however, showed that Tehran was ready for a compromise.
2 See: "Obama i Netanyahu obsudili iadernuiu problemu Irana," Vesti.RU, 18 May, 2009, available at [http://www. vesti.ru/doc.html?id=285936&tid=51134].
3 See: Resolution 1929 (2010) adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 9 June, 2010, available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement].
4 See: "Peregovory po iadernoy programme Irana provalilis," RBK, 22 January, 2011, available at [http:// top.rbc.ru/politics/22/01/2011/531860.shtml].
5 See: E.V. Dunaeva, "Itogi parlamentskikh voborov v IRI," Institute of the Middle East, 16 March, 2012, available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2012/16-03-12a.htm].
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■ Second, the European countries realized that the tight financial and economic sanctions Brussels had introduced in January 2012 had gone too far. Indeed, even a partial embargo on oil deliveries (a complete embargo came into force from 1 July, 2012) put oil refineries geared toward heavy Iran oil in a quandary; Greece, on the brink of an economic precipice (it imported 35% of crude oil from Iran), was hit more than the others.
■ Third, Washington remained lukewarm to all calls to use force against Iran; the Americans did their best to dissuade the Israelis from this step: they helped Tel Aviv set up a multi-layered ABM system. Washington was not seeking peace—it was worried about the need to pull its troops out of Afghanistan and the heavy burden of the military budget, which needed considerable trimming.
Much depends on the next round of talks on the Iranian nuclear file. If the talks between Iran and IAEA move forward and if the EU reciprocates with somewhat alleviated financial and economic sanctions, the slide toward a full-scale nuclear crisis might be slowed down—otherwise the world will come dangerously close to the line beyond which the talks about the use of force will be the only option.
Israel does not need an armed conflict with the IRI: irrespective of the results, Israel has much to lose; if Iran crosses the "red line," that is, carries out nuclear tests, Israel will probably strike back. America will have to close ranks with Israel. This is very, very real. Iran will respond by stirring up trouble in the neighboring states, which will inevitably draw the Central Caucasus into an armed American-Iranian confrontation.
This means that regional security depends on the relations between the U.S. and IRI and that the Central Caucasus will be the place where their interests meet. Let's take a closer look at this situation.
Strong Relations between Armenia and Iran
Today the relations between the two countries are going ahead without a hitch. Late in 2008, Armenia started receiving Iranian gas via the Tabriz-Megri-Kajaran-Ararat pipeline with an annual carrying capacity of up to 2.6 billion cu m; Armenia pays with electricity. The total cost of the project (Russia's Gazprom was also involved) was $250 million.6 Earlier Armenia had to rely on Russian gas delivered across Georgia.
Two high-voltage power lines already connect the two countries used to move electricity in one direction or the other depending on the season. Another power transmission line of 400 kV costing a total of about €100 million is planned.
Two more highways will be added to the existing one; there is an agreement on building a railway between Iran and Armenia. According to the preliminary estimate, it will cost about $1.8 billion: Iran will invest $1.4 billion, while Russian Railways Ltd. will supply the rest. The project will be realized in five years.
There is an agreement that Gazprom will be involved in building an Iranian-Armenian petroleum products pipeline and a liquid fuel terminal with a capacity of up to 1.5 million tons, two cornerstones of Armenia's energy security. The Megri hydropower station will be built within the framework of bilateral cooperation. These projects will cost about $500 million.
6 See: L. Ovanisian, "Zaversheno stroitelstvo vtorogo uchastka gazoprovoda Iran-Armenia," Kavkazskiy uzel, 2 December, 2008, available at [http://krasnodar.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/144850].
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Between 2007 and 2011, trade turnover between the two countries increased from $180 to $323 million7 (Erevan is Iran's fourth largest trade partner). These positive shifts went on in the context of international and unilateral sanctions against Tehran.
In an effort to consolidate its political and economic position in Armenia, Iran repeatedly offered to sell Armenia small arms and ammunition, mortars, missile systems of volley fire, equipment, etc. So far, their military-technical cooperation remains limited to supplies of Iranian kits and foodstuffs of extended storage for the Armenian armed forces.
There is information that the sides signed an agreement on cooperation under which the IRI will protect the Armenian rear in the event of war, while Erevan will prevent a blockade of Iranian territory and strikes on Iran from the north. Whether the treaty can be realized, especially in the event of an American-Iranian conflict, remains to be seen: Erevan cherishes its relations with Washington and does not exclude NATO membership for Armenia. This explains why, despite its CSTO membership, Armenia has been closely cooperating with NATO within the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and cooperating within the Individual Partnership Action Plan since 2005. Until October 2008, the Armenian military were involved in the peacekeeping operation as part of the coalition forces in Iraq; now they serve in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
The Armenian leaders are fully aware that support of the Iranian regime in any form will inevitably worsen its country's relations with the West and dramatically cut down on financial aid from the Armenian diasporas, in France and the United States in particular. On the other hand, the Armenians take into account the positive role Iran has been playing in settling the armed Karabakh conflict.
This means that Iran and the United States are carefully avoiding direct confrontation in Armenia. Fully aware of the problems Armenia has to cope with in power production, Washington does not object to its cooperation with Tehran. The Americans, however, are going to all lengths to prevent military-technical cooperation between the two countries and are trying to keep Tehran as far away as possible from the Karabakh settlement. The United States will become even more active if a war with Iran begins and will stem all attempts to help Iran, while never attempting to draw Armenia into the clash.
Iran and Azerbaijan: Far from Easy Relations
Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Tehran tried to spread its influence to the Azerbaijan Republic: it facilitated the visa regime, opened direct air flights and bus routes between the Azeri provinces of Iran and Azerbaijan's neighboring regions, and sanctioned bilateral contacts at the local level in trade, education, scientific research, and economic cooperation. Iran helped Azerbaijan join all sorts of regional structures, extended economic and humanitarian aid, and tried its hand at Karabakh mediation. Until 1994, the two countries had been developing good-neighborly, constructive, and mutually advantageous relations. Concerned about a possible flare-up of Azeri separatism in its territory, Iran refused to let in Azeri refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighboring districts, however it never prevented their transit across its territory.
Later, contradictions began piling up in Iranian-Azeri relations, which could have caused a deep political crisis. The reasons for this were as follows:
7 See: "Armyano-iransky tovarooborot za pyat let vyros pochti vdvoe do 323 mln dollarov," Novosti-Armenia, 25 April, 2012, available at [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/economy/20120425/42650150.html].
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(1) Tehran was very irritated by Baku's decision to change the route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey-han oil pipeline. The initial economically much more rational variant via Iran had been rerouted under American pressure and due to several other reasons, which cooled Iranian-Azeri relations.
(2) In November 1994, Azerbaijan agreed to sell the Iranian National Oil Company 25% of the shares of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company; several months later, under American pressure, it retreated from its decision. Ten percent in the off-shore gas condensate field Shah Deniz offered as a reconciliatory gesture did nothing to stem the mounting tension in the two countries' bilateral relations. Iran tried to prevent construction of export oil pipelines from Azerbaijan and its exploration and exploitation work in the Caspian. This did nothing to interfere with construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline widely supported by the West, but showed Iran that it needed its own export pipelines for Caspian oil and gas. Today, one of the transit routes of Turkmen gas passes through Iranian territory.
(3) The relations between Azerbaijan and the United States were becoming rapidly stronger, which potentially threatened the national interests of Iran in the Caspian in particular. Tehran responded by establishing closer relations with Erevan, but at the official level Iran still condemns Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan.
In 1997, the two countries began restoring their partnership ties; this became especially obvious when Mohammad Khatami, elected president of Iran, opted for a more balanced foreign policy in the Central Caucasus and concentrated on energy production and transportation.8 Disagreements, however, remained.
In 2002, bilateral political cooperation received a new lease on life from President of Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliev's official visit to Iran: the two countries revived the dialog on the status of the Caspian, one of the most sensitive issues in their relations. At the same time, they signed several documents on cooperation in road building, customs control, transport and communications, culture, and sport. In the summer of2003, the new level of mutual understanding helped the two countries to settle a potential conflict that could have been caused when an Iranian warplane violated the state border of the Azerbaijan Republic.
In January 2005, the first visit to the IRI of new President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev helped to develop the bilateral dialog further. This visit produced a joint political statement and bilateral agreements on joining the railways of the two countries and building the Baku-Astara highway and a hydropower station on the borderline River Arax. Azerbaijan opened its consulate-general in Tabriz.
From that time on, bilateral economic cooperation in power production, trade, agriculture, and industry has been going smoothly ahead. In the winter, Azerbaijan sells natural gas to the northern provinces of Iran; in the summer, it supplies them with electricity. Iran and Azerbaijan are cooperating in border and coastal control and exchange of prisoners, as well as fighting drug trafficking.
Economic cooperation potential remains untapped: in 2009 it barely reached $550 million9; the situation will not improve any time soon because Baku is seeking as much independence from its southern neighbor as possible. This was amply confirmed in the summer of 2010 when a treaty on gas supplies to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (part of Azerbaijan separated from it by a stretch of Armenian territory.—Ed.) discontinued Iranian supplies in favor of moving Azeri gas via Turkey.
8 See: A.M. Vartanian, "Irano-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia: dialog s peremennym uspekhom," Institute of the Middle East, 27 March, 2006, available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2006/27-03-06c.htm].
9 See: "Azerbaidzhan i Iran zhelaiut dovesti tovarooborot do $1 mlrd," Vestnik Kavkaza, 14 December, 2099, available at [http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/diplomatia/12915.html].
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The considerably better relations between the two countries are still burdened with certain negative factors.
■ First, Tehran's continued active cooperation with Erevan is creating a breach in the transport blockade of Armenian territory and taking the edge off the Karabakh settlement.
■ Second, the rights of the huge Azeri population (no less than 20 million, or over 25 percent of the total population) of Iran are consistently infringed upon.
■ Third, the Azerbaijan Republic maintains close relations with the United States, Iran's main external foe, which is causing friction in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan on the question of stationing American military in the Central Caucasus. Late in April 2009, General Duncan McNabb, Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, visited Baku to familiarize himself with the local road and transport communications: since the spring of 2006 so-called "temporarily stationed mobile forces" (between 750 to 1,300 American soldiers and officers) have been stationed at the former Soviet military bases of Kurdamir, Nasosnaya and Gulli. Officially, the military, the numerical strength of which might be at least doubled, are stationed to protect the Azeri-Georgian stretch of the BTC; in actual fact, however, they can be used for other purposes, including a war with Iran.
■ Fourth, Azerbaijan is developing relations with Israel, Iran's regional rival; Tehran is responding painfully to the process. Suffice it to say that in April 2010, the Iranian Majlis discussed a report on Israel's penetration into the Central Caucasus. In February 2012, a weapons contract totaling $1.6 billion that Azerbaijan signed with the Ministry of Defense of Israel caused even more worries in Tehran.
■ Fifth, in the spring of 2007, Baku joined the U.N. anti-Iranian sanctions; Azerbaijan used violation by Iranian military helicopters of its air space in February 2007 as a pretext.
■ Sixth, the still unresolved status of the Caspian makes it much harder to exploit its resources; the status has not been resolved because Tehran refuses to compromise; this situation is fraught with confrontation.
■ Seventh, the IRI and the Azerbaijan Republic, as two oil-and-gas exporter and transit countries, are competing in the European market. In particular, if Iran joins Nabucco, Azerbaijan will lose a large share of its gas transit. On the other hand, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea will reduce the volume of Iranian gas moved to Europe, while a Trans-Afghan gas pipeline might make the Peace gas pipeline (Iran-Pakistan-India) superfluous.
Recently, relations between the two countries deteriorated. In October 2011, a conference was held in the Iranian city of Qom on "Support the Iranian Renaissance in the Azerbaijan Republic and Condemn Islamophobia" attended by students and clergy from many Islamic countries. The conference chairman Ayatullah Muhammad Bagir Tahriri spared no biting words to criticize Baku for the arrest of the leaders of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, called on the Azeris to engage in mass rebellion, and condemned the ban on hijab at secondary schools.10 The Republic of Azerbaijan took this as interference in its domestic affairs, particularly since the activity of the mentioned party, which many in Baku consider to be a tool of Iranian influence, is officially banned.
In the latter half of January 2012, attacks on Israeli properties in Azerbaijan, as well as on Israeli Ambassador to Baku Michael Lotem, were thwarted. According to the available facts, the Iranian special services were directly involved.11 It is believed that these plans could have been triggered by
10 See: O. Sattarov, "Irano-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia prodolzhaet 'triastu'," Vestnik Kavkaza, 2 November,
2011, available at [http://vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/politika/45610.html?date=01%2F17%2F2012+01%3A05%3A31].
11 See: "V Azerbaidzhane predotvrashcheno pokushenie na posla Israelia," MediaInternationalGroup, 25 January,
2012, available at [http://www.mignews.com/news/disasters/world/250112_24258_56246.html].
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the murder of Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Roshan. Tehran is convinced that Azerbaijan cooperated with Israeli intelligence and helped it to set up the secret service network that was responsible for the killing. The Azeri ambassador to Iran received a corresponding note, while the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic refuted all accusations.
Late in March 2012, Tehran was deeply concerned about the information published by the Foreign Policy journal that the territory of Azerbaijan might be used by Israel to strike at Iranian nuclear facilities. The author surmised, in particular, that, after striking, Israeli planes could land in Azerbaijan; he also wrote that there were plans to station search and rescue groups of the Israel Army Military Defense Forces in Azerbaijan.12 Baku refuted this, but was not totally convincing.
In Azerbaijan, the U.S. and IRI remain rivals; the United States is skillfully using the serious problems between Azerbaijan and Iran to draw the former into its sphere of influence. Washington has drawn Israel into the process as an instrument of America's national interests. The use of force against Iran will place Azerbaijan in a tight corner: it will have to choose between supporting Israel (the U.S.) indirectly in view of possible retaliation from Iran or trying to remain neutral, thus endangering its relations with the West. The second option looks preferable given the possibility of a large influx of refugees from its southern neighbor.
Iran and Georgia are Drawing Closer
On 3 November, 2010, Iran and Georgia signed an agreement on a visa-free regime, which came into force on 26 January, 2011.13 Citizens of both countries can stay in the territory of the other country for 45 days without visas. The IRI opened its consulate-general in Batumi and direct flights between Tbilisi and Tehran were resumed after a 10-year interval. Georgia did this not only because the number of Iranian tourists has increased 2.5-fold and not because Tbilisi was looking forward to large investments, but because Iran refused to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, relations between the Russian Federation and Iran have cooled, and there are at least 300 thousand Georgians living in Iran. The Iranian side is trying to forestall its mounting political and economic isolation, expand its influence in the Central Caucasus, and prevent an American airstrike from this direction.
Trade is still fairly slack: Iran accounts for less that 1% of Georgia's total imports, which explains the fairly wobbly bilateral relations. The absence of common borders and the hard-to-overcome cultural, linguistic, and religious differences do not add stability to the relations between the two countries. The United States, the military, political, and financial pillar of the Georgian establishment, does not hesitate to slow down these developments.
Iranian-Georgian relations have been further worsened by transit across Georgia and Azerbaijan of weapons and other cargoes to Afghanistan and back. In view of transshipment across the Caspian and given the existence of other much more comfortable routes, this route is of secondary importance. Since April 2010, America has been moving non-military cargoes to Afghanistan across Russia; shipment from Riga in the Baltics across Russia and Kazakhstan to Termez on the Uzbek-Afghan border takes nine days. Today, America moves up to 20 percent of its non-military cargoes along this safe route.
12 See: M. Perry, "Israel's Secret Staging Ground," Foreign Policy Journal, 29 March, 2012.
13 See: "MID Gruzii: Tbilisi ne skryvaet svoi otnosheniia s Iranom," Rosbalt, 24 April, 2012, available at [http:// www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2012/04/24/973422.html].
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There is an agreement on moving American troops and military cargoes (up to 4.5 thousand flights a year) to Afghanistan and back by air across Russian air space; this will save Washington $133 million. Not yet fully tapped, it serves as an important addition to the other transport corridors.
An agreement with NATO on the transit of non-military cargoes back from Afghanistan is being discussed. It will combine air and land movement of cargoes via Ulyanovsk. This became indispensable because of the pullout, which should be complete by 2014, because railway transit across Uzbekistan is fairly limited, and because of the continued uncertainty of shipping cargoes across Pakistan.14 The Defense Ministry of Russia warned that the cargoes would be subject to customs inspection. The administration of the Ulyanovsk Region has already calculated that this will bring about $800 million into the regional budget and will create up to 2 thousand new jobs.15
This might change if a war with Iran starts in earnest. The transport corridor that has been already set up in the Central Caucasus will provide rear support for the American troops brought to Georgia and Azerbaijan. This explains Tehran's close attention and painful response to all of America's attempts to set up corresponding infrastructure on the Iranian borders.
This means that Iranian-Georgian rapprochement is of a temporary nature; it is caused by Tehran's attempts to avoid isolation from the north. Tbilisi, in turn, is trying to use the periodical disagreements between Russia (the West) and Iran in its own interests. In February 2012, Tbilisi's balanced response to the terrorist act against an Israeli diplomat, of which Tel Aviv accused the Iranian special services, meant that Georgian leaders preferred to keep partner relations with Tehran. On the whole, however, Georgia is following the United States' foreign policy, which means there is a high enough risk that it will be involved in an armed conflict with Iran on the side of the West.
Conclusion
The Central Caucasus is turning more and more obviously into a place where the interests of the United States and Iran cross, which negatively affects regional security in view of the high level of confrontation between the two states and might develop into an armed conflict. There is still time to check escalation, which requires the concerted efforts of all the interested countries potentially able to carry weight with the conflicting sides. Russia plays a special role; it needs a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis because of the very complicated situation in the Northern Caucasus, the high degree of its involvement in all the regional conflicts, and its unwillingness to have another nuclear power on its borders.
For historical, cultural, political, and economic reasons, Iran, even with the Soviet Union removed from the stage, has failed to spread its influence far and wide in the Central Caucasus and acquire a status equal to that of Russia or Turkey.
This happened for the following reasons:
—serious confrontation with the West, which invited international and unilateral sanctions; this has created conditions hardly conducive to economic and political cooperation between Iran and the countries of the neighboring sub-region;
14 On 25 November, 2011 American helicopters mistakenly bombed and destroyed the Volcano outpost of the Pakistani army wounding 15 and killing 24 (later the figure of 27 killed was quoted) Pakistani servicemen; the transit of American cargos for the troops stationed in Afghanistan was stopped.
15 See: "Voennoy bazy i personala NATO v Ulyanovske ne budet," Stroi Terminal, 2012, available at [http:// stroyterminal.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_19.html].
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—the absence of allies (relations with Armenia serve Erevan's short-term interests because in the military-political sphere it looks toward Moscow and partly toward Washington);
—accelerated development of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs; in view of its aggressive foreign policy and the absence of a regional ABM system, this cannot but cause justified concerns in the Central Caucasus;
—Iran's rigid and unsubstantiated position on the status of the Caspian.
Still, the IRI has prevented itself from becoming isolated from the north and even developed partner relations not only with economically-blockaded Armenia, but also with Georgia, America's closest partner in the Central Caucasus. Its relations with Azerbaijan, which is much closer to Iran in many respects than the other two Central Caucasian countries, leave much to be desired, however the two countries have so far avoided direct confrontation despite the hectic activities of the West and Israel.
Tehran and Washington will go on building up their presence in the Central Caucasus through the mutual containment policy. They will not become allies with any of the local states any time soon. This balance should be preserved to minimize the negative repercussions of a possible armed conflict between America and Iran.
