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THE CAUCASUS &
GLOBALIZATION
Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 8 Issue 3-4 2014
GEOPOLITICS
THE STATES OF THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS Alla
IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATES YAZKOVA
THE RULE OF LAW AS A KEY FACTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Eldar
MAMMADOV
15
U.S. GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN THE CASPIAN REGION
Sabina GARASHOVA
24
MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND UKRAINE IN 1994-2014
Niyazi NIYAZOV
32
7
THE MUTUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSTACLES
Masoumeh Rad
GOUDARZI,
Abdollah Baei
LASHAKI,
Samira
TALEBI
GEO-ECONOMICS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN GEORGIA
Solomon PAVLIASHVILI
55
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND FORMATION OF AN INNOVATION ECONOMY IN AZERBAIJAN
Emin
MAMEDZADE
61
GEOCULTURE
ETHNOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF
THE LOUD MALE DHIKR IN INGUSH SOCIETY
Makka
ALBOGACHIEVA
68
THE AKKINTSY OF THE DARIAL AND ARMKHI GORGES: Israpil DISMANTLING OF A MYTH SAMPIEV
80
GEOHISTORY
CAUCASIAN ÉMIGRÉS
IN THE RUSSIAN MASONIC LODGES IN FRANCE (1922-1939)
Irina BABICH
92
GEORGIAN GENERALS
IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: EPISODES FROM THE HISTORY OF GEORGIAN-BALTIC RELATIONS (FROM THE 17TH C. TO THE EARLY 20TH C.)
Nikolai
JAVAKHISHVILI
109
THE KHANS OF KARABAKH: THE ELDER LINE BY GENERATIONS
Eldar Elkhan ogly ISMAILOV 123
NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL TERROR OF NATIONALISTS AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE ETHNOGENESIS OF ARMENIAN ETHNICITY (ESSAY ON SOCIAL-POLITICAL HISTORY)
Oleg
KUZNETSOV
163
ARMENIAN VOLUNTEERS
ON THE CAUCASIAN FRONT (1914-1916)
Index The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 8, 2014
Jamil HASANLI
183 202
Contributors please use the following guidelines:
— begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords;
—articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes;
—footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author's name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19;
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— the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion;
— the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.
All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.
Alla YAZKOVA
D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Head, Department of Black Sea-Mediterranean Studies, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation).
THE STATES OF THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATES
Abstract
The author identifies the main political trends of the South Caucasian states, the United States, the EU, and NATO in the context of the crisis in Eastern Europe of spring-summer 2014 and Georgia's signing of
the Association Agreement with the EU. She looks at the main trends of the multifaceted policy of the South Caucasian states stipulated by their geopolitical location, possibilities, and prospects for their cooperation with Russia.
KEYWORDS: the Southern Caucasus, regional cooperation, separatism, interstate conflicts, Russia, the European Union, the U.S., NATO, globalization, regionalism, transportation routes, strategic importance, risk factors.
Introduction
The Southern Caucasus1 is a region that is gradually gaining more and more importance as a source of huge amounts of natural gas and oil and the crossroads of European and Eurasian transportation routes. Its strategic consequence, however, is not limited to its energy potential no matter how important it may be. Its geopolitical value is created by its immediate proximity to the conflict-ridden regions of the Middle East and the fact it borders on Russia, as well as on Turkey and Iran, two regional heavyweights. Today, relations between the South Caucasian countries and their neighbors are marred by numerous recent risk factors that may upset the regional balance and change the roles and positions of extra-regional powers and their alliances—the United States, the European Union, and NATO.
These changes went through several stages:
■ The international situation created by the November 2013 EU Summit in Vilnius, at which several post-Soviet states were expected to sign the Agreements on Association and Free Trade Area;
■ The grave crisis of the spring and summer of 2014 around Ukraine, which led to armed clashes in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and claimed a multitude of civilian lives;
■ The confrontation between Russia and the United States (the West).
The "referendums" in Crimea and Sevastopol drove Russia into international isolation; Turkey, its regional partner preferred to side with the opposition among the Crimean Tatars ethnically close to the Turks.
At all times, Russia has attached special importance to the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea regions as a security guarantee of its southern border and access to the World Ocean; they have been tied by ethnocultural and confessional factors and the community of their peoples, which goes back centuries. Today, these relations are marred by risk factors and unexpected U-turns that might upset the regional political arrangements and the role of the regional and global actors, such as the U.S., NATO, the EU, Turkey, and Iran. The changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the South Caucasian states—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—are no less important.
Throughout the post-Soviet period, the regional political situation has been and remains highly unstable. Each of the three states is struggling with three levels of political tension: global (the very divergent interests and equally strong pressure of global forces); regional (unsettled conflicts, on the one hand, and the desire to organize cooperation with Turkey and Iran, on the other); and domestic (political developments inside each of the states).
The 2008 armed conflict in Georgia changed a great deal in the integration objectives of the South Caucasian states, as well as their relations with Russia and the leaders of the Euroatlantic world and its alliances. It is highly important to trace the origins of the risk factors in these relations and their dynamics.
The Global Level: the U.S., NATO, and the European Union
Early in the 2000s, the United States developed a much greater interest in the Southern Caucasus and acquired long-term aims in the region. American publications insistently repeated that protec-
1 Unlike the author, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus proceeds from the basic principle that the Caucasian region is divided into three sub-regions: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (the independent states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern ils of Turkey and the northwestern ostans of Iran) (for more details, see: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006; Idem, Tsentral 'ny Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007).
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tion of the interests of American oil monopolies in the region was one of the strategic tasks, the other being containment of Russia. The level of American involvement depended on the state of its relations with Russia and Russia's policies in the post-Soviet space.
The August 2008 events supplied Washington with an excuse to plan "confrontation to Russian expansion." The January 2009 Report of the American Heritage Foundation said, in part, that "Russia's war with Georgia was ... to reassert economic domination of the Caucasus by force and prevent additional oil and gas pipelines from being built outside Russian control." The report encouraged the Barack Obama Administration to focus on preventing "questionable Russian activities."2 They became especially obvious in the spring and summer of 2014 in the course of the international crisis around Ukraine.
Washington's course was accompanied by NATO's strategy of gradual penetration into the South Caucasian region directly connected with the task of maintaining stability along the oil- and gas pipelines. This explains why the Istanbul NATO Summit (July 2004) concentrated, for the first time in its history, on stronger ties with the Caucasian and Central Asian countries.3 It offered Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia, which announced early in 2005 that it was ready to cooperate with NATO within IPAP, new opportunities. Erevan came close to making a choice between its continued CSTO membership and further cooperation with NATO.4 Azerbaijan, likewise, moved closer to more active cooperation with NATO through an extensive political dialog within the permanent mission in Brussels and involvement in the NATO Afghan mission.5
Despite its involvement in the NATO military operations in Afghanistan and its ascension to the "intensive dialog" (ID) level, the Bucharest NATO Summit (April 2008) denied Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) because of the disagreements between the United States and the key European members. The then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pointed out that "the Russian factor could not be ignored when discussing Georgia's problems and the prospects for resolving them."6 This largely explains why the EU moved to the fore in dealing with the South Caucasian countries; it also played the main role in stemming the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008.
From the very beginning, the EU demonstrated a lot of pragmatism in the Southern Caucasus. It was one of the main initiators and investors of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor (TRACECA) designed to link Europe to the countries of Central Asia, the Middle East, China, and Japan and provide the shortest routes for delivering Caspian energy resources to Europe. In July 2003, the post of Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, similar to the one the EU had for Russia and the Ukraine, was instituted on Greece's initiative.7
This was when the EU made an attempt to settle the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia, South Os-setia, and Nagorno-Karabakh and failed because the sides flatly rejected all sorts of concessions. This is largely explained by the economic interests of elite groups in the conflict regions and outside them and the post-Soviet confrontation between the conservative and democratic forces still active in the post-Soviet space. The international mediators, Russia among them, pursued their own interests; they supported the conflicting sides, making a settlement impossible.8
2 A. Cohen, L. Scaszdi, "Russia's Drive for Global Economic Power: A Challenge for the Obama Administration", Backgrounder, No. 2235, 30 January, 2009.
3 See: Eurasia Insight, 27, July 2004, available at [www.eurasianet.org].
4 See: Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), London, 19 June, 2005.
5 See: "Azerbaijan in the World," ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 4, 15 March, 2008, pp. 1-2.
6 Kommersant, 17 September, 2008.
7 See: "The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU," ChaillotPapers, December 2003, p. 159.
8 See: P. Leiashvili, "Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: The Economic Aspects Require an In-Depth Study," The Caucasus and Globalization, Vol. 1 (2), 2007.
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In August 2008, the EU leaders did a lot to discontinue the armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia. The Extraordinary Council of the European Union convened on 1 September in Brussels adopted a special document on "the open conflict launched by Georgia," which led to "violence and an illegitimate reaction by Russia."9
The 2008 Caucasian crisis shattered the trust between Russia and the West. Since then, the EU has been struggling to weaken its energy dependence on Russia.10 On 7 May, 2009, the EU Prague Summit opened an absolutely new trend of the European Union's East European policy by adopting the Eastern Partnership Program for six countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus—which presupposed closer economic relations and their more active "involvement in Europe."
The European Parliament resolution of 20 January, 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea described the Black Sea as "partially internal to the EU and geographically mostly a European sea."11 The document said that the EU should carry out concerted actions in the region of geostrategic importance for its members and strengthen its contacts with the Black Sea countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova). The resolution pointed to the need for a Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Program and "a specific budget line for the Black Sea Strategy."12
The resolution was passed amid heated discussions. Some of the members disagreed with the EU policies in the Southern Caucasus, while other supported the description of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "occupied" territories. The majority rejected the advice offered by a U.K. deputy to keep away from a region "which belongs to the sphere of Russia's historical interests" as "unjustified skepticism."13
The South Caucasian countries, in turn, took into account the Russian factor when steering toward the European Union. "The war in Georgia, which seriously frightened post-Soviet states as well as Europe and made them realize how far Moscow was prepared to go in defending its interests, served as a powerful boost to the development of the Eastern Partnership program."14
This explains why the leading politicians of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia tried, each in his own way, to preserve the balance in their relations with the EU and Russia. Early in October 2013, at a meeting with members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council, the then Prime Minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili deemed it necessary to point out that Georgia believed that the EU should remain engaged in an intensive and principled dialog with Russia, carried out in a way that would convince Moscow that the policy pursued within the Eastern Partnership program was not aimed against Moscow. Later this was confirmed by Irakly Garibashvili, who replaced Ivanishvili as prime minister in November 2013.
Armenia found itself in a more difficult situation. It had agreed to join the Eastern Partnership program and initial the agreements on association and a free trade area at the November 2013 EU Summit. After the Moscow talks between the presidents of Armenia and Russia, which took place on 3 September, 2013, President Sargsian announced that his country would not initial the already drafted Agreement; it would join, instead, the Customs Union with a view to taking part in shaping the Eurasian Economic Union. On 10 September, 2013, Vzgliad, a newspaper of the Russian business circles, published the figures calculated by the Eurasian Bank, which illustrated how much Armenia would gain from its CU membership (lower gas prices—$180 instead of $270; positive dynamics for
9 Council of the European Union, Brussels, No. 1254/08, 1 September, 2008.
10 See: A. Mineev, "Stoit li torzhestvovat Rossii posle spetsialnogo summita ES po Gruzii?" Novaya gazeta, 4-7 September, 2008.
11 European Parliament Resolution of 20 January, 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea, available at [http://www. europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//N0NSGML+TA+P7-TA-2011-0025+0+D0C+PDF+V0//EN].
12 Ibidem.
13 [http ://www. ekhokavkaza. com/content/article/2283 5 87html].
14 [http ://imrussia. org/ en/ analysis/politics/562-the-eu-eastern-partnership-or-friendship-a-la-russe].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Armenian labor migrants; calling off trade dues, and other privileges). On the other hand, there is an opinion that Armenia retreated from its previous stand because it needed Russia (CSTO) on its side in case of a Karabakh inflammation.
Speaking at the November EU Summit, President Sargsian pointed out that his country would seek effective mechanisms of cooperation with the EU, which, on the one hand, would reflect the profound nature of bilateral social, economic, and political relations and, on the other, would not contradict other forms of its cooperation. He pointed out that the five-year long history of European Partnership confirmed its usefulness and its viability.15
President Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan, who attended the Vilnius Summit, declared that his country occupied a very special position shaped by the nature of its relations with the EU countries in the energy sphere and signed an agreement on a simpler visa regime with the European Union.
The EU Vilnius Summit of 28-29 November, 2013, at which Ukraine was expected to sign the agreement on association and a free trade area and Georgia and Moldova to initial similar agreements, was tagged by many as a "summit of failed hopes." The widening international scandal around Ukraine created a negative background for the initialing of the Association Agreement; the ceremony, which developed into nationwide celebrations, took place on 27 June, 2014 in Tbilisi and was marred by the grave crisis between the United States and Russia.
After signing the Agreement, Prime Minister Garibashvili invited Abkhazia and South Ossetia to use the economic advantages offered by the Agreement, which specifically pointed out that their products of adequate quality would be welcome in the EU.16
The economic relations between the EU and Georgia were developing in full accord with the latter's so far low development level: in 2013 its export to the EU countries was slightly over 0.5 billion euro and consisted of agricultural products, raw materials, scrap metal, and textiles, while its import from the EU countries, to the tune of over 2.5 billion euro, consisted of machines and other equipment, combustible materials, and other non-agricultural products.17
This fully applies to Armenia: over 40% of its GDP is earned by import and 10% by export, which is predominantly raw-material: ores, precious and semi-precious metals and stones.18
Thanks to its energy resources, which bring good money into its coffers, Azerbaijan is in a better situation; however, the lopsided fuel-oriented economy prevents diversification of its economic branches and the creation of new jobs. The surplus labor force seeks employment abroad, mainly in Russia. As distinct from Georgia and Moldova, Azerbaijan can and does export its agricultural products to Russia.
The Regional Level: Turkey and Iran
Along with the Euroatlantic countries, Turkey and Iran, two regional powers, are growing more and more interested in the South Caucasian states.
Back in December 1991, Turkey was the first country that recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and, later, Armenia and Georgia. It was approximately at the same time that Turkey was challenged by Iran, which was looking for its share of influence in the region and which accused Turkey of fanning pan-Turkic feelings in Azerbaijan. It feared their spread to its own multimillion
15 [http://www.regnum.ru/news1739043.html].
16 See: Ekho Kavkaza, 27 June, 2014.
17 [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151897.pdf].
18 See: A. Nranian, "Armenia: 20 let integratsii v kapitalizm—posledstviia i vyzovy," in: Yuzhny Kavkaz—20 let neza-visimosti, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2011, pp. 211-237.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Azeri population; Russia did not like it either, due to its own Turkic-speaking regions in the Northern Caucasus and the Volga area.
Having lost the Russian market, Azerbaijan and Georgia extended their economic relations with Turkey, while consistent confirmation of their territorial integrity coming from Ankara and the need to settle the "frozen" conflicts did a great deal for their political relations.
In February 2007, the presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Turkey signed the Tbilisi Declaration on a Common Vision of Regional Cooperation, the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in the Sphere of Energy, and an agreement on building the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway. Kazakhstan and China (the latter plans to use it to send its products to Europe by the shortest available route) were also interested. Turkey and Azerbaijan carry the main financial burden and, despite Washington's disapproval and its refusal to fund it if Armenian was not involved, the project preserved its initial format.
Armenia remained largely isolated because it refused to withdraw its armed units from the "controlled territories" (the Azeri districts around Nagorno-Karabakh) or move away from the preliminary conditions on which it had agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey and open its border. According to well-known Armenian political scientist St. Grigorian, there were no signs that Azerbaijan and Armenia would be ready to arrive at a Karabakh compromise any time soon. This meant that Armenia would be left out of regional projects in future too.19
The above describes the pre-2008 war situation in the region. The Russian-Georgian conflict and independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia changed a great deal in the region, in particular, because of the talks between Armenia and Turkey, which began in September 2008.
The August 2008 unofficial visit of President of Turkey Abdullah Gul to Armenia opened a period of defrosting in the relations between the two countries, which, for many decades, had no diplomatic relations. President of Armenia summed up the visit by saying that his country was ready to settle its relations with Turkey on the "no preconditions" basis, while his Turkish colleague, highly assessing the results of the bilateral talks, confirmed his proposition of 12 August, 2008 on setting up a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
It was in April 2009, in the wake of President Obama's visit to Ankara, that Turkey tried even harder to settle its relations with Armenia and open the border between the two countries. In the process of signing the road map, Turkey agreed, under American pressure, to contemplate a settlement with Armenia, leaving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict aside. As could be expected, Baku responded with a flare of indignation and, late in April of the same year, signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership between Azerbaijan and Russia in Moscow.20
The Zurich Protocols signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia on 10 October, 2009 on "good-neighborly relations without preconditions" can be described as another attempt to change the South Caucasian balance of power. Later Armenian analyst Vigen Hakobian wrote that Erevan had tried once more to disentangle itself from the transportation isolation intensified by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and failed because the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict defied all solu-tions.21
In 2010, however, Armenia and Georgia were excluded from a new set of documents on Turkey's national security as "threats to the Turkish state." In August 2010, Russia and Armenia signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership; a Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance between Turkey and Azerbaijan followed suit. In Baku, it was interpreted as evidence of the growing dissatisfaction with what the Minsk OSCE Group was doing to resolve the Karabakh conflict.22
19 See: Ponedelnik (Tbilisi), No. 5, February 2007, p. 3.
20 See: S. Tarasov, "Kavkazskiy razvod Baku i Erevana," available at [www.regnum.ru /news/], 1 May 2009.
21 See: V. Hakopian, "Turtsia, Rossia, Iran—novy peredel Zakavkazia," available at [http://www.regnum.ru. news/1278964.html].
22 [http ://russian.eurasianet.org/node. 58511].
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The new geopolitical realities determined the nature of the relations between the South Caucasian states and Iran, another regional power. The Southern Caucasus is important for Tehran economically and is doubly important from the point of view of regional and national security. Iran borders on Azerbaijan and Armenia, the relations with which can be described as specific.
In the north, Iran borders on Azerbaijan (their common border is over 600 km long); the two countries still have a long list of so far unsettled contradictions, the periodically resurfacing idea of a Greater Azerbaijan (which would include a large part of Iran's territory with a predominantly Azeri population) being one of the stumbling blocks.23
The two countries have not yet reached an agreement on the use of the Caspian resources, which negatively affects their bilateral relations; in July 2001, they came dangerously close to an armed conflict in the Caspian.24
On the other hand, the relations between Armenia and Iran are very positive for many reasons, including a large Armenian diaspora in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz. In recent years, the two countries intensified their economic contacts. It should be said that Armenia, "wedged in between" Turkey and Azerbaijan and cut off from Russia by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, can reach the outer world only across Iranian territory.
On the whole, Iran's Caucasian policy is strongly affected by Tehran's mistrust of the "Western democracies," the clashes with which (inevitable in the Southern Caucasus, according to certain Iranian analysts) cause numerous problems. M.-R. Jalili goes on to say that Iran's regional policy harmonizes, in a broader context, with the specific structures of Tehran's relations with Moscow and Ankara, on the one hand, and with the global context of international policy, on the other.25
While constrained in its foreign policy initiative by the never-ending American pressure, Iran is ready to join the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.26 Until recently, Tehran was essentially totally excluded from regional cooperation and was not mentioned in the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Its efforts to bring the conflicting sides closer failed.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
In a New System of Coordinates
On the whole, the situation in the Southern Caucasus remains unstable; its three countries are looking for ways and means to settle the frozen conflicts. Without constructive international support and firm consensus of the sides involved, they are unlikely to succeed.
Their economic development level will remain unimpressive, oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan being the only exception. This means that they should learn to take into account the major international economic and political trends and find their own niches in the world system. Eldar Ismailov and
23 Russia acquired the northern part of Azerbaijan under the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828; since that time the Azeri nation was developing in two directions: the northern part became an independent republic when the Russian Empire disintegrated and, later, one of the Soviet Union's republics that gained its independence in 1991. The southern part remained within Iran.
24 See: M.-R. Djalili, "Iran and the Caucasus: Maintaining Some Pragmatism," Connections, Vol. I, No. 3, July 2002, pp. 64, 68 (Iranian M.-R. Djalili is currently lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva).
25 See: Ibid., p. 72.
26 See: Yu. Simonian, "Posrednikov po Karabakhu stanovitsia bolshe," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 October, 2008.
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Vladimer Papava have rightly pointed out that their progress, based on "the low potential" of their economies, depended on the degree of their openness and the rates of their integration into the international economic system.27
Finally, the very different or even opposite foreign policy orientations of the three South Caucasian states cannot help them achieve full-scale cooperation. Today, the "regional historical community and Caucasian identity as an international, ideological and socially-psychological phenomenon"28 of the South Caucasian peoples are losing their previous power. Living in a single geographic space, the South Caucasian republics are disunited: there is no territorial integrity and there are very different potentials of economic cooperation with the outside world. The prospects for European integration that have opened up for some states are creating additional problems for others. Georgia and Armenia each went to their own side—the EU and the CU—which might create even more problems for Armenia which needs transit routes across Georgian territory. In September 2014, Georgia intended establishing a partial visa regime for Armenian citizens who come to stay in the country for a longer time.29
None of the three South Caucasian countries has clear ideas about its relations with the European Union. Georgia signed the agreement on association and a free trade area, which still lacks important details. Armenia has not yet signed any documents related to its choice of integration partners. Azerbaijan, the economy of which can be described as raw-material, prefers to remain neutral. On the whole, current stability is fairly precarious.
If adopted, the Aggression Prevention Act initiated by the U.S. Congress and passed in two readings in July 2014 would have extended the "major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova" to create wide possibilities for their military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Baku hailed the bill, while Deputy Defense Minister Kerem Veliev said at a press conference that NATO membership is the country's final aim.30 At the same time, Armenian experts wrote about Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan possibly drawing closer to the Customs Union members and partial de-blocking of the Armenian-Turkic border if Armenia accepted the Madrid Principles as a first step toward possible settlement of the situation around the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.31
This means that the field of geopolitical maneuvering in the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea area is widening, yet for the three South Caucasian countries the nature of their relations with Russia, their northern neighbor, remains highly important. Their positions on many international issues have undergone changes, but each of them objectively needs continued relations with Russia.
Competing with Russia in the sphere of energy supplies to Europe, Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia depend on Russia to a certain extent because of the huge number of their labor migrants in Russia. Armenia also counts on Russia to address its economic and transportation problems.
Despite the Association Agreement with the EU, Georgia has preserved its fairly stable relations with Russia and even invented a new formula of "With Russia, but not in Russia."32
27 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentral'ny Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, p. 117.
28 A. Dashdamirov, Ideologicheskie problemy mezhkavkazskikh otnosheniy, Baku, 2001, p. 14.
29 [http://www.regnum/ru/news/1828177.html]. Here and hereafter, the information is given as of the writing of this article.—Ed.
30 See: "Integrirovatsia nelzia vstupat," Kacniü-online, 22 July, 2014, available at [http://www.kaspiy.az/news. php?id=14198/].
31 See: A. Levonian, "Sblizhenie Turtsii s Tamozhennym Soiuzom i perspektivy armiano-turetskikh otnosheniy," available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news//1827528 html].
32 See: T. Japaridze, "Poisk soseda: s Rossiey, no ne v Rossii," Rossia v globalnoy politike, 20 December, 2013 (Tedo Japaridze is Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Relations of the parliament of Georgia; former foreign minister of Georgia).
In the near- and mid-term perspective, these countries are unlikely to change their relations with Russia, which means that Russia and each of the South Caucasian republics should take the objective interests of each other into account.
I
