CC BY
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УДК 94(47) «1941/1945»
N.D. Kozlov
The Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War in assessments of the Allies and the Enemy
Советское государство в годы Великой Отечественной войны в оценках союзников и противника
The article explores personal opinions and assessments on the Soviet Union and its historic role of political and military leaders, as well as those of the general public from the countries of anti-Hitler coalition and Nazi Germany, which they voiced during the war.
В статье исследуются размышления, мнения и оценки политических и военных деятелей, представителей общественности стран антигитлеровской коалиции и фашистской Германии о советском государстве и его роли, которые они высказывали в годы войны.
Key words: The Great Patriotic War, the Allies, the Enemy, Premise conditions, Military and economic potential, the Soviet state and its role, Political system, opinions, estimates.
Ключевые слова: Великая Отечественная война, союзники, противник, предпосылки, условия, военно-экономический потенциал, советское
государство, его роль, политическая система, мнения, оценки.
The Great Patriotic War (part of the WWII from the moment the Soviet Union entered the war in 1941 till Nazi Germany’s defeat in 1945) was the most dramatic challenge in the history of our country. Along with the Nazi Germany, ten other European countries joined the war against the Soviet Union. Other European countries sent volunteer divisions to the Eastern Front. The German Army Chief of Staff F. Halder recalls that on June 30, 1941 Adolf Hitler specifically discussed the issue of "unification of Europe in a joint war against Russia" with the General Committee [7, p. 55].
So why did the Soviet Union, which is usually depicted by the rivals of our Fatherland as a state where everyone lived "in a state of fear" and "nothing was right", not only survived the war, but eventually defeated the Nazi Germany and its allies?
The victory in the War was attributed to a number of interrelated factors of economic, social, military, spiritual, and political nature. In recent decades, for political and tactical reasons these factors have
© Kozlov N.D., 2015
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beenforgotten or omitted. In some cases, the significance of such wartime reality-based factors as the unity of the front and rear, planned economy, friendship among different nationalities, Soviet education, in the history of the War and the Soviet’s eventual victory,are being denied. The unity of the country's leaders and the people, the role of theSocialist party, Soviet political system, the Supreme Commander and others, are being subjected to ridicule and humiliation, distorted, denied or forgotten. As a result, a significant number of modern people consider these factors as propaganda. However, Soviet veterans, as well as war allies and enemies, regarded those factors as the most important prerequisites for success and victory.
Not only in the West, but also among the post-Soviet circle, there have been numerous attempts to replace the core meaning and consequences, as well as to negatively present the role of the Soviet Union,and to diminish the contribution of the Soviet people and the Russian state in the defeat of the aggressor and the liberation of other nations.Therefore, the article covers only statements, opinions and estimates expressed by the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, the military, and thepeople of the allied countries, along with the enemy of the Soviet state during the War.
The invaders originally envisioned the Red Army to be defeated in the "blitzkrieg" (was fast as a lightning) within six to eight weeks, and the Soviet state, torn by internal contradictions, would collapse. Secretary of War Stimson G. in June of 1941 reported to the US President Roosevelt that Germany was to defeat the Soviet Union "in one month or at most in three" [6, p. 14]. The British Lieutenant-General D. Brauning wrote in January of 1942: "I remember very well hearing it in June of 1941, when Hitler made his unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, that the Germans were to be in Moscow in three weeks. It was not the official point of view, however, such a belief was widespread..." [17, p. 172].
However, due to growing resistance of the Soviet people and later military successes, opinions of the Soviet state, the army, and the people’s ability to repel an aggressor, were changing. They had to admit that the Red Army fought bravely, was not going to give up or turn their bayonets against the Soviet system. Politicians and experts were trying to identify the reasons for such strength of the Soviet state.One of the first Ministers of Propaganda in the Nazi Germany, J. Goebbels, who before the War believed that "Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards," on July 2 wrote in his diary: "The Red regime mobilized the people", thus recognizing the power of the Soviet state [11, p. 321]. Shortly after, on August 11, 1941, F. Halder wrote in his diary: "The overall situation is making it more obvious and clear that the Russian colossus ... we have underestimated. This statement can be extended to all administrative and organizational aspects, on means of
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communication and, in particular, on Russian military capabilities" [7, p. 264].
The German Intelligence Agency, which studied the mood of German soldiers and ostarbeiters, based on the analysis and observations, reported in 1942 by the authorities that the Soviet political system "actions of the State Political Administrationdo not define the essential part of life in the Soviet Union, as was previously thought" [8, p. 95].
German experts and the general public gradually realized that the Soviet social system provided a decent level of education and health, brought courage and collective solidarity [8, p. 93-95].
The Security division Commander on the Eastern Front Sepp Dietrich noted the intelligence and trainability of the Soviet citizens in his observations. "Very intelligent people, healthy by nature, manageable, and quick to understand technical aspects. ... These huge modern factories, agricultural institutions - it is just grand..." [10, p. 271].
Adolf Hitler, who aimed at the destruction of the USSR, in July of 1942 in a close circle mentioned that in "ten to fifteen years Russia would become the most powerful nation in the world, and it would take two or three centuries to change the state of things." He noted the uplift living standards of the population, development of industrial centers and the railway system "which was not yet on our maps," highly appreciated the Stakhanov movement, continuous success "in the education of the Russian workers”, and ambitious plans for economic development.
The Soviet political system, according to B. Shelenberg, G. Mueller,
J. Ribbentrop and other prominent functionaries of Nazi Germany, was identified with Stalin, who, Hitler stressed, "also needed to be treated with due respect" [14, p. 13-14, 18, 35].
The proof of courage of the Soviet people can be found in official statements, telegrams and memoires of political and military leaders of the Allies during World War II. During the war, their assessments and attitude towards the struggle of the Soviet people underwent several changes, depending on military and political situation, alignment of political forces within the country, nature of relations between the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, and a number of other factors. However, intact was the recognition of the contribution of the Soviet people in the fight against the common enemy. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for instance, in his letters to the Soviet political leaders "expressed admiration of the brilliant success" of the Red Army. In February of 1943, he wrote that the chain of extraordinary victories restricted him from finding the words to express his admiration and gratitude towards the Russian military [12, p. 49, 121].
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Churchill emphasized that the Red Army dealt the German army "a fatal blow, which could not be done by any other army in the world" [5,
p. 1].
"We are amazed at the power of the Russian resistance and the skill with which it is carried out, - Winston Churchill wrote to his wife in October of 1941. We sincerely admire the valor, fortitude and patriotic self-sacrifice of the Russian people" [12, p. 219-220].
Paying tribute to the struggle of the Soviet people, the Allies began to evaluate military,economic and political leadership of the USSRmore objectively. Thosemilitary successes evoked interest in the Soviet political regime, the one thatcreated a strong army with strong spirit.
Admiring the courage and resilience of soldiers of the Red Army, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in February of 1942 in a letter to Joseph Stalin mentioned that such greatness could only be achieved by an army with able leadership, "strong organization, adequate training ...". He also pointed out that the political system of the country were to ensure the unity of the army and people [13, p. 76].
The British weekly "The British Ally," concluded that the development of the post-revolutionary Soviet Russia made it "an important and valuable factor in the life of Europe and in the development of European civilization." The Editorial officehad an opinion that political system, social and national structure of the Soviet Union allowedit to solve a number of pan-European issues, including the position of women in society, relationship between the nation and others [3, p. 9].
Other members of the Allies believed that the Soviet system contributed to the establishment of such prerequisites for victory, as the implementation of large-scale industrial projects, provision of "ethnic democracy and freedom in education," the unity of the people, and high political consciousness of the army and the people [4, p. 1, 5]. In June of 1942, the British internal counterintelligence concluded that public opinion attributed success of the Red Army to the Soviet political system. On the brink of 1942 and 1943, it again mentioned the sympathy for the USSR among the workers and their interest in the Soviet social and political system, for which the Soviet people fought selflessly. D.A. Belov states that English historian F. Bell "based on an analysis of the British press, came to a conclusion that it represented the Stalingrad battle as a Stalin’s personal victory and largely a victory the political system" [2, p. 74].
Analysts believed the Party to be an important element of the political system of the Allies. In 1944, American researchers noticed that the Party was becoming bigger and stronger as "communists had leadership, programs, and, moreover, means. When there was a need for a feat, communists had their pamphlets. When a song was needed to
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improve the morale, they had a song, very inspirational. When the there was a need for very scarce building materials, the Party channel was the fastest way to bypass the bureaucracy of the wartime”. Analysts noted ay that the presence of the Party could be felt everywhere: in army units and guerrilla groups, military factories, collective farms and theaters, on the radio and in the press, at educational institutions and government agencies. The Party "was the cement that sealed the bricks of the Stalinist fortress" [15, p. 11-17].
A generalized description of the role of the political system in achieving victory was given by US experts. In March of 1943, the US President's Committee on protocol relations with the Soviet Union prepared a memorandum for Mr. Hopkins - Advisor and Special Assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The document concluded that the Soviet Union was a decisive factor in the war and it needed to render all possible assistance. "In Russia, the dictatorship, perhaps the most absolute of all that has ever been in the world - said the authors of the document. Russia is very proud of the successes achieved under this dictatorship. There is no doubt that without this dictatorship, Germany would have won the war" [9, p. 168].
After the war, the CIA gathered specialists from different departments and compiled a report on the possible consequences of Stalin's death, for a narrow circle of senior US officials. The report noted the decisive role of Stalin in the political system, emphasized that he had "turned Russia into an industrial and military power ... and repulsed the German invasion of the Soviet Union ... led the people of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian history" [1, p. 32-33].
Thus, both Allies and the enemy were compelled to recognize the significance of the Soviet state and its political system in creation of prerequisites and conditions necessary for the conduct of the war.
Important parts of this system were Stalin and the Communist Party, which played an important role in ensuring the ultimate performance in the conduct of all state and military activities.
The established ruling system was able to function in extreme conditions of war, allowed the accumulation of all forces and resources of the country and its people for achieving victory.
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