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28В. Джеффрис
СОЦИОЛОГИЯ ДОБРА И КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ДОБРОДЕТЕЛИ V. Jeffries1
The sociology of the good and the concept of virtue
In his 1965 Presidential address to the American sociological association Pitirim A. Sorokin evaluated the state of the discipline. In so doing, he advocated an important vision of how sociology could progress as a science. This vision of future growth included the prediction that sociology would replace an emphasis on the study of social pathologies with a more balanced approach. Equal attention woulc^ be given to positive sociocultural phenomena, such as creativity and altruism .
This focus of scientific activity on the positive, or good, was previously elaborated by Sorokin . A number of specific topical areas were suggested: increasing social harmony by discovering new resources for satisfying vital mental, moral and sociocultural needs, thereby alleviating the struggle for subsistence as a source of conflict; gathering and disseminating scientific evidence demonstrating the negative effects of crime and war as a means of reducing their occurrence; logically and empirically elaborating and substantiating the characteristics of a system of culture that would provide for the solidarity and unity of all human beings; investigating the nature of altruistic love and the techniques of altruistic transformation of individuals, institutions, and culture; developing deeper and more extensive knowledge of human nature, institutions, and culture that can serve as a basis for more effectively meeting basic human needs; providing scientific knowledge of which specific techniques of altruistic transformation are most effective for given individuals and situations; and increasing knowledge of how the adequacy of love, in terms of the effectiveness
1 California state university, Northridge.
2 Sorokin P.A. Sociology of yesterday, today and tomorrow // American sociological rev. -Wash., 1965. - Vol. 30, N 6. - P. 834-835, 838.
3 Sorokin P.A. The ways and power of love. - Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2002. - P. 473-480.
of actions intended to benefit others, can be improved. This reorientation of sociology toward the study of the positive would enable the discipline to generate knowledge and understanding that could contribute significantly to the general social welfare.
This change in emphasis toward studying the positive, or good, has already taken place in psychology. After World War II the science of psychology focused on pathologies and ways of healing them. However, in recent years an intellectual movement espousing the study of human strengths, goodness, and flourishing has established a viable tradition referred to as «positive psychology»1. The aim of the positive psychology movement has been to correct the previous imbalance by studying positive human traits, and how they may function as preventives against pathologies. This «refocusing of scientific energy» has led to the study of phenomena such as love, forgiveness, the virtues, and human competency2.
The nature of good
At the highest level of value generalization Sorokin identifies goodness, along with truth and beauty, as the «supreme» values. In his view «the main historical mission of mankind consists in an unbounded creation, accumulation, refinement, and actualization» of these values3. Wendell Bell4 has characterized a «sociology of the good» as one focused on the investigation of values that appear to be universal, and an assessment of their beneficial effects.
Formulating a conception of the nature of the good, and the variety of its particular manifestations, requires a dialogue that would take place continuously within the discipline of sociology. This exploration of the nature of goodness is an important task of critical sociology in Burawoy's5 holistic model of the discipline.
A general orientation adequate for this article is that «good» means the perfection of those beneficial properties that are proper to the essential nature of a given entity. The highest range of good is thus the fullest possible actualiza-
1 Snyder C.R., Lopez S.J. Handbook of positive psychology. - N.Y.; Oxford: Oxford univ. press, 2005.
2 Seligman M.E.P. Positive psychology, positive prevention and positive therapy // Ibid. -
P. 8.
3 Sorokin P.A. Integralism is my philosophy // Sorokin P.A. This is my philosophy. -N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1957. - P. 184.
4 Bell W. Public sociology and the future: The possible, the probable and the preferable // Handbook of public sociology // Ed. by V. Jeffries. - Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. - P. 95-96.
5 BurawoyM. For public sociology // American sociological rev. - Wash., 2005. -Vol. 70, N 1. - P. 4-28.
tion of all positive potentials1. The specific qualities of goodness thus differ according to the nature and potentials of the particular entity under consideration.
The triadic matrix and the study of the good
The substantive concerns of the scientific study of the good are inevitably shaped by the disciplinary context in which they are formulated. In sociology, the basic conceptual frame of reference of culture, society and personality provides the most general context for formulating ideas regarding the nature of the good and its particular manifestations. Thus the nature of the good in the human person is of necessity different than it is in society or culture, since each are distinct entities with different properties and processes.
Sorokin explicitly designated the concepts of culture, society, and personality as the basic frame of reference of sociology2. Parsons later located them in an interdisciplinary framework3. These foundational ideas were developed in the writings of the classical theorists4.
Essential and universal components of the reality that is the subject matter of sociological analysis are identified by these concepts. Indeed, no single component can exist without the others. Therefore, to achieve the most complete and comprehensive sociological analysis, each component of the «triadic matrix» must be referred to the others5.
Each of these general concepts designates aspects of reality that include numerous, varied, and distinct phenomena. Accordingly, different concepts are necessary to identify and analyze specific phenomena within the abstract domain of each of these three general concepts. Similarly, different conceptions of the good are necessary depending on the particular focus of study.
The sociology of the good: alternative formulations
The idea of the sociology of the good thus entails different sociological phenomena at different levels of analysis. Recent examples of phenomena
1 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. - P. 663; Aquinas Th. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. - Notre Dame (ID): Dumb Ox books, 1993. - P. 4, 41.
2 Sorokin P.A. Society, culture and personality. - N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1947. - P. 63-64; Sorokin P.A. Sociological theories of today. - N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1966. - P. 636-637.
3 Parsons T. An outline of the social system // Theories of society / Ed. by T. Parsons, E. Shils, K.D. Naegele, J.R. Pitts. - N.Y.: Free press, 1961. - Vol. 1. - P. 30-79; Toward a general theory of action / Ed. by T. Parsons, E.A. Shils. - Cambridge (MA): Harvard univ. press, 1951.
4 Parsons T. The structure of social action. - N.Y.: Free press, 1968.
5 Sorokin P.A. Society, culture and personality. - N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1947. - P. 64.
viewed as positive or good include: generosity1; unlimited love2; virtue3; human rights4; individual and intergroup forgiveness5; global altruism6; and universalizing solidarity7.
Ideas of the good can be placed within a broad and integrated theoretical and research framework. In this systemic context, multiple conceptions of the good serve as fundamental organizing ideas at different levels of analysis. The works of Pitirim Sorokin and Eric Olin Wright provide examples of such systemic sociologies of the good.
Pitirim Sorokin specifies the nature of goodness at both the personality and sociocultural levels of analysis8. His foundational premise is the beneficial nature of altruistic love. At the level of personality, this form of love is a curative, life-giving, integrative, and creative power in the lives of individuals. This love entails unselfishness, sacrifice, cooperation, and giving of self for the welfare of others. It is inseparably linked with the idea of the goodness of indi-viduals9.
At the level of interaction, altruistic love is manifested in some, but not all, instances of solidary interaction10. In this form of interaction the intentions and behavior of the interacting parties concur and facilitate the realization of their objectives11. Solidarity can vary in intensity and extensity. The characteristics of altruistic love are usually manifested only in instances of solidary interaction that involve higher levels of intensity and extensity.
At the more complex and sociocultural level of social relationships, the ideal type of familistic social relationships most closely parallels the characteristics of altruistic love as they are manifested in interactional patterns and normative and value systems12. Familistic social relationships are characterized by
1 Science of generosity. - Mode of access: http://www.generosityresearch.nd.edu
2 PostS.G. Unlimited love. - Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2003.
3 Jeffries V. The integral paradigm: The truth of faith and the social sciences // The American sociologist. - N.Y., 1999. - Vol. 29, N 3. - P. 36-55; Levine D.N. Visions of the sociological tradition. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1995; Smith Ch. What is a person? -Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 2010.
4 Blau J., Moncada A. Human rights. - Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2005; Howard-Hassmann R.E. Public sociology and universal human rights // Handbook of public sociology / Ed. by V. Jeffries. - Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. - P. 357-373.
5 Oliner S.P. Altruism, apology, forgiveness and reconciliation as public sociology // Ibid. -P. 375-390.
6 Tiryakian E.A. Global altruism: Some considerations // Ibid. - P. 409-427.
7 Alexander J. C. The civil sphere. - N.Y.: Oxford, 2006.
8 Jeffries V., Pitirim A. Sorokin's integralism and public sociology // The American sociologist. - N.Y., 2005. - Vol. 36, N 3-4. - P. 72-76.
9 Sorokin P.A. The ways and power of love. - Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2002. - P. 47-79.
10 Ibid. - P. 13.
11 Sorokin P.A. Society, culture and personality. - N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1947. - P. 93-99.
12 Ibid. - P. 99-102, 109-110.
a strong sense of unity, a willingness to sacrifice self to benefit others, and a normative system stipulating an unlimited ethical motivation toward providing for the needs of the group and each of its individual members. In purest form, these social relationships are most often found found in harmonious families, although they can also predominate in various other groups, such as close friends, religious organizations, or military units. Conversely, many families seldom or rarely manifest familistic social relationships in their culture or interaction.
Altruism, solidarity interactions, and familistic social relationships are sustained by a culture in which the ethical and normative systems emphasize cooperation, helping, and mutual aid1. When these norms are universal, they are generally effective in controlling behavior2.
The study of the good in Sorokin thus focuses on creative and unselfish love. As a sociological variable it is identified as altruistic love at the level of individual personality and as solidarity and familistic relations at the sociocul-tural level. The normative system of culture is universal, effective, and supportive. This conception of the good is the foundation of a detailed program of altruistic transformation3, sociocultural reconstruction4, and the reorientation and restructuring of the exercise of power in societies5.
Another perspective on the sociology of the good is provided by Erik Olin Wright's (2010)6 model of emancipatory social science. The fundamental premise of this model is that the search for scientific knowledge has a moral purpose: eliminating oppression and creating conditions for human flourishing7. The good to be sought is identified as justice, entailing two forms, social and political. In social justice, access is available for the means necessary for human flourishing, viewed as the development of the various and different talents and capacities of individuals. In political justice, people have access to the means to participate in decisions that affect their lives, both as separate persons and collectively.
This idea of good in terms of the lives of individuals provides the basis for evaluating and potentially changing structures and institutions. Changes at this sociocultural level are necessary to achieve greater justice8. Foremost in
1 Sorokin P.A. Society, culture and personality. - N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1947. - 119-144.
2 Sorokin P.A. The conditions and prospects for a world without war // On the practice of sociology / Ed. by B.V. Johnston. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1998. - P. 279-291.
3 Sorokin P.A. The ways and power of love. - Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2002.
4 Sorokin P.A. The crisis of our age. - N.Y.: Dutton, 1941; Sorokin P.A. The reconstruction of humanity. - Boston (MA): Beacon press, 1948.
5 Sorokin P.A., Lunden W. Power and morality. - Boston (MA): Extending horizons,
1959.
6 Wright E.O. Envisioning real utopias. - N.Y.: Verso, 2010.
7 Ibid. - P. 10.
8 Ibid.
these is the transition to an economic structure based on democratic socialism. In this form of economic structure power is derived primarily from voluntary associations located in a developed civil society. Democratic socialism is posed as an alternative to capitalistic economic systems, in which private ownership of the means of production is the primary source of power, and statism, in which the state is the primary source of power1.
The realization of the normative purpose of sociology is achieved through a model of practice entailing three basic tasks. The first task, diagnosis and critique, assesses the degree to which existing structures and institutions harm individuals, and seeks to identify the relevant causal mechanisms. The second task of sociological analysis is the proposal of alternative structures and institutions that would more adequately provide for the conditions necessary for the stipulated good of the forms of justice. The final task is the exploration of the problematics of transformation and formulation of strategies and tactics to achieve movement toward sociocultural conditions conducive to greater social and political justice2.
Each of these theorists formulates multiple conceptions of the good that are located at different levels of analysis. Each also provides a program for reaching the stipulated goods. Yet the two systems of sociology and their focus are distinctive and different. The sociology of the good thus transcends any particular theoretical approach or particular conception of the good. What is common is a clearly articulated vision of the good and a theoretical and research agenda that can facilitate the participation of sociology in providing vital knowledge and understanding to the general society.
On the concept of virtue
In exploring the nature of the sociology of the good this article focuses on the concept of virtue. In contemporary writings, the virtues are typically defined as personality traits that provide impetus to judgments, choices, and behavior. The virtues are regarded as entailing dispositions and behaviors that are manifestations of human excellence and flourishing of various types3.
The idea of virtue represents one of the oldest and most persistent ideas in the history of speculative thinking4. From a historical perspective, analysis of the nature and effects of the virtues dates to Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, and to early Judaism and Christianity. The identity and nature of the virtues was explored further during the Middle Ages. Foundational schemes of
1 WrightE.O. Envisioning real utopias. - N.Y.: Verso, 2010. - P. 110-128.
2 Ibid. - P. 11-29.
3 Peterson Ch., SeligmanM.E.P. Character strengths and virtues. - N.Y.: Oxford univ. press, 2004. - P. 87.
4 Maclntyre A. After virtue. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1984; Pieper J. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966.
the virtues such as those of Aristotle1 and Aquinas2 focus attention on fundamental and continually recurring aspects of human motivation and behavior. The latter part of the twentieth century was characterized by a widespread and pronounced revitalization of interest in virtue ethics, which persists to this time3. Studies of the virtues have become an ongoing research topic in psychology in recent years4.
Traditionally, virtues have been viewed as representing human goodness and as the criteria of greater perfection5. Since virtue is a disposition that is directed toward the good, it is consistent with the true nature of human beings6. As acts, virtues are choices that can become operative habits with repetition. As such, they increase the goodness of the individual and contribute to the perfection of various positive potentialities of human nature7.
The writings of Aquinas8 present a comprehensive and logically systematic scheme of the virtues. In this scheme a distinction is made between «primary», or basic, virtues and «secondary» virtues. A secondary virtue is a «part» of a given primary virtue. This is the case because secondary virtues represent a more specific application of the essential characteristic of the primary virtue of which they are a part. Based on Aquinas' writings, five primary virtues are: temperance, fortitude, justice, charity, and prudence9. This scheme identifies a full spectrum of attitudes and behaviors that are inherent to human beings and to social interaction. The five primary virtues are defined, along with some of their attendant secondary virtues.
Temperance. The essence of temperance is restraint, moderation, and discipline with respect to the appetites, passions, and the desire for pleasure10. This foundational characteristic can be manifested in a number of more specific orientations. The secondary virtue of meekness is the exercise of restraint and discipline in the moderation, control, and positive use of the passion of anger. Another secondary virtue, humility, is an objective recognition of one's own
1 Aristotle. The basic works of Aristotle. - N.Y.: Random house, 1941. - P. 928-1112.
2 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. -P. 817-894, 1263-1879.
3 Smith Ch. What is a person? - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 2010. - P. 385.
4 Peterson Ch., SeligmanM.E.P. Character strengths and virtues. - N.Y.: Oxford univ. press, 2004.
5 MacIntyre A. After virtue. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1984; Pieper J. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966.
6Aquinas Th Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. - P. 897.
7 Ibid.-819-827.
8 Ibid.-817-894, 1263-1879.
9 Jeffries V. Virtue and the altruistic personality // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 1998. - Vol. 41, N 1. - P. 151-166; Jeffries V. Virtue and marital conflict: A theoretical formulation and research agenda // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 2000. - Vol. 43, N 2. - P. 231-246.
10 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. -P. 1757-1879.
limitations and failings, and a complementary recognition and deference to the good qualities of others. Sobriety and chastity are also parts of temperance.
Fortitude. The criterion of fortitude is steadfastness in pursuing the good in spite of difficulty, adversity, opposition, or danger1. Patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude. Patience involves persistence in seeking the good despite sorrows, especially the sorrows brought about by the actions of others. Perseverance pertains to the bearing of difficulties in pursuit of the good over a long period of time.
Justice. Rendering to others their basic rights, or dues, is the fundamental characteristic of justice2. This virtue includes both fairness, according to some kind of equality, and the effort to fulfill responsibilities to others. In this general sense, justice gives recognition to the rights of others. Friendliness, gratitude, and truthfulness are secondary parts of justice.
Charity. The essence of the virtue of charity is the love of benevolence, in which good is wished to another3. This virtue includes a variety of acts intended to do good to another. Appropriately meeting the needs of others, correcting them when necessary, forgiving them, and tolerating their faults and imperfections, are all manifestations of charity. Charity goes beyond the obligation of justice in that it entails benefitting others irrespective of their merit4.
Prudence. Prudence is an intellectual virtue5. The other primary and secondary virtues define what is good. Prudence entails the use of reason and objectivity to choose the most suitable means to realize the good. The exercise of prudence thus perfects the ability to make right choices. Secondary parts of this virtue are docility, an openness to the viewpoints of others, and solicitude, a watchfulness and alertness in seeking to realize the good.
The virtues are attributes of the personality and behavior of individuals, yet they are inevitably implicated in varying degrees in the countless sequences of interaction that constitute group life. They are both independent and dependent variables: they influence the quality and direction of interaction, and are also formed partly through that interaction. Two substantive areas in which the concept of virtue has great analytical potential are the study of love and the study of morality.
1 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. -P. 1699-1755.
2 Ibid. - P. 1423-1698.
3 Ibid. - P. 1263-1305.
4 Kohlberg L. The philosophy of moral development. - San Francisco (CA): Harper & Row, 1981. - P. 311-372.
5 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. -P. 817-894, 1263-1879. See also: Pieper J. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966. - P. 3-40; Selznick Ph. The moral commonwealth. - Berkeley: Univ. of California press, 1992. - P. 60-61.
В. Джеффрис
Benevolent love and the concept of virtue
Love is multidimensional. On the basis of his comprehensive study of the history of ideas about the nature of love, Singer1 characterizes two basic forms of love, «appraisal» and «bestowal». Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, conceptions of the nature of love, ranging from Plato to contemporary writings, identify one or both of these ideal types. Though analytically distinct, both forms of love are present in varying degrees in the psyche of individuals and in social interaction2.
Appraisal is a love based on self-gratification. The utility of the other for the satisfaction of one's desires, appetites, and needs is of primary concern3. In contrast, bestowal is a love in which the general well being of the other is of primary concern. The other is accepted as he or she is, with faults and failings. Benevolence is a necessary condition for bestowal, and is manifested in caring for the interests and welfare of the other, respect of individuality, protection of the other, and self-sacrifice4. This same basic distinction between receiving and giving love is evident in both contemporary theories of love and in empirical research5.
Bestowal has traditionally been identified as benevolent love. This form of love is the focus of this article. Benevolence is the love considered by Aris-totle6 in his analysis of true friendship, and by Aquinas7 in his analysis of charity. The concept of benevolent love is also generally comparable to various definitions of altruism in the interdisciplinary field of prosocial and altruistic behavior8.
The essential nature of benevolent love is that good is wished to the other, and appropriately manifested in behavior intended to benefit the other in some manner. Such a general idea obviously has many different and more spe-
1 Singer I. The nature of love. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1984. - Vol. 1: Plato to Luther. - P. 33-38; Singer I. The nature of love. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1987. - Vol. 3: The modern world. - P. 157-158.
2 Jeffries V. Virtue and marital conflict: A theoretical formulation and research agenda // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 2000. - Vol. 43, N 2. - P. 231-246; Rubin Z. Liking and loving. - N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973. - P. 214; Singer I. The nature of love. -Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1987. - Vol. 3: The modern world. - P. 389-406.
3 Singer I. Op. cit. - P. 390-396.
4 Singer I. The nature of love. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1984. - Vol. 1: Plato to Luther. - P. 5-11; Singer I. The nature of love. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1987. - Vol. 3: The modern world. - P. 392-396.
5 Jeffries V. Virtue and attraction: Validation of a measure of love // J. of social a. personal relationships. - L., 1993. - Vol. 10, N 1. - P. 99-112.
6Aristotle. The basic works of Aristotle. - N.Y.: Random house, 1941. - P. 1058-1102.
7 Aquinas Th. Summa theologica. - Westminster (MD): Christian classics, 1981. -P. 1263-1335.
8 Jeffries V. Virtue and the altruistic personality // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 1998. - Vol. 41, N 1. - P. 151-166.
cific manifestations, both psychological and behavioral. What is beneficial to the other can vary widely in content, and also according to both time and situ-ational context1. A deeper understanding of the nature of benevolent love and its empirical referents thus requires an enumeration of its component parts.
One perspective through which this problem can be approached is to consider that the foundational components of benevolent love are the virtues. In personality theory, the virtues can be viewed as schemas. As such they are psychic structures that involve particular ways of thinking and acting, and are a basis for understanding and evaluating. They are stored in memory, exist at both unconscious and conscious levels, and can be activated by psychic or social sources2.
Because of its content as an idea, each virtue provides for a particular way of benefitting the other, and thus loving them. Each virtue can be regarded as both initiating and maintaining behaviors in response to the particular nature of the need of the other and the situational context.
Temperance, along with its various manifestations of self-control in related secondary virtues, limits behavior that is often contradictory to love. It further provides the discipline and stability necessary for giving to another in a consistent manner. Without temperance, it is difficult for the other virtues to develop and be established as consistent habits that express the different manifestations of benevolent love3.
Fortitude is relevant to a love in which the good of the other is sought because benefitting another is by its very nature a sustained activity that inevitably involves some degree of difficulty, hardship, and occasionally danger. Fortitude enables benevolent love to remain viable under such circumstances.
Justice provides for fulfilling basic responsibilities that are frequently an integral part of loving another. Justice requires a fundamental good will and fairness that is particularly important in situations of dealing with individual and group differences, and in relation to out-groups.
Manifestations of charity such as meeting needs, forgiving, giving counsel, and correction are necessary to do good to others under given circumstances. Such actions are often considered as representing the essence of love.
Prudence is the rational element necessary to make the best decisions about how to manifest the intent to love another, or to give love in a particular
1 Jeffries V. Virtue and marital conflict: A theoretical formulation and research agenda // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 2000. - Vol. 43, N 2. - P. 231-246.
2 Brewer W.F., Nakamura G. V. The nature and functions of schemas // Handbook of social cognition // Ed. by R. S. Wyer, T.K. Srull. - Mahwah (NJ): Erlbaum associates, 1984. -P. 119-160.
3 PieperJ. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966. - P. 145-206.
instance1. Making the right choices of how best to benefit others is the foundation of an adequate practice of love2.
In summary, the love of benevolence is the attempt to benefit other persons through caring, giving, and in some instances sacrificing of self. Each virtue makes a particular contribution to the ability of the individual to consistently practice benevolent love in his or her relations with others. The relevance of particular virtues varies according to the situation. For example, at one time this love will call for the practice of justice; another time it will call for the exercise of fortitude, and so forth. The full and consistent expression of the love of benevolence requires the manifestation of all the virtues3.
The idea of benevolent love as virtue has the potential to make important contributions to understanding sociological phenomena. It specifies different dispositions and manifestations of seeking to do good to the other. In so doing, it opens new perspectives for the study of the structure and dynamics of interaction and intergroup relations in a variety of contexts. Except for the framework provided by the analysis of altruism and prosocial behavior, sociologists have failed to develop and apply a generalized concept of love that entails seeking the welfare of the other. For example, Bahr and Bahr4 note that self sacrifice as a giving of self for the benefit of others is a basic part of both family life and social life generally. Yet a concept of sacrificial love is virtually absent from family theory, an area where it is obviously relevant.
Morality and the concept of virtue
The ideas of Emile Durkheim are foundational in the sociological study of morality. There are interesting parallels between Durkheim's5 concept of morality and its components and the virtues.
In the most general sense, Durkheim6 maintains that morality is a system of rules that directs and determines conduct in a variety of situations. Two aspects of these rules are essential. First, morality entails the idea of duty. Second, morality is also «a morality of the good, since it assigns to human activity an
1 Pieper J. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966. - P. 3-40.
2 Sorokin P.A. The ways and power of love. - Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2002. - P. 17-19.
3 Jeffries V. Virtue and the altruistic personality // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 1998. - Vol. 41, N 1. - P. 151-166; Jeffries V. Virtue and marital conflict: A theoretical formulation and research agenda // Sociological perspectives. - Berkeley (CA), 2000. - Vol. 43, N 2. - P. 231-246.
4 BahrH.M., BahrK.S. Families and self-sacrifice: Alternative models and meanings for family theory // Social forces. - Oxford, 2001. - Vol. 79, N 4. - P. 1231-1258.
5 Dürkheim E. Sociology and philosophy. - Glencoe (IL): Free press, 1953; Dürkheim E. Moral education. - N.Y.: Free press, 1961.
6 Durkheim E. Moral education. - P. 24.
end that is good»1. Understanding the elements of morality does not involve «a complete listing of all the virtues, or even the most important»2, but rather a consideration of the fundamental mental dispositions that are the foundations of moral life. There are three: discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy, or self-determination3.
Discipline is the foundational element of morality4. It promotes regularity in conduct by limiting and constraining. It entails restricting inclinations, suppressing appetites, moderating tendencies, and exercising self-control. Discipline thus involves subjecting passions, desires, and habits «to law» and developing «self-mastery»5. Discipline «gives the unity and continuity» that are the «essential preconditions of personality»6. The practice of discipline teaches the individual that conduct should follow enduring principles that are ordered to determinate goals.
Attachment to groups is the second component of morality7. Morality involves goals that go beyond individual interests to the pursuit of impersonal ends. Their object is society, in terms of the collective interest. These «general interests of humanity» include «an access to justice», a correspondence between merit and conditions of life, and «preventing individual suffering»8. Charity is an interest in the welfare of others on a «person to person» basis9. Charity at this level has only «a secondary and subordinate place in the system of moral behav-ior»10. However it «has moral value... because it points to a moral propensity to sacrifice, to go beyond one's self, to go beyond the circle of self-interest»11. Collective action that is concentrated and organized is necessary to affect society and remedy social evils. Therefore, «genuinely moral ends» are collective and involve attachment to groups, which are the «truly moral force»12. Morality involves identification with all groups, but the nation has «pre-eminence»13. Collective action in groups «takes on a higher moral character precisely because it serves more impersonal, more general ends»14.
1 Durkheim E. Moral education. - P. 122.
2 Ibid. - P. 21.
3 Durkheim E. Sociology and philosophy. - Glencoe (IL): Free press, 1953; Durkheim E. Moral education. - N.Y.: Free press, 1961.
4 Durkheim E. Moral education. - P. 17-63.
5 Ibid. - P. 46.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. - P. 55-94.
8 Ibid. - P. 77.
9 Ibid. - P. 82.
10 Ibid. - P. 83.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. - P. 82.
13 Ibid. - P. 80.
14 Ibid. - P. 84.
The third element of morality is autonomy, or self-determination. It is constituted especially by the application of reason as a part of morality. Autonomy involves individuals deliberating and choosing in the application of moral principles. Morality thus entails «an enlightened assent» to a moral code because «we deem it good»1. Adherence to a moral order is ideally based on knowledge of the «nature of things»2. Assessing the extent to which the existing moral order conforms to this reality, rather than being pathological, is an aspect of the exercise of autonomy. Morality involves a reasoned and free choice in view of this knowledge. These aspects of autonomy are also exercised in the necessity of individual initiative in applying moral rules in particular situations3.
There are clear parallels between the five virtues emphasized in this article and Durkheim's three elements of morality. The primary virtue of temperance is essentially similar to the concept of discipline. The virtue of fortitude appears to be implied in Durkheim's mention of attributes of discipline such as effort, enduring goals, and self-mastery as ongoing dispositions of the moral life. Firmness in facing difficulties and hardships, the essence of fortitude, seems an inevitable requirement in developing and maintaining these dispositions over time.
Justice and charity are both explicitly mentioned by Durkheim as aspects of the second element of morality, attachment to groups. His ambivalence toward charity is focused on levels of analysis. Higher moral value is given to group activity. Yet, it appears the spirit of self-sacrifice and concern for the welfare of others characteristic of charity are still motivational forces giving impetus to individuals' involvement in collective action at meso or macro levels.
The emphasis Durkheim places on rational deliberation and individual choice in morality is similar to the essence of the virtue of prudence. Prudence is the operation of reason in making the best choices consistent with morality. Traditional ideas of this virtue emphasize reason, deliberation, objectivity, and openness to the ideas of others in making moral choices. In this sense prudence orders and commands the other virtues4. The capacity to choose is a fundamental aspect of human nature that is inherently involved in moral development5. Traditional ideas of the virtue of prudence thus closely parallel Durkheim's analysis of autonomy / self determination and its functions in the moral life.
Durkheim's analysis of morality is focused at the level of «fundamental» and «general dispositions» that are «at the root of the moral life» and «adapt
1 Dürkheim E. Moral education. - P. 115, 120.
2 Ibid. - P. 116-117.
3 Ibid. - P. 21.
4 Pieper J. The four cardinal virtues. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1966. - P. 3-40.
5 Selznick Ph. The moral commonwealth. - Berkeley: Univ. of California press, 1992. -P. 148-182.
themselves readily to the particular circumstances of human life»1. These dispositions are contrasted to the virtues, which are regarded by Durkheim2 as more specific and numerous. How the virtues fit into this more general scheme indicates the correspondence of the traditional virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, charity, and prudence with Durkheim's formulation. The correspondence is high, ranging from similarity in the case of temperance and prudence, to recognition as components in the case of justice and charity, to implied presence in the case of fortitude. The idea that duty and good are foundational aspects of morality is common to both Durkheim's analysis and to conceptions of virtue.
Wallwork's3 account of Durkheim's historical analysis of pedagogical ideals in various periods of Western civilization, first presented in lectures at the Sorbonne in 1904-1905, reinforces a view of parallels between virtue theory and Durkheim's formulation of morality. The aims and content of pedagogy in the early and late Middle Ages were regarded by Durkheim as a genuine and unique synthesis of religious and secular ideas. The Christian education of these periods emphasized formation of the total person. The goal was to direct individuals toward the pursuit of a life of duty. The development of the spiritual self in its totality was central to this formation. The Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages incorporated the ideas of Aristotle into the synthesis. Durkheim's familiarity and appreciation of the ideas of this period provide further indication that he was conversant with the theory of virtues developed by Aristotle, and reformulated by Aquinas in the late Middle Ages.
In summary, it appears reasonable to assume that traditional schemes of the virtues influenced Durkheim's views of the nature and components of morality, probably to a considerable degree. On this basis, the sociological study of the virtues as a moral code can be viewed as a continuation and elaboration of Durkheim's foundational work. This historical viability of conceptions of virtue also indicates their status as moral universals.
Moral universals. The existence of «moral universals» in the form of general values or principles is supported by the analysis of cultures4. Though they may be expressed in specific rules and practices which differ in different societies, the «universals show that human societies are everywhere much the same in their appreciation of basic morality»5. This basic morality emerges from three sources: human nature, requirements of group life, and limited alterna-tives6.
1 Durkheim E. Moral education. - N.Y.: Free press, 1961. - P. 21.
2 Durkheim E. Moral education. - N.Y.: Free press, 1961. - P. 21.
3 WallworkE. Durkheim: Morality and milieu. - Cambridge (MA): Harvard univ. press, 1972. - P. 130-150.
4 Bell W. Foundations of future studies. - New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction publishers, 1997. - Vol. 2. - P. 171-227; Selznick Ph. The moral commonwealth. - Berkeley: Univ. of California press, 1992. - P. 96-98.
5 Selznick Ph. The moral commonwealth. - P. 96.
6 Ibid. - P. 97-98.
The idea of morality depends on some theory of the good1. For example, Selznick2 proposes a «certain kind of well being» that involves «the enhancement of fellowship» as the general criteria of the good. Both the integrity of the individual, and the interests of others deriving from the social nature of human existence, are encompassed in this conception of the good. It is manifested through the virtues. In this fundamental sense the virtues entail what is good in the character of human beings3.
A similar dual emphasis on social and individual good can be observed in the moral codes of the world religions. Starting at the most abstract level, all major world religions emphasize «the moral ideal of generous goodwill, love, compassion epitomized in the Golden Rule»4. This doing good to others is accompanied in major religious traditions by the norm of effort toward personal transformation toward greater goodness5. The virtues can be regarded as enumerating a comprehensive scheme of this positive form of the Golden Rule6. The virtues also express and enumerate classical philosophical conceptions of morality7.
Research by Peterson and Seligman8 provides evidence of moral universals in beliefs about the identity of human strengths and virtues. A historical and cross-cultural literature search in the realms of philosophy, religion, politics, and education was conducted. The focus was to look for uniformities regarding notions of an exemplary life or person. Traditions of three areas were examined: China, including Confucian and Taoist virtues; South Asia, including Buddhist and Hindu virtues; and the West, including Athenian, Judeo-Christian, and Islamic virtues.
On the basis of this survey of influential religious and philosophical traditions, six «core virtues» that are universally valued by moral philosophers and thinkers in different historical periods and cultures are identified: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom9. Though there are
1 Selznick Ph The moral commonwealth. - P. 98.
2 Ibid. - P. 33.
3 Ibid. - P. 32-35, 148-151; Smith Ch What is a person? - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 2010. - P. 384-433.
4 Hick J. An interpretation of religion. - New Haven (CT): Yale univ. press, 1989. -P. 316; see also: CatoirJ.T. World religions. - N.Y.: Alba house, 1992; HuntA.B., CrottyM.E., Crotty R.B. Ethics of the world religions. - San Diego (CA): Greenhaven press, 1991.
5 Hick J. Op. cit. - P. 36-55.
6 Jeffries V. The integral paradigm: The truth of faith and the social sciences // The American sociologist. - N.Y., 1999. - Vol. 29, N 3. - P. 36-55.
7 Levine D.N. Visions of the sociological tradition. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1995. - P. 105-120.
8 Peterson Ch., SeligmanM.E.P. Character strengths and virtues. - N.Y.: Oxford univ. press, 2004. - P. 3-52.
9 Ibid. - P. 33-52.
some differences in terminology, these virtues are basically similar to the virtues of Aquinas presented in this article1.
Normative culture, individual morality, and the virtues. The normative culture of a group defines the appropriate modes of conduct for its members. It specifies rights and duties, and the relations of group members to each other, in a variety of situations. It also specifies relations toward those outside the group. Two types of norms are most important, law-norms and moral norms. The former are considered obligatory, the latter are urged or recommended, but not required. For the individual, group norms are the primary guide to conduct. They can, and often do, become convictions that provide normative and emotional motivation. Particular norms may vary, being obligatory in some groups, or to some individuals, and recommended in other cases2.
The virtues can serve to specify the content of the good, and of obligation, and thus of morality3. In fact, there is a long history of this usage, both with respect to cultural moral codes and individual morality4. In most instances, the virtues have been regarded as moral norms, and thus recommended but not required. In others, however, one or more of the virtues have been considered obligatory.
The study of morality is far more comprehensive than that of the virtues. Other moral codes of the good have been important in the traditions of philosophy and of the world religions. In some instances, behavior that directly contradicts traditional conceptions of the good, such as the virtues, has been defined as desirable and good5. In other instances the virtues have been embedded in more basic codes and assumptions that severely limit their application or contradict their basic meaning6. All of these variations are basic topics in the study of morality. The universe of moral codes needs to be described, its content needs to be categorized, and the causes and effects of different moralities need to be investigated. The study of the traditional virtues is an important part of this broader framework.
1 Peterson ChSeligmanM.E.P. Character strengths and virtues. - N.Y.: Oxford univ. press, 2004. - P. 47-48.
2 Sorokin P.A. Society, culture and personality. - N.Y.: Harper & bros, 1947. - P. 70-85.
3 Jeffries V. The integral paradigm: The truth of faith and the social sciences // The American sociologist. - N.Y., 1999. - Vol. 29, N 3. - P. 36-55.
4MacIntyre A. After virtue. - Notre Dame (IN): Univ. of Notre Dame press, 1984; Peterson Ch., Seligman M.E.P. Character strengths and virtues. - N.Y.: Oxford univ. press, 2004.
5 Alexander J.C. Toward a sociology of evil: Getting beyond modernist common sense about the alternative to «the good» // Rethinking evil / Ed. by M.P. Lara. - Berkeley: Univ. of California press, 2001. - P. 170-172.
6 Ferrera A. The evil that men do: A meditation on radical evil from a postmetaphysical point of view // Ibid. - P. 173-188.
Conclusion
The concept of virtue has potentially great importance for sociology for a number of reasons. First, the virtues are a basic potential of all human beings. In this sense they are a universal attribute of personality, though actualization can vary over a wide range in the degree and configuration of its development1. Second, the virtues entail a multidimensional manner of relating to others, as enumerated in a general sense in the primary virtues. They are thus inherently involved in a considerable amount of the basic process of social interaction as it takes place through space and time and in different social situations. Third, the broad range of behaviors included in the virtues is potentially relevant to interaction in many different kinds of groups, ranging from families, to formal organizations, to global society. Fourth, the degree and configuration of the virtues manifested in interaction can be regarded as both cause and effect of some of the characteristics of groups and institutions. Fifth, the virtues can be linked to historical and worldwide traditions of the good, providing additional relevance to both policy and public sociologies based on knowledge and understanding of the virtues.
The study of the virtues can be placed in a broader approach to sociological research and theoretical development in which the virtues serve as a normative standard of good. In his description and analysis of the «Hellenic tradition» Donald Levine2 maintains there is something «deeply attractive in Aristotle's vision of the good society and the kind of social science needed to promote it». This vision rests on the assumption that human nature is goal-directed toward perfection, which is reached through acquiring the habits of virtue. This is accomplished through the mechanism of human choice, directed by the use of reason, and by social environments that encourage the development of the virtues. The envisioned social sciences would study the general properties of human action, and those specific to various domains. In these different investigative contexts the «object would be one and the same: to arrive at prescriptive suggestions for ways to socialize... into optimal moral habits and reflective compe-tences»3. The social sciences would also be focused on how to structure the relations between the parts of society to «achieve survival, justice, and the optimal achievement of its purposes»4.
1 Krebs D.L., Van Hesteren F. The development of altruistic personality // Embracing the other / Ed. by P.M. Oliner, S.P. Oliner, L. Baron, L.A. Blum, D.L. Krebs, M.Z. Smolenska. -N.Y.: New York univ. press, 1992. - P. 142-169; Sorokin P.A. The ways and power of love. -Philadelphia (PA): Templeton foundation press, 2002.
2 Levine D.N. Visions of the sociological tradition. - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 1995. - P. 120.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
A recent work by Christian Smith1 also examines the virtues as subject and as normative standard of evaluation. A normative understanding of both individuals and society can be formed in reference to the virtues. The good for human persons is to flourish by «achieving the essential nature of their true human personhood as fully as possible»2. The dispositions and habits that exemplify the good in human nature are the virtues3. Concern for the flourishing of others and «selflessness» are an integral part of the morality of the virtues4. The social good of societies is to «facilitate and foster through its institutions and structures» this good of human nature5. Societies that do this can be considered as good, those that do not as bad.
In summary, the idea of virtue can make an important contribution to sociological analysis. It can be incorporated into sociological traditions both as subject of study, and as normative standard of the good. As a subject of study, the virtues can be used as an enumeration of the components of benevolent love, in which the object is the welfare of the other. Viewed as a moral code, the study of the virtues parallels the Durkheimian tradition of the components of morality, and includes philosophical and religious traditions that can be regarded as universal. As a normative standard for sociological analysis, the virtues exemplify centuries of worldwide traditions regarding the greater perfection and good of human nature and of individuals. The concept of virtue can thus contribute to the moral purpose of the practice of sociology.
The principal theme of this article is a consideration of the nature and potentials of a sociology of the good. The study of the virtues is only one focus, centered primarily at the level of individual personality, within this more inclusive, diverse, and comprehensive perspective. The full scope of the sociology of the good includes the study of phenomena at the micro, meso, and macro levels. The study of the good transcends particular theoretical and research traditions. It also transcends particular conceptions of the good. Variations in underlying theoretical traditions, and in the identification of the good at different levels of analysis, are illustrated by the previously considered systems of sociology of Pitirim A. Sorokin and of Erik Olin Wright.
A systematic consideration of the nature and variable forms of the good, their locations in the sociological universe, and their causes and effects would add greatly to the theoretical and research scope of sociology as a science. It would supplement the analysis of problems with the analysis of the positive, desirable, and good. This study of the good would produce knowledge and understandings directly relevant to the betterment of the general society. This article can be viewed as an invitation to further explore the characteristics, func-
1 Smith Ch. What is a person? - Chicago (IL): Univ. of Chicago press, 2010. - P. 384433.
2 Ibid. - P. 400.
3 Ibid. - P. 402.
4 Ibid. - P. 406-408.
5 Ibid. - P. 386.
tions, and potential contributions of a comprehensive and developed sociological study of the good.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to Wendell Bell, Cecelia Jeffries, and Matthew Lee for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
