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A problem on specifics of the Islamic identity in some regions is directly associated with a problem of the regional-doctrine Islam ratio. Taking into account a historical process of the Islamic and the national culture interpenetration it's more correct to speak not about the regional kinds of Islam ("the Russian", the "Turkish" and etc.) but about the regional forms of its being. A religious consciousness of the Moslems of Perm land is subjected to transformation processes. We observe a religious tradition washing out without losing its importance. The Islamic identity of the informers is closely interwoven with the positive Russian identity. A process of the faithful consciousness regionalization is more noticeable in the ethnic field and it can't but influence on its confessional constituent. At the same time a weakness of a regional aspect of the Islamic identity doesn't mean impossibility for its forming for the concrete socio-political goals.
"Identichnost' kakpredmet politicheskogo analiza", M., p. 252-256.
Zamir Dumanov,
political scientist
(Kabardino-Balkar scientific center of RAS)
THE NORTH CAUCASUS:
FROM SEPARATISM TO THE RADICAL ISLAM
At the present one can observe a protracted ethno-political crisis on the Northern Caucasus suppressing a region development to a great extent and making it very exposed. Many problems were defined as early as during the soviet period (people resettlement, border redrawing and unequal distribution of production) but their considerable part was actualized during "transition period" (setback in production having achieved 90% in some republics, "division of labor" being ethnically established, mass unemployment). As a result a democratization and
liberalization being not economically backed began developing in interethnic and inter-confessional conflicts and contradictions; the most striking were "Chechen crisis" and Ossetino-Ingush conflict in 1992.
Today a gross regional product on the Northern Caucasus in terms of per head is considerably lower in comparison throughout Russia. So, in Kabardino-Balkaria on the eve of terrorist attack in Nal'chik on 13 October 2005 a level of unemployment was estimated in 27% of economically active population (the age of one in three an unemployed person was 16-19 years!) So, the republics of the Northern Caucasus belong to a group of either underprovided or poor regions. At the same time a role of shadow economy is great as nowhere in Russia.
According to the experts almost one in three people is somehow occupied in the sphere of shadow economy but in the North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan these indexes are 80% in comparison with the Russian ones -20-25%. One can't but mention a corruption eroding all the levels of regional authorities. So, the inquiry in 2008 showed that 77% of the respondents in Nal'chik personally faced with corruption in the different social institutions and in the area of life; 75% are sure that the corruption scopes in the republic won't be either changed in near future or will increased. It's natural that the different extremist forces made the most of such vulnerability in the sphere of economic security. At the beginning of 1990-ss the separatists and the ethno-nationalists brought forward drafts secession not only from Russia but also from the republics where the representatives of any or that ethnic group were included (for example, a draft to establish Lezgistan on the lands occupied by the Lezghins, in Azerbaijan and in Dagestan). Only in 1991 one proclaimed 5 republics in Karachai -Cherkess also including two Cossacks. In Kabardino-Balkaria in 19911992 there was the intensive process to separate the republic according to the ethnic principle (with referendum organization and "land
surveying"). The Confederation of the highlands people of the Caucasus was also in action with the idea of "common Caucasus home" without a participation of the Russian "architectures".
But the brightest example of ethno-separatism was Chechnya having existed beyond a legal and socio-political area of Russia during six years. However, even this conflict wasn't purely ethno-political. So, there were also the followers in the Supreme Board of the republic disbanded by J. Dudaev on 6 September 1991 to keep Checheno-Ingushetia as the part of Russia but a confrontation between Moscow and Grozny was only one conflict among a great number (in particular, between Grozny and Nadterechny district where Dudaev wanted to assign his prefect; between the republican authorities and a city hall of Chechnya's capital; between secular nationalists and religious radicals; between the followers of Sufi Islam and salafites and etc.). All of them used a force against each other. It happened at the background of numerous Chechen community existence outside the republic within the Russian Federation and an active ethnic business but the most part of the Chechens prefer going to Russia but not far abroad even during the military operations.
The height of the ethnic nationalism fame fell on the first half of 1990-ss. It's explained by that, firstly, any above-ethnic formation disintegration is accompanied by and worsened by "roots" search, a new identity finding; secondly, the North Caucasian republics as a part of the Russian Federation were included in the USSR during 70 years, on one hand pursuing a policy of a state atheism but on the other hand, promoting a legal institutionalization of ethnicity. So, the Islamic "radicals" appeared at the beginning of 1990-ss on the North Caucasus strived to combine a religious rhetoric with ethno-nationalism. However, then ethno-nationalism (also ethno-separatism) lost its popularity as ethno-nationalism (also separatism) is fraught with
conflicts because of ethnic mixed characters of the North Caucasus. Ethno-nationalism couldn't solve some urgent problems of ethnic elites (in particular, hopes for a territorial rehabilitation) and they having forgotten their promises given to "their people" began privatizing power and property. The failed state experiment "Ichkeriya" also influenced greatly on a popularity decrease of the ethnic nationalism. In de facto Chechnya didn't manage to establish a state being comparable at least with Abkhazia or Nagorny Karabakh. Moreover, "free Ichkeriya" was so aggressive towards the neighbors that Russia was the less evil for them in comparison with it. So, today one can state that ethno-nationalism under conditions of the North Caucasus was historically defeated, may be temporary especially with a wrong policy of a federal center.
So, today the radical protest movements against a federal or a republican power use not ethno-nationalist (or separatist) but the Islamic language (as the hopes for that the West will prefer a continuation of "the evil empire" disintegration weren't realized and the eyes of the yesterday's nationalists turned on the East). So, if there wasn't anti-westernism in the slogans of "ichkeriitsev" then D. Umarov named not only Russia but also the western world as an enemy of "true Moslems" and proclaimed the Caucasian Emirate instead of "the Republic of Ichkeriya" abolished by him. "Chechnya's freedom" yielded to the slogans of "the Islamic solidarity".
As a result there formed a radical-Islamist environment on the North Caucasus in the middle of 1990-ss where a project of so-called "pure Islam" was formed for a region. Its ideologists made the best use of their psychological methods of influence (appeal to unsuccessful strata of the youth having no possibilities for career development and qualitative education). Such propaganda finds a support, first of all, among the youth, in circumstances of mass unemployment. There was
no clear strategy of a social, economic and political development of the North Caucasus. As a result, a radical Islam distribution began not only in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia but also in the republics where population religiousness was traditionally lower having resulted in tragic events in Nal'chik, 13 October 2005. At the same time it would be a great mistake to consider all protest movement on the North Caucasus as Islamist. There is also a secular opposition in the republics and its criticism is directed against the republican authorities to a greater degree. These people are very different by a political descent and convictions united by rejection of regional authorities but in Dagestan they are activists of some All-Russian parties. They are also present today though their force and power were seriously weakened in 2007-2008.
One can't ignore "opposition within apparat" in all the region subjects having no public slogans and open debates but one can't underestimate its role in personnel policy and in making administrative decisions. So, today there is not ethno-separatism on the North Caucasus but the radical Islam is a main challenge for a state security and society. This political trend is characterized with such vices of federal and regional authorities as nepotism, corruption, closure, inaptitude and unwillingness to dialogue with opponents.
Together with the above-mentioned problems there emerged external threats for security in the South of Russia - not only the traditional strategic rival attention of Russia in the region is attracted to the North Caucasus (first of all, of Turkey and Iran) but also of the international terrorist organizations and religious-extremist movements. Therefore, many threats and challenges for a threat on the North Caucasus (conflicts, social explosions, migration and etc.) can destabilize a situation when unfavorable development of events all over
Russia and distribute its negative influence beyond the bounds of a region. However, this situation isn't unconvertible.
Today a regional and national policy of Russia must be different where the following principles are:
1. Admitting a prolonged ethno-political crisis as a system-forming element of regional socio-political processes by both federal and regional authorities;
2. A main criterion to make decisions effectively must be their destabilizing influence on ethno-political sphere;
3. A refusal from attempts to solve a situation rapidly and readiness for a long and laborious task to overcome it;
4. A work with reasons but not with consequences; transition from reactive to preventive and projective policy in ethno-political sphere;
5. A retreat from "overture" with ethno-political elites; ethno-political elite responsibility increasing for a state of affairs in the subjects of the Russian Federation;
6. A reasonable denouncement of nationalism, chauvinism, political extremism and separatism by mass media and bodies of power.
"Fundamental'nye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny sintez", 2010, p. 98-101.
