CC BY
14
resources of the Caspian Sea and under conditions of "the new crusade" of the Western World against the East. For the period of the XXI century, the negative consequences of globalization on the planet's space are seen more evidently. The contemporary globalization processes are perceived as a western strategy, aimed at intensification of "world chaos", used by the USA in order to pursue its imperialist policy.
"Kaspiysky region: politika, ekonomika, kultura ",
2009, N 3, p. 89-96.
R. Mukhametov,
publicist
THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA
IN THE POST-SOVIET MIDDLE ASIA
The main foreign policy objectives of most states are concentrated in the geographic region of their location. Therefore they give top priority to the relations with neighboring countries. The states of the post-Soviet space were, are and will be for the historic perspective the zone of its vital interests. It is dictated not at all by the notorious "imperial ambitions", which certain foreign forces try stubbornly to impute to Russia. The national interests of Russia in near abroad do not have neither emotional nor conjuncture tint. The postSoviet space means for Russia not a chessboard for geopolitical games. The national interests of the country are based not on momentary, applied or bureaucratic tasks but on the constant priorities. The national interests in the CIS countries and Baltic countries are objective and are determined by geographic, historic, cultural and other factors.
The near abroad space occupies a special place in the system of national interests of Russia. These countries are its nearest neighbors.
They are united by common history and interwoven human destinies. The vital interests of the Russian Federation in the spheres of economy, defense and security, protection of the rights of the Russian speaking population, constituting the basis of national security, are concentrated on the territory of the republics of near abroad. The economic interests were always and remain at present the main motives of foreign policy aspirations of big and small states and of their coalitions. Carrying its policy in relation to the near abroad states, Russia proceeds from the fact that ensuring access to natural resources of the former member-states of the USSR, particularly to the oil and gas of the Caspian region, corresponds to its pragmatic interests. Making estimation of hydrocarbons' deposits, one should not ignore the common world practice of preliminary exaggeration of the resource potential in one or other region. The propaganda campaign around "new Persian Gulf" was beneficial to two parties: the ruling elites of the Caspian states, interested in attraction of foreign investments and in making promises of future flourishing to their population; the transnational corporations (TNC), doing business there in order to make much of it among partners and competitors, according to some experts. The actual amount of hydrocarbon deposits turned out to be much less, since the first published estimates referred rather to politics than geology. Even in the distant perspective the Caspian region has no serious chance to replace the Persian Gulf as the main supplier of oil and to replace Russia - as the main supplier of gas to the world market. At present, the Caspian region is regarded to be one of the regional centers in the field of hydrocarbons' extraction. The reserves of oil and gas in the Caspian region should not be considered as vital reserves for ensuring the international energy security. Nevertheless, this region in terms of oil fields may occupy the place, which equals the North Sea (2.3 billion tons) and the USA (3.1 billion tons), taken together.
The access to the hydrocarbon resources, particularly to natural gas, is very important for Russia for some reasons. First, Russia needs it to prevent shipment of the Caspian gas by western project "Nabucco", which provides for delivery of "blue fuel, "making the round of Russia and competes directly the "South Flow" of Russia. Russia needs to purchase gas not only for geopolitical considerations: according to some information, Gasprom experiences difficulties in fulfillment of its obligations to gas export to European consumers, in shipment of "blue fuel" under its contracts without its additional reserves. Therefore Russia initiated implementation of the project, relating to construction of the Caspian gas pipeline under the agreement, signed in the end of 2007 by its participants (Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). This pipeline with annual capacity of 20 billion cubic meters of gas will be laid around the Caspian Sea along its eastern coast. The pipeline will be laid from the compressor station "Belek" in the surroundings of Turkmenbashi to the gas meter station "Alexandrov Gai" on the border between Kazakhstan and Russia, where it will join the gas pipeline system of Russia. The extent of the pipeline on the Turkmen territory will make 360 km and on the territory of Kazakhstan - 150 km. The gas pipeline Central Asia-Center (CAC) will be modernized within the framework of implementation of the project. The capacity of the CAC pipeline system will be enlarged by 20 billion cubic meters per year. At present, its capacity accounts for 50 billion cubic meters; thus, construction of the Caspian pipeline and reconstruction of the CAC pipeline system will make it possible to increase purchases of the Central Asian gas up to 90 billion cubic meters per year.
The competition between shipment routes of the Caucasian oil was raised enormously. It is conditioned by the significance destinations of supplies of hydrocarbons for geopolitical and geo-economic interests of all countries of the world community. The transportation of the
Caspian oil to the world market through the territory of Russia corresponds to the foreign policy's priorities of Russia. The export of "black gold" from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to the world markets along the so-called "northern" route (Tengiz-Novorossiysk, Baku-Novorossiysk, Atyrau-Samara) is profitable for Russia, since in this case tariffs for the oil shipment will come to the Russian budget and not to the budgets of adjacent states. As an example may be cited the export pipeline of the Caspian pipeline consortium (KTK), which is summoned to ensure transportation of oil from the northern part of Kazakhstan to the Russian port Novorossiysk on the shore of the Black Sea. This route is seen on the map as follows: it begins in Tengiz, rounds the northern part of the Caspian Sea and goes directly to Novorossiysk through the territories of four subjects of the RF (the Astrakhan region, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Stavropol kray and the Krasnodar kray). According to estimates of experts, for 40 years of exploitation of the pipeline the central and regional budgets will get over $ 23.4 billion as taxes and profits. However, it is not clear which is the projected oil price. The volatile oil prices may make changes in the estimates, which should be considered as hypotheses.
Although Russia possesses a developed network of pipelines in the region, but, unfortunately, it does not have the monopoly right for transportation of the hydrocarbon resources to the world market. Russia is a big but not the only player in the Caspian fuel-energy market. The big actors are Washington and Brussels. The USA and the European Union actively lobby the transit schemes in the western direction -through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Some examples may be mentioned. The scheme of transportation of the Caspian oil to the American market is as follows: oil from Kazakhstan (10 million tons per year) is shipped by barges to Baku, further the oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan comes to the Turkish port of Ceyhan
on the Mediterranean sea shore by pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. The transportation route of the Caspian "black gold" to the European market is as follows: oil from Azerbaijan is sipped by the pipeline to the Georgian port of Supsa and further by tankers to "Yuzhny" port in Odessa, later by pipeline Odessa-Brody - to Europe; in perspective it is projected to ship oil the ports in the Baltic Sea (by projected oil pipeline Odessa-Brody to Gdansk).
The planned channel of the Caspian gas shipment to Europe is composed of three stages: the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (transfer of natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan on the floor of the Caspian Sea), the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum (from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey) and pipeline "Nabucco" (from Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria). From the geopolitical point of view, creation of the transfer corridor in the direction from east to west, passing by Russia, as projected by Washington and Brussels, will make it possible: to diversify the channels of energy supplies for the sake of reduction of dependence of national economies on the biggest suppliers of oil (OPEC as a whole and the Near East region, in particular) and of "blue fuel" (Russia) and to ensure in this way its own energy security; to establish control over hydrocarbon reserves of the region and to prevent capture of these resources by the countries, considered by the USA and Brussels as their opponents or competitors (Russia and China); to establish political control over the countries of the region by means of control over energy resources; to ensure geopolitical pluralism, independence (from Russia) of new independent states.
For achieving their strategic aims Washington and Brussels use different means, devices and instruments. The main element of implementation of the united plan for development of the regional natural resources by the USA and the EU is embodied in such
organization as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). One of its documents stresses intensification of the efforts, exerted for implementation of joint programs and projects ... on transfer of energy resources from the Caspian region to the European energy market, using territories of the member-states of GUAM (the Declaration, adopted in 2005 in the capital of Moldova. The main aim of these efforts consists in prevention of economic pressure and monopoly (on the part of the Russian Federation, as it is evident from the activities of GUAM), as was pointed out in the declaration of GUAM, adopted in 2006 in Kiev). It is possible to make the conclusion that the attitude of Russia, first, to creation of routes and schemes of transfer of Caspian hydrocarbons in western direction, second, to GUAM as a regional organization will be negative, since they do not correspond to national interests of Russia. As is written in the Conception of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, approved by president D. Medvedev, the attitude of Russia to the subregional entities and other structures without Russian participation in the CIS space is determined by the appraisal of their readiness actually to take into account the legal Russian interests.
It is significant for Russia to ensure the interrupted transfer of their goods on the territory of post-Soviet states. The image of Russia as a reliable supplier of energy resources is needed not to make a good impression on the outside world, although it is also important. The image of the country represents by itself the most significant advantage, capable to consolidate the geopolitical status of the state on the world arena, to ensure its security, protection and advancement of its national interests. However, sometimes the international reputation of Russia was damaged by faults in transfer via republics of the former USSR. Thus, the image of the country as a reliable supplier of energy resources was undermined by the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, when differences in the Ukrainian debt, in the prices for natural
gas from Russia to Ukraine, as well as in shipment of gas through the territory of Ukraine resulted in total cessation of its delivery. This incident had been preceded by analogous conflict in 2006. The problem of transfer is for Russia a rather acute problem, connected with unsustainable tariffs, indebtedness and non-sanctioned extraction of energy resources.
This conflict demonstrated dependence of the supplier (Russia) and consumers (West European partners) of energy resources on the transit-country (Ukraine). At present, there exist two Russian export pipelines, which connect the gas deposits in the north of West Siberia with the final consumers in West Europe: Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod (via the territory of Ukraine) and Yamal-Europe (through the territory of Byelorussia). Therefore it is not surprising that Russia jointly with its western colleagues started construction of two gas pipelines, namely the North Stream and the South Stream. The North Stream will go on the floor of the Baltic Sea from the Russian Vyborg to German Graifswald. The projected capacity of the gas pipeline will account for 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. The South Stream will be laid on the floor of the Black Sea from the port of Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian port Varna and further will separate to two branches - via Serbia and Hungary to Austria and through Greece to the south of Italy. The planned capacity of the gas pipeline will make 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. The main aim of these projects consists in ensuring direct communications between the seller and the buyers in West Europe, avoiding the East-European intermediary agents, decreasing in this way expenses, including reputation.
The Russian Federation has not only economic but also other interests, directly relating to the military-political interests. If you wish calmness for yourself, pray for tranquillity of those, who surround you, as wrote Buddhist monk Nitiren. This maxim is particularly urgent for
Russia, which is interested in regulation of existing and prevention of coming conflicts in the regions, adjacent to the Russian Federation. Russia is not able to reduce completely its presence in near abroad or leave it, to ignore conflicts and even abstain from participation in their regulation. At present, as well as in the visible future Russia in some or other way will be involved in these events even against the wish of political rulers and the groups of the population, which support them for many reasons. It seems that the viability for destiny of ethnic Russians (over 20 million people), who are either involved in regional conflicts or are subject to pressure by conflicting parties. One should recognize the fact of an impact of instability on the situation on the territory near Russian borders. The devastation, forceful actions and violation of human rights engender flows of refugees and forced migrants, while many of them will go to Russia. Finally, the hotbeds of tension lead to involvement in military actions of residents of the regions adjacent to the RF (volunteers), to the material damages for Russia and to human losses in the course of forced operations for the sake of separation of the belligerents. Thus, Russia for the above mentioned circumstances is interested in ensuring stability in the region, in minimization of risks and threats on its borders, in reduction there of the national tension's level.
A number of super secret objects of defense infrastructure are located on the territory of near abroad states, and Russia seems to be interested in their preservation on the basis of mutual agreement. For instance, a particular significance for Russia represents employment of the ground system of warning on rocket attack (SPRN). At present, three radio tele-control stations (ORTU) are located outside the territory of Russia. In Byelorussia the station "Gantsevichi" is equipped with the radio-location device (RLS) "Volga". It is relied on discovery of ballistic rockets launched from water basin of the North Atlantic. In
Azerbaijan the station of type "Daryal" (ORTU "Gabala") is earmarked for discovering and determining of cosmic objects at the altitude from 2000 to 4000 km above Eurasia, the North and Central America, the water basins of the Indian, the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans.
Russia for ensuring its military security is also interested in employment of communication stations (US), located in some states of the post-Soviet space (Byelorussia, Kirghizstan). These communication stations maintain radio contact in the interests of the navy of the RF, including submarines, on duty cleared for action in the regions of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The Ministry of Defense of the RF holds on lease some proving grounds of strategic significance, which are not destined for alien eyes. For instance, proving ground "Sary Shagan" is intended to test anti-rocket arms, while proving ground "Emba" is destined for carrying out scientific- research work and tests of antiaircraft weapons. Keeping in Sebastopol up to 2017 points of location of the Black Sea navy of the RF corresponds to national interests of Russia.
Expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east, particularly by admitting to its membership of the countries, situated near the borders of Russia, does not correspond to the national interests and to the interests of security of Russia. The enlargement of NATO by inclusion in its structure of post-Soviet states and by location of its military objects near the Russian borders greatly complicates for Russia the purely military situation, according to experts. The Alliance gets actually a direct access to the central, formerly rear districts with key military-economic significance. The tactical fighting aircraft of NATO gets theoretical ability to penetrate the air space of Russia and to achieve the dislocated targets in the hinterland as well as the means of warning, the stations of combat direction and reconnaissance. Finally, after entry of Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) in the North Atlantic
Alliance there emerged in direct closeness to Russian borders the uncontrolled, from the point of view of the Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (DOVSE), zone, being "free" from restrictions for dislocation of conventional armed forces, including military aircrft, of other NATO countries.
Despite a very small probability of a large scale military conflict, the NATO expansion to the east has negative political consequences for Russia. First of all, it reduces the freedom of actions of Russia in the post-Soviet space, the choice of means for defense of national interests. Thus, for the above mentioned reasons for Russia it would be preferable should the vacuum of security on the perimeter of Russia be filled with neutral (i.e. extra bloc) states. The stoppage of narcotic traffic through the borders of the Community corresponds to the national interests of Russia. Up to 99% of narcotics, coming to Russia, is transferred either from or via the Central Asian republics, according to some experts. It is connected with the fact that the borders of Russia with its southern neighbors are actually not guarded. The distance of only the land frontier with Kazakhstan makes up about 7.5 thousand km. The "advantageous" location of the Central Asia has transformed it into a big transportation route of narcotics' spreading. The Central Asian countries are located between the biggest world producers of opium and the most profitable markets in West Europe. They either border or are near the countries of the so-called "Golden Crescent" (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran), while they via China they have access to the countries of "Golden Triangle" (Myanma, Laos, Thailand), which is one of the world leaders in production of opium narcotics. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have common borders with Afghanistan (1206, 744 and 137 km correspondingly), which at present is the biggest producer of opium in the world. Thus, the quantity of narcotics, produced near the borders of the CA countries, represents a challenge to
its new and weak states, which actually are unable to respond to this challenge.
As an integral part of the system of foreign policy priorities of Russia is protection of the Russian speaking population, turned out to be outside its territory after disintegration of the Union state, as well as ensuring their rights and equal position on the territory of the states of their residence. It is conditioned by the fact that the Russian Federation considers this task, as is written in the Conception of Support of Compatriots Abroad, "its moral duty". Many ethnic groups of Russians live near abroad. Owing to existence in the post-Soviet states of Russian Diaspora, comprising over 20 million people, Russia objectively is unable to be outside the events, taking place there, to keep full and unbiased neutrality, the more so, as the situation of the Russian speaking population is rather complicated. Although the constitutions and legislative acts of these countries declare equality of citizens irrespective of their nationality and language, protection of rights of aboriginal people, in practice the Russian speaking population feels displays of nationalism not only in daily life but also at official level.
The following measures in the sphere of protection of the rights of the Russian speaking population correspond to the national interests of the RF: prevention of mass and forceful violations of their rights; unimpeded expression, preservation and perfection of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious distinction; use of their names and family names, including in the official documents, as it is used in their native (Russian) language. Thus, the protection of the Russian speaking population, ensuring its rights and equal position in these countries becomes a more and more important component of the Russian foreign policy, being a separate direction in the cause of protection of its national interests. The above said makes it possible to conclude that the
near abroad space is for Russia a zone of its privileged interests owing to objective causes.
"Politeks", S-Pb, 2009, t.5, N 3, p. 134-145.
D. Fayzullayev,
doctor of philosophic sciences
THE USA-THE CENTRAL ASIA:
THE SHIPMENT POINT OR SPRINGBOARD?
In 2009, after the new American Administration, headed by president B. Obama, came to power the burden of the Russian-American mutual action became the slogan of "resettlement" in relations between two countries, which had deteriorated greatly in times of former leadership of the White House. The use of term "resettlement" in the sphere of foreign relations most likely implies not only mutual wish of the Russian and the American parties for discussion of urgent foreign policy problems, smiles and friendly personal relations of the leaders of both countries but also willingness to come to an agreement, i.e. to make compromise and make mutual concessions in their own geopolitical interests. And it is not an easy matter: Washington and Moscow make concessions to each other just being alive in the spheres of crossing interests.
Vice-president of the USA J.Biden was the first to declare "resettlement" on 7 February 2009 at the Munich conference on security affairs. On 21 October 2009, in Bucharest he stressed that despite "resettlement" the USA and Russia were in disagreement on basic principal matters and said that the USA came out against the perceptions of "spheres of influence", reigned in the XIX century. He said that the USA would not stand such approach.
The Central Asian region is one of the traditional directions of the Russian-American geopolitical rivalry. The changes in the situation in
