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Sabina Garashova,
candidate of political sciences (Baku State University)
THE GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE USA STRATEGY IN THE CASPIAN REGION
For the whole post-Soviet period the Caspian region attracted attention of the leading world and regional powers. It was determined not only by the reserves of hydrocarbons concentrated there but also by the geopolitical specifics of the region. Its location in Eurasia, the political structure and the connections with the adjacent powers can not help influencing its geopolitical significance in the epoch following termination of the cold war. The above mentioned factors constitute the basis of the multi-vector geopolitical rivalry started in the Caspian region after termination of the bipolar situation. The USA as the sole superpower could not be aside of the geopolitical struggle in this most important region of Eurasia for the post-bipolar period. The author will try to give the answer to the specifics of its interest, the corresponding activities and the mechanism, which are mostly applied in this direction.
The new century is characterized by the risen attention of the world and the regional powers to the water basin of the Caspian Sea and the adjacent territories. The exhaustion of world reserves of oil and gas was one of the most evident global trends, which promoted it. Under these conditions, the internationalization of these reserves in the Caspian region liberated recently from the Soviet control became the aim of strategic priority of the energy dependent western countries in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the RF demonstrates its interest in regional domination, since it considers the control over the region rather as a chance to monopolize all hydrocarbons' flows going to Europe from the post-Soviet space. The regional policy of other
powers (Turkey, Iran and China) is also motivated to a large extent by the access to the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region.
The Caspian oil and gas region is as follows: the Caspian Sea and the adjacent territories of Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. The share of the Caspian Sea in the world oil reserves accounts for 15-20 billion tons (almost 10%), some Russian analysts think. At present, Kazakhstan is the leader in the oil reserves and in their extraction, followed by Azerbaijan, while Turkmenistan concentrated its attention to development of gas deposits.
Analyzing oil and gas geopolitical trend in the region after termination of the cold war, one may stress the activities of certain countries and the specific interests of such activities in relation to regional hydrocarbon resources. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan considered as their main aim solving economic problems by export of hydrocarbons, while the countries of the European Union and further the CPR strived for extension of external resources of energy by import of the Caspian oil and gas. This issue originally was much more politicized for Russia and the USA.
Moscow and Washington regarded the Caspian region rather as a chance to solve their geopolitical problems in Eurasia. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Moscow used the process of monopolization of the regional oil and gas capacity for raising its geopolitical status in Eurasia. Washington regarded diversification of the pipeline system in the post-Soviet space as a means of creating more extensive and stable external resources of energy supply for its allies in Europe as well as a means of preventing a probable restoration there of the imperial system able in the perspective to challenge the leading role of America, using words of Z. Brzhezinski.
For the beginning and the middle of the 1990s, due to weakness of the central power and the lack of clear strategic line relating to the
Caspian region the activities of Russia were mainly the responses to initiatives of the Caspian neighbors in the CIS or the agreements with the interests of national oil extracting companies (Lukoil, Yukos and others), which often did not coincide with the state interests. V. Putin coming to power radically changed the situation. Since 2000s the Kremlin activities were concentrated mainly on the intention to control a probable great amount of hydrocarbons exported by Caspian states. It was supposed, in particular, to make Gasprom the monopolist in transportation of gas from the Central Asia both to the west and east directions and to extend as much as possible participation of Russian corporations in implementation of projects of gas and oil extraction in the Caspian region, particularly in the Caspian sector of Kazakhstan.
The interests of Turkey in development of the pipeline system connecting the Caspian region with the EU space through its territory (projects Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum, Nabucco) were motivated not only by the profits thanks to the transit of resources but also by political advantages thanks to its transformation into the most important energy distribution point in Eurasia, which might be used by Ankara to solve the prolonged issue of Turkey' membership in EU.
Probably, Iran was less than other countries interested in development of hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region by western companies. First, due to existing tension of relations between Iran and the USA Tehran should have been afraid of appearance of elements of military-political influence of the USA and NATO, which could follow western corporations. Second, from the point of view of oil and gas profits the zone of the Persian Gulf was the principal area, since the biggest gas deposits and oil fields subject to development were situated exactly there. Correspondingly, the Iranian regional policy for the post-Soviet period was oriented to creation of the most advantageous conditions for ensuring security of its northern borders by
means of development of relations with the Caucasian and Central Asian states as well as with its historic competitors in the region -Russia and Turkey. Tension in relations with the USA forced Tehran to look for the way of rapprochement with Russia as the most perspective counterbalance to the extension of American influence in Eurasia. And what is more, Iran regarded Russia to be the main supplier of military technique and technologies. In order to realize its oil and gas interests Iran strived for maximum use of its advantageous geopolitical location and for development of its transit capacity. The question is the probable transit of Caspian hydrocarbons to the Persian Gulf and the South Asia.
Out of all Caspian new independent states (CNIS) Kazakhstan possesses the biggest oil fields. The main transportation route of this oil is laid through the Russian territory (the oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and pipeline Atyrau-Samara). One should note that Russia and Kazakhstan were the first Caspian states, which regulated completely the issues of division of the sea bottom; and this fact promoted regional stability and investment attractiveness of Caspian oil projects. At the same time, this situation limited self-dependence of Kazakhstan, since Russia regarding its interests may unilaterally regulate the amount of oil pumped via its territory. Given the fact that Kazakhstan is a Russian competitor in the world energy markets, this device of pressure may be actively used. Therefore, since the end of the 1990s Astana urged towards diversification of oil export routes both in the western (via sea port Aktau and oil pipeline BTC) and in the eastern (oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou) and in the southern directions (probable oil transportation line from Aktau in Kazakhstan to Iranian port Neka). Such diversification reduces dependence of Kazakhstan on Russian oil pipelines and gives Astana great chances for political maneuverability. At the same time, Kazakhstan justifies its choice of routes for its oil transportation by the long-term economic and
political interests with due account of current events in other Caspian states.
Turkmenistan occupies the third place in terms of reserves of liquid and gas hydrocarbons and, being deprived of a free access to the world market, is interested very much in development of a wide network of export routes. The principal route of transportation of Turkmen gas is laid through the Russian territory, and Turkmenistan, like neighboring Kazakhstan, urges towards probable diversification of gas export routes. In 2009, the gas pipeline for delivery of Turkmen gas to China was commissioned (Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-CPR). Turkmenistan displayed its interest in transportation of energy raw resources via the Iranian territory. Diversification in the western direction is hindered for Ashghabad by the lack of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline and by tension in relations with Azerbaijan concerning disputable oil fields in the Caspian Sea.
Azerbaijan carries out an active foreign policy and uses the oil factor to maintain close relations with the leading states of the West. This country uses also its abilities for transportation of Caspian oil round Russia. Having obtained its independence in the end of 1991, Azerbaijan turned out to be in the center of the so called geopolitical triangle of crossing interests of Russia, Iran and Turkey. For the beginning of 1990s, the highest leadership of the country confronted the choice of foreign policy orientation: it was necessary to choose one of these competing centers of force. Finally, the pro-western strategy was selected with the stress on close reciprocal action with Turkey and the leading powers of the West.
Recently, Azerbaijan confronted new development trends of the geopolitical situation in the region of the Caspian Sea: a marked rapprochement of positions of its rival - Russia with the positions of its main ally - the USA. As a result, Baku had to look for new ways of
arrangement of mutually beneficial cooperation with Moscow, including the oil and gas sphere. At the same time, as marked president I. Aliyev in his book "The Caspian Oil of Azerbaijan", it is possible to suppose that in the perspective Azerbaijan will be able to play the mediator role in relations among big powers. The location of the republic in the junction of several biggest geopolitical and geo-economic structures makes it possible to be friends with all and to reconcile all with all, to become the initiator of rapprochement of the West with the East, I. Aliyev thinks.
The list of actors interested in development of energy and transport-commercial projects in the Caspian region may be enlarged at the expense of the states, which are primarily oriented to get dividends from transportation of the Caspian energy resources via their territories. The question is the position of Georgia, Ukraine as well as some countries of the Central and East Europe - Romania, Bulgaria (since 2007 - EU members), Greece. The existence of oil and gas resources is not the sole matter, which defines the significance of the Caspian region. Of great importance is its location on the border between Europe and Asia - in the junction of perspective inter-continental transportation communications. The control over this space provided the corresponding power with the significant advantages in the geopolitical competition started in Eurasia after collapse of the USSR. The factors connected with this fact were not less important for the USA than the probable access to the Caspian hydrocarbons.
Under geopolitical conditions created after disintegration of the USSR and creation of CNIS, the USA should have been supposed to be a rival with other actors trying to get points in the region, particularly Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The EU and China tried to carry out their own policy in this region. Since the middle of the 1990s, the USA tries to establish its own control over the main transport and energy
objects in the Caspian region (project TRACEKA, oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, in the perspective - oil pipeline Nabucco), to construct the geopolitical line Balkans-Caucasus-Central Asia. The main direction of the USA foreign policy in the Eurasian space became the following idea: to support the existed geopolitical pluralism and to prevent Russian domination in the whole Caspian region. The USA also paid attention to the existed conflicts in the Caucasus (Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, south Ossetia) as well as the activities of Turkey and Iran in the North Caucasus.
Since 1997, the Caucasian region was proclaimed to be the zone of the American national interests. The USA plans aimed at development of the Caspian region correspond to the American national energy strategy, which foresees the establishment of the American control over the main oil extraction regions of the world officially named as the control over global energy balance. Of great importance for the USA are its geopolitical interests in the Caspian region. The geographic location of the region, particularly its adjacency with the main geopolitical competitors of the USA in Eurasia (RF, CPR and Iran), contributes to the rise of this interest.
The main components of the USA policy in the Caspian region are as follows: consolidation of statehood and independence of the region's countries going on the way of market democracy and weakening their connections with Russia; extension of commercial advantages for the USA; settlement of regional conflicts inter alia by means of strengthening political, economic and military ties among new countries of the region; formation of special troops and protection forces along the energy transport communications laid from the Caspian region in the western direction; consolidation of energy independence of the USA at the expense of the Caspian energy carriers as well as the reduction of dependence of the region's states on Russia
by ensuring the guaranteed free flow of Caspian oil and natural gas to the world markets. Of special significance is the growth of military-political and military-technical cooperation of the USA and NATO with the states of the region. In the context of the known events in South Ossetia in August 2008, such cooperation with Georgia acquired a particular intensified characteristic.
In terms of oil and gas resources the Caspian region is regarded by the USA rather as a reserve basin of hydrocarbons with strategic significance. Washington is interested not so much in extraction as in installation of its control over big oil fields of the region. The regional policy of the USA is marked by a wide specter of ways and methods. Since 1996 Washington carried out a great work in order to involve in its orbit of influence Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as well as Armenia in the situation, which in 2008 was characterized by an intensified American-Russian rivalry.
For the last two decades, the significance of the region for the USA increased so much that the American Administration started to regard the problems of the Caspian region as a separate direction of its foreign policy. In 1999, in time of presidential term of B. Clinton, the Caspian Financial Center (CFC) was established to render assistance in financing oil and gas projects in Turkey, in the South Caucasus and in the Central Asia, as well as to raise to maximum the American commercial participation in implementation of the adopted projects. The Center became for Washington a convenient mechanism for penetration in the region, for raising its influence in its separate countries and for creating a starting point for the future.
Creation of an extensive structure of pipelines occupies the most significance place in American strategy in the Caspian region. The new routes should not be laid through Russian and Iranian territory. Turkey is supposed to be a kind of bridge for the exit of Caspian oil to western
markets. In this connection the main stake was made on pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. By means of pipelines in the direction from the Caspian region-Turkey-Europe, the USA intended to get certain geopolitical advantages, including new orientation of new independent states of the Caucasus and the Central Asia to the West, intensification of consolidation of European NATO allies and Turkey, more rigid isolation of Iran as well as a chance to reduce access of CPR to the region, particularly to its hydrocarbon resources. Washington is interested also in greater internationalization of communication projects in the Caspian region: participation of a wide circle of countries, including mainly western countries, is expedient not only economically but makes it possible to present the issue as an international actual problem.
The USA in the course of carrying out its strategic policy, apart from its traditional allies (Turkey, Israel and EU countries) relied on some new independent states in the region. In particular, in various periods of time the stake was made on Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At present, a rather convincing idea seems to be the supposition that the efforts exerted by Washington to create and to develop the consolidating vector of GUUAM were connected primarily with the American geopolitical interests in the Caspian region. At the same time, the USA makes repeated attempts to tear away from the Kremlin its closest military-political ally in the region - Armenia. The process of Armenian-Turkish normalization, intensified since 2008, should have been used for it.
Due to existing tension in relations with Iran, the USA did not support the energy transportation projects with participation of Iran, including the route of hydrocarbon transportation to the Persian Gulf via Iranian territory. Meanwhile, this direction is considered as the most advantageous routes from the economic point of view, and some American oil corporations insist on exactly this vector of diversification
of energy communications in the Caspian region. It seems that for Washington the economic advisability in this question for a long period in future will be forgotten in favor of geopolitical intentions of America, since it is impossible to speak about normalization of American-Iranian relations up to present time, and the stake on isolation of Iran, including trans-regional oil and gas projects, remains
an instrument of American strategy in the Caspian region.
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The Caspian region as a place of concentration of big hydrocarbon resources and as a significant space from the point of view of geopolitical confrontation in Eurasia after termination of bipolar epoch, probably, should be taken into account in the process of appraising the current significance of the region for external actors. Analyzing the USA policy in the Caspian region for the post-Soviet period, it is necessary to stress the evident connection with the both factors. At the same time, the geopolitical factor remains to be the dominant, and the issue of access to hydrocarbons continues to be subject to consideration by Washington from the prism of geopolitical processes in Eurasia. The Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the reset of American-Russian relations after Obama Administration coming to power, the rise of Islamic trends in Turkey and its probable distance from geopolitics of the West, the lack of settlement of energy security issues of American allies in Europe, as well as the evident next stage of tension in relations of the USA with Iran, seem to predict in the near future the rise of American activities in the Caspian region. At the same time, it is possible to expect certain tactical corrections of American strategy in the region with due account of dynamics of geopolitical and geo-economic processes.
"Kavkaz i globalizatsiya ", Baku, 2010, N 4, vol. 3-4, p. 33-40.
