CC BY
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Natalya Kharitonova,
Ph. D. (Hist.), Moscow State University THE MARKET OF SUICIDE-KILLERS IN CENTRAL ASIA
When talking of the use of suicide terrorists in Central Asia, Islamic terrorism is presumed as an ideological product of religious extremism.
According to the general definition, Islamic terrorism, being a widespread form of terrorism, is a tactic of violent actions aimed at opponents and ideologically substantiated by Muslim teaching, which allows it in the name of the defense of Islamic faith from influence or aggression on the part of non-Muslim countries and ideologies.
The fact that terrorist acts in Central Asia have Islamist roots is confirmed by the data of investigations carried out by the law-enforcement agencies of the Central Asian countries. Participants and organizers of the acts of terror are in most cases members of banned terrorist Islamist organizations. It is precisely Islamist extremism that is one of the leading factors of destabilization of the situation in the region.
On the one hand, statistical data show that participation of suicide-killers in organizing terrorist acts in Central Asia (excluding Afghanistan) is insignificant so far, and on the other, Central Asia is already a target of such acts perpetrated by them.
Examining the problem of resonance actions by suicide-killers, we should not exclude Afghanistan, because it is inhabited by the same peoples as those living in Central Asian republics. This is why there is a contingent to be used for recruiting perpetrators of terrorist acts.
In the first decade of the 21st century terrorist acts with the participation of suicide-killers took a mass and regular character in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, the North Caucasian region of
Russia, and elsewhere. Along with the continuing aggravation of the situation in Syria and escalation of military hostilities in that country, there are no guarantees that new experience and technologies of carrying out major acts of terror with a big number of casualties would not be transferred to Central Asia with a view to increasing destabilization in the area. In the view of certain experts and analysts, if the Syrian regime falls, the wave of destabilization may reach Russian borders1.
In contrast to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Russian Federation, the armed forces, special services, and law-enforcement agencies of Central Asian republics have not enough practical experience in the struggle against illegal network organizations using suicide-killers. The latter are an alien phenomenon for Central Asia brought in from Afghanistan and Pakistan where terrorist acts with the use of "live bombs" have become an almost regular phenomenon.
On the example of one of the most notorious terrorist organizations of Central Asia - the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) it can be seen that these organizations began to use suicide-killer about the time when they had moved to Afghanistan and begun to cooperate closely with "Al Qaeda."
The situation in Central Asia began to destabilize from the early 2000th due to a number of reasons, including the implementation by NATO and ISAF of their operations in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan has remained an "island of stability" in Central Asia for quite some time. However, in 2011 alarming events began to take place there, too, which, according to experts, were closely connected with Islamist terrorism.
In the course of a special operation in Almaty region to smash a group of terrorists, Kazakhstan was forced to admit the presence of extremist organizations on its territory, thus adding another country to
the list of Central Asian states where radical Islamists carried on their activity.
Objects of Suicide Terrorists
Experts define terrorism with the use of suicide-killers as the act of inflicting maximal damage on the civilian population with a view to intimidating people, accompanied by the conscious refusal of the perpetrator to save his or her life2. However, in recent years the situation has changed essentially - the number of objects of encroachments of terrorists in general, and suicide terrorists in particular has increased.
It is believed that prior to the 1970s, when radical Muslim spiritual leaders announced that self-sacrifice in the fight against the enemies was a type of martyr death, suicide-killers had practically not been used for political purposes. From the 1970s to the early 1990s terrorist acts with participation of suicide-killers were relatively rare. This type of terrorism was not characteristic of European non-Muslim terrorist organizations, such as IRA, ETA, etc. The use of suicide-killers is typical of Islamic radical movement where certain passionarity, religious fanaticism and upbringing in the spirit of self- sacrifice have always played a significant role, although there were suicide-killers in non-Islamist terrorist organizations, too, such as the Workers' party of Kurdistan, Lebanese Communist party, Syrian Nationalist party, "Tamil Ilama" (Sri Lanka), and some others.
Among the early examples of Islamic terrorism with participation of suicide-killers are the explosion of one such person, member of the "Al Dawa" terrorist organization, at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in 1981, explosion of the barracks of American troops and explosion at the headquarters of French troops in Beirut in 1983, an attempt on the life of Anwar Sadat in Cairo, terrorist acts in Israel, etc.
From the beginning of the 2000s the use of suicide-bombers has become a widespread practice of radical Islamist organizations, and the number of terrorist acts and their victims has grown sharply.
In September 2001, as a result of an attack of suicide-killers Ahmad Shah Masud, an outstanding leader of the Islamic movement of the mojaheds, was killed, which radically changed the geopolitical situation in the entire region.
But the greatest number of casualties was caused by the terrorist act on September 11, 2001, in the United States, which involved the greatest number of suicide-killers.
The objects of terrorist strikes have also changed. A specific feature of modern terrorism with the use of suicide-killers is that its target is usually civilian population or the enemy manpower. In this lies the difference of modern terrorism from that of the 19th - the first half of the 20th century, which was mainly spearheaded against representatives of state power. Information of the acts of terror with the use of suicide-killers spread by the mass media bears an exceptionally political nature and causes wide panic among the population. It aims at forcing the authorities to agree to concessions and exerts great influence by fear. It is important to consider the fact that the explosions of "live bombs" comprise three percent of all terrorist acts committed in the world, but they account for up to half of all casualties 3 and the strongest public reaction.
Thus, the use of suicide-killers is one of the most widespread forms of inflicting maximal harm on the population and authorities.
In his statement at the conference on "Central Asia in Post-Soviet Integration" in Issyk Kul in Kyrgyzstan in September 2010, the representative of the Anti-terrorist Center of the post-Soviet countries M. Kochubei said that the circle of potential objects of terrorist acts with the use of explosive devices had a well-pronounced tendency to
broaden due to two reasons. First, terrorist acts become more professional. It is now evident that they are prepared by specialists well-versed in the theory and practice of explosions. Secondly, materials for making explosive devices are easily available. Almost all of them have elements of industrial manufacture - detonators, explosive substances, microcircuits, etc. This shows an abnormal situation in army units, arsenals, war industry enterprises, and law-enforcement agencies, where it is not too difficult to obtain materials necessary for making such devices.
It was also pointed out at the conference that expenses for making an explosive device to equip a suicide-killer with it are not too high. As is known, suicide-bombers are the cheapest means to commit murderous crimes: the cost of an explosive device used by such people in Israel is $150, on average, and the growth of donations from Islamic foundations, other organizations, and individual persons is estimates at hundreds of millions of dollars4.
The reasons for which illegal network structures in the person of Islamist terrorist organizations use suicide-killers are as follows:
1. Preparation of an act of terror with the use of suicide-killer is not a difficult task as preparation of an action involving the use of a big group of fighters which requires finding ways of clandestine arrival, hiding and retreat; suicide-killer does not need all this, and it is very easy for him or her to arrive at the place of the panned terrorist act.
2. It is impossible to apply symmetrical retaliatory measures to a suicide-bomber, because the explosion of a "live bomb" exerts a very powerful influence on the civilian population and authorities.
3. The death of suicide-bombers creates a heroic image of martyrs for faith - Shakhids, which makes it possible to draw new members to Islamist organizations.
4. The perpetrator of a terrorist act cannot be interrogated after the crime, which makes more difficult to investigate it and search for its organizers.
5. A relatively low cost of the preparation and execution of the terrorist act.
6. Actions with participation of suicide-killers are always in the limelight of the mass media and evoke great repercussions and criticism of the law-enforcement agencies and authorities.
By committing such terrorist acts the heads of various illegal armed groupings demonstrate the ability of the bandit underground to destabilize the situation in a country, enhance their prestige, and give account for financial expenses to their sponsors4. Meanwhile, suicide-killers themselves are regarded as "weapons of strategic importance" in the arsenal of the means of terrorists. By using them the leaders of extremists wish to demonstrate to the authorities and world public the potential of their organization and their determination to reach their aims by any means. This is why the special services do not exclude the possibility of the organizers of such explosions going as far as to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear components, as well as perpetrate terrorist acts leading to technological disasters5.
It is also necessary to note that in studying such phenomenon as the use of suicide-killers for committing acts of terror it is important to correctly determine and sort out the facts of "suicidal terrorism," when a member of an illegal network organization commits self-explosion with a view to dealing maximal harm to public security or the enemy manpower (in the latter case this crime can be determined as subversion of military security), and the fact of accidental self-explosion of the suicide-bomber or its maker. It is also necessary to make a difference between terrorist acts with the use of suicide-killers within the
framework of criminal cases of lone fanatics, and terrorist acts committed by religious extremists.
Technology of Recruiting
and Training Suicide-killers
The first stage of preparation of a terrorist act includes selection of persons who are best suited to it by their psycho-physical parameters, social status, educational level, passionarity, and readiness to submit to the requirements of the operation.
The educational level of the people selected for the operation is not high, as a rule, although it is not always necessary. An important feature brought out by experts is the absence of firm social connections and susceptibility to outside influence. This factor is enhanced by practically complete isolation of the suicide-killer from outside social contacts directly on the eve of committing the terrorist act.
The main criterion of selection is the psychology of a person, the traits of character and psyche which make him or her controllable and suggestible. The person's religiousness is of no decisive importance. Terrorist groups often cultivate various rites of transfer of their members into the ranks of suicide-killers and support various heroic myths of self-sacrifice. Their ideologists use cultural traditions and historical examples making death not only acceptable, but also commendable6.
An expert on terrorists' psychology T. Nestik points to the fact that often psychological trauma, with whose help the organizers of terrorist crimes manipulate the consciousness of the potential suicide-killer is created artificially in order to make the latter wish to sacrifice himself or herself, or regain his or her "ego," or acquire new self-identification. This is clearly seen on the example of the Chechen suicide women-bombers who were subjected to psychological and
physical violence and rape, so that "heroic death" for them was the only possible means to "cleanse themselves."
The Arab newspaper "Al-Shark Al Awsat", in an interview with representatives of the Palestinian "Khamas" grouping about how people were selected in Palestine for becoming suicide-terrorists, wrote the following: "There are four criteria with the help of which we determine who will fit for us. First, religiousness, secondly, his or her relations with the parents and the general position of the family: whether he or she is the only child; in that case we dismiss the candidature. Thirdly, he or she should fully realize the importance of the mission. And fourthly, his or her death should kindle the flame of jihad in the hearts of other people and evoke the desire to sacrifice their life to the great cause."7 It should also be taken into account that the families of the suicide-terrorists often receive material assistance from terrorist organizations and sympathizers.
Previously, men have largely been used as "live bombs", because they were better trained, yet they could change their mind during the operation and thus thwart it altogether. Subsequently, the methods of using "live bombs" has been changed slightly; selection acquired a universal character and women and children began to be used more widely, because they are more susceptible to outside influence and cause less suspicion in the conditions of the extraordinary regime. This is why more and more women and children are among suicide-killers nowadays. By the mid-1990s women comprised about 40 percent of all "live bombs."8
Terrorist organizations strive to draw adolescents to this deadly business. For instance, at the beginning of 2006 the "Hamas" organization created a special site for children (http://www.al-fateh.net/http://www.al-fateh.net), which glorifies young Shakhids and calls on children to "take the path of martyrs."9. The use of children as
"live bombs" is a new and serious trend of hiring kids for murder, which has fist emerged in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Benazir Bhutto was killed by a 14-year-old boy, and a 12-year-old lad shot at Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan.
In 2011 the security forces of Iraq eliminated the base of the organization "Tuyur al-Janna" ("Birds of Paradise"), which existed from 2006 and trained children for the role of suicide-killers. In 2008 Iraqi officers showed journalists six crying arrested adolescents, some of them under 14, who told them that they had been recruited by a "Saudi militant" and had to explode themselves.
In 2009 the newspaper "Washington Times" published results of an investigation, which showed that one of the Taliban leaders in Pakistan had bought children from seven years of age for a price not exceeding $14,000 to be trained as suicide-killers10.
The selection process of candidates to Shakhids takes place at Islamist educational centers sponsored and maintained by Islamist radicals or those under their influence and control, at mosques during religious education and sermons, as well as in refugee camps
It should be noticed that there are differences in the tactic of using suicide-bombers.
Some use them blind (when the Shakhid carries a bomb to a definite place unaware of what it is, and explosion is directed by remote-control console. This is practiced with those who can show doubts and hesitation. But if a "live bomb" has no courage to explode himself or herself, for some reason, he or she has an accompanying person who will make the blast.
The next stage of training is psychological brainwashing. The training of "live bombs" is conducted by people with special knowledge. If Shakhids are trained from among Islamic radicals, these
instructors are either mullahs, or persons with a special religious education who can well explain the need to make self-sacrifice.
As a rule, there are many people among suicide-terrorists whose relatives, husbands or wives have been killed in counter-terrorist operations, suffered from actions of the official authorities, etc., that is, a great role is given to searching for a real motive. Training is going on in special camps from several weeks to several months, sometimes in ordinary living conditions, prayer houses, or refugee camps. Brainwashing is usually accompanied by inducing to use drugs and other psychedelic substances. After this, at the end of training suicide-terrorists take the oath, and then the way back is out of the question.
By the time when a suicide-terrorist comes to the place of perpetrating the crime the level of his or her psychological readiness is high enough, which allows him or her to avoid suspicion on the part of any security agent. This is why to prevent terrorist acts committed by suicide-killers is one of the most difficult tasks facing the law-enforcement agencies11. At the same time it is noted that there have been cases when candidates to "live bombs" have been selected literally a week before terrorist acts12.
At the stage of training of suicide-terrorist he or she is taught the simple skills of handling makeshift explosive devices. Of course, suicide-bombers can use more complex explosive devices, but they are remote-controlled, in most cases. The training program is individual and is connected with motives close to the trainee.
The training period may vary in time. Its duration depends on the nature of the terrorist operation: is it on transport, strategic infrastructure, etc. Transportation routes of bombers to the place where the act is to take place should be planned beforehand.
Indicative in this respect were events on Dubrovka in Moscow in 2002, where 916 hostages were taken by suicide-terrorists.
S. Goncharov, deputy to the Moscow City Duma, retired colonel of special KGB forces, notes: "In order to talk of the Dubrovka lesson, one should remember previous cases of hostage taking. The terrorist act in Budyonnovsk in 1995, where Chechen fighters took more than 1,600 hostages at the local hospital, was a precursor, as it were, of the Dubrovka tragedy. After the special force unit lost three men and received an order from Moscow to lift the siege of the hospital, the Chechen bandits left the scene waving flags and believing in their impunity.
"At the theater on Dubrovka Chechen terrorists captured about 900 people, but this time they were all suicide-killers ready to give short shrift mercilessly to all hostages."13
It is important to note that in conditions of the existence of transnational network terrorist structures, which can "supply" well-trained suicide-killers for committing terrorist acts on concrete territory there is always a reserve of such suicide-terrorists.
Terrorist Acts with the Use
of Suicide Murderers in Central Asia
It is difficult to list all acts of terror with the use of suicide-killers in Central Asia because far from all such acts have been registered by official statistics, and information about them is difficult to find in open sources, but they have taken place in Kazakhstan14, Uzbekistan15, and Tajikistan16.
There are no data on terrorist acts with the use of suicide-terrorists in Kyrgyzstan, however, there is information about the activity of the previously unknown grouping called "Jaishul Mahdi" ("Army of the Faithful Ruler") and its role in organizing explosions at a synagogue in September and in a gym in Bishkek in November, as well
as an abortive attempt to explode a police building in Bishkek in December 2011.
There is evidence that Kyrgyz citizens can be used as suicide-bombers on the territory of other republics of Central Asia.
There is no information about the use of suicide-terrorists on the territory of Turkmenistan in open sources.
Then most well-known banned terrorist organizations operating on the territory of Central Asian are: "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," "Jamaat of Mojaheds of Central Asia," "Khizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islamiya" ("Islamic party of Liberation"), "Tabligi Jamaat" ("Group of Envoys"), "Zhaishul Mahdi," "Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan," Uighur "Shark Azatlyk Tashkilati," "Akromiya," "Khizb an-Nusra" ("Arty of Victory)," branch of "Khizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islamiya"), "Musulmon-birodalrar" ("Muslim Brothers"), "Adolat" ("Justice"), "Islam Lashkarlari" ("Warriors of Islam"), "Islam uigonish partiyasy" ("Party of Islamic Revival"), "Toaba" ("Repentance"), "Jamaat Ansarulla."17 Many of them are parts of the international "Al Qaeda" network.
From the mid-2000s Central Asian states began active cooperation in the sphere of opposing terrorism at the level of international organizations, such as FMC, CSTO, SCO, ANC CIS, etc.
However, as noted in a report of the Center of anti-terrorist programs, there are certain differences and friction between various countries of Central Asia on questions of opposing and fighting terrorism and extremism. This became especially noticeable in relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
At the Tashkent trial in July 2004 of persons involved in spring terrorist acts, some of the defendants admitted that they were trained at special camps in South Kazakhstan. From their words it followed that these camps were also used for transferring terrorists via Azerbaijan
and Iran to Pakistan. There were quite a few Arab instructors at these camps. This information has been distributed by the Uzbek mass media.
Taking into consideration difficult relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the authors of the report admitted that the accused made confessions under pressure exerted by secret service agents for the purpose of discrediting Kazakhstan at an international level. In any case, the State Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan denied the charges stating that there were no camps for training fighters in the country. But in the course of the trial it was proved that there was the Kazakh terrorist group "Zhamaat of mojaheds of Central Asia," whose members were directly involved in the above-mentioned explosions18.
Suicide-terrorists as a Commodity
Suicide-killers to be used on the territory of Central Asia are trained in four camps of Pakistan (near Islamabad, Quetta, Lahore and Waziristan) by the so-called Iraqi technology. Among future suicide-killers are people from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Usually, young men from Central Asia studying at the Islamic University in Lahore are carefully watched by special agents who try to find zealous Islamists among them, susceptible to outside influence and interested in individual elements of teaching connected with victimhood.
After graduation the candidates selected for further studies and training are thoroughly brainwashed in one of the four camps mentioned, as a result of which their will becomes fully suppressed.
This training is carried on by specialists from the "Khakkani" group (independent terrorist organization in Afghanistan connected with the Taliban engaged in the guerilla fight against the country's government and the NATO forces). The "Khakkani" network becomes
the owner of "human slaves." This group can use the trained suicide-killers for its purposes, transfer or sell them to other organizations and groupings operating in neighboring or distant countries, including in Central Asia. The price of a person trained in Pakistan, according to various estimates, may reach $100,000.
These suicide-killers are used for committing acts of terror with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the local authorities in order to gain political or ideological advantages. But, as experts point out, the aim of suicide-killers may be the liquidation of undesirable political, public and religious leaders.
In December 2011, one of the graduates of the Lahore University killed the deputy to Afghan parliament of Uzbek origin Abdullah Mutalib Bigi and 21 people along with him in Tahar province of Afghanistan.
Experts see a definite Afghan-Pakistani trace in the use of suicide- killers in Central Asia. Cooperation between the "Khakkani" network and the "Islamic movement of Uzbekistan" has played a definite role in the matter of recruiting candidates to suicide-terrorists among ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyzs in the southern districts of Central Asia.
Moreover, there was information that the Kyrgyzstan authorities were threatened with terrorist acts to be perpetrated in Bishkek by suicide-killers, which the authorities dismissed as a newspaper hoax, although it has been confirmed by well-informed sources.
In the period of the presidential election campaign in 2011 the son of the ex-president of Kyrgyzstan, an influential businessman M. Bakiyev threatened the incumbent President Almazbek Atambayev with a series of explosions in Bishkek committed by suicide-killers. Indeed, there were seven such persons, ethnic Kyrgyzs and Kazakhs, who were bought by Bakiyev in Tajikistan. These terrorists were
transferred to Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan, and after they fulfilled their assignment, they were returned to the territory of Afghanistan.
Thus, experts state that to the south of the Russian borders there is a well-organized and well-functioning market of suicide-killers regulated by "market rules," one of which says that until they fulfill their assignment, they remain in possession of a person who paid for them. According to the operative data of the Afghan special services, purchase of suicide-killers by people from Central Asia does not have a mass nature, it is more typical of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves. However, in the experts' view, this market will broaden in Central Asia due to the growing instability and presence of rich resources in the region, and also proceeding from the fact that it is to the advantage of certain geopolitical actors in the region.
Suicide-killers as a Threat to Central Asia
The countries of Central Asia are now an object of close attention and actions on the part of international and regional terrorist organizations of Islamist character. They pursue three goals:
First, to commit terrorist acts in order to intimidate the authorities and force them to adopt concrete political decisions, and also to saw fear among the civilian population.
Thus, the situation in certain countries and the region as a whole, as well as along the borders with Russia, is destabilized, and this circumstance makes it possible to use local terrorist organizations by major geopolitical actors implementing their interests in Central Asia.
The base of Kazakh Islamic extremism is the southern regions of Kazakhstan (Chimkent and Dzhambul). It is from there that "missionaries" move to the north, to the practically "transparent" Kazakh-Russian border. The conditions of the functioning of the Customs Union will allow Islamists to penetrate, practically freely, in
such deep-lying territories of Russia as the Urals and Siberia. When Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan join the Customs Union the situation may become still more complicated.
As to internal factors, along with a difficult socio-economic situation the problem of drug trafficking and consumption is of great importance, because the money earned from the sale of Afghan heroin goes to financing terrorist acts. Besides, the development and thriving of the drug business in the region go hand in hand with recruiting new members to Islamist organizations, especially in the Ferghana Valley. The problem of corruption in the law-enforcement agencies is of no small importance. Military service provides one of the key social lifts for young men in the countries of Central Asia. After the army service it becomes easier for demobilized men to get a job at government offices. Experts note that members of Islamist grouping are doing everything in their power to join the army where they are engaged in clandestine propaganda work.
Thus, the army and military structures are one of the targets for Islamist radical elements as a broad recruiting base. If drastic measures to curb this trend are not taken, radical Islam may penetrate the core of the government apparatus and spread among its officials, and the consequences of it may be simply catastrophic.
Secondly, to use the territory of the Central Asian countries by international and regional Islamist organizations for propaganda and subversive work on the territory of third states, including Russia.
According to numerous mass media reports, there are transfer bases of fighters and caches of arms which can easily be moved practically to any point of the region and used on the territory of third countries. There are also possibilities for transfer, upkeep and legalization of trained suicide-killers.
Thirdly, to use the territory of the Central Asian region as a recruiting base, including for suicide-killers.
Thus, serious attention should be paid to Central Asia in view of the spreading of Islamism of its Salaphite form and growing influence of Islamist propaganda, especially in several districts of the Ferghana Valley. Otherwise, the situation may worsen as is the case of Iraq or the North Caucasus. It is also necessary to take into account the developments in Syria. As soon as the situation in Syria begins to stabilize, some terrorists operating there may be transferred to Central Asia.
For example, there are statements issued by the mojahed grouping "Ansar al-Din" connected with "Al Qaeda," in which it sharply criticized the activity of Kazakhstan's authorities and warned that as soon as they scored victory in Afghanistan, they would turn to Central Asia, and Kazakhstan would become a sphere of their interests. The Uighur fighters from the "Islamic party of Turkestan" group, who are now fighting against the Asad regime in Syria, will be returning to China, and it cannot be excluded that from there they will penetrate in the territory of Central Asia.
In the middle of June 2013 five members of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan were apprehended in Kunduz province of Afghanistan. They were connected with the training of suicide-killers. According to available information, two of them were planned to be used as suicide- killers. During the interrogation they told investigators that they had been trained in a special camp in Northern Waziristan (Pakistan).
On June 23 several citizens of Turkmenistan were arrested in Aleppo (Syria), among whom was the commander of demolition unit of "Al Qaeda," who had been trained near Ashkhabad in the unit of Sheikh
Murad, from where he was transferred first to Istanbul and then to Syria.
Thus we see that the threat of suicide-killers penetrating Central Asia becomes very tangible. This also concerns Russia.
Evidently, without a system of government measures aimed at curbing this expansion it will not be possible to solve the problem of opposing the terrorist forms of establishing the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, including with the use of suicide-killers. The forces and means of the special services alone will hardly be sufficient for the purpose. It is necessary to adopt and carry out measures aimed at improving the socio-economic situation of the population and democratizing the local regimes. Broad support of radical Islamists by the local population is based on the latter's substandard social position and dissatisfaction with the authorities. Of course, serious efforts should be undertaken to establish closer interaction of the countries of the region aimed at fighting Islamists terrorism. It is necessary to improve the mechanisms of the implementation of the growing role of state-private partnership in preventing terrorism, combating its ideology and propaganda, and opposing radicalization of sentiments and behavior of the most diverse sections of the population and mass recruiting of people in terrorist organizations.
It is evident that the fight against terrorism and suicide-killers as one of its instruments should include finding the infrastructure which recruits, trains and transfers them to places of terrorist acts. At the same time, experts note that the opposition to terrorism is more effective when it is possible to find and use inner contradictions and differences in the midst of terrorists.
In this connection it is necessary to carry on:
- Constant preventing measures to find and reveal cells of networks, neutralize them, and stop the distribution of illegal Wahhabi literature.
- Appropriate measures in regions with a higher level of social and confessional tension.
- Corresponding training of special service personnel and employees of law-enforcement agencies, including the development of agent network.
- Monitoring and analysis of information.
- Work of civil authorities on education of the population, particularly, explaining the danger of religious extremism.
- Find and reveal those who can present a threat to state and public security.
- Train specialists in counter-terrorist operation.
- Objectively analyze the effectiveness of counter-terrorist activity.
It is necessary to emphasize that the use of suicide-killers with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the authorities in the Central Asian countries becomes more extensive and effective with every passing year. And its role will grow along with drawing the Central Asian states in the new format of relations with the global political actors, especially during the withdrawal the ISAF and NATO forces from Afghanistan, because the regional and transnational radical Islamist organizations tend to regard the local authorities as the satellites of the West.
Similarly, such situation can develop on parts of the Russian Federation's territory bordering on Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus, and also in the Volga area and West Siberia inhabited by Muslims. Apart from that, there are very many Muslims of Central Asian and North Caucasian origin living and working in big Russian cities as
labor migrants, who are dissatisfied with their economic and socio-legal status.
Notes
A. Aleksandrov .Siriya -posledny rubezh? [Syria - the Last Border-line?] // URL.: http://csrc/articles/22http ://csrc/articles/22
V. Sosnin., T. Nestik. Fenomen terrorizma s ispolzovaniyem smertnikov: sotsialno-psikhologicheskaya interpretatsiya [Phenomenon of Terrorism with the Use of Suicide-killers: Socio-psychological Interpretation] URL.: http://psyfactor.org/lib/ terror20.htmhttp://psyfactor.org/lib/terror20.htm
V. Zhuravel. Terroristy-smertniki: problemy protivodeistviya // Pravo i bezopasnost [Suicide-terrorists: Problems of Counter-actions // Law and Security]. 2010, No 3 (36).
U. Otorbayev. Terroristy-smertniki - kto oni? [Suicide-terrorists - Who Are They? // URL. :http://www.easttime.ru/analitic/1/3/992.html http://www.easttime.ru/ analitic/1/3/992.html
Terrorism - eto bolezn [Terrorism Is a Disease] // NVO. 2004, May 14. Terroristki-smertnitsy - kno oni? {Women suicide-terrorists - Who Are They?] // URL.: http://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/22786 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/ beseda/22786
V. Malyshev. Wumen-terrorism; zhenshchiny-smertnitsy kak politiucheskoye yavleniye (analiz) [Women-terrorism: Women-suicide-killers as a Political Phenomenon (Analysis)] // URL.: http://www.centrasia/ru/ newsA.php?st= 1132990020 http://www.centrasia/ru/newsA.php?st=1132990020 K. Zubkov. Ne plach, mama -ya stal shakhidom [Don't Cry, Mamma, I've Become a Shakhid] // URL.: http://gzt.ru/world/2006/03/08/211827.html http://gzt.ru/world/ 2006/03/08/211827.html
Cited by A. Sukharenko. Zhiviye bomby [Live Bombs] // URL.: http://sartraccc.ru/ print.php?print_file=Pub/suharenko%2807-04-10%29.html http://sartraccc.ru/print.php?print_file=Pub/suharenko%2807-04-10%29.html Tragediya bez sroka davnosti [Tragedy Without Period of Limitation]] // Parlamentskaya gazeta, 2012, October 26 - November 1.
M. Podkopayeva. Noviye ugrozy v Tsentralnoi Azii [New Threats in Central Asia]] // Sut vremeni. 2012, No 3, November 7.
A. Uvarov. Terrorizm v Kazakhstane: naskolko realna ugroza [Terrorism in Kazakhstan: How Real Its Threat] // URL.: http://russkie.org/index.php?module= fullitem&id=24221 http ://russkie.org/index.php?module=fullitem&id=24221 G. Saidazimova. Uzbekistan: Effect of Tashkent Explosions Still Felt Two Years Later // Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 2006, March 27 // URL.:http://
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