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global changes going on in the world, especially in the post-Soviet states, call for new systemic indices to generalize different sides of the same problem in order to use them for a comparative analysis of countries and regions.
The problems of the national development strategy and ethnic security discussed in this article have been theoretically substantiated in academic writings, but have not yet been used in practice. This explains why my understanding of the interconnection between the national development strategy and ethnopolitical security was aimed at revealing the ambiguous and multivariable nature of their dialectics in order to receive clearer answers to the globalization challenges.
Nana GEGELASHVILI
Ph.D. (Political Science), head, Section on Regional Problems, The Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia).
THE IRANIAN PROBLEM AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS AGGRAVATION
Abstract
The article gives an analysis on the Iranian problem from Russian and American perspectives with an emphasis on possible areas of cooperation and confrontation as well as their stance on the Iranian problem as a whole. The author points out the two states have an important legacy of
preventing proliferation of which they should be proud. It is a legacy that should be revived and focused on the core proliferation threats in Iran and elsewhere before the nuclear confrontation of the Cold War is replaced by a broader nuclear competition the two states will not find as easy to control.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The author notes that even in the depths of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union often worked together to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries. Now, both countries realize that Iran’s nuclear program is more advanced than supposed before and may be aimed directly at creating nuclear weapons in the next few years. The article says that the current political line has nothing to slow Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, so new approaches and better coordination are urgently required before it is too late.
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U.S. Stance on the Problem
Iran has become an obsession with the Bush administration. It has also emerged as a major issue in the foreign policy debate for the U.S. presidential candidates. While some Democrats are accusing Bush of raising the specter of a global war, Hillary Clinton has opted to give the president “a virtual blank check.”
No matter the U.N., the U.S., the EU and Russia have been continuing efforts aimed at the full scale freezing of the nuclear program, Iran continues to ignore the international calls for termination of uranium enrichment.
The U.N. Security Council has introduced sanctions twice (December 2006 and March 2007) for refusal to stop the nuclear program though Iran insisted the program was destined for nuclear stations fuel production.
The U.N. 1747 resolution saw light on 24 March, 2007. It toughened sanctions against Iran and was a follow up to the resolution 1737 of 23 December, 2006 calling for the program termination.
As a response to the resolution 1747 Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, “the world was to know no sanctions, no matter how tough, had a chance to make Iranian people relinquish their legitimate rights.” He said, “the suspension of the program was not on the agenda.”1
The given circumstances complicate the issue and make it a tall order. Is a solution feasible? If there is a will there is a way. Iran is adamant in taking away an unjust preliminary condition, that is, the enrichment termination. Getting rid of the condition could bring it to the negotiating table again. U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice made known the U.S. official stance. She said, “as an independent state Iran has a right to have a peaceful nuclear program. It’s not peaceful use of nuclear energy that is in focus, but rather weapon grade uranium enrichment that is a matter of concern.”2
The U.S. insists on introducing new sanctions till Iran stops the program and delivers detailed information on it.
It even went a bit further in October 2007 imposing new economic sanctions against Iran encompassing over 20 banks and natural persons the U.S. private organizations and natural persons are banned to have financial deals with. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps came under sanctions too. Not long ago it was declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. The Corps has about one third of the Iranian economy under control, including oil and gas fields, vehicle assembly, media.
Washington is consistent in its policy—new economic sanctions are to damage Iran significantly and prospects to worsen relations with the U.S. will frighten away foreign companies from Iranian markets. Republican congressman Chris Chays says “being against war he believes in sanctions taking effect.”3
Nevertheless, many Americans remain skeptical of U.S. allegations against Iran’s nuclear program. In an op-ed piece, Scott Ritter, a former U.N. arms inspector, asserted that “ a careful fact-based assessment of Iran demonstrates that it poses no threat to the legitimate national security interests of the United States.”4
The U.S. and allies are to go on exerting double pressure: The EU-Iran talks and U.N. Security Council approved sanctions. The allies have worked out a plan that envisages trade benefits and civil nuclear energy support in exchange for giving the nuclear program up. The U.S. thinks the Iranians should simply abandon fuel cycle, enrichment and processing—the things that may lead to nuclear technology acquisition. It’s Iran who hinders the diplomatic process.
As many U.S. politicians believe all this is to finally bring Iran from confrontation to negotiations. If not, State Secretary Condoleezza Rice should step aside to give way to those who think the time for diplomacy is over.
1 [www.strana.ru], 25 March, 2007.
2 The New York Times, 27 August, 2006.
3 [http://usinfo.state.gov/], 4 October, 2008.
4 T. Fatemi, “Growing Russian-Iran Ties,” DAWN-Editorial, 30 October, 2007.
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As Washington said not once, Iran, probably, remains “the only and the most serious challenge to the U.S. security in the region, but the diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue would be preferable. Iran may be the greatest challenge for the U.S. not in the Middle East only, but, probably, in the whole world, because the interconnection between terrorism supported by Iran, internal repressions and nuclear program on the way is a very inflammable mixture.”5
More than this, the U.S. says the danger coming from Iran is not limited by nuclear issue only. The country is an arms provider and financial donor of Middle East terrorists. As Washington views it, Iran strives to become the leading military force in the Middle East and it supports Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestine Liberation Front—Chief Command, Islamic Jihad and others for the purpose.
The well-known 3 December, 2007 U.S. intelligence report says Iran is not going through with its military nuclear program at present. As the report says Iran suspended nuclear arms program in 2003 as a result of international pressure. The U.S. intelligence thinks there is a high probability no military nuclear program was underway in the summer of 2007 though Iran has the potential to acquire nuclear weapons in case the leadership takes a decision.
When it comes to Iran Washington takes into consideration the fact that Iran is the world’s fourth-largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, and that it has the second largest gas reserves after Russia.
In this respect it should be said that in the past few years, a combination of international sanctions and internal technical and political problems has hindered both gas production and development of Iran’s energy sector. But surging gas prices have spurred foreign interest in Iranian reserves. Tehran has been pursuing a more energetic gas policy, indicating its readiness to cooperate with the European Union, which, eager to diversify its gas supplies, is increasingly willing to separate political from economic questions in relations with Iran.
In this respect the Nabucco project should be mentioned which Europe and the United States view as the main prong in the drive to diversify gas deliveries to the EU. It was initially designed to pump gas from Iran’s Caspian coast to Europe, bypassing Russia.
Aware of its critical importance for Nabucco, Tehran has become more active on the gas market. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said during his visit to Bulgaria shortly after Russia and Bulgaria signed the South Stream contract in late February 2007 that Iran’s involvement in Nabucco was “a possible sphere of cooperation with the EU.”
Iran’s advance to the European gas market and its plans to develop its gas reserves could well disrupt the balance of interests on the market, which European consumers question anyway.
Coupled with U.S. plans for developing Iraqi gas reserves, Iranian gas could provide the requisite supply for the Nabucco project. This may be hypothetical at the moment, but the mere existence of potential gas reserves for the pipeline may encourage Russia to step up the South Stream project.
Meanwhile, Iran is playing on the EU’s desire to ease its dependence on Russia and save money. Also there is a strong possibility that Iran may reroute its gas supplies to China, Pakistan and India. Why should it wait for the United States to change its attitude when there are potential clients in the east with huge energy requirements who will not be swayed by Washington?
Russian Attitude to the Problem
On its part Russia realizes Iran is given a choice between cooperation with the world community or continuation of uranium enrichment and, correspondingly, further isolation. The chief Russia’s
’ Ibid., 24 February, 2006.
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concern is the possibility of Iran pulling out of Non-Proliferation Treaty and breaking relations with IAEA in case it’s driven to the wall. That’s why, while on a visit to Iran in October 2007, President Putin noted that “Russia was a sole country to help Iran implement its peaceful nuclear program and stressed the importance of Iran’s membership in NPT.”6 Its patience Moscow calls for, saying Iran still may strike a deal with the world community. Moscow notes the November 2007 IAEA report said that Tehran had cooperated with some of IAEA inspectors in some areas and provided for more transparency.
Currently American policy on Iran is commonly perceived in Russia as designed not against nuclear proliferation, but against the Iranian regime. On this issue, Moscow believes it is entitled to its own policy tastes. Perhaps the Russian view of an acceptable enhanced enrichment capacity is tacitly shared by the IAEA, China and India, while the EU would probably be deeply split on this issue.
That’s why an intriguing turning point in the Russia-U.S. geopolitical game started to loom. U.S. State Undersecretary Daniel Fried dropped a hint “the U.S. may become more attentive to Moscow’s BMD concern and curtail the European element of the program in case Russia makes Iran curtail its nuclear program.”7
To some extent it can be considered as a response to the Putin’s October 2007 open air statement that said “Russia would respond accordingly if the NMD plans don’t take its concern into account.”8
The Iranian problem was discussed by our presidents in Pusan (S. Korea), at APEC 2005 summit, 2006 and 2007 G8 summits.
The issue had been discussed by president Putin with the president of France, U.S. secretaries of State and Defense, chancellor of Germany. Upon coming back from Iranian visit President Putin received prime minister of Israel. So one can say, Russia is in close contact with the leading players. It is in Tehran President Putin made an attempt to find a compromise. The gist of it is: Iran stops the enrichment, Russia blocks new UNSC sanctions. The proposal was supported by Washington. The Iranians could have civil use nuclear potential sending the used nuclear fuel back to Russia to prevent enrichment. So far, Iran has been refusing the proposal but it can be changed.
We can’t speak about Russian approach toward Iran without mentioning Russian political, economic and security interests concerning Iran.
Russian political interests are:
—from the beginning of the 1990s, Iran has been a traditional political partner of Russia in restraining the Sunni radical groups, primarily in the Northern Caucasus, making it impossible to isolate Armenia, working for a peaceful settlement in Tajikistan, and also actively assisting in the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan;
—preservation of partnership relations with Tehran—one of the conditions for substantial Moscow influence in the region of the Middle East;
—Iran, as a regional competitor of Turkey, significantly weakens its influence, initially in the Southern Caucasus where Moscow’s position is not strong enough, especially since the significant rise in prices for Russian energy carriers (Iran is an alternative source of energy resources and at least 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis live there).
Russian economic interests are:
—an important trading partner (annual trade turnover has reached $2.2 billion) in the sphere of high-technology products, as well as in the extraction (transportation) of oil and gas, construction of the railway component of the “North-South” project, and also in the area of foodstuffs and the supply of light industry commodities;
6 The Moscow Times, 16 October, 2007.
7 [http://usinfo.state.gov/], 27 November, 2007.
8 [http://www.rol.ru/news/misc/newssng/07/10/18_083.htm].
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—third most important importer (after China and India) of arms (in November 2005 a contract for delivery of Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran was signed, at a value of around $1 billion);
—a large importer of atomic energy products (the value of the contract for further construction of the energy reactor in Bushehr came to $800 million; around 300 Russian companies were involved in that contract resulting in approximately 20 thousand jobs; the Iranian leadership has requested the construction there of two more Russian energy reactors).
Russian security interests are:
—because of territorial proximity, armed conflict between any country and Iran could lead to destabilization of the situation, first in the South Caucasus and later in the Northern Caucasus (the population of each of the Southern Caucasian republics is many times less than in Iran, under heavy aerial missile bombardment the flow of Iranian refugees could come to millions); as a result of this there would be a huge zone of destabilization and would heavily damage the economy of the whole region;
—Russia, China and India have found themselves facing a complicated choice: either to support the West in putting growing pressure on Tehran and at the same time weakening their positions among the Muslim world countries, or to aggravate their relations with the West and risk the prospect of creating global bipolarization;
—continuing conflict over the Iranian nuclear problem will inevitably lead to a split in the antiterrorist coalition and strengthen the positions of radical groups in the Muslim world;
Thus it seems that it is very important for Moscow to secure its partnership relationship with Tehran, that is why Russia is against the introduction of economic sanctions against Iran pursuant to a decision of the U.N. Security Council. At the same time, Russia holds a pragmatic position and has no intention of harming its relationship with the West to please Tehran.
Russia did take a reasonable position both times the two UNSC resolutions were taken. It voted for sanctions and demonstrated its readiness to give priority to common sense over economic interests, no matter the voices in Russia were raised for the continuation of nuclear cooperation because of importance of the Iranian market. Some see the affirmations that Iran poses a bigger threat for Moscow than Washington as empty rhetoric. There is an opinion that Iran poses no danger to Russia whatsoever. In the 1980-1990s there was some talk about mutual ideological threat, but at present Iran is no adversary from any point of view, it’s not even a competitor. It’s a long time Iran became a European mineral resources provider, but in no way it hinders Russia’s interests. On the backdrop of Russia’s claims to the U.S., including sanctions against enterprises selling conventional arms to Iran, meddling into the CIS affairs, especially color revolutions support, deployment of NMD elements in Europe, Moscow’s recent assertiveness on the international arena, Moscow may revise its Tehran policy in favor of economic benefits of Iranian market presence.
Despite the fact that Moscow has historical and geographical reasons to pursue a good neighborhood policy with Tehran and it benefits greatly from sales of arms and other manufactured products to Iran it seems that Russia will have to consider carefully where to draw the line on such sales. Transfers of nuclear or ballistic- missile technology is likely to draw the ire of the U.S. and its allies unless reform in Iran is so extensive that its capabilities would be viewed as less as a threat. Russian nuclear and missile technology transfers to Iran could damage the extent of cooperation with the West on other more important European issues. Some Russian experts in security area are convinced that technology transfers to Iran could backfire by directly or indirectly arming Islamic elements that might eventually turn their attention to Russia.
Brenda Shaffer of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy calls Russia and Iran “partners in need,” motivated mainly by three ends: curbing U.S. influence, maintaining a multipolar world, and undermining U.S. efforts to sideline both states (take, for example, the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
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pipeline which skirts both Iran and Russia). Yet Michael Eisenstadt, writing in Arms Control Today, says cooperation between the two countries “is driven as much by fear and mistrust as it is by opportunism and shared interests.”9 Regardless, closer Russia-Iran ties pose challenges to peace in the Middle East, analysts say, especially if Iran goes nuclear over the next decade.
Hence, probably close to 100 percent of the Russian political elite and strategic community would reject the use of economic sanctions or military force to prevent Iran from developing an experimental uranium enrichment capacity under full IAEA safeguards and squarely within the provisions of NPT. This limited capacity keeps Iran at least ten years from being able to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, though the position of the Russian elite on this subject may differ from that of the Bush Administration and Israel, it is apparently quite close to the views of EU “Troika”, the IAEA, and the democratic opposition in the United States, to say nothing of China and India.
By demanding the immediate cessation of Iranian enrichment activities, Russia is following its own economic and security interests and is demonstrating cooperation with the United States (and the West in general) on nonproliferation. By opposing U.N. sanctions and U.S. military force, Moscow is accommodating its interests in cooperation with Iran and in avoidance of the inevitable economic, political and security damage of war.
Thus the Russian course has made war less likely, or at least postponed it for some time, and it may have somewhat slowed down, but certainly not stopped, Iran’s gradual movement toward a full nuclear fuel cycle.
U.S. arguments that Iran is a “threat” will not have much of an effect on Russia’s policy line. Russia sees this argument as very weak bearing in mind American unsuccessful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
If Iran really is the top priority of U.S. foreign and security policy, then Washington’s overall approach to the region, its broad policy toward Russia and China, as well as the treatment of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, must be profoundly changed.
The main question is—How do you convince Tehran?
Only one thing—the realization in Teheran that the refusal means count down for U.S. military action.
Russia cannot get away from it now, even if its efforts bring no immediate result. To the contrary, Russian diplomacy should act intensively, in close cooperation with the Eurotroika (Germany, Britain, France), China—a standing, veto-wielding UNSC member and, of course, the U.S.
From Russia’s point of view a nuclear Iran is less dangerous than the action against it, which could destabilize Pakistan. What Russia is really afraid of is terrorists laying their hands on nuclear arms. Hardly U.S.-U.K. forces would be able to reliably neutralize the nuclear potential after a coup-d’etat in Pakistan. This scenario is closely tied to the aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan, the aggravation that could get back the same security problem for Russia that, as it seemed then, vanished in 2001.
The two scenarios are unacceptable for Russia. The first—a nuclear capable Iran, that changes the correlation of forces to the South and brings the region ton the brink of a nuclear war, or provokes a U.S. (or U.S.-Israeli) military action. The last one—that would retard the program but will make nuclear capability acquisition inevitable. The follow up—the growth of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine that could spill over to the Caucasus and Central Asia.
As Moscow views it, it’s not nuclear capability to neutralize Israel that Iran is after but the recognition of the regional power status. Such a recognition with corresponding guarantees could make Iran suspend the program without going the whole hog.
Looks like the Bush administration will not do it, but if the U.S. recognizes the Iranian interests as legitimate, if Washington restores the relations, takes sanctions away, lifts bank accounts freeze...,
9 Daily Analysis. “Russia, Iran: Brothers in Arms,” 1 November, 2007.
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may be Iran will embrace a compromise that would envisage the continuation of nuclear program, but accepting military use prevention conditions. It’s unacceptable for the U.S. at present but it can change with the new administration coming to Washington.
And though many in Washington still suspect Russia of double play and are ready to list it as a problem country, like Syria, Venezuela and Iran, suspecting it of dragging time to neutralize the U.N. and help Iran acquire nuclear arms, the U.S. cannot but realize the opportunity window is going to shrink, so it’s more blessed to find common rules of the game and understand that Washington cannot handle it all alone. The best prove is U.S. policy drawbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Middle East, abrupt rise of federal budget deficit and trade deficit, the overall overextension of potential. Besides, some analysts say the U.S.-Iran position is becoming more flexible and the threshold of preliminary requirements for starting talks is getting lower.
Moreover, it’s more and more clearly recognized in Brussels that Iran will never agree to freeze the enrichment fully. So it’s rather “new interpretation of enrichment” that is on the agenda. That is the nuclear program is partially preserved but no real enrichment takes place.
That’s why the Washington’s stance on Russia concerning the Iranian issue has gone through some changes. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer says “Russia could play an important role because its relations with Iran are more friendly. The U.S. could use these relations in order to exert influence on Tehran in the interests of the world community.”10
Russia should use all possibilities, including diplomatic accords, supported by real guarantees. To intensively work along with the EU and the U.S. in order to reach a solution of the Iranian problem. A new Russia-U.S. working group may become a useful tool of coordination and better understanding. We need each other to achieve success in the 21st century, only united we can guarantee normal, calm existence on the regional and global scale.
C o n c l u s i o n s
To sum up, the United States and Russia should revise an idea that nuclear weapons will not be used to threaten states having no nuclear weapons or effective nuclear programs. Since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia have concentrated on factors under which they would be willing to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons. It is time the two countries recognize that such a policy has negative implications that could drive states to acquire nuclear weapons.
To his thinking, it’s only multilateral efforts that security and stability can be achieved through. First of all, it applies to such global threats as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, religious fanaticism and the phenomenon of rogue states. At the regional level Russia-U.S. cooperation is an imperative for laying down a basis for stability in the Middle East and adjacent territories, including Afghanistan and Central Asia.
The article concludes that the goal of the Russian policy is to establish relations with the U.S. and EU on equal footing. Equal and, if possible, partners like. The success depends on what’s achieved in the field of Russian economy’s modernization, its integration into the world economy as a reputable competitor, as well as the social and political progress of Russian society. Russia has no aspiration to become the second Pole, a U.S. opponent. But as for a power center, independent from the U.S., Russia is already the one.
[http://usinfo.state.gov/November17,2007].
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