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Jakobson A. Ya. YAK 316.3
THE GEOPOLITICAL AND MARKETING BACKGROUNDS OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONSHIPS
Russia and China have been interacting in Eastern Asia since 17-th century. In 20-th century we can speak about interrelations not in regional but in the global scale. The forms and the plot of these interrelations have changed drastically and not once. The generation living now remembers the times when the two great nations used to be the best friends and later the worst enemies. Now the relationships are quite normal and friendly (which is not the same that "the best friends").
However, it is interesting to determine some theoretical background of these relationships, in order to be able to predict some tendencies in future. Saying this we lean at the hypothesis that both friendship and conflicts of the past were not only the choice of Stalin, Mao Tsetung, Khrushchov, Deng Xiaoping, Gorbachov or other state leaders. There should have been some regularities that prevented to realize either long-term union or war.
The regularities of this kind are the subject of a special field of science known as geopolitics. Although existing for more than a century, geopolitics hasn't by now become something universally recognized; it is true not only for the principal notions or regularities but even for the very essence and structure of the science.
On our opinion, geopolitics deals with the trends of a state external policy which are long-term and do not depend on some up-to-date sympathies or antipathies of certain politicians.
One of the fundamental in geopolitics is the notion of an empire. Various features are meant when this word is used. Some of them are principal, some seem to be minor. Thus, such a feature as monarchy used to be nearly a synonym of empire but nowadays we often deal with republican empires.
Another important feature believed to be inherent to an empire is that it includes some parts conquered once by force and by force held inside the empire now. The former is usually true but, again, nowadays we know a lot of examples when
the inhabitants of such a land once conquered do not want to obtain independence.
Some authors treat an empire as a conglomerate of territorial units which differ substantially as for their ethnic structure and historical traditions, usually each having some specific legal rights in the sphere of self-government but still being the parts of one state with the priority of imperial (federal) laws and traditions over the regional or local ones.
According to this point of view, all the states of federal type may be called empires. On our opinion, it would be rather reasonable, although perhaps it is not so fruitful when we speak about uninational countries like, say, Ostrich. On the other hand, all multinational countries should be attributed to empires as well, independently of their state form (either federal or unitarian).
Other fundamental notions are sphere (zone) of influence and sphere (zone) of interests. The former can be defined as a country or a part of a country somehow dependent on certain dominating state. The intensity of this dependence may vary. It can be a zone of occupation where the whole amount of state power is performed by the dominating state. Sometimes the two countries are united by a treaty which is formally equitable but it is obvious that one of the partners, much more powerful, dominates in this partnership. Sometimes domination (influence, dependence) is not political or not only political but perhaps financial or cultural.
The two notions (sphere of influence and sphere of interests) are usually used separately. Our opinion is that they are closely interdependent. And both are linked with the notion of empire.
Indeed, having its own spheres of influence and interests may be treated as an additional feature of an empire. Not all the countries have them. A good example can be France: the state itself is now, after it had lost all its colonies, rather
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homogenous and Unitarian. But French Empire still exists (without having this name as an official title) and includes all or nearly all ex-colonies. Moreover, it is little use in calling such country as Switzerland, although multinational, an empire: having spheres of influence and interests outside the state territory seems to be an even more important feature than multinationality.
So, empire is, in general case, a complicated formation consisting of parent state, some formally integral parts of the parent state characterized by ethnically different population, overseas colonies and informal sphere of influence, supplemented often by the sphere of interests.
A sphere of interests may be just the same that a sphere of influence or a potential sphere of influence. Very interesting is the question why some territory becomes a sphere of interests of some country. One of the possible answers is that it is not only potential but as well a former sphere of influence (or a former colony, or a former part of the country): historical memory makes a state to look at such a territory in this very manner. But such an answer does not seem to be comprehensive.
Indeed, we see that the former colonies of Great Britain, France or Portugal have been still dependent on ex-parent states. Even if we don't mention various financial, commercial or migrational linkages, rather important is the fact of wide usage of metropolitan language in these countries.
After this theoretical introduction, let us pass to our two countries.
Russia has been imperial country since 16-th century when the Tsar Ivan the Terrible initialized first increments outside the ethnic territory of Russian people. Unlike most other empires having existed by that time it was a continental one. It is a quite different type of empire. The lands conquered do not have the status of colonies. The metropolitan population feels them as an integral part of the country, not as overseas lands, and this difference influences strongly at their historical destiny.
One of the increments of that time was the conquest of Western Siberia. During the next century, the whole Siberia up to the Pacific Ocean had been discovered and colonized by Russian "zemleprokhodtsy" (special word for the category of people who did it, which included Cossacks,
fugitive peasants, merchants, hunters, searchers of adventures, travelers, state officers etc).
In the Far East, the "zemleprokhodtsy" approached the borders of Chinese Empire. "Empire" is the traditional word to determine that state in European languages, while "Emperor" is the traditional translation for Chinese "Huangdi". Indeed, China had been an empire for centuries, a continental, highly centralized and multinational one, spreading its cultural influence much broader than that in political sphere. One interesting peculiarity: twice in the last thousand years was China conquered by "barbars" -Mongols and Manchurians. And both times the conquerors founded barbaric dynasties which after some time appeared to be in fact Chinese: the imperial civilization simply "digested" alien influences even in such cases.
After a series of conflicts and peace treaties, by the beginning of 20-th century, the border between the two empires had been determined. They were not in equal position. Russia was becoming more and more powerful while China weaker and weaker. Some parts of China were turned into zones of influence of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. Russian sphere included Dungbei (after 1905 only its Northern part) as well as Mongolia.
Between 1911 and 1949 China in fact didn't even exist as a united state. Many provinces were governed by local rulers who ignored the central Government. A good part of the country was under control of Communist Party and its armed forces. Another part was occupied by Japanese troops. Only in September 1949 did China become really independent and united state headed by Communists - allies of the Soviet Union.
As for Russia (by that time the Soviet Union), 1949 was the time of its maximum imperial power. The Soviet empire had included two levels: first, the Soviet Union itself, the borders of which moved apart in 1939-1940 and then in 1945; and its sphere of influence - several European countries, including Eastern Germany, and Mongolia in Asia. Dungbei, occupied by Soviet Army, although under rule of Beijing Government, also was the part of this sphere.
In these circumstances, it seemed to Stalin that it would be very easy to include the whole China into the Soviet sphere of influence. We shall never know what was Mao Tsetung's opinion on this idea but he did not object. Maybe, he understood that it was Stalin's great mistake and
was going just to wait when it becomes obvious. Maybe, at that time, he was mistaken too.
But why do we say the idea of including China into the Soviet sphere of influence was a great mistake? Just because China is an empire by its nature, as well as Russia. An empire may be conquered, it may be divided into parts, it may be turned into a colony or destroyed at all. But while it exists as a united and independent state, never will it be a part of some other state's sphere of influence. Moreover, it will seek to form such a sphere itself. This seems to be a geopolitical law (regularity), confirmed by the historical experience of many countries of this type. However, history knows several exceptions when sometime imperial country has lost this status without any remnants (Poland, Ostrich, Netherlands) but they
are scarce. By the way, this very experience demonstrates that at the same time there may exist zones of alien influence on some part of the territory of an empire.
Certainly, the history of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union needs a detailed analysis. But we state that one of the reasons of this conflict was contradiction between China's seeking to realize its imperial potential and the imperial policy of Soviet Government treating China as its zone of influence.
Just one comment. Other countries of Soviet sphere of influence might also reject or try to reject this influence. But, as historical experience shows, their seeking independence was in fact seeking to enter the sphere of influence of some other country or a group of countries. Obviously, this is not so in the case of China.
Passing to our days, can we say that the two countries are not more than independent subjects of international law and nothing prevents them to become good and long-term partners? The answer doesn't seem to be simple. It should consist of answers at many important questions.
First of all, does contemporary Russia have its sphere of interests? Second, does China have such a sphere? Third, do these spheres, if they exist, coincide in some localities?
Undoubtedly, Russia does have its sphere of interests. After the crash of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the lands connected with it by numerous economic flows, by cultural traditions, by humanitarian contacts. A lot of Russian-speaking people live in new independent states, having become an ethnic minority. Two
kinds of migrational flows from these countries to Russia exist: one is emigration of the Russian-speaking, the other is labor migration, predominantly of native population.
All these factors cause the interest of Russia to ex-Soviet countries. This interest is informal, there is no formulated policy in this direction. But nobody will insist that, say, Kazakhstan is for Russia just a foreign country, a subject of diplomatic relations and international trade.
More complicated is the question about the countries which used to be dependent on Soviet Union although formally independent, including Mongolia. As for the latter, it seems to remain a part of Russian sphere of interests.
Less obvious is the interest of China to both Mongolia (which used to be a part of Chinese empire) and the countries of Middle Asia. But this interest exists and is manifested in trade contacts, in investments, etc. So, it can be stated that, in some space, Russia and China compete.
A still more acute question: don't Russia and China have any zones of interests on the territory of each other?
Russia did have such zones in China. One of them was Dungbei. In the beginning of 20-th century it was such a zone officially (as it was already said, later Russia lost its Southern part but saved the North). The end to Russian presence here was put by Stalin in early 50-s. The Russian population was forced to return to Russia, Soviet Army also returned home, the railroad and military bases were transferred to China.
This may seem strange, as nobody can call Stalin so kind and unselfish. Perhaps saving this regional zone of influence didn't seem significant to him, as he hoped to spread his influence at the whole China.
However, now there are practically no signs of former Russian presence in this region. It is a theoretical problem, whether ex-sphere of influence can become sphere of interests in such a case. But Russian chelnoki (small wholesale merchants buying goods in China and bringing them to Russia) prefer to deal with this very region, as well as Russian tourists. Perhaps there exists some interest to Dungbei in Russia, although not very strong.
Another zone of interests could be Xinjang (Uiguristan), the native population of which is congener to the peoples of Middle Asia. But now, when Kazakhstan itself does not belong to Russia
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and is not more than a zone of interests for it, Russia seems to have no interests in Xinjang.
And what about Chinese interests in Russia? There are a lot of Chinese people in Russia today: merchants, agricultural and forestry workers, students, etc. Their presence is determined geographically: mostly in Vladivostok and Primorye, very many in other territories conterminous with China, than still fewer and fewer to the West. We can say that Southern parts of Siberia and the Far East are the field of Chinese migration, of Chinese goods import and, perhaps, in the nearest future, of Chinese investments. Doesn't it mean Chinese interests?
We have used the word "compete" speaking about Chinese and Russian interests in Middle Asia and Mongolia. Competition may bring to conflicts. The existence of Chinese interests in Russian territory and vice versa is still more fraught with conflicts.
Some people in Russia believe that Chinese immigration is dangerous for Russia. It may be followed, they say, by significant demographic and cultural changes and afterwards by territorial claims. It is very easy to proclaim that our peoples are good friends now, that they do not compete but only cooperate. But it doesn't sound very convincing.
Let us discuss the very idea of competition. It is a central notion of market economy. Some market actors compete with some others. This is determined by the niches they occupy in the market. Competition sometimes brings to conflicts. These conflicts may take a very acute, even criminal form. But it is not obligatory. Civilized competition assumes that the competitors are partners. Having each their own interests, they compete in the framework of law and ethics. Sometimes their interests coincide, this is a real reason for cooperation. Civilized competitors understand that they need each other, that the failure of the partner is not in their interests.
Here it is time to recollect one idea which is not popular in today's Russia but maybe has not been forgotten in China. It is the idea of socialist emulation. In the Soviet Union, it appeared in 20-s and was in the very beginning a real initiative of people masses. Later, like many other ideas of 20-s, it became subject of bureaucratization but in the beginning it did work. Help your comrades and do your work trying to be best - this is the principal slogan of socialist emulation.
However, there may be various forms of competition - from socialist emulation to criminal methods. Most important is that two actors who just cannot be anything other than competitors can choose civilized forms.
Now let us look again at geopolitical problems. According to their geopolitical situation, Russia and China are competitors in the geopolitical market and cannot be anything other. By the way, Japan is one more competitor, as it belongs to the same imperial type, while Korea and Mongolia are not.
Nothing prevents these countries to compete in civilized, friendly manner. Nothing prevents to respect each other's interests until these interests come into contradiction with one's own national interests. It is important to be ready for such a situation, not to react at it as a tragedy: competition is competition. And there exists such a civilized form of behavior at a competitive market as marketing.
Study the market demand, adapt your production to it, promote this production with the help of branding, price policy, advertising, public relations, etc., organize the system of sales and merchandizing, do it as perfectly as possible and do not be afraid of competitors! This is the slogan of marketing, and it is actual not only in commercial competition but in geopolitical one as well.
At the same time, there is a vast field for cooperation of competitors. When we speak about Russia and China, we mean mutually beneficial trade, investments and especially mutual projects.
One of the most important among such projects is Trans-Eurasian transportation corridor. Having possibility to transport goods by railway through the continent instead of sea way around Asia would be beneficial for most countries involved. China and Russia have a specific interest, as the corridor will pass the territories of both countries. But there are different variants of the root, and here some interests come to contradiction.
The most realistic variant is to use the already existing Trans-Siberian road. This variant will need some new investments, but much less than any other one. Again, to the East of Baikal, this variant consists of fore roots:
- from Eastern ports of Russia, using only Russian territory;
- from Chinese ports, through Dungbei and then Russia;
- from Southern Korea, through Northern Korea and then using one of the two previous roots;
- from Central and Southern provinces of China, through Mongolia and Russia.
The principle alternative variant avoids Siberia. It goes through Chinese territory to the West, then through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, again Kazakhstan and European Russia.
The variants avoiding Russia at all (but not avoiding China) are still less realistic, but they exist.
So, we see that comparative interests of the two countries in different variants are not equal. But mutual interests can be found.
For example, if Russia is interested in the Trans-Siberian roots, it can promote this variant in China. And China, in turn, can promote the root from Korea through Chinese territory.
One of the most important and complicated marketing problems is that of image. The image of Chinese production is very low in Russia. It is understandable: Russian consumer has got used to cheep Chinese goods with the quality respective to price, bought in Chinese markets or from Russian chelnoki who had brought them directly from China. Now there exist companies that are ready to import from China the goods of highest quality but they meet consumers' misunderstanding, something like this: "What? Chinese and so expensive?"
In this case, those are Russian companies that are interested in promotion, but Chinese side shouldn't be passive as well.
We know too little about Russian image in today's China (we have just started investigations in this direction). But if Russia wants to attract Chinese investments we must do much for promoting our positive image.
Толстых О.Д., Гозбенко В.Е.
УДК681.3:[001+62 + 33]
СТРУКТУРА И СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ТЕСТОВОЙ БАЗЫ «КОМПЛЕКСНЫЕ ЧИСЛА»
В настоящее время комплексные числа и функции комплексного переменного находят широкое применение в картографии, электротехнике, аэро- и гидродинамике, теории фильтрации почв, теоретической физике, теории упругости, в расчетах различных конструкций на прочность, в квантовой механике, при изучении движения спутников и т.д. Геометрическая интерпретация комплексных чисел способствовала их широкому распространению. Использование комплексных чисел и функций комплексного переменного в реальных задачах позволяет избежать многих противоречий и упростить техническую сторону при решении задач. К примеру, эффективный метод расчета цепей переменного тока основан на применении комплексных чисел и функций комплексного переменного. Комплексные числа являются базовой основой теории аналитических функций.
В связи с этим при создании тестовой базы по высшей математике комплексные числа
были выделены в структуре, как отдельная позиция. Диапазон количества аудиторного времени, отведенного на раздел «Комплексные числа. Теория функций комплексного переменного» по рабочим программам достаточно широк: 12-14 часов на экономических специальностях, УПП (управление процессами перевозок); 16-20 - на общетехнических специальностях; 52 часа на специальности ЗИ (защита информации).
Такой большой разброс в количестве аудиторных часов требует достаточно подробной детализированной структуры. Предложенная автором структура по комплексным числам приведена в приложении.
Тестовая база по комплексным числам содержит 423 задания теоретического и практического характера, в том числе заданий на установление порядка -1; заданий открытой формы - 75; заданий закрытой формы - 197; заданий на установление соответствия - 150. Пакет тестовых заданий содержит перечень ис-
