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ТУЧЕК Ф., TUCEK F., бакалавр, Bachelor, ft2439@columbia.edu ft2439@columbia.edu Факультет международных Columbia University,
и публичных дел; School of International
Колумбийский университет, and Public Affairs,
NY 10027, г. Нью-Йорк, 116th St. and Broadway,
116-я улица, Бродвей, New York, NY 10027,
Соединенные Штаты Америки United States of America
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СОЮз И ЕГО ПОЛИТИКА БЕзОПАСНОСТИ
Реферат. Предпринята попытка осмысления собственных возможностей Евросоюза в обеспечении региональной безопасности. В современных условиях, характеризующихся беспрецедентным количеством международных и региональных (в том числе негосударственных) субъектов обеспечения безопасности, имеющих множественные задачи по отражению самых разнообразных угроз, эффективная политика европейской безопасности в XXI веке должна основываться на других принципах, нежели те, что существовали во время холодной войны. Изменение действительности влечет переосмысление архитектуры глобальной безопасности, что не может не сказываться и на таком ее сегменте, как региональная безопасность. Реальность показывает, что в сфере безопасности невоенные средства часто играют ключевую роль; их эффективное использование Евросоюзом создает универсальную платформу для сотрудничества. Кратко рассмотрен процесс евроинтеграции, на фоне которой исследована эволюция европейской безопасности, формирующейся от разрешения эпизодически возникающих вопросов до постоянного и самостоятельного направления политики Евросоюза, что стало особенно актуальным после холодной войны. Анализируется нормативная правовая основа (источники европейского права), в соответствии с которой возникла сеть учреждений, институтов и средств. Применительно к современным угрозам и вызовам им дана оценка, позволяющая говорить о Евросоюзе как о самостоятельном субъекте обеспечения европейской безопасности. Охарактеризованы конкретные мероприятия и действия, предпринятые в отношении выявленных угроз безопасности в Европе, показаны направления политики обеспечения внешней и внутренней безопасности Евросоюза. В завершение, с учетом рассмотренных нормативных, институциональных, инструментальных, коммуникативных и функциональных аспектов системы безопасности приводятся рекомендации по созданию и осуществлению эффективной стратегии противодействия вызовам и угрозам современности.
Ключевые слова: безопасность, Европейский Союз, кооперация, угрозы, терроризм
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS SECURITY POLICY
Abstract. The text examines to what extent can the European Union (EU) be considered a security actor in the present security environment. Given the unprecedented number of relevant global and regional actors, together with the most eminent threats, agents and targets of which are often nonstate entities, an effective security policy is inevitably build upon different characteristics than it used to be throughout the Cold war. Various non-military instruments often play a key role and the EU, well equipped with them, might provide the desired platform for cooperation. The article briefly discusses progress in European integration from its original, purely economic nature with, to initially hesitant but ever-deeper cooperation in security and defense matters, especially after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the essay introduces normative background that allows the EU to play act in security policy issues. This normative background facilitated development of a network of institutions and instruments. They will be evaluated in context of the present-day security threats and challenges against which they should aim. Finally, focus is given to specific actions that the EU has taken in respect to the identified threats. In conclusion, a sober summary of activities of the EU in the realm of security and defense policy is offered and a few recommendations for a further effective development provided.
Keywords: security, European Union, threats, terrorism, cooperation
The European Coal and Steel Com- - to maintain peace - "the Community re-
munity (ECSC), established by the Treaty of mained largely untouched by [cooperation in]
Paris in 1951, marked a first step in modern the security and defence policy" [1, p. 160].
European integration. Despite its original pur- The only credible Western platform for depose throughout the period of the Cold War fence collaboration was the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). After Germany and Italy joined NATO, all founding members of the EU were also members of NATO and therefore could easily work together on security and defence issues through a different (and thanks to presence of the United States) more influential platform than the EC.
The unwillingness of the Western Europeans to coordinate their defence and security policies outside of NATO in the decades after World War II is well reflected in their attitude towards the Western European Union (WEU). The signatories, UK, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, designed the body to coordinate their defence policies, but as soon as NATO emerged in 1949, the WEU was „kept relatively dormant" [1, p. 5]. The project was then effectively reactivated only in 1984, at the end of the Cold War, by the Rome Declaration.
The international environment was transformed dramatically with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which ceased to exist on December 31, 1991. The forming European Union reflected the changes in the international realities and development of a coordinated foreign and security policy stepped up on the agenda of Maastricht Treaty negotiators. Eventually, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) formed a second (intergovernmental) pillar of the newly formed European Union. However, defense, not to mention security, was still defined vaguely in the Maastricht Treaty.
The Balkan wars fully exposed the lack of preparedness of the European Union to act with coordination in security policy matters. It was not until St. Malo that the EU would become a "credible security [and defense] actor". The prolonged bloody conflict in the Balkans presented the most serious test for the early CFSP the war was in the eyes of many Europeans perceived as a collective failure.
Hence, in December 1998, the president of France, Jacques Chirac, and the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, agreed on the need to develop a European Security and Defence Policy. In their joint Saint-Malo declaration, the leaders stressed that "the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces".
Amidst the prolonged Kosovo crisis, seeing the urgency for strengthening cooperation in the sphere of security and defence,
European leaders responded. The European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 launched the European Security and Defence Policy, renamed by the Lisbon Treaty to Common Foreign and Security Policy, as an integrated part of the CSDP [2, p. 555].
Since 1999, the EU has created a number of institutions and mechanisms to enable itself to act in accordance with the goals declared in Saint-Malo. The nature of the security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and some previously secondary threats became dominant after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. In Europe, the risk of a conquering war has mitigated, and asymmetric, rather complex threats have emerged. Facing the security challenges they pose requires a comprehensive approach in terms of timing, resources, capabilities, command, and political will.
Asymmetric threats in the 21st century
The intertwined international environment, globalization, and technology proliferation have all contributed to the emergence of new, previously non-existent or marginal threats. The conventional concept of security, primarily restricted to (and directed at) military threats, has been reassessed dramatically in the years following the Cold War. States no longer constitute a sole object of security, as the concept has been progressively expanded to include new phenomena and new types of non-state actors [1, p. 11]. The network of interdependencies, caused by economic openness and pursuit of welfare maximization together with increased pressure on a democratic and equal approach, has weakened the state's "gate-keeper" role [2, p. 28]. The resulting effect is that "more than ever threat to one is a threat to all". Complex challenges to peace require concerted responses to which the EU has proven to be well suited.
Before examining its activities in more detail, the growing complexity and variable nature of threats requires their categorization. The following is a two-layer categorization by Barry Buzan [3]. In his three-sector division he distinguishes among three potential targets: individual, state, international system. Then he divides threats into five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. This division has become a basic framework for a broad understanding of security and
Table
Agents and targets of threats to peace
Type of threat Bearer Target
Military State State, International System
Political State, Non-State Entity, Individual State, International System
Economic State, Non-State Entity, Individual State, International System, Individual
Societal State, Non-State Entity State, International System, Individual
Environmental State, Non-State Entity Individual1
Note: The threat should have the potential to directly endanger the very existence of the target 1 Even though a state may be affected severely (the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004, or the destruction of the Fukushima nuclear plant by an earthquake in 2011), environmental problems can only extremely rarely, if at all, threaten the very existence of a functioning state.
has also been a starting point for contemporary security strategies. The table below outlines the connections between the three targets and the five-sectoral theory.
Of course the directions in a table are not absolute and in practice many different factors affect the quality (or existence) of peace. Moreover the threats are often combined or triggered by one another. Nevertheless the table provides a lucid overview of the sectorial theory that represents a basis for further categorization included in the National Security Strategy of the United States (2010), the European Security Strategy (2003) [6], NATO Strategic Concept (2010), and the United Nation's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). These documents serve to list the most eminent current security threats; Inter-state conflict, failed states and lack of governance, terrorism, proliferation of conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, transnational organized crime, threats to energy supply and critical infrastructure, cyber threats, environmental threats, economic threats and prosperity.
Normative Background of the CSDP
Key provisions of the legislative framework are to a large extend characterized by equivocal provisions. This is the reason of the desire of the EU member states to cooperate in the field of security and defense on one hand, and their unwillingness to give up too much sovereignty in this sensible matter on the other.
The ambiguity starts with the EU's full legal personality [4, Article V (47)]. Albeit explicit, the provision in practice has not led to a significantly enhanced status of the EU in international organizations; in the two vital security forums - the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and NATO - the EU has no formal participatory status [5, p. 11 and p. 37].
For the CSDP actions, the member states "shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets (...) for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security" [4, Title 42 (3)]. To be able to provide the Union with effective capabilities, the countries "shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities" [4, Title V, Article 42 (3)]. To identify operational requirements and to promote modernization, the EU even established a specific body: the European Defence Agency (EDA)*. This exhibition of deepening civilian and military cooperation should eventually lead to the "framing of common Union defence policy" [4, Title V (4)].
The prospect of a common defence policy seems extremely distant so far, due to national reluctance and the required unanimity. Since all decisions regarding the CSDP must be adopted by the European Council "acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State," [4, V, Article 42 (4)] the Commission thus remains largely apart from a practical CSDP dominated by member states. Furthermore, the national security and defence policies are explicitly protected by Declaration 13, amended to the TEU, which states that the establishment of the CSDP "do[es] not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organizations" [4, Declaration 13].
* More on EDA can be found in later pages.
Even the Mutual Assistance Clause (MAC, by some interpreted as Mutual Defence Clause) does not effectively shake off the somewhat ambiguous language of the previously mentioned provisions. MAC binds all EU member states to provide "aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51* of the United Nations Charter [4, Title V (42)]" to any member state subjected to any form of armed aggression on its territory. In direct contrast to a similar provision in the WEU Brussels Treaty by which member states would offer "the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power," MAC completely omits the word military. MAC is thus a compromise to please all parties: those eager to have a defence commitment, those seeking to retain their neutrality, and those worrying about undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The provisions above represent a key legal framework in which the EU realizes an actual security and defence policy.
Institutional Background
To overcome deeper organizational challenges, the EU has established a strong institutional background to CSDP. In 2000, the European Council in Feira formally approved the establishment of key decision-making structures: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, and associated EU Military Staff. This has been a "remarkable [achievement] in a system where institutional change often proceeds at a glacial pace" [8, p. 199], and it demonstrates how serious the EU member states were about the future (military aspect) of security and defence cooperation. To provide support
* „Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security". Charter of the United Nations, Article 51, available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter/chapter7.shtml
to the member states' capabilities in development, research, and acquisition of armament capabilities and to promote the unity of their military requirements, the EU established a European Defence Agency - interestingly
- in 2004, in parallel with the release of HHG 2010 and the establishment of the BGs concept. Further, the Lisbon Treaty introduced an institute of permanent structured cooperation that enables states that "fulfill the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities" [4, Title V (46)] to cooperate under the EU framework**.
CSDP Activities; Security Actorness in Practice
The scope of EU activities in the field of security policy is largely predetermined by two key documents, the European Security Strategy outlining threats, as mentioned previously, and the (extended) Petersberg Tasks. The Pe-tersberg Tasks were initially incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 (effective in 1999), and included humanitarian and rescue tasks as well as combat forces for crisis management. The set of operations has been extended by the Lisbon Treaty to include "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may also contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories" [4, Title V (43)].
Activities of the EU towards most of these threats are conducted largely or exclusively with non-military means. They aim to strengthen security by regional cooperation, by the promotion of human rights, democracy, and good governance, by the prevention of violent conflict, by battling organized crime and enhancing internal security, and by including cyber-security. The common denominator of these efforts is multilateralism, on which the eventual success of non-military (persuasive) actions is "increasingly dependent" [6, p. 9].
The non-military capacities often have a persuasive form (economic, political, diplomatic) and play a key role in assurance (post-conflict interventions) and prevention
** Qualified majority voting is required, and in decisions regarding missions, unanimity.
(pre-conflict interventions), and partially also in protection (internal security). On the other hand, coercive military (and policing) capacities serve primarily for compellence (military intervention).* The EU has largely moved beyond a compellence security policy into a sphere of laws, rules, and international cooperation, as effective security actorness in current environment requires [7, p. 60].
Counter-Terrorism
To become a credible actor in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime, the EU adopted a Counter Terrorism Strategy (CTS) in 2005** that builds on the Hague Program from 2004. Its four pillars
- prevention, protection, pursuing, responding - are based almost exclusively on nonmilitary means.
The EU has acknowledged that the global fight against terrorism and organized crime must be built on effective multilateralism, cooperation with the UN, important intergovernmental organizations and key third states. The EU's added value to the (concerted) efforts should be strengthened national intelligence capabilities, facilitating sharing of best practices, increased police and judicial cooperation, and developing collective mechanisms such as Europol, Eurojust, and Frontex***.
Significantly, as time passes and these instruments, although non-military, are adopted, the Union clearly comes to be perceived in international security relations as an influential actor capable of purposefully influencing the system.
To translate the strategy into reality, the EU has adopted a number of practical steps.
The Schengen Information System (SIS) facilitates information-sharing among
* James Sperling, „The Post-Westphalian State, National Security Cultures, and Global Security Governance", in Sonia Lucarelli, Luke van Langen-hove and Jan Wouters (eds), The EU and Multilateral Security Governance (Routledge, Oxon, 2014), p. 11, p. 35.
** The Strategy was evaluated and revised in 2011 by EU Action Plan on combating terrorism.
*** Council of the European Union, „The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy", (Brus-
sels, November 2005), http://register.consilium.
eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf, accessed March 2014
states, accompanied by Frontex, the Visa Information System, and (still not finalized) the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, aiming at protecting EU borders and citizens. To pursue terrorists and criminals, the EU has established Europol and Eurojust, together with the European Arrest/Evidence Warrant and Financial Action Task Force. To ensure effective response capabilities, the EU agreed on an action plan and also on The European Civil Protection Mechanism [9].
Fight against Proliferation of WMDs
This effective multilateralism is also the cornerstone of the EU strategy against "potentially the greatest threat to EU security," the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMDs (2003) makes commitment to multilateral safeguard agreements a top priority****. Even before the Strategy was adopted, the EU had agreed during the 2002 World Economic Summit in Kananaskis with G8 countries on Common Partnership against WMD's proliferation. The initiative names destruction of chemical weapons, dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, and disposal of fissile materials as toppriorities*****.Theadherencetomultilateral-ism is reflected in Article 16 of the Strategy, which sees the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguard agreements and protocols, the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as key pillars for action [10, p. 6]. To strengthen the normative non-proliferation system, regular dialogue with key partners
- the USA, Russia, China, Japan - and also with non-NPT signatories India and Pakistan is necessary.
However, because of the gravity of the threat and the relative geographical proximity of the key regions - the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia - the EU acknowledges that "coercive [even military] measures under Chapter VII of the UN
**** The Thretegyt egyroartlpiB itksstimstdortpottmnuti-mul-tilateral agreements.
***** Europiarol|ieia)inlHxt(einn[axtAcrtidn^(;tG!nC,lGb-Glob-al Partnership", European Union External Action website, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/g8-global-partnership/index_ en.htm, accessed March 2014
Charter ...could be envisioned" [10, p. 3] if all diplomatic measures fail*.
The EU is thus not only a proactive security actor in the sphere of non-proliferation, it also has the potential to become a coercive actor (under the UNSC mandate), which gives it leverage in pursuing the aforementioned objectives. However, unified action is sometimes missing. While the EU has been very active in pressuring Iran to modify its nuclear program, it has been absent or ambiguous regarding North Korea or NPT non-signatory democratic partner India**.
Critical Infrastructure and Cyber-Security
The EU has also been more and more active in energy and critical-infrastructure protection.The"concerns(...)have i ncreased"*** but even the evident security imperatives have not led to clear and coherent critical-in-frastructure protection on the EU level****. The European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) from 2005, which sets out principles on protection and on post-disruption aid, is important but not sufficient as more powerful national economic or political interests often hinder greater cooperation. The six key energy and infrastructure security principles - efficient internal market, diversification of energy mix, solidarity, sustainable development, innovation, and concerted external policy - have been so far achieved with only mixed success*****.
In terms of cyber security, the approach built on Strategy for Secure Informa-
* For example, the EU is very active in imposing UN- and US-led sanctions against Iran.
** Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), „The European Security Strategy 2003 - 2008, Building on Common Interests", European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 30, http://www.iss.europa. eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report_05.pdf, accessed March 2014
*** Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, (Brussels, December 2008), p. 5, http://consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_ Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf, accessed March 2014
**** Richard Youngs. Energy Security, Europers New Foreign Policy Challenge (Routledge, Oxon, 2009), p. 20
***** TomasKarasek,„EnergyPolicy,EasternEnlarge-ment and the Concept of Securitization", in Tomas Karasek (ed.) European Union in a New Security Environment (Matfyz Press, Prague, 2008), p. 116
tion Society (2006) was reinforced in 2013 by the Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union. As economy, transport, financial systems, administration, and other sectors become more reliant on cyber technologies, the EU has decided to tackle the challenge by "promoting freedom online" and by "setting out actions for effective protection [14, p. 3]". The EU security actorness has a strong internal dimension that should be reinforced by the eventual adoption of a Draft Internal Security Strategy and through the work of the Lisbon-Treaty-created Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security [11, p. 13].
The non-military EU security actorness toward assurance, prevention, and protection therefore includes a significant scope of activities. However unfinished the process is, the EU has already developed a significant nonmilitary security presence.
Military Dimension
Soon after the Amsterdam Treaty included the Petersberg Tasks in the EU in 1999, the need to introduce a concrete military cooperation became evident. The previous table 2 shows that without a credible military force to back up its non-military action, the EU could not be a security actor, as its role would be limited solely to declarations full of "strong nouns, weak verbs," as Desmond Dinan quotes Ch. Patten [2, p. 563]. Despite the undisputable institutional progress, the differences between member states' approaches to military cause that the non-military dimension still significantly dominates.
The European Council summit in Helsinki in December 1999 set a specific target (the so- called Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, or HHG) that member states should be able to voluntarily deploy within 60 days forces capableofafullrangeof PetersbergTasks****** (European Rapid Reaction Forces - ERRF). The ERRF concept was reinforced by the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), approved by the Laeken European Council. The ECAP called for further development of national (mutually interoperable) communication, intelligence, logistics, training, research,
****** In numbers: up to 15 brigades consisting of 50 000 to 60 000 persons, available for a crisis area up to 2,500 miles and sustainable for up to one year.
and industrial cooperation*. However, the final Declaration from the same summit explicitly stated that all the aforementioned efforts "do not imply the creation of European Army," again, typical for the inherited CSDP ambiguity.
To further strengthen the forming EU security actorness, the Copenhagen European Council in March 2003 agreed on the Berlin Plus Agreement, which enabled planning and sharing of operational capabilities with NATO. Moreover, as the HHG 2003 was achieved, the Brussels European Council in 2004 agreed on HHG 2010, corresponding to extended Pe-tersberg Tasks and to the ESS.
Building Interoperable Capacities
To be able to cover a relatively large scope of tasks assigned by the Petersberg Tasks and by the ESS, HHG 2010 acknowledges that the EU "must retain ability to conduct concurrent operations simultaneously". To achieve that, individual national capacities must be increasingly interoperable, deployable in distant theatres, which can be, according to the document, best achieved by increased pooling and sharing. The Capability Development Mechanism should ensure that the capabilities are enhanced in coordination with NATO in order to fully exploit the potential of the Berlin Plus.
Furthermore, the member states have agreed in HHG 2010 to form EU Battlegroups (BGs)**, 1500-man-strong units capable of rapid response within 10 days after decision. The BGs became fully operational, with a command center and strategic equipment, by 2007. However, to date, they have not been used in a conflict and thus questions are being asked about their future. Nevertheless, the BG concept is at least symbolically (and potentially practically) a vital part of the military dimension of EU security actorness. At the same time, the BGs speak volumes about how the military aspect of the CSDP is complicated.
The clearly demonstrated willingness of EU member states to seek closer defence
* European Council, „Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities" (Brussels, November 2001), p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/European%20Capability %20Action%20Plan%20-%20Excerpt%20Press% 20Release%20November%202001.pdf, accessed March 2014
** Denmark and Malta remained outside of the
concept.
cooperation [12, p. 6], the BGs have so far "substantially supported the transformation of the [national] armed forces and intensified national defence reform process [12, p. 7]". However, the pace and scope of transformation are smaller than initially expected (partially due to economic slowdown). On one hand, the fact that member states are able to provide interoperable equipment and logistics, deployable from bases in home states within 10 days, is an extraordinary achievement. The initially preferred 2 + 1 formula has been largely put aside as individual BGs become more numerous. Joint strategic planning has led to convergence of national practices. Several long-term collaboration programs have already started; Nordic (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Ireland, and Norway), Weimar (Poland, Germany, and France), and Visegrad (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) BGs have become an established platform and have the potential to go further.
On the other hand, concrete obstacles make it impossible to test the cooperation in action.
First, the decision-making procedure requires a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU (with the possibility of constructive abstention). Simultaneously, member states must agree with the deployment of armed forces according to their national procedures. Moreover, the member states that participate in a BG must bear the costs of a mission, while the EU covers only so-called "common costs" such as OHQ or extend troop transport (under the Athena mechanism***). Selfcentered political and economic interests may thus remain in the way of sending troops to what may be distant places to prevent escalation of conflict, to stop violence, or to bridge various UN missions.
Second, the so-called framework nation has the responsibility for ensuring the operational readiness of their navy, air force, and army components, including an operational headquarters (OHQ). But thus far, only five EU states can provide the OHQ: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Greece. If none of these states participates in a given BG and is not willing to provide its OHQ, the EU must
*** The „common costs" funded through Athena Mechanism include: The "common costs" related to the operational headquarters, local administration, transportation within the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) area, and lodging infrastructures.
use the permanent OHQ in Brussels, operational since 2007. However, the Brussels OHQ is limited in terms of political and strategic capabilities [12]. So even though a BG may be highly capable in terms of equipment, it might struggle with an insufficient command structure.
Conclusion
For decades, the EC and then the EU have resisted the temptation to become a security actor. Today, the formalized Common Security and Defence Policy with its wide range of instruments and a solid institutional base, have enabled the Union to play a security role. No matter whether the EU's security actorness is viewed from a broader perspective (including prevention, development, assistance, dialogue, etc.) or from a narrower one (the task is simply to make a difference in the international security environment), the tide of globalization and EU internal development has swept the Union into becoming a security actor [13, p. 22]. However, in order to develop a truly sustainable, coherent global security presence, the EU must overcome existing conceptual, organizational, and capability issues [13, p. 15].
The Common Foreign and Security Policy, established by the Maastricht Treaty to form the second - intergovernmental - pillar of the EU, replaced and broadened European Political Cooperation. However, the security aspect remained largely unrealized, as institutions, capabilities, and political will were lacking. The military and defence cooperation at the time was thus largely focused within the Western European Union.
Through the 1990's the EU witnessed at its periphery instability and perpetual conflict. The Union's inability to take decisive action to meet security challenges in Maghreb, Kosovo, the Caucasus, or the Baltic has forced the EU leaders to rethink the CSFP. The 1998 St. Malo Declaration has meant a turning point toward true EU cooperation in security and defence. The Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty; the Western European Union ceased to exist in 1999 and its structures have become an integral part of
the European Union. Moreover, during a summit in Cologne in June 1999, European leaders agreed to launch the European Security and Defence Policy as a part of the CSFP. To support the finally-emerging security policy ambitions institutionally, the Feira European Council in 2000 formally established key institutions: PSC, EMC, and EUMS.
To further strengthen its security position, the EU agreed in 2003 on capability-sharing with NATO under the Berlin Plus Arrangement. Simultaneously, in the European Security Strategy from December 2003, the EU members agreed on what they perceive as common security threats and on principles that should frame the efforts to mitigate them. The ESS was followed by a CounterTerrorism Strategy, the Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Cyber-Security Strategy, and more. The military aspect of EU security actorness was reinforced by Headline Goals 2010 and by the establishment of EDA, both of which have focused on facilitating the transformation of national military capabilities. The EU itself agreed in 2004 on the concept of multinational Battlegroups, fully operational since 2007. The BGs and the increasingly interoperable national armed forces should be able to cover the whole spectrum of missions as defined in the Extended Petersberg Tasks. The Lisbon Treaty incorporated the EPTs into the TEU, replaced the prefix European for Common to create the CSDP, and introduced the Mutual Assistance Clause and the PSCOop institute.
Through these documents, the EU has managed to agree on security priorities and to gradually build common mechanisms to tackle them. However, in practice the actions, above all in the military sphere, have been often hampered by political differences and economic difficulties. The uncertainty and ambiguities about what the EU security and defence role really should be still prevails among member states. In effect, despite the considerable material and institutional capacities, the EU is still searching for a more forceful and decisive security role [2, p. 530].
References
1. Jolyon Howorth. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Palgrave Mcmillan, New York, 2007).
2. Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union, An Introduction to European Integration (Palgrave Mcmillan, The United States of America, 2010).
3. Barry Buzan. People States and Fear (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Great Britain, 1983).
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