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■ First, none of the Central Asian states feels completely safe being located next to one of the most unstable zones on the planet—Afghanistan. The ongoing chaos, which could at any moment spread to the neighboring states, is mainly generated by the growing resistance to Hamid Karzai’s ruling pro-Western regime from anti-governmental forces in the context of the ruined economy and ubiquitous corruption and the existence of regional ethnic leaders’ armed groups that are not subordinate to Kabul.
■ Second, in conditions of the unresolved socioeconomic problems in the Central Asian countries, the influence of different religious extremist organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, and others, is continuing to steadily rise despite the measures being carried out to expose, prevent, and stop their activity.
■ Third, the complicated issues involving borders, territories, and natural resources are also feeding the continuing contradictions and problems among the Central Asian countries and could lead to interstate conflicts in the future.
However, there has been no significant progress so far in security cooperation between the Russian Federation and Central Asia. Nor has the level of confidence inherent in strategic allies been reached. By implementing a multi-vector approach in their foreign policy, all of Moscow’s Central Asian partners without exception are also showing an increased interest in greater security cooperation with the West, particularly with the U.S. and other NATO member states.
It also seems that the new trends in the development of the international situation around Russia, largely caused by the most recent events in the Caucasus, as well as the world financial-economic crisis, could make significant adjustments to the cooperation issues in security between the Russian Federation and Central Asia. Whereby these adjustments may not necessarily help to strengthen the Russian-Central Asian alliance.
ARMENIA: A DEFENSE REFORM THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
Michela TELATIN
Ph.D. (International Relations), Westminster University (London, U.K.)
Introduction
Armenia can be considered as the Switzerland of the Caucasus, both having a mountainous, lacustrine, and landlocked territo-
ry. Armenia’s current borders have been unable to contain the marvels of its ancient civilization; of its scattered nationality; and its historical herit-
age. The solidity of its culture has clashed during centuries with an unstable surrounding environment, as the Caucasus has been an area of confluence and contrasts.1 Historically Armenia has been a country located between empires, the Romans and the Parthians; the Arab and the Byzantine, and found itself “as a vessel of fragile earthenware, obliged to journey in company with many vessels of iron.”2 Thus, Armenia has been a country between empires, but also a country linking empires; a nation between clashing cultures, but also a nation linking cultures, and people. Armenia, then, has been a launching pad for a new beginning; it will be the aim of this paper to find out if Armenia also marks a new interpretation of current policies linking development and security concerns.
The background of what makes Armenia the focus of this paper is the management of its national security strategy permeated by its foreign policy of complementarity.3 This 360 degree foreign policy bears the influence and the balance of power between the different players in the Caucasian region. This might be the reason why, in recent years, Armenia has chosen a path of defense
1 See: G.J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood. Armenian Political Thinking since Independence, Blue Crane Books, Cambridge, MA., 1999; R.G. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999; S. Pa-yaslian, The History of Armenia. From the Origins to the Present, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007; K. Tololy-an, “The Armenian Diaspora and the Karabakh Conflict since 1988,” in: H. Smith, P. Stares, Diasporas in Conflict. Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers, United Nations University, Tokyo, 2007, pp. 106-128; C. Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars. Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus , New York University Press, New York, 2007.
2 A. Manzoni, I Promessi Sposi, Sansoni, Firenze, 1827 (ed. of 1981), p. 20.
3 See: Caucasus Region. Geopolitical nexus? ed. by
A.I. Kapidze, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York, 2007.
reforms supported by NATO but which contains the technical language of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies.4 In this case, this conceptual complementarity does not aim at bridging a Cold War divide, but a policy divide whose reasons need investigation. The objective of this paper is to clarify why the Armenia’s defense reform has included the language of SSR policies without actually implementing these policies.
I contend that being able to “talking SSR” has become synonymous of talking the language of democracy. Armenia needs this conceptual complementarity for reassuring the West about the capacity of its democratic structures to manage the defense sector, while serving its national interests of having an army capable of facing military threats. Ultimately, this is indeed the strength of the SSR-language when it is used outside a SSR-frame-work: it becomes an onomatopoeic policy sound of reassurance for Western-type democratic states.
4 Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies aim at strengthening the governance of the security sector of the state (such as the army, police, judiciary system) so that its institutions can create a secure environment conducive to the enjoyment of development entitlements by its citizens. The conceptual substratum of these policies is the merging of development and security concerns to be addressed by a whole of government approach. In order to support the governance of the security sector, these policies use a technical language which includes expressions such as democratic control of the armed forces; rule of law; civilian oversight of the armed forces (for general information about SSR policies see: Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, Department for International Development (DfID), London, 2002, available at [http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/ files/supportingsecurity.pdf], 2 April, 2008; A Beginner Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR), Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GNF-SSR), 2007, available at [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFNSSR_ A_Beginners_ Guide_to_SSR_v2.pdf], 1 April, 2008; Handbook on Security Sector Reform. Supporting Security and Justice, Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), 2007, available at [http://www.oecd. org/ dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf], 1 April, 2008).
The Legal Framework of the Defense Reform: Another Policy of Complementarity
The independence achieved in 1991 partially solved “the Armenia question,” but raised the “Armenia security question.” National security is in fact an inherent preoccupation of all coun-
tries, whose response permeates the orientation of their domestic, foreign, and security strategy policies.5
According to the Armenia National Security Strategy,6 the complexity of the Armenia’s national security is due to manifold issues, both internal and external. First of all, there is the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh: a military stalemate has been maintained since 1994, and a political solution, linked or not to a new military confrontation, is still out of sight.7 Adding to this is lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey; lack of energy sources which makes Armenia depending on Russia and Iran; and a need for economic partners in order to promote the national economy and raising citizens’ standards of living. These are some of the issues which brought Armenia to pursuit a foreign policy of complementarity: this policy is rooted in the country’s decision to use its geographical and geopolitical position to get the best from the military and political vestiges of all sides of the Cold War. Armenia’s national defense strategy, the subsequent defense reform and military doctrine are shaped by this panoptic view of its national security.
The search for sources about Armenia’s defense reform stretches across various political, economic and military agreements that Armenia has signed with some major actors, in particular Russia, European institutions, and NATO.
Soon after having acquired political independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia started a policy of integration into various international and intergovernmental organizations, taking advantage of the opportunity to have become a member of the international community of states. Firstly there was the inclusion within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, followed by the inclusion within the United Nations in 1992, and in the same year within the Collective Security Treaty which was named Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. Once Armenia’s sovereignty rights and military backup were all guaranteed, the country initiated a diversification of its foreign policy stakeholders.
The road leading toward a dialog with the European Union started in 1996, when Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), followed by the adhesion in 2001 to the Council of Europe. A more prominent engagement with the institutions of the European Union was its adherence to the European Neighborhood Policy in 2006.8 This policy engagement was marked by the redaction of a country report9 and an Action Plan for reforming Armenia’s institutions in order for them to achieve
5 See: R. Giragosian, Toward a New Concept of Armenian National Security, Armenian International Policy Research, 2005, available at [http://www.aiprg.org/UserFiles/File/wp/jan2005/WP0507.pdf], 5 July, 2008; idem, Repositioning Armenian Security and Foreign Policy within a Region at Risk, Armenian International Policy Research Group, 2006, available at [http://www.aiprg.net/UserFiles/File/wp/jan2006/wp07-06.pdf], 3 July, 2008.
6 See: National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007, available at [http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=49], 1 July, 2008.
7 See: G.J. Libaridian, op. cit.; T. de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York, 2003; The Caucasus: Armed and Divided. Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Humanitarian Consequences in the Caucasus, ed. by D. Hiscock, A. Matveeva, Saferworld London, 2003; E. Mehti-yev, Armenia-Azerbaijan Prague Process: Road Map to Peace or Stalemate for Uncertainty? Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, 2005; Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, International Crisis Group, 2007, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/187_nagorno_karabakh___risking_war.pdf], 5 July, 2008; Armenia: Picking up the Pieces, International Crisis Group, 2008, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ europe/caucasus/b48_armenia_picking_up_the_pieces.pdf], 5 July, 2008.
8 See: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, European Union and the Republic of Armenia, 1996, available at [http ://www.delarm.ec.europa.eu/en/newsletter/pdf/pca_armenia.pdf], 1 July, 2008; Working Together. The European Neighboring Policy, European Commission, 2007, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/information/ enp_brochure_en.pdf], 1 July, 2008; Armenia Public Sector Reform Program, Government of the Republic of Armenia,
2007, available at [http://www.gov.am/pwc-apsrep/html/index.html], 3 July, 2008; A. Hovsepyan, A. Khudaverdyan, Public Sector Reforms in Armenia 1999-2005: Achievements and Challenges, Armenia International Policy Research Group, 2006, available at [http://www.aiprg.net/UserFiles/File/wp/jan2006/wp03-06.pdf], 3 July, 2008.
9 See: European Neighborhood Policy Country Report Armenia, Commission of the European Community, 2005, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/armenia_country_report_2005_en.pdf], 2 July, 2008.
European standards.10 The objectives of this plan are to strengthen national democratic structures and respect for human rights; the rule of law; reforming the judiciary; fighting corruption; enhancing poverty reduction and sustainable development. These objectives are also reiterated in the Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013; in the Country Program 2007-2010; and in the progress report of the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy.11
Since 1992, Armenia has also held a parallel dialogue with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since 2000, OSCE has opened an office in Erevan and initiated a fruitful collaboration with Armenia in a plurality of fields, such as training of the National Assembly expert staff; police assistance programs; armed forces and legislative reform; human rights awareness; etc., without mentioning that Armenia has initiated a SSR program with the support of OSCE.12
These programs in the field of security have not affected the military alliance that Armenia has with Russia, also considering that Armenia does not intend, for the time being, switching its “military patron” and joining NATO. However, the Western-looking foreign policy of Armenia and the Eastern-looking expansionist policy of NATO have led to the signing of a Partnership for Peace agreement in 1994 which was followed by the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2005 and other collateral agreements such as Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB).13 The IPAP contains sets of broad orientations for reforms in many institutional spheres such as political-security issues; defense; civil emergency planning; public information, etc. The aim was to set the tone for the type of state functioning institutions that Armenia had to develop in order to facilitate its institutional dialog not only with NATO but with the European Union. In fact, the type of security-management recommended by NATO is implemented and guaranteed by the type of state-democratic-management recommended by the EU. These agreements with NATO are supporting documents of the Armenia defense reform whose legal framework is constituted by the national security strategy, the military doctrine and defense legislation.14 The echo of the construction of a national legal framework for a defense reform is only
10 See: EU/Armenia Action Plan, European Commission and the Republic of Armenia, 2006, available at [http://www. delarm.ec.europa.eu/en/press/16_11_2006.pdf], 1 July, 2008; European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, European Commission, 2006, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ enpi_csp_armenia_en.pdf], 1 July, 2008; “Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007 " Progress Report, European Commission’s Delegation to Armenia, 2008, available at [http://www.delarm.ec.europa.eu/en/press/10_04_2008. htm], 1 July, 2008.
11 See: European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, European Commission, 2006; European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Armenia National Indicative Program 2007-2010, European Commission, 2006a, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_armenia_en.pdf], 3 July, 2008; Working Together. The European Neighboring Policy.
12 See: Action Plan on the Reform of the Prison System in Armenia, Council of Europe, 2003, available at [http://www. coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_cooperation/Prisons_and_alternatives/Technical_co-operation/Armenia/ Armenia_4thSG_meeting%20report.pdf], 3 July, 2008; Overview of the Office activities in 2006, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Erevan, 2007, available at [http://www.osce.org/documents/oy/2007/02/ 23315_en.pdf], 2 July, 2008; Overview, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Erevan,
2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/Erevan/13204.html], 2 July, 2008.
13 See: Armenia's Commitments Under Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2005, available at [http://www.armenianatomission.com/ index.php?cnt=3&sub=10&PHPSESSID=26fde350a06c1dd42443a3372b18da78], 5 July, 2008; NATO and Armenia General Information, Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2007, available at [http://www. armenianatomission.com/index.php?cnt=3&PHPSESSID=26fde350a06c1dd42443a3372b18da78], 1 July, 2008.
14 See: Parliamentarians and the Process of Defense Transformation in the Framework of Cooperation with NATO, NATO, 2006, available at [http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-index-1/xdocs/conf/conferences-current/static/xdocs/conf/2006-conferences/0602/RazuksPresentation-en.pdf], 5 July, 2008; National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007, available at [http://www.mil.am/eng/ index.php?page=49], 1 July, 2008; The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007a, available at [http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=104], 1 July, 2008; The Public Informing Conception of Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007b, available at [http://www.mil.am/eng/ index.php?page=111], 1 July, 2008.
heard within the Ministry of Defense. In fact, in the elaboration of other national policy papers such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or the latest Armenian government’s program for 2008-201215 there is no mentioning of this defense reform; or how its implementation might affect, or indeed necessitate, the involvement of other ministries. This institutional separation between national defense reform and other national reforms demonstrates the policy isolation of this defense reform, in stark contrast with the SSR approach. However, an analysis of the language used in this defense reform shows how the wording might bridge the gap between the two. Perhaps this defense reform is another example of the Armenia’s policy of complementarity: refusing to take side, or attempting to gain the best from both policy approaches.
SSR Language in Armenia’s Defense Reform: Policy Perfidy Or Policy Syncretism?
Armenia is not implementing SSR policies; however it has adopted some of the language of SSR in designing its defense reform. This raises questions about the significance, the compulsion, and the reason for using this language in isolation, outside an SSR policy framework.
The Armenia’s defense reform is the logical outcome of the National Security Strategy which was approved in 2007. According to this document, some of the pillars upon which the national security strategy of Armenia rests are: an efficient system of governance; the rule of law; a consolidation of democratic values; an independent and impartial judiciary; comprehensive social justice. Besides, there are those pillars which are linked to the army’s capabilities per se, such as an adequate fighting capacity of the armed forces; and efficient law-enforcement structures.16 The list of internal threats to national security includes as examples: an ineffective judiciary system which does not guarantee the rules of law; insufficient level of democracy within state structures; polarization of wealth; lack of education. Therefore, what is said to constitute the Armenia’s security question is not only a direct military threat, such as Azerbaijan, but also poverty and an inadequate guarantee of the rule of law.
The Military Doctrine provides with a more in depth look at the principles and goals of the defense reform.17 Its reading shows an anatomized analysis by the Ministry of Defense of the national security strategy in order to ensure an adequate and prompt response to the threats identified in the latter document. In the section titled “The Reforms in the Military Security System” it is stated that the objective of these reforms is to have a “modern Military Security System based on democratic fundamental principles of civil control,” and capable to protect Armenia’s national security. The document points out the need for the civilian control of the armed forces, and the civilianization, wherev-
15 See: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Republic of Armenia, 2003, available at [http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/ files/Armenia_PRSP.pdf], 5 July, 2008; “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper " Progress Report, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2006, available at [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06239.pdf], 2 July, 2008; Republic of Armenia: Sixth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—Staff Report, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, available at [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08176.pdf], 2 July, 2008; Government Program 2008-2012, Republic of Armenia, 2008, available at [http://www.gov.am/enversion/programms_9/pdf/ cragir_eng2008.pdf], 20 June, 2008.
16 See: National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007.
17 See: The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007a.
er possible, of the defense department. This two issues, modernization and civilian oversight of the militaries are also reiterated in the public informing conception of the MoD which frames the conceptual presentation of the defense reform to the public.18
For Armenia, defense reform was one of the items in the agenda which has shaped the dialogue with NATO. It implies modernization and restructuring of the defense sector, in order to make it more efficient in responding to new threats.19 The defense reform framework is outlined in the IPAP and in other documents called PAP-DIB.20 After having submitted the IPAP agreement, “in December 2005 NATO accepted Armenia’s plan for defense reform.”21 In this document, Armenia stated its commitment to reform the defense ministry and it includes training; modernization of means of communication; improvement of planning; participating in NATO operations; etc. The defense tout court objectives of this perestroika of the defense sector in Armenia, is complemented by others such as the amelioration of the democratic control of its armed forces; increasing civilian participation in the designing of defense policies for which seminars were organized.22
The government of Armenia has also included a section, titled “Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption” where it lists the necessity to reform the electoral system; the judiciary oversight of the defense sector; and freedom of the press. Thus, while the modernization of the army is the key topic of this document, SSR-ism languages such as democratic control of the armed forces; rule of law; civilian oversight, are strategically located at the fore front of each section. The emphasis on the civilian control of the armed forces within a set of reforms aiming at having a more efficient army which currently has to defend a front line sounds more like a policy linguistic borrowing than a response to a military necessity. Or perhaps, the adoption of this language has become a policy imperative, as it guarantees military training and political support by states supportive of SSR policies.
18 See: The Public Informing Conception of Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007b.
19 See: G. Katsirdakis, “Defense Reform and NATO,” in: Post-Cold War Defense Reform. Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, ed. by I. Gyarmati, T. Winkler, Brassey’s Inc., Washington, D.C., 2002, pp. 189-203; NATO and Armenia General Information, Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2007.
20 See: S. Lunn, “Defense and Security Policy: The Role of Parliaments and the Evolution of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,” in: Defense and Security for the 21st Century, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2000, Atalink, London, pp. 12-13; NATO, EU and the Challenge of Defense and Security Sector Reform, ed. by P. Fluri, S. Lunn, 2007, available at [http://www.dcaf.ch/about/dcaf-brussels/_index.cfm?nav1=1&nav2=4], 2 July, 2008; P. Fluri, H. Bucur-Marcu, Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building: Country Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, 2007, available at [http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?ord279=title&q279=armenia&lng= en&id=31092&nav1=5], 5 July, 2008.
21 S. Mher, “Armenia Perspective,” in: P.H. Fluri, E. Cole, Defense Institution Building: 2005 Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building Regional Conference, Paper presented at the Conference held in Tbilisi, 25 April, 2005, pp. 62-65, available at [http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?id=19825&nav1=4], 5 July, 2008; 12-16 June, 2006—Joint Visit to Armenia and Georgia by the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defense Capabilities and the SubCommittee on Democratic Governance, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2006, available at [http://www.nato-pa.int/ default.asp?SHORTCUT=971], 2 July, 2008; 167 DSCFC 07 E bis—Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007, available at [http://www.nato-pa.int/ Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1283], 2 July, 2008; NATO and Armenia General Information, Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2007.
22 See: Parliamentarians and the Process of Defense Transformation in the Framework of Cooperation with NATO, NATO, 2006; Armenia Defense Reforms I. Seminar on the Civilianization of the Ministry of Defense and Amending the Law of Defense, European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall, 2007, available at [http://www.marshallcenter.org/ site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-index-1/xdocs/conf/conferences-current/static/xdocs/conf/static/2007-conferences/0710/ 0710_Overview_eng.pdf], 1 July, 2008; On Introducing the Civilian Element in the Ministry of Defense and Reforms of “Law of Defense," Ministry of Defense of Armenia, 2007c, available at [http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-de/page-mc-index-1/xdocs/conf/conferences-current/static/xdocs/conf/static/2007-conferences/0710/Aghabekyan_Keynotes_eng.pdf],
5 July, 2008; “The Starlink Program: Training for Security Sector Reform in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies,” Quarterly Journal, No. 7 (2), pp. 81-91, available at [https://consortium.pims.org/filestore2/download/4005/The%20Starlink%20Program-Faltas-Hartog.pdf], 2 July, 2008.
SSR Language Reality Check: Useful, Fashionable, But Not Pret-a-Porter
Many people might question if Armenia is implementing a defense reform, a SSR, or a concoction of initiatives which goes untitled.23 Sometimes, the same fact can be examined through “a looking glass,” and therefore “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”24
The Armenia’s defense reform shows the conceptual weight and significance of the usage of the SSR language in the redaction of defense reform policies, thus outside its SSR policy framework. All defense documents analyzed have included in their texts the SSR technical language. In the IPAP NATO document, the democratic control of the armed forces is the first objective mentioned in the section titled “Defense Security and Military Iissues,” despite having had a full section dedicated to it in another part of the same document. The National Security Strategy lists as the first pillar of national security an “efficient system of governance” and continues by listing: rule of law and an independent and impartial judiciary system. Without entering in a polemical debate about the role of these pillars within the Armenia national security, it does seem awkward that in a National Security Strategy, which was also part of the NATO-package of defense reform, the armed forces are mentioned as a pillar of state security only after the judiciary system. While the pole position for the role of the army in the state security assets is by no means an indication of an aggressive foreign policy, this listing in the Armenia security strategy, a country currently at war with Azerbaijan, seems bizarre; especially if compared with the opening statement of the 2006 U.S. National Security Council which says “America is at war.” Are we witnessing two extreme national strategies, one politically correct and the other outspoken?
It is not under investigation what the constitutive elements of Armenia state security are. What raises questions is that it seems that the language is not followed by its conceptual base. Armenia is not doing an SSR and the analysis of the threats to its national security does give a prominent role to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The contention is that the emphatic use of nominal syntagmas deriving from a democratic tradition and which have been adopted by SSR policies serves the purpose here to underline the non-aggressive, democratic, non-militarized nature of the foreign policy of Armenia. This language is used for reassuring political partners involved in the defense reform of the innocuous nature of this reform: its objectives of modernizing and increasing the efficiency of the armed forces must be hollowed of any aggressive attitude in foreign policy. Thus, this language which within a SSR framework indicates the state governance effort to ameliorate its control of the means of coercion, when it is used outside this framework it has the purpose to emphasize the passive and defensive tone of a defense reform, in conformity with the behavior of so-called responsible democratic states.
The reason behind the adoption of the SSR language without its policies could also be to circumvent donors funding criteria, as humanitarian budgets cannot be earmarked for funding defense reforms but democratic reforms. Therefore, if a reform of the Ministry of Defense also contains within its objectives good governance; democracy promotion; assistance for ameliorating training stand-
23 See: Inventory of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Efforts in Developing and Transition Countries, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 2005, available at [http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ssr_complete_list.pdf], 3 July, 2008; Security Sector Transformation in Armenia, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 2005a, available at [http:// www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/armenia.pdf], 2 July, 2008; G. Avagyan, D. Hiscock, Security Sector Reform in Armenia, 2005, available at [http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Armenia_English.pdf], 3 July, 2008.
24 L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 1871, available at [http://ftp.cs.indiana.edu/metastuff/looking/ch6.html.gz], 1 July, 2008.
ards, etc. its funding will be more palatable to donors. However, the spread of this language cannot simply be motivated by financial reasons.
Another explanation of the usage of the SSR-ism lexicon in defense reforms is the current interpretation of the concepts of security, war, defense, and development; and their interrelations. From this it derives that a policy which addresses only one of them is considered as partial and flawed. In fact, the concepts of security and development has been linked in a conceptual nexus since the 1990s exemplified by the concept of human security; and by the latest trend called the securitization of development exemplified by view of poverty causing war. According to this trend, policies can only be effective if they address both development and security concerns. It derives that war is deprived of its most complex historical connotations and is seen as a result of lack of development. This view regards development-security nexus policies, such as SSR, of having conflict-prevention capacities. In such a climate, the defense concept alone can not gain policy attention: it needs to be soften by a language of democracy and of non-military aggression in foreign policy. Thus the SSR language is used to provide the concept of defense with a democratic orientation which complements military objectives; and above all it validates these objectives. This validity does not require to be accompanied by the implementation of SSR policies: in a world full of war theatres and distracted and busy donor states, SSR-ism lexicon is enough to reassure foreign donor states that any word in political science includes a concept which orients an action which, alone, is sufficient to reform a state. The language of SSR in the Armenia’s defense reform facilitates the recognition, by the international community, of Armenia as a democratic-responsible state, thus defining and validating this positive state-identity. The conceptual complementarity contained in this defense reform is thus a policy attempt to present, publicize, and consolidate a democratic form of governance which Armenians quested for centuries.
KYRGYZSTAN’S SECURITY PROBLEMS TODAY
Ryskul ABDUVALIEVA
Ph.D. (Political Science), acting associate professor at the Institute of Integrated International Educational Programs, Kyrgyz National University (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)
Regional stability and security consist of two levels—the external security of each country at the regional level and the internal security of each of them individually. A state’s external and internal security are closely interrelated concepts.
It stands to reason that ensuring internal security and stability is the primary and most important task. But the external aspect also requires attention. This article takes a look at the most important problems of ensuring Kyrgyzstan’s security.
