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union created under pressure from the outside is sooner or later doomed to collapse. Only a clear understanding by the South Caucasian states themselves of the expediency of this integration (no matter how it occurs) can be of vital potential and have sustainable development.
Zaur GASIMOV
MA, Ph.D. candidate, Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany Institute for Central and Eastern Europe
(Eichstätt, Germany).
THE EMERGENCE OF THE AZERBAIJANI AND GEORGIAN REPUBLICS (1918-1921): ARMY-BUILDING AND MILITARY COOPERATION
A b s t
From the historical viewpoint, Azerbai-jani-Georgian relations resemble the Hungarian-Polish relations in Central Europe. The Germans call it Schicksalsgemeinschaft, which means a community of destinies. Although totally different linguistically and ethnically, the Azerbaijanis and Georgians have lived for centuries in one region and partially shared a similar experience. The religious difference between these two nations in the Southern Caucasus shows the heterogeneity and particular cultural richness of the region. For two centu-
r a c t
ries, both Azerbaijan and Georgia were parts of the Russian Tsarist Empire and later on, they were republics of the Soviet Union. In 1918-1921, Baku and Tbilisi were the capitals of independent states. This article deals with the emergence of Azerbaijan and Georgia as states in 1918 and their subsequent cooperation in army-building and security. It shows the military cooperation between the two new-born states located between regional powers such as Russia and Turkey, which were competing for dominance in the Southern Caucasus.
Historiographic Notes
Until 1991, the period of South Caucasian independence was mostly explored in Western countries. Publications by F. Kazemzadeh, T. Swietochowski,1 A. Altstadt, R. Pipes, R. Suny,
1 See: T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
W. Zürrer,2 and E.-M. Auch dealt with aspects of nation-building, ethnic identity, and state-building in the South Caucasian region at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Caucasian émigrés and intellectuals contributed significantly to the scientific discourse of 19181921. The works of A. Nikuradze,3 Hilal Münschi,4 Mir-Yacoub,5 Noe Jordania,6 and Mamme-damin Rasulzade are of particular interest, because these authors witnessed history through their participation in the political processes going on in the region. During the Soviet occupation of the Southern Caucasus, Azerbaijani and Georgian historians studied the years of independence of 1918-1920/21 from the viewpoint of official Communist ideology. The first scientific articles that tried to analyze the short-lived republics without any ideological framework did not emerge until 1988-1989. In 1990, Azerbaijani historian Nasib Nasibzade7 published one of the first books on the history of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (ADR), and three years later, a work by his colleague Camil Hasanli8 on the foreign policy of the ADR appeared. Many Georgian historians, such as V. Guruli, A. Menteshashvili, L. Urushadze, etc., specialize on the history of the Georgian Democratic Republic, paying particular attention to the ethnic policy issues in Georgia at the beginning of the 20th century, Georgian-German relations, etc. An in-depth work on Georgian-Turkish relations (1918-1921) was published in 2001 under the editorship of Turkish historian Serpil Sürmeli.9
Russian Czarist Colonies
Like the nations in Central and Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan and Georgia experienced national emancipation in the second part of the 19th century. The repressions of the local mass media and suppression of the national schools under Tsar Alexander III were among the reasons for the discontent among the intellectuals in the South Caucasian colonies. The whole region became a supplier of natural and energy resources. Tens of thousands of settlers from the western part of the Russian Empire were resettled in the Southern Caucasus. The territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia were used by the Tsarist authorities as places of exile for political oppositionists and national movement activists from European part of Russia. In spite of all that, Caucasian intellectuals emerged as a social group based on the Georgian nobility and the Azerbaijani clerics. Representatives of the Caucasian intelligentsia, such as Ivane Djavakhishvili, Ilia Chavchavadze in Georgia, and Mirza Akhundzade in Azerbaijan, were the protagonists of national enlightenment and cultural emancipation. Criticizing the social trends of that time, they supported the social initiatives in the development of national folklore, as well as the improvement of regional education.
Due to a certain amount of liberalization within the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, the mass media culture was able develop in Baku and particularly in Tbilisi. The number of
2 See: W. Zürrer, Kaukasien 1918-1921. Der Kampf der Großmächte um die Landbrücke zwischen Schwarzem und Kaspischem Meer, Düsseldorf, 1978.
3 See: A. Sanders (A. Nikuradze), Kaukasien. Nordkaukasien, Aserbaidschan, Armenien, Georgien. Geschichtlicher Umriss, München, 1944.
4 See: H. Münschi, Die Republik Aserbaidschan. Eine geschichtliche und politische Skizze, Berlin, 1930.
5 See : Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, Paris, 1933.
6 See: N.N. Jordania, Za dva goda (s 1 marta 1917-go—po 1 marta 1919-go). Doklady i rechi, Tiflis, 1919; N. Jordania, Moja jizn’, Stanford, 1968.
7 See: N. Nosibzado, Azorbaycan demokratik respublikasi. Moqalolor ve sonodlor (Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Articles and Documents), Baki, 1990.
8 See: C. Hosonov, Azorbaycan beynolxalq münasib3Ü3r sistemindo 1918-1920-ci illor (Azerbaijan in the System of International Relations in 1918-1920), Baki, 1993.
9 See: S. Sürmeli, Türk-Gürcü iliskileri (1918-21) (Turkish-Georgian Relations [1918-1921]), Ankara, 2001.
primary schools rose and more Caucasians gained access to higher education institutions in St.-Pe-tersburg, Odessa, and Warsaw. The oil boom in Baku and Tbilisi’s rapid development contributed to the ‘reopening’ of the region to the West. In the context of the large-scale transformation processes going on in the European part of the Russian Empire since 1905, many Georgian intellectuals participated in the socialist discourse, which encompassed the entire European continent at that time. For Georgians like Noe Jordania, Gegechkori, and Chenkeli, hopes for liberalization were related to the development of the social-democratic philosophy in Russia. Azerbaijani national democrats, such as M. Rasulzade, around the Party of Musavat regarded elections to the Russian Duma as political participation, giving them the opportunity to make the Russian authorities pay more attention to the cultural development of the Caucasian Muslims.
There were many reasons for such strong idealism among the Caucasian politicians. Russia, as a state, was weakened partially due to World War I and began to lose control over its peripheries and colonies in 1917-1918. From the domestic political viewpoint, Russia became an arena of deep ideological conflict, followed by its embroilment in the civil war between the Bolsheviks and the Whites. The Caucasians had to learn how to think in foreign policy terms because of Russia’s weakness and the changes in the geopolitical constellation of the regional powers, like Turkey and Persia, and of the European nations, like Germany and Great Britain. However, the factor preventing the Caucasians from reacting uniquely to the processes going on in the region was their failure to acquire an all-regional identity. The Bolshevization of Russia in 1917, the fiasco of the German-Turkish alliance in World War I, and the internal political emancipation processes in the Southern Caucasus extensively challenged Azerbaijani and Georgian intellectuals.
Actually, the Caucasians struggled for national autonomy and cultural rights until 1918, when they declared themselves independent states. Social-democrat Jordania and Musavatist Rasulzade could not see any future in an alliance with the Bolsheviks. After a century of coexistence, the Caucasian nations separated themselves from Russia in April 1918 and founded the so-called Transcaucasian Sejm, which was supposed to regulate the Federation of Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians. Because of the different foreign policy views, priorities, and affinities of the Caucasians, the Federation was doomed to collapse as early as the end of May 1918.
May 1918 for the Georgians and Azerbaijanis
The month of May 1918 designated a historical and epochal watershed for the Caucasians. They were finally able to obtain national independence and liberate themselves from their century-long Russian dominance. On 26 May, 1918, the Georgians declared the establishment of the independent state of Georgia. The Azerbaijanis and Armenians followed suit two days later. The very emotional picture of the end of Russian dominance and hopes for a better future under the total chaos in the Southern Caucasus influenced the Caucasian domestic political discourse in the spring months of 1918.10
The independence of the Georgians and Azerbaijanis in 1918 and their ability to create a more or less functioning state was closely related to the social processes going on in the region in the last decades. The emergence of a national intelligentsia and some other factors contributed to that immensely.
10 See: N.N. Jordania, Za dva goda..., p. 98.
Similar to the situation in 1989-1991, in 1917-1918 too, the Caucasian intellectuals became the leading actors in the movement for autonomy, which ended in the declaration of national independence in 1918. The social groups of the local intelligentsia were a recruiting base for the political elite. That is why it is important to analyze the dangerous perception of the leaders of the national movements of Azerbaijan and Georgia—independent states since 1918—Mammedamin Rasulzade (18841955) and Noe Jordania (1868-1953). Both of them were among the best-educated men close to the people and who challenged the Bolshevik regime, even when in emigration in 1921-1922.
Dangers for Independence
Azerbaijan and Georgia saw the main danger in the Volunteer Army of Russian White General Denikin, who struggled for “a single and indivisible Russia,” and in the Bolsheviks, who had been strengthening their power in Moscow since the coup in October 1917. Although Lenin proclaimed the principle of the self-determination of nations, Bolshevik Russia launched increasingly intolerant policies with respect to “Musavatist” Azerbaijan and “Menshevik” Georgia. Tbilisi and Baku were often called “agents of international imperialism” by the officials in Moscow. Beginning in 1918, the Bolshevik government experienced a shortage of Baku oil, and reoccupation of the Southern Caucasus was discussed more intensely in political circles. The independence of the South Caucasian states and the attempts of Rasulzade and Jordania to pursue their own foreign policies became an additional factor disrupting the Bolsheviks’ plans to achieve future expansion and “regional order.” The Bolsheviks created a strong authoritarian regime in Russia at the end of 1917, which was based on the totalitarian Communist ideology. In spite of all the economic difficulties and the lack of state bureaucratic experience, Azerbaijan and Georgia were not authoritarian dictatorships. So the relationship between Moscow and the South Caucasian capitals corresponded to the model of relations between an autocratically ruled former metropolis, preparing for a permanent world revolution, and weak democratic states “under construction.” That is another significant aspect of Azerbaijani-Russian and Georgian-Russian relations in 1918-1920/21. This challenged the South Caucasian democracies to a great extent and diminished their potential for diplomatic activity.
The Emergence of National Armies
Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged as states on the ruins of the Russian Empire’s periphery and also found themselves on the periphery of Eastern Europe. Beginning in 1918, these two new-born republics had to find their way within a system of international relations that was “foreign” to them. The main tasks of Tbilisi’s and Ganja’s11 diplomacy were to enter into relations with both the Entente and the German-Turkish alliance military blocs, as well as to find a solution to their enormous economic problems. Strengthening national sovereignty and gaining recognition by the Great Powers were of paramount importance for the Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders. Since the new states were established under conditions of non-stop military disputes, acute border problems, and permanent danger from the Bolsheviks, the new governments were eager to create national armies that could defend their population and statehood.
11After the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was declared on 28 May, 1918 in Tbilisi, Ganja (Western Azerbaijan) was where the Azerbaijani government was first located. In September 1918, the Azerbaijani authorities moved to Baku after the city was freed from the Bolsheviks.
From the viewpoint of urban development and infrastructure, Georgia was the most developed state in the Southern Caucasus, with its capital in Tbilisi, which was the political center of the region since the beginning of the 19th century. Since the Georgians had access to Russian military schools and were recruited for the Tsarist Army, Georgia had better prerequisites for army-building than Azerbaijan, which, being a Muslim nation, had almost no chance of obtaining a high-level military education in Russian schools, with only a few exceptions.12 With German assistance, Georgia was able to create a number of military schools for training officers. Although an Azeri-Turkish military school functioned in Ganja since 1918, Azerbaijan suffered from an absolute dearth of officers.13
“The formation of the Georgian army began while the Commissariat still existed and before the Georgian State was declared,” writes Noe Jordania in his memoirs. He continues: “The Transcaucasian State needs military forces which consist of three nations and are led by a united General Staff.”14 The Georgian leadership was eager to preserve the unity of the South Caucasians in one state, which should have a united strong army. Noe Jordania rejected the idea of building troops recruited on the basis of the nationality principle. He supported the creation of a “territorially recruited army.”15 This territorial principle was reaffirmed by most deputies during a meeting of the Transcaucasian Sejm on 24 March4, 1918. The issue of military service for all Caucasians was also discussed at that session. However, the Federation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia was too short-lived.
After declaring the State of Georgia on 26 May, 1918, the National Council of Georgia decided to create a National Guard on 2 June, 1918. Noe Jordania stated that this Guard was a provisory measure, which should cease to exist during peacetime. Jordania was opposed to the idea of a regular army in a democratic state. He intended to organize a popular militia instead of a regular army.16 In 1918, the Georgian leadership saw the formation of a National Guard as the only solution to the security problem. Georgian soldiers who served in the Tsarist army and returned from the battlefields of WWI could not be engaged in Georgia’s new army due to the very strong Bolshevik propaganda in the Russian troops. Jordania writes that “they (the soldiers—Z.G.) did not belong to us any more.”17
Thus, Georgia was able not only to create relatively strong military forces, but also to support the army-building processes in neighboring Azerbaijan, rebuff the Armenian attacks in Southern Georgia in December 1918, and put up military resistance against the Bolshevik expansion. Military resistance against the Bolsheviks continued in Georgia even after occupation of the country in 1921 to 1924. The officers of the old regime played a prominent role in Georgia as well as in Azerbaijan. Georgian generals Kote Abkhazi, Nestor Gardapkhadze, and Colonel Kakutsa Cholokashvili were among the most active fighters in the national guerrilla movement, writes Georgian historian Levan D. Urushadze.18 We can speculate that the Georgians’ resistance might have had different results if it had not been for the ambivalence within Georgia’s military forces. As already mentioned, Noe Jordania supported the idea of the National Guard, which could not
12 U.S. historian Tadeusz Swietochowski wrote that a small number of Azeris enjoyed military education in Russia. Among them were War Minister of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic General Mehmandarov and a few others. According to Azerbaijani emigrant historian Hilal Munschi, Azerbaijanis never served in the Russian Army. The same view is shared by contemporary Azeri historian Nasib Nasibzade, who explains this by the Tsarist authorities’ lack of trust in the Muslim soldiers and Iran’s weakness at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, which did not challenge Russia in strengthening the border. In summary, it can be said that an Azerbaijani officer in the Tsarist Russia was a rarity and no significant military elite of Azerbaijani origin could emerge at that time.
13 See: W. Zurrer, op. cit., p. 158.
14 N. Jordania, Moja jizn" p. 92.
15 N.N. Jordania, Za dva goda..., p. 70.
16 Ibid., p. 97.
17 N. Jordania, Moja jizn" p. 92.
18 See: L.D. Urushadze, Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921), ed. by Paata Bukhrashvili, available at [http://www.geocities.com/levan_urushadze_98/DRG.doc], 3 November, 2006.
coexist with the regular army in peacetime. Thus, he placed the accent on militia units rather than on a professional army.
The Azerbaijanis had almost no experience in military service as part of Tsarist Russia. When the Azerbaijani State was declared in May 1918, the republic possessed only one military unit with about 600 soldiers. On 4 June, 1918, the Azerbaijani government signed the Treaty on Friendship and Peace with Turkey, which had to provide military assistance to Azerbaijan.19 “The Special Azerbaijani Corp” was created in the summer of 1918 with Turkish support.20 But even the first graduates of the Ganja-based military school could not solve the problem of the shortage of professional officers at the end of 1918.
The Azerbaijani authorities were concerned about creating military units able to defend the territorial integrity of the republic. In 1919, 24% of the state budget was devoted to military expenses and, according to historian N. Nasibzade, “War Minister General Mehmandarov wrote that the bigger part of état should be given to the National Army, following Georgia’s example, which was ready to allot 60% of the budget to the army’s concerns.”21 According to the official documents of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, “the Ministry of War possessed a well-organized army of 50,000 soldiers.”22
After the recruitment issues were essentially resolved, the shortage of professional officers still remained an acute problem during the 23-month-long life of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The authorities were obliged to engage former Tsarist military specialists, whose loyalty to the ADR was fragile. The officers’ corps of Azerbaijan consisted largely of Turkish servicemen under the influence of the changing Turkish-Soviet relations and of a small number of high-ranking Azerbaijani generals educated in the Tsarist military schools.
Azerbaijani-Georgian Military Convention of 1919
Seeking confirmation of their own sovereignty, Azerbaijan and Georgia enjoyed the backing of various European and regional powers from the very moment their states emerged. Georgia’s sympathies for Germany and the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance defined the political processes in the Southern Caucasus at that time.23 Although Berlin and Istanbul had different views on many aspects of Caucasian affairs, these two powers shared the same opinion on the Caucasus’ future: the Caucasian region should remain outside Russia’s sphere of influence. Germany in particular was a protagonist of close Azerbaijani-Georgian cooperation and, together with Turkey, it contributed to army-building and the development of infrastructure in the region.
Baku and Tbilisi exchanged diplomatic missions and understood the importance of interdependence as early as the first months after declaring their independence. Both of the states saw themselves as hostages of the domestic political dispute in Russia. After Germany and Turkey lost World War I and had to withdraw their troops from the region, Georgia and Azerbaijan felt left alone. Both states could count only on their own potential and achievements in the first year of state independence.
In 1919, Azerbaijan and Georgia reached an agreement on military cooperation. The document, called a military convention, was signed in Tbilisi on 16 June, 1919, and as early as 27 June, it was ratified by the Azerbaijani Parliament.24 The Georgian delegation in the talks on the military conven-
19 See: R. Mustafasade, Dve respubliki. Azerbaijano-rossiiskie otnosheniia 1918-1920 gg., Moscow, 2006, p. 36.
20 See: N. Nssibzads, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
21 Ibid., p. 60.
22 La Republique de l’Azerbeidjan du Caucase, Paris, 1919, p. 26.
23 See: A. Sanders (A. Nikuradze), op. cit., S. 304.
24 See: R. Mustafasade, op. cit., p. 70.
tion consisted of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia E. Gegechkori, Minister of Internal Affairs and War M. Ramishvili, General Gedevanov, and General Odishelidze. The Azerbaijani side was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Jafarov, War Minister General Mehmandarov, and Chief of General Staff General Sulkiewicz. “Considering the danger for the independence of the South Caucasian republics,” both delegations reached an agreement on several aspects of future cooperation and common delimitation of the Azerbaijani-Georgian border. The Military Convention signed by Mehmandarov and Gegechkori was of a clearly defensive nature and was entered for three years. Mutual support using military force was foreseen only in the event one of the signatories was attacked by a third country.25 Georgia assisted Azerbaijan in army-building and military training of officers and the Azerbaijani side provided Georgia with oil and petroleum products.26
Azerbaijani historian Camil Hasanli writes that an Agreement on Technical Cooperation was signed in addition to the Military Convention between Georgia and Azerbaijan. The founding of an Azerbaijani-Georgian Military Council consisting of top representatives of the War Ministries of both countries was one of consequences of those talks. The Military Council consisted of General Shikhlinski, General Sulkiewicz, General Kuteladze, and General Odishelidze.27
C o n c l u s i o n
Deployed in the western part of the country, the Azerbaijani army failed to put up efficient resistance to the Soviets. The Azerbaijani generals were under the illusion that rapprochement with the Bolsheviks would allow them to preserve their country’s broad internal independence. Kemalist Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, was collaborating with Communist Russia and was reluctant to support Azerbaijani independence after 1919.28 The fall of Azerbaijan weakened the former Tbilisi-Baku axis and immensely strengthened the Bolsheviks’ position in the South Caucasian region.
Neither Azerbaijani-Georgian military cooperation, nor the diplomatic achievements of both states helped them to avoid the Bolshevik occupation. On 28 April, 1920, the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan, and on 25 February, 1921, the Georgian capital of Tbilisi was occupied by Bolshevik forces. The re-conquest of the Southern Caucasus began with the fall of Azerbaijan and ended with the Red Army’s invasion of Tbilisi. Most Georgian and Azerbaijani politicians and intellectuals decided to emigrate in order to avoid physical reprisals in the event they refused to collaborate with the Communist authorities.
In May 1920, the anti-Soviet uprising in Ganja was thwarted by the Bolsheviks. The uprising against the Communists in Georgia in 1924 was brutally subdued by the Red Army troops. Representatives of the old armies’ officer corps played a leading role in organizing both the anti-Soviet actions in Georgia and Azerbaijan.29 Rasulzade and Jordania, two of the former leaders, continued their political activities in France, Poland, and Germany in the 1920-1930s. Consolidating the émigré community and organizing meetings and publications on Caucasian issues and criticism of the Communist policy in the Caucasian region were the only remaining tools in the hands of the politicians and many other political migrants.
The National Armies of Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged as the basis of the state-building process launched by the Caucasian intellectuals and politicians. Being poorly equipped, the Georgian and Azerbaijani military forces and army elites were the most vulnerable part of the whole establishment in the new-born republics. The short-lived Caucasian states were unable to recruit new elites during
25 See: La première république musulmane: l’Azerbeidjan. Revue du monde musulman, Paris, 1919, pp. 42-44.
26 See: S. Sürmeli, op. cit., pp. 458-459.
27 See: C. Hsssnov, op. cit., p. 220.
28 See: T. Swietochowski, op. cit., pp. 175-177.
29 See: R. Zeynalov, Voennoe stroitelstvo v Azerbaidzhanskoi respublike. 1920-iiun’ 1941 g., Baku, 1990, p. 21.
the period of independence. So not only the weakness of the land forces, but also the ideological weakness of the Georgian and Azerbaijani military establishment played a crucial role in the demise of both states. As democracies, Azerbaijan and Georgia were unable to diminish the local communist activities on their territories, which tried to blow up the new-born republics from the inside. However, even if Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation ties in the military and security field had been stronger and professionalism of the National Armies higher, this would still have not been enough to preserve the independence of both states. Face to face with Bolshevik Russia, which was striving for Baku’s oil and control over the mountain chain from the Black Sea to the Caspian shores, the Caucasian states had almost no chance of defending their independence at the beginning of the1920s without serious support from Europe.
Gudisa VARDANIA
Ph.D. (Hist.), associate professor, the State University of Abkhazia, project head at the Study Center of National Interests and Strategic Problems of Abkhazia
(Sukhumi, Abkhazia).
THE CAUCASIAN DIASPORA-ABKHAZ AND ADIGHES: EPISODES FROM THE PAST
Abstract
The author takes a look into the past in order to shed light on some of the still painful issues relating to the emergence of the Abkhaz-Adighe element of the Caucasian diaspora, the ups and
downs of the Caucasian War Russia waged in the Caucasus for many years, the deportation of huge numbers of local people, and their arduous integration into Ottoman Turkey.
The Beginning
The Caucasian diaspora dates back to a much earlier period than the mid-19th century, when the mountain dwellers were deported in huge numbers. According to Procopius of Caesarea (the 6th century), the Abkhazian rulers selected handsome young men from among their subjects to be sold into slavery to the Byzantine court. Their relatives were all exterminated just in case, to avoid a blood feud.1 This
1 See: Procopius of Caesarea, Voyna s gotami, Moscow, 1950, p. 383.
