CC BY
3016. Skierka Lsabel. Die 5G-Debatte: Ein Test für die „digitale Souveränität" Europas. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Analysen und Argumente. Nr. 397, S. 4/
17. Sahin Kaan. Zwei Tech-Welten. Was der Zerfall in eine amerikanische und chinesische Sphäre bedeuten würde. In: Internationale Politik, 2020, Nr. 1, S. 46.
18. Dukow Marcel. Das EurasiaNet - oder wie das Internet zerbrach. In: Fischer Sabine/Klein Margarete (Hrsg.): Denkbare Überraschungen. Elf Entwicklungen, die
Russlands Außtnpolitik nehmen könnte, 03.10.2019 Online ...
19. SoldatovAndrei. Security First. Technology Second: Putin Tightens his Grip on Russias Internet - with China's Help, 20.09.2019 Online...
20. Ankenbrand Hendrik. Huawei teilt die Welt im „Techno-Krieg". 11.06.2019.
21. Voelson Daniel. 5G , Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze. Handlungsoptionen für die deutsche Politik. SWP-Aktuell, 5 S.6, 27.
22. Rudolf Peter. Der amerikanisch-chinesische Weltkonflikt. Studie der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 2019, S.32/
23. BendiekAnnegret et al. Das Zeitalter der digitalen Politik. In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2019, 4.
24. Mascolo Georg. Wie aus dem Kampf gegen den Terror Wirtschaftsspionage wurde. Süddeutsche Zeitung 24.04. 2015, S. 6.
25. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Washington DC 2015, p. 4, 9.
26. CDU/CSU/SPD in Deutschen Bundestag, Positionspapir, 2013, S. 103, S. 77.
27. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Abschlussbericht Aufbaustab Cyber und Informationsraum. ... Berlin 2016, S. 17.
28. Deutsche Bundesregierung. Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und der Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Berlin 2016, S. 93, 131f.
29. Budesministerium für Verteidigung. B undeskabinett beschließt Cyberagentur. Berlin 2018.
30. Deutsche Bundesregierung. Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela erkel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 21. März. Berlin 2018. S. 15, 19.
31. Conrad Björn, Meissner Miriam, Wübbeke Jost. DigitalesPowerhaus. In: Deutsche Gesellschaft für AuswärtigePolitik:Internationale Politik 2019, Nr. 3, S. 12, 16.
32. Voelsen Daniel. 5G, Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze. Handlungsoptionen für die deutsche Politik. SWP-Aktuell, 5. S. 4/
33. Kleinhans Jan-Peter. Kontrolle ist besser. In: Internationale. Politik. 2019, Nr.74 (4), S.13.
34. R.Peter. Der amerikanischen Weltkonflikt. Studie der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 2020.
35. LippertBarbara, Perthes Völker (Hrsg.) Strategische Rivalität USA und China. Warum es geht, was es für Europa (und andere) bedeutet SWP-Studie 1 2020, S. 9.
36. Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten. 19.11.19. Polen geht bei 5G Sonderweg mit USA; MüllbauerP. Das beste„Mittel",um die Sicherheit von5G zu garantieren. 15.07.20.
37. Deutsche Welle. Altmaier fordertfairen Wettbewerb mit China, 19.06. 2019, Online ...; Koch Moritz/Scheuer Stefan. Außenminister Maas stellt sich in der Huawei Frage gegen Kanzlerin Merkel. 08.12.2020, Online ...
38. LudwigKristiana. Die Hauwei-Frage spaltet die CDU. 21.11.2019, Online ...
39. BewarderManuel, Brause Kristina. So will Merkel Huawei aussirtieren. 22.09.20.
40. Koch Moritz, Scheuer Stefan. Außenminister Maas stellt sich in der Huawei Frage gegen Kanzlerin Merkel. 08.12.2020, Online ...
41. SPD-Fraktion im Bundestag. Ein digital souveränes Europa mit sicheren 5G-Netzen. Positionspapier der SPD - Bundesfraktion vom 17. Dezember 2019, Online ...
42. Koch Moeitz, Neuerer Dietmar. SPD fordert von Union Entscheidung zu Huawei. 11.02.20.
43. B. Gareis. Auf den Sprung zur Weltmacht. Chinas außenpolitische „Grand Strategy", S. 49 - 66. In: M/ Staack. Asiens Aufstieg in der Weltpolitik. Verlag Barbara Budrich. Berlin/Toronto 2013
44. M. Staack. Einleitung, S. 9-48.
45. Niklas van Alst. Die USA, Deutschland und der Fall Huawei. Berlin/Toronto 2021. Verlag Barbara Budrich, S. 73. Слова благодарности
Этот текст не мог бы возникнуть без опоры на источники, любезно предоставленные Научным Форумом по Международной безопасности (WIFIS, Hamburg/Wien).
РАУ ИОГАНН - доктор философии, профессор; Научный форум по международной безопасности при Академии штабных офицеров Бундесвера (Гамбург) и Академии защиты Отечества (Вена).
RAU, JOHANNES - Doctor of Philosophy, Professor; Scientific Forum on International Security at the Academy staff officers of the Bundeswehr (Hamburg) and the Academy of defending the Homeland (Vienna) (rau100@mail.ru).
УДК 94(669)«20»:323.283 Б01: 10.24412/2308-264Х-2021-3-126-139
МАКПА О.Д., ИДАХОСА С.О. ДИЛЕММА РЕЦИДИВА МЯТЕЖЕЙ И ПРОБЛЕМ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В НИГЕРИИ: ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ БОКО ХАРАМ
Ключевые слова: Боко харам, повстанческое движение, жесткая сила, военные расходы, терроризм, безопасность в Нигерии.
В статье исследуется исторический опыт борьбы правительства Нигерии против террористической исламистской организации, известной как Боко Харам. Авторы освещают политическую и военную стратегию властей страны, показывают проблемы и трудности противодействия терроризму на фоне кажущейся неспособности сдержать угрозы, исходящие от членов данной секты. На основе научных статей, материалов СМИ, документов объясняется, почему, несмотря на увеличение бюджета безопасности с 1,44 млрд. долларов США в 2009 году до 2,81 млрд. долларов США в 2018 году, операции против повстанцев, проводившиеся военными Нигерии все еще не принесли ожидаемых результатов. В статье предложена авторская трактовка, объясняющая почему Нигерия, похоже, проигрывает войну против «Боко Харам», на фоне роста ее военных
126
расходов и возможностей, включая ее скромные успехи в Либерии и Сьерра-Леоне. В исследовании утверждается, что неспособность Нигерии сдержать повстанческое движение «Боко Харам» может быть связана с ее внутренними системными проблемами, в частности, с политизацией вопросов национальной безопасности. Авторы полагают, что для создания более эффективных и подотчетных сил, способных победить повстанческое движение «Боко Харам» необходим тщательный анализ военных операций против нее на всех уровнях.
MAKPAH, O.J., IDAHOSA, S O.
THE DILEMMA OF RECURRENT INSURGENCY THE SECURITY SITUATION IN NIGERIA:
BOKO HARAM IN PERSPECTIVE
Key words: Boko Haram, Insurgency, Hard power, Military expenditure, Terrorism, security in Nigeria.
A number of studies have reviewed the Nigerian Government and military strategy and quest to defeat the dreaded islamist militant known as Boko Haram vis-à-vis the claims of Boko Haram defeat and the seeming inability to contain the threats posed by members of the sect. Drawing references from scholarly articles, electronic channels, and other commissioned reports, the paper explains why despite the rise in security budget from about US$1.44 billion in 2009 to US2.81 billion in 2018, military-led counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria still faces some notable challenges. The paper further examines why Nigeria appears to be losing the war against Boko Haram, in contrast to its military expenditure and capabilities including its modest strides in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The study argues that Nigeria's inability to contain the Boko Haram insurgency can be sited within the context of its homegrown systemic challenges; particularly, the politicisation of its national security. It therefore contends that a thorough overhaul of the military counterinsurgency operations at all levels is necessary for a more effective and accountable force capable of defeating Boko Haram insurgency.
Introduction
Insurgency in its diverse form has emerged as one of the greatest threats to human and international security and Nigeria has its fair share of this menace. Nigeria's hard power endowment has been called to question being that it has become the main hub of insurgent operation. It is common knowledge that Boko Haram terrorism is the major insurgent challenge confronting Nigeria; even though many others in recent years have emerged in form of Headers-Farmers conflict and the emergence of bandits especially in the Northern fringes of the country.
For many years, Borno state, Nigeria was the historic stronghold of the Boko Haram terrorist group and its activity was mainly concentrated in the state. But since early 2014 (International Crisis Group 2014 [1]; Prieto Curiel, R., Walther, O. & O'Clery, N. 2020 [2]), the threat became regional. While the attacks on civilians and military positions in northern Cameroon have since March 2014 multiplied as well as in southern Niger and western Chad since early February 2015 -the day of the first attack by the group in Ngouboua, on the shore of Lake Chad. However, it is noteworthy, that from the early 2000's onwards, Kanuri and Bornouan living in N'Djamena were listening to the sermons of Boko Haram's founder, Mohamed Yusuf, on audio cassettes. Some even posted stickers of his image on their cars. And his Chadian disciples regularly preached in the capital (International Crisis Group 2014 [1]).
In Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, Boko Haram has between 2011 and 2021 caused thousands of death. Nigeria is one of the countries mostly affected by the group's attacks (Idahosa and Bakare 2020 [3]), with states in the North-East region registering the highest number of deaths. Moreover, Borno is by far the most threatened state, in that Boko Haram has caused around 32.8 thousand deaths in this area. Among the news on attacks mostly present in the media, the kidnapping of 276 female students from a secondary school in Borno in 2014 received global response. As at January 2021, 112 girls are still missing, and six students were believed to have died (Simona Varrella [4]).
Boko Haram has been the most active terrorist group in the country over the past decade. However, the death from terrorism in the year was 83 percent lower than at its peak in 2014, in Nigeria (Global Terrorism Index 2020 [5, pg. 2.]). The number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 25 per cent from 2018 to 2019. Renewed activity by Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, including Cameroon, Chad and Niger, remains a substantial threat to the region (Global Terrorism Index 2020 [5, pg. 13]). The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2019 were the Taliban, Boko Haram, ISIL and Al-Shabaab, as shown in Figure 1, of the four deadliest groups in 2019 only Boko Haram, which operates in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, recorded an increase in the level of terrorism over the prior year (Global Terrorism Index 2020 [5, pg. 16]).
Nigeria is arguably one of the most powerful and influential Sub-Saharan African states in terms of hard (material) power which is proven by comparison of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores (Omoruyi et. al. 2020) [6] and its seen as a dominant power (Degterev 2020:164) [7]. Despite this material power and the rise in security sector budget from about US$1.44 billion in 2009 to
US2.81 billion in 2018, military-led counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria faces some notable challenges (Onuoha, F.C., Nwangwu, C. & Ugwueze, M.I. 2020b). Debatably celebrated for its significant military interventions, especially during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the late 1980s through the 1990s, Nigeria's military has recently come under severe criticism for its inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency, a development that raises questions about Nigeria's military response to managing violence at the home front and abroad (Onuoha, F.C. 2020b) [8].
It is pertinent to note that, the inability to tackle these challenges of insurgency indicates that Nigeria will continue to harbor instability and this instability that it harbors particularly the threat caused by the Boko Haram Terrorist group not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of its own people (and the surrounding territories - Lake Chad) but endangers world peace. By extension Nigeria's ultimately incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within her own borders, leaving her northern section of the territory governmentally empty. What are the factors of this incapability or challenge(s)? According to Onuoha et. al. (2020b), "challenge at the operational level" has continued to undermine military operations in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria, but rarely emphasised are the rationing of arms and logistics, lack of judicious spending of military expenditures, infiltration of the military and sabotage (i.e. leaking vital information to Boko Haram insurgents) have all combined to diminish troop morale and undermine the success of military operations (Onuoha, F.C. 2020b) [8].
However, in September 2015, the Director of Information at the Defence Headquarters of Nigeria announced that all Boko Haram camps had been destroyed but attacks from the group continue (Nnenna Ibeh 2015) [9]. In 2019, the Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, claimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated" (Searcey, Dionne 2019) [10]. Despite these claims, attacks by Boko Haram have escalated and still posed a major threat as of 2019/2020. What made the Boko Haram insurgency even more disturbing to many is the seeming inability of the Nigerian military to contain the recurring violence perpetrated by the group (Cat Cronin 2019 [11]; Amao and Maiangwa 2017 [12]).
Consequently, in this paper power capability (hard power) refers primarily to economic and military strength to fight and influence actions, including the judicious use of security budget and force, to halt the widespread and almost daily violence and destruction perpetrated by Boko Haram against civilians as well as to curtail and reverse its expansion and territorial control. We therefore submit that the paper is limited on other scholars' views and submission on responses (hard power), addressing the insurgency which are primarily about (1) official corruption, (2) relative economic deprivation of the north within the Nigerian polity, (3) soft power as a means to addressing the menace, (4) lack of effective regional cooperation. Scholarly analyses of the Boko Haram phenomenon have tended to focus on two dimensions: the group's origins, and the response it has, or ought to have, received. This article is primarily a contribution to the latter (Mickler et. al. 2019) [13]. It departs from the premise that for the most part, from 2010 to 2015 and 2018 to 2020, the Nigerian Government's Counter-Boko Haram campaign failed to effectively respond to the group's violent expansion during which tens of thousands of civilians within and outside Nigeria's borders were killed.
Methodology
This article adopts the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research methods are of different kinds and their utilization in the field is largely determined by two understanding: firstly, the nature of the research problem and what the researcher seeks to investigate, and secondly, what the researcher actually intends to achieve about the quest to defeat Boko Haram and the dilemma of Boko Haram recurrent insurgency in Nigeria (Bintube Mustaoha 2015) [14]. To this end, research objectives must be explicit while formulating both general and specifics objectives for the study (Charmaz, 1991) [15].
For the purpose of this paper qualitative methodological approach in the study of the dilemma of Boko Haram recurrent insurgency and security situation in Nigeria, comparative analysis, (Bintube Mustaoha 2015) [14], case study approach, historical research would be adopted (Bintube Mustaoha 2015 [14]; Brannen, 1988 [16]). Through the use of academic, non-academic, government and non-government agencies documents, reports, and News Papers that relates with the activities of Boko Haram would be examined in showing their appropriateness of the subject matter of this paper (Bintube Mustaoha 2015) [14]. To further ensure that significant elements of the phenomena of the dilemma of Boko Haram recurrent insurgency in Nigeria were comprehensively addressed in a qualitative manner, the questions would be (3) specific ones.
Research Questions: What is the nature and impact of Boko Haram attacks/activities? What is the nature of Nigeria's hard power capabilities? How effective is the quest to defeat Boko Haram in Nigeria? - An attempt to answer these questions required the establishment of the following, which constitutes the methodological significance of the research. The Broad Objective of the Research; is to investigate the nature of Boko Haram's activities and attacks in Nigeria, while the Specific Objectives of the Research; is to examine the nature of the quest to defeat Boko Haram Boko in Nigeria and investigate the inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency despite the improvement in military funding since 2011.
The Dilemma of Boko Haram Insurgency and Activities in Nigeria.
Boko Haram Islamist group, formally known as Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Onuoha and Oyewole 2018:3 [17, p.3]; Global Terrorism Index 2020:16 [5, p. 16]), is an Islamic extremist/terrorist group based in northeastern Nigeria and also active in Niger, Chad and northern Cameroon (Ilesanmi Bakare) [18]. It recorded a surge in terrorist activity in 2019, following a period of steady decline. It had alleged links to al-Qaeda, and also announced its allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in March 2015 (International Crisis Group, 2014:13 [1]; Idahosa Stephen [19]).
After its founding in 2002, the group's increasing radicalization led to a violent uprising in July 2009 in which its leader was arrested and killed. Its unexpected resurgence came after a mass prison break in September 2010 (David Cook, 2011 [20]; Onuoha and Oyewole 2018 [17]), later accompanied by increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks in 2011 which progressed to include suicide bombings of police Headquarters building and the United Nations office in Abuja (David Smith 2010 [21]; Idahosa, Stephen, 2016 [19]; Idahosa and Chukujekwu 2020:244 [22]). In 2016, internal tensions led to multiple Boko Haram splinter groups forming. The largest splinter group is the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), who claimed responsibility for a number of brutal attacks targeting civilians and military personnel in 2019. Owing to data collection restrictions, attacks by both Boko Haram and ISWAP are attributed to Boko Haram in the Global Terrorism database (GTD) (Global Terrorism Index 2020:16) [5, pg. 16]. The rise of Boko Haram has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity and gross instability hitherto unknown in any part of Nigeria. They have attacked both the police and military, churches and other places of worship, schools, international agencies, market squares and other highly-public targets (Idahosa, Stephen, 2016) [19].
Boko Haram ranked as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2019, and remains the deadliest in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the insurgency started in 2009, according to Global Terrorism Index (2020) (Global Terrorism Index 2020:16) [5, pg. 16], Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths throughout the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa. The group's Arsenal includes I.E.D's, conventional arms and ammunition of various degrees of lethal capacity. The salafi-jihadi insurgency has led to over 37,500 combat-related deaths and over 19,000 deaths from terrorism since 2011, mainly in Nigeria and the group is known for its brutality (Elena Holodny) [23]. Of the 1,068 deaths attributed to Boko Haram in 2019, 69 percent occurred in Nigeria, while the remainder occurred in Cameron, Niger and Chad at 20, 7 and 4 percent, respectively (Global Terrorism Index 2020:16) [5, pg. 16]. Hostage taking incidents have increased by 36 per cent since 2018, accounting for 16 per cent of terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram (Elena Holodny) [23].
Figure 1. Boko Haram the Fourth Deadliest Group in 2019 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:16).
Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2019
Tile Taliban were the deadliest terrorist group fbr the B&cond consecutive year
35.000
■ Al-ShJbaab 30.000 Taliban
■ ISIL
Boko Haiam Unknown
All other ijffii i p*.
Taliban Boko Haram ISIL — Al-Shabaab
2002 2Q04 2СЮ6 2008 2QtO 2012 2014 2016 2018 Source: START GTD, IEP calculations
2002 2004 2006 200S 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
The Global Terrorism Index 2020 placed Nigeria as 3rd in the list of terror ranking countries in the world to be 8.3 (GTI Score) just below Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite an overall decline in terrorism, Boko Haram, Nigeria's deadliest terrorist group, recorded an increase in terrorist activity mainly targeted at civilians. Terror-related deaths and incidents attributed to Boko Haram in Nigeria increased by 25 and 30 per cent respectively from the prior year. Over the past year Boko Haram increased attacks on military targets, with deaths rising from 26 persons in 2018 to 148 in 2019 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:21) [5, pg. 21]. In Nigeria, violent attacks in the first six months of the 2020 exceeded the total recorded in 2019. IS WAP were responsible for the deadliest attack of the year so far in June 2019, when operatives ambushed Foduma Kolowombe village in Borno state. Eighty-one residents were killed in the attack while six others were injured (Global Terrorism Index 2020:20) [5, pg. 20].
Figure 2. The Global Terrorism Index 2020 placed Nigeria 3rd in the list of terror ranking
countries (Global Terrorism Index 2020:21) [5, pg. 21].
GTI RANK GTI SCORE 1,245 t DEAD
41» i INJURED
Nigeria 3 8.314
411 * INCIDENTS
Total deaths since 2001 Deaths by group Attacks by target
£aa J*n* I ^^^^^^ ■ Boko Haram ^^^^^^^ ■ Private Citizens
f 22,441 A ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ Property
5000 I \ Unknown a Government
Police & Military Religious Figures,1
O. Boko Haram ^^^^^^^
Unknown |
■ Other
J
Similarly, the economic impact of Boko Haram activities on the Nigerian economy has been unprecedentedly damaging. The total global economic impact of violence was estimated at $14.5 trillion for 2019, equivalent to 10.6 per cent of global GDP. This figure covers 18 variables including military, homicide, incarceration and terrorism. Nine of the ten countries with the highest economic impacts of terrorism are suffering from ongoing conflict (see figure 4 for ease of reference). See breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism, 2019 in figure 3 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:32) [5, pg. 32].
Breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism, 201©
Deaths account Tor just over 61 par cent of the economic impact of terrorism.
Snurce: IEF
Figure 4 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:32) [5, pg. 21].
The ten most affected countries by the economic cost of terrorism, 2019
Nina of the ten counties with Che highest economic impacts of terrorism are suffering from ongoing conflict.
Country Economic Cost of Terrorism ■a Percentage- of GDP GT) 2020 Rank
Afghanistan 16.7K !
Syria S.4K 4
Nigeria 2.4% 5
Burkina FaM 1Я* 12
Mall to» 11
Sonata 1Л 5
Iraq 11% 1
Yemer lUOS e
Sri Lanka i.as 2D
Central African Ftepjbllc C.Sft 17
source i EP
In Africa, Nigeria incurred the largest economic impact from 2007 to 2019 at $142 billion. See figure 5 for the country level breakdown. The increase in the economic impact since 2007 is largely driven by Nigeria. Figure 6 shows the total economic impact for each of the 18 focus countries as well as total attacks and fatalities. Of the 18 countries, Nigeria has suffered the highest economic impact of terrorism, equal to $142 billion since 2007. In 2019, Nigeria and Sudan had the largest economic impact of refugees and IDPs at $14.7 billion and $12.9 billion, respectively. Figure 7 shows that Nigeria had the highest violence containment spending of any of the 18 focus countries, having spent $137 billion since 2007 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:35-37) [5, pg. 35-37].
Figure 5 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:35) [5, pg. 35]. The economic impact of terrorism by UNDP foe us group category, constant 2019 SUS, billions, 2007-2019
Epicentre At-risk Spill-over
Country impact Country Impact Country Impact
Nigeria $141.90 Sudan $JJ1 Cameroon $?J0S
Libya $4.SO Central African Hepjbllc 30.41 Kenya 31.37
Somalia SI.20 Uganda 30.¡6 Tunlsls $OJS5
Ms II $1.10 Morocco $0.07 Chsd $0.45
Senegal J0.05 Burkina FSm S0L42
Tanzania J0.05 Ethiopia $D.33
Niger JO.SO
Mauritania 50.01
Total $149.06 Total $3.04 Total $6.40
SaUrOE: IEP
Figure 6 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:36) [5, pg. 36].
Terror is m in UNDP's f ocu a cou ntries, 2007-2019
The economic impact of terrorism was the largest in Nigeria, at $US142 billion since 2007.
Country Number of Terrorist Attacks Number nf Fatalities Economic Impact of Terrorism (Constant 2016, SUS m il; Ion;
Nigeria А,за3 23.354 I4i,saü4
Libya МПЗ 1,876 4,509£i
Sudan S21 IjbSO 2ДСГЛ
Cameroon 615 2,011 2,062.7
Kenya SOD 1314 1,271.3
Somalia ЗД60 7,126 l.isaj
Mall Б;Э 1,717 1,126.5
man 7T 16S »1.9
chad 53 6SÏ 447.3
Burkina Fa:-:j 225 732 423.0
central African Republic Ethiopia Niger Uganda Morocco 306 97 T34 65 9 1,910 S2I 1.0Л 241 32 414.1 334.7 ЭС3.6 159.S ИЛ
Senegal IB El 47.7
Tanzania 44 47 45.0
Mauritania 9 4 5.5
Source: START GTD, IEP
Figure 7 (Global Terrorism Index 2020:37) [5, pg. 37]. The UNDP focus countries' expenditure on securitization, constant 2019 $US, billions, 2019
Nigeria had tha highest violence containment spending of any of the eighteen focus countries in 2019 at $9.4 billion.
Cnuntry Securitiaaticn Expenditure
Nigeria Э.4
Sudan 4.1
MOnOCDD 5.2
Ltoya 4.7
Tunisia 1.0
Kenya 1.5
Ms II 1.3
Ethiopia u>
chad 0.1
Tanzania Щ
Senegal 0.7
Uganda 0.6
Burkina Faso 0.7
Cameroon 0.5
Mauritania 0.5
Niger 0.1
SDTlBlfi 0.1
Central African Republic QJ04
saurce: START GTD. IEP
According to Global Terrorism Index, 2020, a case study of the economic impact of Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria identified three channels through which terrorism impacted economic activity:
1. Conflict leads to the disorganisation of production as businesses and farms close down;
2. The physical destruction of capital such as roads and buildings impedes production;
3. Displacement of labour (Global Terrorism Index 2020:38) [5, pg. 38].
Nigeria's Hard Power and the Response to Boko Haram
While studies have severely criticised reliance on military force to counter insurgency (Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8]; Mbah and Nwangwu 2014 [24]; Jones and Libicki 2008 [25]), none has completely dismissed its importance. Nigeria is arguably one of the most powerful and influential Sub-Saharan African states in terms of hard (material) power, (see figure 8) as shown by comparison of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores. "The widely-used CINC index is based on the share (rate) of the country in global population (TPR), urban population (UPR), iron and steel production (ISPR), energy consumption (ECR), military expenditure (MER) and military personnel (MPR, which is calculated according to the formula below in figure 8, though the last update of CINC index was made in 2012" (Omoruyi, Idahosa, Mugadam & Sidibe, 2020) [6].
Figure 8. Update of CINC index
TPR +■ UPR + ISPR t ECR - MER l MPR ,., С /.'VC =- ( I )
Table 1
To|> 10 African Countries hi Mate nul Capacity
Countries % of global potential % of AU potential
Egypt 0,99 12.8
Nigeria 0.91 11.2
South Africa 0.64 9.0
DR Congo 0.47 6.1
Algeria 0.42 5.4
Morocco 0.3У 5.0
Ethiopia 0.38 5.0
Sudan 0.3Û 3.9
Angola 0.24 3.1
Eritrea 0.22 2.9
Source. Composite Index of National Capability (CINQ (v5.0) /. The Correlate of War Projects. URL: bttps ^'correlate so fwar.org/data-sets/nati onal-nstgnal-capabiLitics (acccsscd: J5.Q2.202Û).
According to Degterev (2020) [7] cited in Omoruyi et. al. (2020) [6], "in Africa, Egypt has come to the forefront in terms of material potential, projecting its power mainly in North Africa, while Nigeria is being dominant in the framework of ECOWAS" (Degterev 2020: 164) [7]. The calculations of CINC for 2018 (done by Omoruyi et. al. 2020 [6] see table 1) shows that the share of Nigeria in global potential increased during 6 years from 0.91 to 0.94%, while its military personnel - 118 thousand, population -195 mln, as well as in urban population - 98 mln. Nigeria's military expenditure - 2.81 bln USD (Onuoha, F.C., Nwangwu, C. & Ugwueze, M.I. 2020b [8], Omoruyi et. al. 2020 [6]). Nonetheless, in the fight against Boko Haram, the Nigerian army, of about 118,000 men and women, appears deflated and demoralised.
Table 1. Nigeria CINC Scores for 2018 (Omoruyi et. al. 2020) [6]
Nigeria CI IMC Scores for 2018
Nigeria CINC Scores for 2018 Col uni nl Column? Column^ Column4 Column^ Columnfi 1
Country MER MPR ISPR ECR TPR UPR
Nigeria 1 746 118 100 713S 195 87S 98 Gil
Debatably celebrated for its significant military interventions, especially during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the late 1980s through the 1990s, Nigeria's military has recently come under severe criticism for its inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency, a development that raises questions about Nigeria's military response to managing violence at the home front and abroad (Amao and Maiangwa, 2017) [12]. In the 1970s through the 1990s, Nigeria was regarded as the leading light in Africa, and one of the major powers on the continent, particularly in the context of peacekeeping and conflict management (Amao and Maiangwa, 2017) [12].
The once upon a time capacity of the Nigerian army as a force to contend with and its record all over the world in the area of peacekeeping operations as proven in Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc. which she has demonstrated to the international community could not be proven at home against Boko Haram insurgents (Amao and Maiangwa, 2017) [12]. The Pax Nigeriana philosophy (coined in 1970 by Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria's former minister of foreign affairs between 1985 and 1987) articulates how Nigeria's demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its staggering human resources have been and can be put to use in providing leadership for Africa (Fawole 1993 [26]; Amao and Maiangwa, 2017 [12]).
Looking backwards there is no doubt that Nigeria has the strategic, operational and tactical capacity to halt the Boko Haram menace and expansion. It however, needs to deal with the lack of effective intervention, as well as the need to overhaul the military counterinsurgency operations at all levels and improve the morale of its officers for a more effective and accountable force which is in no doubt capable of curtailing the Boko Haram insurgency. It is pertinent to state that, the government is relatively doing its best to contain the insurgency, but it is imperative that the task of bringing back the peace and tranquillity that once characterised the northern region of Nigeria must be of great concern (Idahosa, Stephen, 2016 [19]). According to Bokeriya and Omo-Ogbebor (2019) [27] "The battle against Boko Haram launched by the current government led by President Buhari is yielding positive results, having decimated the activities of Boko Haram, reclaiming back territories once occupied by the Boko Haram group."
What follow sections focus on a brief analysis of quest to defeat Boko Haram and how despite the improvement in military funding since 2011 the persistence of some longstanding problems still remain unabated including concerns over sabotage i.e. Nigeria's inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency.
The quest to defeat Boko Haram
The main counter-terrorism response combating Boko Haram is the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) (Bakare I. 2017) [28], which operates in conjunction with the Nigerian military. The MNJTF struggled to reclaim territory from Boko Haram in 2019 and the group maintained limited safe havens in parts of northeast Nigeria and on islands in Lake Chad, where they prevented the reestablishment of state administration, service delivery and humanitarian relief (Global Terrorism Index, 2020:16) [5, pg. 16].
The quest to defeat Boko Haram has seen the deployment of successive military operations under various codenames. Starting with Operation Flush, which was deployed to crush the July 2009 revolt, Operation Restore Order of 8 June 2011, was "aimed at restoring law and order to the north eastern part of Nigeria and Borno in particular by serving as a counter weight to Boko Haram" (Bakare I. 2017) [28]; Amao and Maiangwa, 2017:11 [12], Onuoha 2020b [8]) and Operation Boyona tasked to destroy terrorist camps/bases, restrict their ability to communicate, regroup and reinforce, fish out perpetrators and bring them to justice.
Following a strategic review of the military operations in the North-East, the government approved the creation and activation of Division 7 of the Nigerian Army in August 2013, and subsequently replaced Operation Boyona with Operation Zaman Lafiya. The Operation began conducting counterinsurgency campaign, focusing essentially on shelling Boko Haram bases in the Sambisa forest, Baga and several other enclaves in the savannah parts of Borno State (Omenma, Abada, & Omenma, 2020 [29]; Onuoha, F.C., Nwangwu, C. & Ugwueze, M.I., 2020b [8]). For more details on the operations and code name see figure 4.
Figure 8. Codenames of Military operations in the Fight Against Boko Haram
(Omenma, Abada, & Omenma, 2020 [29])
Year Code name Target
12 June 2011 Operation RESTORE ORDER I Restore law and order In the north-east and Borno state in particular
Late 2011 Operation RESTORE ORDER II & III To provide security against Boko Haram in Bauchl & Yobe states
May 2013 Operation BOYOMA Destroy terrorist camps/bases, restrict their ability to communicate, regroup and reinforce, fish out perpetrators and bring them to justice
August 2013 Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA The same as above
16 July 2015 Operation LAFIYA DOLE (Peace by Force) To meet the changing nature of Boko Haram tactics
16 August 2015 Theatre Command North East with HQ at Maidugurl was created To coordinate and oversee the operations of 3,7 & 8 Task Force Divisions and the Air Component
April 2016 Operation CRACKDOWN To decimate weapon and equipment capacity of Boko Haram, and blocking positions
22 December 2016 Operation RESCUE FINALE To capture Sambisa-Camp Zero
8 July 2017 Operation DEEP PUNCH To clear remnants of Insurgents from Sambisa forest and restoring normality In the north-east
20 April 2018 (4 months operation) Operation Last Hold Showcase military combat efficiency, to destroy Boko Haram locations In the Lake Chad totally, clearance of the Lake Chad waterways, destruction of BH terrorist camps & strong points In the Lake Chad basin, facilitates rescue of hostages, restoration of economic activities & relocating of IDPs to their communities
The strategic review of the military operations and the quest to defeat Boko Haram insurgency was part of the reason many voted for President Buhari (Denisova 2015 [30]). For instance, the argument on defence related policies may therefore be that a leader's idiosyncrasy matters a lot when it comes to the strength of its defence forces. For instance, in the 1970s, General Yakubu Gowon played an influential role in the formation of ECOWAS, General Babangida, led the formation of ECOMOG, and its deployment to peace operations in the West African region (Amao and Maiangwa 2017 [12]; Francis 2009:111 [31]). Under the Obasanjo presidency (1999-2007), the Nigerian army still had some semblance of its old self and was relevant in several peacekeeping operations in the West African region. Under former President Goodluck Jonathan, Adekeye Adebajo had asserted that "the Nigerian state is becoming a crippled Leviathan unable to exert a monopoly of the use of force over its own territory" which perhaps the greatest indictment of a leadership (Bamidele Olowosagba [32]; Amao and Maiangwa 2017 [12]). It can be argued that this could be the reason behind the support given to President Buhari towards his election and victory in the 2015 general election (Kevin Sieff 2015 [33]).
Military Expenditure and the Fight Against Insurgency in Nigeria
According to 2020 Global Fire Power (GFP) index, Nigeria is ranked 42 of 138 out of the countries considered and ranked 4 in Africa for the annual GFP review ( Global Fire Power 2020 [34]). It is noteworthy that despite the improvement in military funding since 2011 the persistence of some longstanding problems still remains unabated. For instance, according to interviews and analysis conducted by Onuoha et. al. "the military services often receive less than 50% of their capital budgets" (Onuoha et. al. 2020b) [8]. In other words, the Ministry of Defence has never received all the budgetary allocations for defence operations. The strength of military funding has been vital to Nigeria's acquisition of military hardware and projection of its hard and soft power in the fight against insurgency.
Details from 2015 indicates that Nigeria military spending/defense budget for 2016 was $1.72B, a 16.57% decline from 2015, Nigeria military spending/defense budget for 2017 was $1.62B, a 5.92%
decline from 2016, Nigeria military spending/defense budget for 2018 was $2.04B, a 26.02% increase from 2017, while Nigeria military spending/defense budget for 2019 was $1.86B, a 8.95% decline from 2018 [35]. According to available data before 2009, military budgeting in Nigeria hovered between $1.14 billion (about N176 billion) in 1999 and $1.7 billion (about N272 billion) in 2008 (SIPRI 2019) [36]. However, between 2009 and 2018, Nigeria's military spending ranged between $1.78 (about N284.8 billion) and $2.04 billion (about N734.4 billion), respectively (SIPRI 2019) [36]. Military expenditure in Nigeria increased in 2018 from 1621 mln USD in 2017 (Omoruyi et. al. 2020) [6]. The need to accommodate more funds to boost the country's expenditure on security to combat rising militancy and kidnapping necessitated the increase (Omoruyi et. al. 2020) [6]. Given budget appropriations since 2008, it means that by the end of the 2018 fiscal year, the Federal Government of Nigeria had spent about six trillion naira (about $16.7 billion) on defence within 132 months.
According to Trading Economics, global macro models and analysts' expectations of the Nigeria military expenditure was projected to trend around 2 bln USD in 2020 [37]. President Buhari had spent N1.864 trillion (about $5.2 billion) representing about 30.57% of the 11 years defence budget since 29 May 2015 when he assumed office, with the inclusion of the approval of $1 billion by the National Economic Council in April 2018 from the Excess Crude Account to buy weapons to confront security challenges. This indicates that the defence expenditure in 11 years had risen to about N6.5 trillion (about $17 billion) (Onuoha et. al. 2020b) [8]. Furthermore, although Nigeria' defence expenditure has over the years continue to increase, (with expectation that it will continue to rise) (Pieri & Serrano 2014: 5 [38]), the Nigerian military still ranks below and behind most other African countries', e.g. South Africa (Omoruyi et. al 2020) [6]. Despite these military expenditures, the complaint about military underfunding instead of unchecked fund leakage persists (Onuoha et. al. 2020b) [8].
Figure 10 Security Budgetary Allocation: 2010-2017 (Onuoha et al 2020b) [8]
MDAs 2010<f#'Bn) 2011 (#'Bill 2012 (it En) 2013 (»'Bin 2014 ({#' Bnl 2015 (#'B) 2016 (#'B) 2017 (»B) 2018
Defence 241.719 348.037 359.736 397.750 340.332 358.4» 443.077 469.838 567
Police Affairs 82.552 13.279 5.979 8.506 7 268 4.3 IS NA' NA° NA'
Police Formations & Command 245.(»5 295.666 308.474 311.l+S "^92 25 7 329.669 308.919 313.515 332
Police Service Commission 3.865 2.611 2.238 2 1.796 0.784 0.947 1.465 NA*
Office of the National Security Adviser 107.148 109.555 123.488 1 If].459 110.725 84.13 88.875 123.490 121
Total 730.379 769.448 799.915 536.048 752.373 777.367 841.818 90S. ЗОН 1020
Figure 11. A Breakdown of Nigeria's Military Expenditure (in Naira) (Onuoha et. al.
2020b)[8]
Year Personnel cost (In Billion Naira) Percentage (4) difference Overhead 1L. Billion Naira) Percentage (%) difference Recurrent till Billion Naira) Percentage 1%) difference Capital (In Billion Naira) Percentage (S) difference Total recorded expenditure Total calculated expenditure
2009 132.3 33$ 43 9 lis 176.2 44% 46.8 12% 223" 399.2b
2010 155.3 36j6% 37.3 192.6 45.4% 39.4 9.3% 232" 424.6b
2011 NA NA NA NA 309.8 89% 38.2 11% 348" 347.21'
2012 254. В 40.636 41.6 b.6% 296.4 47.1% 35.9 5.7 332" 625.16b
2013 300.4 82.4551 NA NA NA NA 64 17.6% 364" 364.4"
2014 273.81' 43.8% 40.53" 6.5% 274.53" 44% 35.36-1 5.7% 340" 624.23b
2015 289.29' 41% 49.49" 7% 330.59" 46.8% 36.7" 5.2% 357" 706.07b
2016 278.24° 38,2% 33.79" 4.6% 285.66" 392% 130.86° 18 443" 728.55t
2017 279.14' 34.9% 51.3" 6.4% 330.44" 41. Yi 138.99' 17.3% 469" 799.87b
2018 370.63' 37.5% 51.81" 5.2% 422.43" 42.6% 144.99° 14.7% 567" 989.86b
Concerns over sabotage: Failures/Challenges
Nigeria's military has recently come under severe criticism for its inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency. The major concerns on the criticism of the Nigeria's military for its inability to check the Boko Haram insurgency is sabotage which has always been a clog in the wheel of progress in the fight against Boko Haram. For example, in 2012, the then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan revealed that Boko Haram sect had infiltrated his government, arguing that some of the infiltrators (or their apologists) are in the executive, legislative and judicial arms of the government while others are in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies, this was supported in an interview conducted by Sahara Reporters with Stephen Davis, the Australian negotiator (Reuters 20 October 2012 [39]; Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8]; Igboin 2014 [40]). These concerns have always featured in
136
top military leadership (Quedraogo 2014: 23 [41]; Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8]), the question has always been on the capacity of the military to proactively identify and neutralise these infiltrators, according to Onuoha and Ugwueze 2020a [42] in Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8] this capacity has proven to be weak (Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8]).
In October 2014, for instance, military authorities arrested several soldiers who were found to have leaked important security information to Boko Haram that led to a series of ambush and killing of over 30 Nigerian soldiers, and shooting down of a NAF Alpha Jet in September 2014 (Kingsley Omonobi 13 October 2014 [43]; Onuoha et. al. 2020b [8]). The increase in Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks against military targets and the successful killing of many Nigerian soldiers, including officers, indicates the feeling that someone in the army was spying for the militants and led the military authorities to suspect "that moles were feeding terrorists with movement of its personnel, government workers and vulnerable villages" [44]. The concern that some soldiers are moles (Priye S. Torulagha) [45] working for the insurgents continue to increase among patriotic soldiers (Priye S. Torulagha) [44].
Another challenge is the problem of arms and equipment deficits which is further compounded by Nigeria's huge reliance on imported weapons, and therefore heightened the nation's strategic vulnerability to the whims and caprices of leading arms manufacturing countries such as the US and its allies in terms of Nigeria's quest to procure sophisticated weapons. More than 60 years after Nigeria's independence, the country should be able to boast of a flourishing industrial military complex able to manufacture sophisticated weapons as well as dual use of military equipment. The protracted war to defeat the dreaded Boko Haram terrorists exposes the flaw in lacking a viable indigenous military industrial complex (Omoruyi et. al. 2020) [6].
Conclusion
In the course of writing this article, attempts have been made to contribute to the body of literature on Nigeria's power capability and Nigerian army's response to the Boko Haram crisis and the examples of its economic impact, military expenditure including military intervention in Liberia, etc. The article reveals that Nigeria's seemingly decisive role in Liberia, etc is intricately linked with the political and leadership orientation that demonstrated Nigeria's capacity to provide leadership and security for its immediate sub-region. So, the seeming inability of Nigeria to effectively put to rest the Boko Haram insurgency appears to be insufficient political zeal on the part of the Nigeria Government and its military.
The article shows some grave deterioration in the Nigerian military structure particularly in terms of morale, also contrary to what obtained in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the Nigerian army appeared relatively equipped to handle the conventional warfare tactic which defined the intervention. Experiences from the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency suggests otherwise, as it appears the Nigerian military has not evolved alongside the changing dynamics of West Africa's security challenges. This is a sombre reminder that the Pax Nigeriana project seems feckless and less important to those involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency which is in sharp contrast to the Nigeria's 33-year military era (1966-1999), when Nigeria's active role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution issues within its shores and its immediate subregion were pursued with pride, vigour and viewed as a matter of urgent national interest and security (Amao and Maiangwa 2017 [12]).
Given the foregoing challenges, we contend that if the Nigerian military is to be made more relevant to the country's security crises, it must be subjected to aggressive and productive military training and be provided with modern equipment to face the changing dynamics of the country's security threats (Amao and Maiangwa 2017 [12]). Solid efforts must, therefore, be made to comprehensively overhaul the training and logistics departments of Nigeria's military institutions, judicious use of the defence budgetary allocations particularly, in terms of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Despite the power capabilities of the Nigeria Government and huge sums of money expended on defence budgets in general military operations against the insurgents, especially since 2011, sabotage in the military continue to hamper the ability of the military to confront highly mobile and ideologically motivated groups such as Boko Haram. Thus, the military-led campaigns against Boko Haram insurgency must address various kinds of sabotage which accounts for occasional battlefield failures despite huge sums of money expended on defence budgets in general military operations against the insurgents, which in turn gravely undermine national interests. What made the Boko Haram insurgency even more disturbing to many is the seeming inability of the Nigerian military to contain the recurring violence perpetrated by the group.
While the emphasis in this article has been on the (in)ability of the Nigerian military to respond to the Boko Haram crisis, it is important also to state that long-term peace within Nigeria and around its borders will be determined by the success or otherwise of the aggressive and productive military action to face the changing dynamics of the country's security threats. So therefore, the failure of Nigeria to provide security for its own citizens in the face of mass atrocities by Boko Haram over a long period, by extension means that the Nigerian government failed in its "responsibility to protect" its citizens from violence. Finally, the response to Boko Haram's violent insurgency has important implications for ongoing debates about the relative merits of sovereignty, security and regional governance. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Special thanks to the Head of Department Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, for his support and constructive criticism. Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
References and Sources
1. International Crisis Group. (2014) Nigeria's Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence Africa Report N°220, 21 November.
- https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/220-nigeria-s-dangerous-2015-elections-limiting-the-violence.pdf
2. Prieto Curiel, R., Walther, O. & O 'Clery, N. (2020). Uncovering the internal structure of Boko Haram through its mobility patterns. ApplNetw Sci 5, 28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-020-00264-4
3. Idahosa, S. O. & Bakare I. A. (2020). Conceptualisation of regional instability in Sahel: modelling ABM-AfriLand-Rebel Approach, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2020.1796946
4. Simona Varrella. Deaths caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria 2019, by state. Statista. Jan 21, 2021. -https://www.statista.com/statistics/1197570/deaths-caused-by-boko-haram-in-nigeria/
5. Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index (2020). Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (accessed 3 February, 2021)
6. Omoruyi I., Idahosa S.O., Mugadam M.M., Sidibe O. (2020). Nigeria - South Africa Rivalry in Quest for Regional Power Status: from Material Potential to UN Security Council Membership // Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, Vol. 20. - N. 1. - P. 147-157. doi: 10.22363/2313-0660-2020-20-1-147-157
7. Degterev, D.A. (2020). Evaluation of Current Balance of Power at the International Arena and Formation of a Multipolar World. Moscow: RuScience publ. (In Russian)
8. Onuoha, F. & Nwangwu, C. & Ugwueze M. I. (2020b). Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle. Springer Security Journal, 33. 10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6
9. Nnenna Ibeh. "Boko Haram camps 'wiped out' - Nigerian military". Premium Times. 9 September 2015. Retrieved 7 February, 2021.
- https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/189748-boko-haram-camps-wiped-out-nigerian-military.html
10. Searcey, Dionne. "Boko Haram Is Back. With Better Drones". The New York Times. 13 September 2019. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 7 February, 2021. - https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html
11. Cat Cronin. "Don't Forget About Boko Haram: A 2019 Update". American Security Proj ect. June 24, 2019. Retrieved 7 February, 2021. - https://www.americansecurityproject.org/dont-forget-about-boko-haram-a-2019-update/
12. Amao O. B. and Maiangwa B. (2017). Has the Giant gone to sleep? Re-assessing Nigeria's response to the Liberian Civil War (1990-1997) and the Boko Haram insurgency (2009-2015). African Studies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2017.1285665
13. Mickler D., Suleiman M.D. & Maiangwa, B. (2019). "Weak State", Regional Power, Global Player: Nigeria and the Response to Boko Haram, African Security,, 12:3-4, 272-299, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2019.1667052
14. Bintube M. (2015) Qualitative Methodological Approach to Boko Haram 'Jihad': The Imperative of Interview Methods in Understanding the Nature of Periodic Attacks in Nigeria. International Journal of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods, Vol.3, No.2, pp.13-53, September. - http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Qualitative-Methodological-Approach-to-Boko-Haram1.pdf
15. Charmaz, K. (1991). Translating graduate qualitative methods into undergraduate teaching: Intensive interviewing as a case example. Teaching Sociology, 19(3), 384-395.
16. Brannen, J. (1988). Research note: The study of sensitive subjects. Sociological Review, 36(3), 552-563.
17. Onuoha, F.C., and Oyewole S. (2018). Anatomy of Boko Haram: The rise and decline of a violent group in Nigeria. Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/ reports/documents/ 4f179351e3244e1882a6033e0bf43d89_100.pdf
18. Ilesanmi, A. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Terrorist Group." Asia and Africa Today. 713.12 (2016).:51-54.
19. Idahosa, S. (2016). Contemporary Arc of Instability in West Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria. Global Journal of Advanced Research, volume 3. 884 - 894.
20. David Cook. (2011). The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. CTC Sentinel, September 2011, Volume 4, Issue 9. -https://ctc.usma.edu/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria/
21. David Smith. More than 700 inmates escape during attack on Nigerian prison. The Guardian. 8 Sep 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/08/muslim-extremists-escape-nigeria-prison
22. Idahosa, S. O. & Chukujekwu, E. SF. Domino theory for the promulgation of instability in the sahel region: post Gadhafi era in perspective. Revista Inclusiones, Vol: 7 num Especial (2020): 240-250.
23. ElenaHolodny. Africa's largest oil producer has been dethroned // Business Insider. Retrieved 16 May 2016
24. Mbah, P., and Nwangwu C. (2014). The Counter-insurgence operations of the Joint Task Force and human rights abuses in Northern Nigeria, 2011-2013. Journal of Educational and Social Research, 4 (5): 67-78
25. Jones, S.G., and Libicki M.C. (2008). How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering Al Qaida. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Publication.
26. Fawole, W.A. (1993). The Psychological Foundations of Nigeria's African Diplomacy. Ile-Ife: Mimeo
27. Bokeriya S.A., Omo-OgbeborD.O. (June 2016). Boko Haram: a new paradigm to West Africa security challenges. VestnikRUDN. International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 274-284/
28. Bakare, I. "International Efforts in Fighting Boko Haram: United Nations and African Union as Case Study." Asia and Africa Today. 718.5 (2017).17-20
29. Omenma, J. & Abada, I. & Omenma, Z. (2020). Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate. Security Journal. 33. 10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7
30. Denisova, Tatiana. "Nigeria 2015: Leadership Change." Asia and Africa Today. 697.8 (2015).: 12-17/
31. Francis, D.J. (2009). 'Peacekeeping in a bad neighborhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa'. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9(3): 87-116.
32. Bamidele Olowosagba. How Boko Haram Exposed President Jonathan. Legit. - https://www.legit.ng/67626.html
33. Kevin Sieff. Nigeria's new president, an ex-military man, vows to crush Boko Haram. Washington Post. April 1, 2015. (Accessed on 9 February, 2021) - https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigerias-new-president-vows-change-has-come-after-historic-election/2015/04/01/368e2cc6-d7f8- 11e4-bf0b-f648b95a6488_story.html
34. Nigeria Military Strength // Global Fire Power. 2020. URL: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- strength-detail.asp?country_id=nigeria (accessed: 15.02.2020)
35. Nigeria Military Spending/ Defense Budget 1960-2021. - <a href='https://www.macrotrends.net/countries /NGA/nigeria/military-spending-defense-budget'>Nigeria Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2021</a>. www.macrotrends.net. Retrieved 2021-02-11.
36. SIPRI. (2019). Military expenditure by country, in constant (2017) US$ m, 1988-2018. Sweden: SIPRI.
37. Nigeria Military Expenditure. 1960-2018 Data, 2019-2020 Forecast // Trading Economics. URL: https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/military-expenditure (accessed: 15.02.2020).
38. Pieri, Z. & Serrano, R. 2014. 'Insurgency prolonged: Nigeria lack of strategic adaptation and the rising Boko Haram death toll'. West Africa Insight May <http://www.westafricainsight.org/articles/PDF/ 281> (accessed 9 September 2021).
39. Reuters. Nigerian army arrests Boko Haram member at senator's. Reuters. 20 October, 2012. - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBRE89J0DJ20121020; Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan: Officials back Boko Haram. BBC. 8 January 2012. -https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16462891
40. Igboin, B.O. (2014). "Boko Haram Radicalism and National Insecurity: Beyond Normal Politics." Journal of Religion and Violence 2, no. 1: 94-121. Accessed February 8, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26671418.
41. Quedraogo, E. (2014). 'Advancing military professionalism in Africa'. Africa Centre for Strategic Studies Research Paper 6:1-55.
42. Onuoha, F.C., and Ugwueze M.I. (2020a). Special operations forces, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency operations in the Lake Chad area. In New architecture of regional security in Africa: Perspectives on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, ed. U.A. Tar and B. Bala, 267-293. London: Lexington Books
43. Kingsley Omonobi. Military arrests soldiers for being 'moles' for Boko Haram. Vanguard. 13 October, 2014. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/10/military-arrests-soldiers-moles-boko-haram/
44. Priye S. Torulagha. Nigeria's Tragedy: The Lack of Political Will to Fight and end the Boko Haram War and Banditry. https: //torulaghareports .com/
45. Nigeria Army nabs alleged militant "moles". (2014, October 13). AllAfrica. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from allafrica.com/view/group/main/id/00033137.html/
МАКПА ОЙЕИНБИЙЕРИДЕЙ ДЖОЙ - кандидат наук, кафедры теории и истории международных отношений Российского университета дружбы народов им. П. Лумумбы.
ИДАХОСА СТИВЕН ОСАХЕРУМВЕН - аспирант кафедры теории и истории международных отношений Российского университета дружбы народов им. П. Лумумбы.
MAKPAH OYEINBIYERIDEI JOY - - Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Theory and History of International Relations Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Russia. ORCID: 0000-0002-4977-001X (joymakpah@yahoo.co.uk). IDAHOSA STEPHEN OSAHERUMWEN - Ph.D. Researcher, Department of Theory and History of International Relations Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Russia. ORCID: 0000-0002-9085-0070 (idahosa8@gmail.com)
УДК 94(470):069/02 Б01: 10.24412/2308-264Х-2021-3-139-143
ХАМЗАТОВА З.Р., ИБРАГИМОВ М.М. «ПОИСКОВОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ РОССИИ» В ЧЕЧЕНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ И ЕГО РОЛЬ В СОХРАНЕНИИ ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЙ ПАМЯТИ О ВЕЛИКОЙ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ ВОЙНЕ1
Ключевые слова: Великая Отечественная война, поисковое движение, Чеченская Республика, подвиг народа, память.
В статье рассматривается деятельность регионального отделения «Поискового движения России» в Чеченской Республике и его роль в сохранении и увековечении памяти погибших при защите Отечества. На основе опубликованных материалов анализируются результаты поисковой деятельности последних лет. Показано, что ежегодно участники «Поискового движения России» через различные формы деятельности возвращают из безвестности имена героев, приближавших час Победы. Из материалов архивов, экспедиций, раскопок на местах боев извлекаются все новые данные, документально свидетельствующие об участии чеченцев в боях, как на различных фронтах Великой Отечественной войны, так и в тылу врага. Материалы, полученные благодаря деятельности чеченских поисковиков, раскрывают героические подвиги наших
1 Работа выполнена при финансовой поддержке Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований (РФФИ) в рамках гранта № 21-09-43022 СССР «Чечено-Ингушетия в годы советской власти».
139
