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Политические проблемы международных отношений, глобального и регионального развития
Л. Саваста
Легитимность сирийских курдов: вызовы и пути достижения
В статье рассматривается современное положение сирийских курдов с политической точки зрения, в частности, как они могут получить легитимацию (политическую и гражданскую) в региональном контексте, что подразумевает международную оценку этого процесса. В начале статьи автором дается определение этнической группы «сирийские курды», исследуется ее статус (в прошлом и в настоящем) как крупнейшего этнического меньшинства, непризнанного в Сирии, представители которого проживают на территории четырех государств (Турции, Сирии, Ирана и Ирака), что существенно осложняет их положение. В статье рассматривается понятие политической легитимации, определяются субъекты (региональные и международные), обладающие правом легитимации сирийских курдов, раскрывается процесс легитимации, а также отличие статусов «легитимный» и «легальный». В качестве примера в статье рассматриваются попытки легитимации одной из партий, представляющих интересы курдского меньшинства, - партии «Демократический союз» (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, PYD), а также роль России в определении места данной партии в политической структуре Сирии. Это касается также того, как Россия может влиять на окончательное решение относительно определения возможной позиции партии внутри страны. В заключительной части статьи описываются несколько путей достижения легитимации партии «Демократический союз», учитывающих позицию гражданских, региональных и международных субъектов (в частности, России, Турции и США), способных признать право на существование политической партии или группы внутри страны. Ключевые слова: сирийские курды, Россия, моральная легитимность, международная легитимность, партия «Демократический союз» (PYD).
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1 f° The case of Syrian Kurds:
i2 challenging and challenged legitimation inside | the country
This article discusses the position of Syrian Kurds under the political point of view, in the specific of how they can obtain legitimation (political and civil) from a regional vision, touching also the international point of view. It starts giving an overview of who are Syrian Kurds, the current and past conditions as unrecognized minority inside the Syrian borders and the fact that their presence in four countries (Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq) complicates their problem more than how it is. It introduces the concept of legitimation in political science, it explains the actors that can define somebody as legitimate or not (regional and international). It develops the way in which they can do it and it makes also a distinction from the term 'legal'. It describes how the Democratic Union Party, known as PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat), is in search for legitimation inside the country and how it can gain it taking into consideration as main factors the military power and the already working institution in their territory. It touches also how Russia can influence the final decision regarding which will be the possible position inside the country. The final part of the text gives a series of ways of how this legitimation can be reached. It takes into consideration civil, regional and international actors (as Russia, Turkey and US) which can make this declaration that can define a political party or a group as legitimate inside the country, giving them in this way the moral and legal right to rule.
Key words: Syrian Kurds, legitimization, Russia, moral legitimization, international legitimization, Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD).
Introduction
The Kurds have, from the Ottoman Empire, had an unstable and not clear status, they have achieved a special form of national existence and depends entirely on the goodwill of the countries where they reside, goodwill that often is not so visible. In some of these countries Kurds can have a measure of self-rule form, as the example in Iraq, but their security cannot be always granted; in Turkey, the use of the Kurdish language is barely tolerated, and Kurdish national rights are not recognized. Regarding Iran and Syria, Kurds are/were subjected to the rigors of repressive rule. The Kurds of Syria,
in contrast to the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey, are little known in the West,
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but they have similarly strained relations with the state that governs them ^g™ and face human rights abuses as a minority. The Syrian state's repression 02° of its Kurdish population, which thus far has not sought a separate state, may ^ contribute to Kurdish claims for self-determination
[8, p. 48-53]. According to current estimates, there are nearly 1.5 million Kurds ^ in Syria, or approximately 9% of a total population of 22 million, making them o the largest non-Arab minority in the country [Ibid.]. They are concentrated ^ primarily in the north and northeast of the country, in the Jazeera, Efrin, and Ain al-Arab regions [16, p. 1-12]. A substantial Kurdish population also lives in Hasakah province in the northeast; a smaller number live in Damascus. In Syria they've never had an easy life, the Syrian government even began to replace the names of Kurdish villages and sites with Arabic ones [ibid]. Moreover, the majority of Kurds are refused Syrian documents in Hasakah province, especially in Malkia and the cities of Qamishli and Ras al-Ain, either Kurds classified as foreigners carry red identity cards that permit them to be recorded as aliens in official records [Ibid.]. They cannot, however, obtain a passport or leave the country. Concealed Kurds carry only a yellow definition certificate, or residence bond, issued by a local mukhtar (chieftain) and used purely to identify the holders whenever authorities found it necessary to do so [9, p. 1-12]. Though authorities issue the certificates, official Syrian institutions do not accept them, so for all intents and purposes the holders of yellow documents have no official status as Syrian citizens [16, p. 1-12]. The issue of Kurdish rights in Syria started to became quite known worldwide in the last 20 years, but it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, these years have been crucial to both national and regional politics. The Kurds lived outside Syria have been a constant concern in the region because of the conflict between Iraqi Kurds and the Saddam Hussein regime as well as the brutal longstanding struggle between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish government [3, p. 1]. The Kurds of Iran have appeared traditionally less threatening to political stability, perhaps because Tehran controls Iran's population so stringently.
What is legitimation and how it appears
A good start for better understanding the situation is to give a sort of comprehension regarding the meaning of legitimacy. In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a régime where as "authority" denotes a specific position in an established government the term "legitimacy" denotes a system of government, wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence" [13]. An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power.
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Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without «303 which a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse [13]. x^i In moral philosophy, the term "legitimacy" is often positively interpreted as the normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors' & s institutions, offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government's ¡5 actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government. § The political legitimacy of a civil government derives from agreement among c the autonomous constituent institutions-legislative, judicial, executive-combined for the national common good. One way civil society grants legitimacy to governments is through public elections. [Ibid.] We have different examples in political philosophy of what does this term means, many of them have various views about it; I think that we could concentrate all these ideas in Kant's view, which says that political authority is created by the establishment of political institutions in the civil state. It does not pre-exist in individuals in the state of nature, what exists in the pre-civil social state, according to Kant, is the moral authority of each individual rational being and a moral obligation to form a civil state. Legitimacy, for Kant, depends on a particular interpretation of the social contract [Ibid.]. The juridical concept of political legitimacy is often seen as a sort of justification for those that are ruling at the moment, in this way the main function of political legitimacy is to explain the difference between merely effective or de facto authority and legitimate authority. The main function of legitimacy is precisely to justify coercive power, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political power from mere coercion. One way to capture the thought is that legitimacy relates to the way in which the rightful use of political power creates or constitutes political authority [Ibid.].
There is a difference to point out, which is the one between legalization and legitimation. In our case, both political parties which represent the Syrian Kurds are legals, also the PYD, even if Turkey continues to accuse it as a 'divided brother' of the PKK. Maybe at the birth of this party the ideology could have been the same, or very similar, to the one of the Turkish representative, but the matrix is absolutely a different one, this is the main reason why in Syria they are legals. To be legal describes something or someone as having to do with or being permitted by the law or system of laws in a country or organization [7, p. 1].
But how a party or a group can gain legitimation inside the country? First of all it has to be in a position to exercise authority; there must be a transformation of power into this one. They should have a moral right to rule, which means that they have to gain the consent of the people which allow to govern them, and when there are formal constitutional basis we can see legitimacy [Ibid.].
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Syrian Kurds belong both to the Kurdish National Council (KNC) S or the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, or PYD), <x a branch of the anti-Turkish Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren 02° Kurdistan, or PKK) that is based in northern Iraq. Syrian Kurdish politi- § ^ cal demands can be seen and perceived in two/three different ways: from I ^ assimilation into a new Syrian state to self-rule or outright independence [7, p. 1]. KNC has said it is interested in federalism and political decentraliza- o tion, which suggests an autonomous Kurdish government to apply wherever a Kurd is. Regardless, Syria's Kurds seem unwilling or unable to articulate how their vision for a new state would work in practice [Ibid.]. They will probably reject any post-Asad settlement or transitional government in which Turkey can be involved, but they have few alternatives. Syrians Kurds are unlikely to play a significant role in ending or rescuing Asad's regime, but they are armed and dangerous and could pose a major challenge to a post Assad government. But, whatever their ambitions or hopes, they have to be ready to be opposed by Turkey.
Syrian war and Kurdish political and military impact
The establishment of de facto autonomy in Syria's Kurdish majority areas has turned the Kurds into key actors in the conflict in Syria. Since then the connection between the conflict in Syria and Kurdish politics in Turkey and Iraq has increased significantly, as seen most strikingly during the siege of the Syrian town of Kobane [4, p. 1-20]. The establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which governs the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and a limited rapprochement between the Turkish state and its Kurdish population in the 2000s gave rise to a feeling of unprecedented opportunity for the more than 35 million Kurds in the region. This feeling intensified in late 2013 with the creation, as a result of the civil war in Syria, of the autonomous administration of Rojava (Western Kurdistan) [Ibid.]. Across the region, Kurds seem to sense that their moment has arrived. Syrian Kurdish representatives and opposition groups have diverging views about the nature of Kurdish rights in a post-conflict Syria. This key issue prevents the inclusion of Kurdish demands into the program of the Syrian National Coalition and other Syrian opposition groups. The Kurdish movement in Syria is itself deeply divided, and these splits are exacerbated by the influence of Kurdish and state actors outside Syria [Ibid.]. The legitimacy of the dominant Syrian Kurdish political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is questioned by other Kurdish parties in Syria (and elsewhere), by the Syrian opposition and by neighbouring states. Moreover, the PYD and the Rojava project need to be understood within the broader context of trans-state Kurdish nationalist politics, the key factors in which are the influence of Turkey's Kurdistan Workers.
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511 Party (PKK) and the tension between that movement and the KRG in Iraq o^o [8, p. 48-53]. Another consequence of the Syrian war for the Kurds has been x^i the disruption caused by jihadist groups in both Syria and Iraq - particularly by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as its offensive against the Kurds demanded a military response [5]. Kurdish forces in Syria have been fighting jihadists since 2012, most notably during the recent siege of Kobane. ISIS's impact has extended beyond the military sphere, as its emergence has loosened previous alliances and enmities among the Kurds [4, p. 1-20]. The 2011 civil war in Syria and have created the conditions for a major shift in Kurdish politics and society in Syria. Most Kurdish political parties trace their descent from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria - the first Kurdish nationalist party - which was founded in 1957 [Ibid.]. The PYD is openly a member of the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), the umbrella body for groups supportive of PKK ideology and goals. At the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the PYD was one player among many in Syrian Kurdish politics [Ibid.]. By the summer of 2012, as Syria collapsed into warring factions and fiefdoms, the PYD moved decisively to assert control over three pockets of territory with majority Kurdish populations in the north of the country: Jazira, Kobane and Afrin [8, p. 48-53]. By late 2013/early 2014 the PYD had styled these as cantons of local administration under the collective name Rojava ('West') to represent Western Kurdistan, and had held elections to local assemblies [4, p. 1-20]. The official Syrian government and the PYD are not natural bedfellows, but the expedience of war and the fact that both share mutual enemies have led to an understanding for the time being. Rojava marks the first attempt at government based on the political theory of democratic confederalism (or democratic autonomy), but till nowadays the project remains quite fragile. Whatever it will be its future, the creation has somehow altered the Kurdish nationalist discourse; trapped in such a hostile and dangerous environment, Kurds have had no alternative but to create their own government as a means of protecting their security [Ibid.]. The demise of state authority in Syria is creating an unprecedented opportunity for Kurds in the country and in the region, who have acted with speed to organize themselves politically and militarily. However, despite constituting roughly 10% of Syria's population, the Kurds do not on their own have the sufficient political or military power to determine the outcome of the conflict or their own future trajectory. In Syria, as we saw, the Kurds are short of friends, the Arab nationalist Assad government is and has always been implacably opposed to their autonomy, and would not remain passive if it were able to act against Rojava [11, p. 16-32]. Islamist groups are committed to Rojava's destruction, and the non-Islamist parts of the Syrian opposition remain Arab nationalist in orientation and therefore do not support Kurdish autonomy [Ibid.]. Turkey
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parties in Syria do not advocate the creation of an independent Kurdish state; § ^
is opposed to Rojava as much as to the Iraqi Kurds (in this moment maybe even more to these after the referendum for the independence), and the international community is unsure how to deal with the enclave. Kurdish political
rather, their goal is extensive autonomy, pluralist democracy and recognition of the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities in Syria [4, p. 1-20]. Kurd- ^ ish political issues must be viewed simultaneously as domestic issues in each o of the four states and as regional geopolitical issues.
For whom they are legitimate and when
During the conference in Damascus in the beginning of May 2017, it has been shown one of the strongest signs of support for Syria's Kurds when it has been officially recognized that the Syrian Democratic Force has been the most effective in fighting IS in Syria. Walid al-Moualem (Syrian Foreign Minister) said the Kurdish battle against the Islamic State (ISIS) inside Syria was "legitimate" and one aimed at helping to preserve Syrian unity [14]. Moualem responded to a question about U.S. support for Kurdish groups, including the People's Protection Units (YPG), during this conference. "I think that what the Syrian Kurds are doing in fighting Daesh is legitimate in the framework of their keenness on preserving the unity and integrity of Syrian territories", [15] he said using the Arabic acronym for ISIS. As I wrote already, Turkey sees the YPG and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) as "terrorist organizations" as it says they have ties with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is designated as a terror group by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU. Washington does not look them as terror groups, in contrast, the U.S. has actively cooperated with them in the fight against ISIS in Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened on April 30 to take further action against the Syrian YPG and the PKK, slamming the patrolling of U.S. troops alongside the YPG on the Syrian-Turkish border [14]. The fact is that Syria is without a functioning government in many areas but not without governance. As already said, the PYD took control of the region following the Syrian official government's handover, in doing so, it has displayed pragmatism and strategic clarity, and has benefited from the experience and institutional development of its affiliate organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [12]. The PYD now seeks to further consolidate its power and to legitimate itself through the provision of security, services and public diplomacy; yet its local legitimacy remains contested. It is an effective provider of services, its provision varies across Rojava: in areas where the PYD co-exists with government's authorities, a myriad of institutions have developed, sometimes creating parallel structures [6, p. 1-28]. Meanwhile, in areas where the PYD enjoys greater control,
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gil power remains centralized, despite that it claims to decentralize power o^o to the local level. In Arab-majority areas such as Manbij, locals report x^i that the PYD ensures that only representatives that are loyal to it are able to govern, undermining the legitimacy of the new structures in the eyes a! s of the local community [6, p. 1-28]. Unlike other Kurdish parties, which ¡5 were politically active, but institutionally weak, the PYD, through PKK § affiliates, already had experience, networks and governance institutions set c in place years before the Syrian civil war [Ibid.]. This infrastructure has played a key role in incubating the current Rojava project. The institutions built by this Kurdish group now run functions previously performed by the Syrian state, varying from the provision of security and public services to restructuring society in accordance to the PYD's own ideology. These functions are ostensibly managed in a decentralized manner by local councils and assemblies through the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA) system across three cantons which form Rojava [Ibid.]. For many locals, when questioned about the Rojava governance project, they complain in response, 'you mean the de facto authority?' [Ibid.]. The PYD's Kurdish opposition and critics exclaim that the Rojava leadership is illegitimate, authoritarian and seeks only to increase PYD power and control at the expense of its own population and local neighbours. Legitimacy itself as we saw at the beginning is a subjective concept, local legitimacy implies social and political trust, unforced public acceptance of the governing power relations and structures, as well as responsiveness to shared rights and obligations [Ibid.]. Without these, the effectiveness and legitimacy of any governance cannot be sustainable. But we have to take into account also the international actors that are now playing an important role in the country, as Russia and its proposal of making the Kurdish region independent. Kurds proposed a model of federal state where the now regions of Rojava can be autonomous but still a part of the whole Syrian state, so in their minds independence wasn't the last step. Of course the Assad official Syrian government denied any possible federalization of the state and recently the Assad's advisor Shaaban said earlier remarks made by Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem that Damascus was ready to negotiate autonomy with the Kurds were "misinterpreted" [1].
PYD in search for legitimation
Benefitting from a huge and well working network locally, in Turkey and across Europe, the PYD relies on three governance factors to legitimize itself: The provision of security, public services, and public diplomacy [2, p. 393-413]. And while, under the DAA (Democratic Autonomous Administration) and TEV-DEM (The Movement for a Democratic Society), the PYD manages these factors relatively well in Kurdish-majority areas but
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still with some problems, the main difficulty is the lack of true representation ^ of local actors not subservient to the PYD in the Rojava project structures. ^f oo This challenges both its quest for local legitimacy and its ability to govern 02° effectively and sustainably. In order to assess these governance factors, § ^ it is first necessary to analyze the institutional development of the Rojava I ^ project [2, p. 393-413]. In doing so, it is clear that the infrastructure that > has developed inside is complex and not uniform across its self-declared o territories [6, p. 1-28]. Given the difficult conflict environment in which Rojava has emerged and the momentary success achieved, a critical question arises: to which extent Rojava represents the implementation of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's concepts of 'democratic confederalism' and 'democratic autonomy'?These concepts reject the hierarchical and patriarchal nation state, the beliefs of this political vision are radical democracy and self-governance, gender equality, an ecological society, and a cooperative economy [Ibid.].
The Rojava model of democratic autonomy represented by the DAA appears to possible mirror of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK). The KCK most likely formed the base of structures from which the Rojava project has developed, a comparison between the KCK and DAA structures, reveals parallels. The DAA consists of three cantons: Cezire (Jazira in Arabic), Efrin and Kobane (Ain al-Arab in Arabic). Each of these has its legislative, judicial and executive councils and one general coordinating council acting for all the cantons, these have academies, committees, commissions and cooperatives operating within them [Ibid.]. Committees and commissions under the executive function focus on areas related to diplomatic, social, political foundations, economic, legal and self-defence functions. According to the Rojava leadership, cantons work in a decentralized manner with administrative autonomy, each canton is said to have its own constitution, government, parliament, courts, laws and municipalities in a manner compatible with the charter of the democratic autonomy of Rojava [Ibid.].
The success of the PYD's fight against the Islamic State has given a sort of commonly approved legitimacy, on the international level and of course in Kurdish-majority areas in Syria, but still Arab-majority areas maintain a different dynamic and a different vision.
The United States sees the YPG as the most effective fighting force on the ground against ISIS. It has increased its level of assistance since the ISIS offensive in Kobane, which commenced in September 2014 and ended with the recapture of Kobane and its nearby villages from ISIS by early 2015 [Ibid.]. Instead the view of the other external player, Russia, is more difficult to discern, but it apparently sees the PYD as consistent with its antiFree Syrian Army stance and with its support for the Assad official Syrian
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5x1 government. Till now Russia has provided several diplomatic channels for «303 the PYD, the last it was the possible invitation to the peace talks which were c = i planned for the 18th November 2017 but at the beginning of November they decided to postpone them [10, p. 1-20]. The reasons can be several, one could have been the firm opposition by Turkish representative in dealing with a group that they consider as terroristic one. Voices from the Turkish side said that once the next date will be set the PYD will not be invited to the congress, which aims to discuss the future constitution of Syria [15].
The PYD/YPG had declared their desire for an autonomous region in Syria's north since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, and as the war progressed, it positioned itself as a key player for the future of Syria by overtaking large swaths of land in northern Syria with the help of the US [12].
Although backed by the US, Russia has also tried to get a hand on the group. After the first round of Astana talks in January, where Turkey had barred PYD/YPG participation, Russia invited various groups from Syria, including the PYD to a meeting for a draft constitution in Syria [9, p. 1-20].The document included a provision on "autonomy of Kurdish regions" [15] and except Russia the only party which was ready with a draft of a new constitution were the Kurds; surprisingly their document didn't contemplate the independence of Syrian Kurds. Of course is not an easy situation the one that Russia has to face and it has to move quite carefully due to the other actors that are playing their cards in the conflict. But Russia always underscored that the Syrian crisis can only be resolved by political and diplomatic methods. [17] On September 14-15, 2017 in Astana a trilateral Iranian-Russian-Turkish coordinating centre has been established and four de-escalation zones were finalised [Ibid.]. This process has spurred intra-Syrian dialogue under the auspices of the UN. The deputy foreign minister Gennady Gatilov has remarked in his speech during the 72nd UN General Assembly, hold the 22nd of September 2017, saying that "it is necessary to ensure the participation of Kurdish representatives during dialogue with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Efforts to bar them from searching for conflict resolution options might serve as a time bomb for the future of Syria and the entire region" [Ibid.].
Kurds' success on the battle against ISIS has given a boost to the Kurdish cause, and to the YPG/YPJ specifically. Minorities such as the Yazidis and the Syriac saw (and still they do) the YPG/YPJ protection against ISIS attacks as fundamental to their survival. The PYD's military success against ISIS derives from institutional and organisational strength, its members say that it benefits from fighters with years of experience fighting with the PKK but highlights that these are no longer PKK members and that they have no affiliation with the KCK or PKK organisations. The perceived local
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legitimacy attributed to this military success and to the Rojava administration's & security institutions, depends on the security context across the different oo PYD-controlled regions in Syria. Its effectiveness in the provision of services 02° is a critical factor in building local legitimacy. Effectiveness here means § ^ these facilities need to be equitable and sustainable, it relates to what I ^ services are provided, how they are managed and by whom. The PYD has been outstanding in its ability to arrange these services despite the difficult o situation in Syria. But in all the places ruled by them there are different opinions regarding this issue, mainly given by an ethnical factor and/or by the doubt of whether or not they can be trustable.
Conclusion: Looking for a way of diplomatic legitimation
The Rojava project is a good example for explaining Kurdish ability to communicate and create solidarity using traditional and new media (with the diaspora, mainly based in Europe, kurds were able to run global campaigns like the one for the Peace in Kurdistan and mobilize solidarity networks globally), as well as diplomacy institutions and networks. Moreover the institutions are well working if we compare with what we can find now in the rest of the territory of Syria, gender equality is a key discourse promoted for local Kurds showing the Kurdish struggle, protection and rights. The example of female fighters in the peshmerga forces is a very well developed system of gender equality. It also benefits from educated leaders capable of tailoring media messages to a diverse audience and from decades of activism, taking the path of diplomacy and law instead of speaking with the taste of hate in their mouth.
Regarding whether or not they can be described as a legitimate group acting for the freedom of the country, we still have to diversified it from local to international. At the local level, legitimacy means more than just the provision of services, security and public diplomacy image management, all of which even authoritarian states can do in quite a good way. Legitimacy here means a non-authoritarian approach that enjoys social and political trust from the different components of society (which means also different ethnic groups). It involves the ability of building a social contract based on real participation and representation from different components of the society and non-coerced acceptance of the institutions [6, p. 1-28]. If we instead pass to the international approach, there things become more complex. For some countries Kurds are something to consider as dangerous and as possible destabilizing group, for other instead they are a sort of security, balance and ally in the fight against terrorism and extremism in the region. Russia for example has a difficult role in the Syrian war, because it recognizes the importance of the Kurds and how much they have helped in withdrawing ISIS
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gil fighters, but it has also to confront its ideas regarding them with the 'histori-
«303 cal enemy' of this ethic minority, Turkey. The main problem that Russia has
x^i to face is how to deal with 'cat and dog', how to bring a sort of compromise
| ^ between these two actors, and it's hard to believe that if a decision will be
& s make one of the two will agree and keep silence without trying to show (even
¡5 with the violence) its disagreement. But even with the withdrawal of Russian
§ forces, Russia plays a key role in the restoration of Syrian state and this can
c be somehow positive for Syrian Kurds too. How much this can be in Kurds' favour will depend on how much Turkey will provoke.
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13. Standford Enciclopedia of Philosophy. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html.
14. Syria's foreign minister is describing the role of US-backed Syrian Kurds fighting the Islamic State group in Syria as "legitimate". The New Arab & Agency. 2017. May the 9th.
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17. Выступление заместителя Министра иностранных дел России Г.М. Гати- ¡2 5 z: лова на мероприятии высокого уровня по Сирии «на полях» общеполи- ш =§ оптической дискуссии 72-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН // Сайт vo Ч о МИД РФ. Информационные материалы Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН Я (от 22.09.2017). URL: http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_ ^ Ёв publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/2873017?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_lrz- ^ | ZMhfoyRUj&_101_INSTANCE_lrzZMhfoyRUj_languageId=ru_RU (дата ^ *
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Саваста Лукреция - аспирант департамента политической науки факультета социальных наук, Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», г. Москва
E-mail: [email protected]
Savasta Lucrezia - Postgraduate Student at the Department of Sociology of School of Political Science, Higher School of Economics - National Research University, Moscow
