CC BY
109
Niyazi NIYAZOV
Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of International Relations,
St. Petersburg State University (St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation).
THE ARMENIAN-AZERI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AZERBAIJAN'S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Abstract
This article analyzes the influence of the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the need to create and develop military production in the Azerbaijan Repub-
lic. The analysis also examines the ways in which Azerbaijan is cooperating with foreign partners to manufacture different types of modern weapons systems.
Introduction
When the Soviet Union collapsed, most experts, without conspiring, unanimously agreed that the downfall of the Soviet Union, a state with colossal military power, primarily occurred due to overextension of its economy, the main resources of which were used to develop the Soviet military-industrial complex. So it stands to reason that the states emerging from the ruins of the Soviet empire tried as best they could to choose an economic development model that placed the emphasis on enhancement of the civil sector of the national economy.
However, for various reasons, several countries of the post-Soviet expanse were again forced to spend enormous amounts of money on ensuring their military security. One of these countries was Azerbaijan, which was drawn against its will into a full-scale war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Liberation of the Occupied Territories as a Driving Force behind the Establishment and Development of the Defense Complex of the Azerbaijan Republic
By the spring of 1994, Armenia's armed formations had succeeded in occupying Nagorno-Karabakh itself and seven districts of Azerbaijan adjacent to it. After entering a cease-fire agreement, Azerbaijan nurtured the fond hope that it would be able to settle the conflict and liberate the occupied territories within the framework of international law. However, this hope soon proved futile. So the country's political and military leadership began restoring, or to be more precise, rebuilding its armed forces from scratch, the main objective of which was to prevent a further advance of Armenian troops into the interior of Azerbaijani territory, as well as to liberate the already occupied districts.
It was this objective that decided what weapons systems the National Army of Azerbaijan (NAA) and other security and defense structures would need for maintaining the military security system.
■ The country's armed forces were primarily in need of tanks, combat armored vehicles, anti-tank artillery systems, attack aviation, and attack helicopters. The purchase of these weapons systems was to have eliminated Armenia's perceptible superiority in heavy armaments, owing to which it was able to achieve appreciable success at the first stage of the Karabakh conflict.
■ Second, the Azerbaijani army needed communication and fire control systems.
■ Third, it needed air defense means and aviation systems.
■ Fourth, it required the latest types of small arms and ammunition for them.
As the conflict dragged on, the Azerbaijani armed forces needed to purchase gun/missile systems capable of destroying the enemy's engineering and fortification works. This was because, since 1994, the Armenian side had begun building military-engineering structures on the external border of the occupied Azerbaijani territories for repelling an attack of the Azerbaijani army in the event hostilities resumed.
Given its economic interests in the region, Azerbaijan could not ignore the needs of its navy either.
However, determining the need for armaments did not guarantee that the NAA would actually acquire the necessary weapons systems. The main reason for this was that in the mid-1990s-beginning of the 2000s, Baku essentially did not have enough financial resources at its disposal for making mass purchases of heavy weapons systems. This was because the country's economy was in a protracted crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and world oil prices at that time were extremely low.
Of course, the Azerbaijani authorities understood that an efficient economic policy would help to deal with the crisis and that the growing need of the world economy for energy resources would boost a rise in oil prices and, consequently, an increase in the Azerbaijan Republic's revenues. However, the fragile truce established on the front, along with Armenia's superiority in heavy weapons, made it incumbent on the Azerbaijani authorities to find the resources needed to purchase various weapons systems immediately. The fact that in 1996, Russia provided Armenia with weapons worth $1 billion free of charge caused Azerbaijan to step up its efforts even more.1
1 In Russia itself, a special parliamentary commission led by Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Lev Rokhlin was engaged in investigating this incident. However, after his tragic death in July 1998, the commission's activity was reduced to naught.
So it is no accident that by the end of the 1990s politicians, military experts, and even economists in Azerbaijan began talking about the need to create the country's own military-industrial complex called upon to at least partially meet the demands of the NAA for weapons and particularly for ammunition.
At this time, not one of the former Soviet countries, apart from Russia, Ukraine, and partly Belarus, could boast of having its own military-industrial complex. There can be no doubt that almost all the Union republics still had enterprises that used to belong to the Soviet military-industrial complex. But to say that the aggregate of their production capacity automatically led to the formation of a military-industrial complex in the newly independent states is the same as claiming that a skeleton is the sum-total of its bones.
The concept "military-industrial complex" was first used by Dwight Eisenhower on 17 January, 1961. In his television address to the nation, he said, "This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. .. .In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex."2
This definition does not entirely apply to the Soviet military-industrial complex since the economic and political environment in which it functioned was slightly different. So we are inclined to think that the Soviet military-industrial complex was a specific conjunction of various branches of the national economy and party and government councils, the main objective of which was to develop and mass produce the weapons systems required by the army. The Soviet military-industrial complex was able to make use of the capabilities of many branches of the economy for its purposes, as well as the entire national economy in the event of a major war.
When industrialization began in the Soviet Union, the country's regions found themselves drawn into industrial production and internal division of labor. The only exception were the industrial districts and enterprises formed during the time of the Russian empire, one of which was the Baku industrial district.
It is no secret that the value of the Baku industrial district lay in the fact that this was where most of the oil was produced to meet the needs of the Russian empire. So it is not surprising that Azerbaijan was one of the first territories of the former empire that the Bolsheviks made it imperative to gain control over, and on 28 April, 1920 they achieved this goal by establishing Soviet power in Azerbaijan.
Baku continued to be the main source of oil for the Soviet Union. By 1940, "the Baku oil industry supplied up to 80 percent of high-grade aviation gasoline, 90 percent of heavy benzene and kerosene, and 96 percent of car-and-tractor oil of the total production of these products in the Soviet Union."3 At the turn of 1939-1940, the Anglo-French military and political command was even planning to make air strikes on Baku both to support the Finns in their opposition against the Soviet Union and to deprive Germany, which was already fighting against the Western democracies, of a source of petroleum products.4
During World War II, establishing control over the Baku oil sources was one of the Wehrma-cht's main strategic goals. However, the German advance into the interior of Soviet territory, including in the direction of the Caucasus, prompted both the transfer of several military enterprises from the western regions of the Soviet Union to the eastern and the transfer of a large number of local enter-
2 "Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961," available at [http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/ ~hst306/documents/indust.html].
3 S. Knyazkov, "Stanet li Baku gorodom-geroem?" Krasnaia zvezda, 22 April, 2005.
4 See: See: A. Stepanov, "Anglo-frantsuzskie plany napadeniia na SSSR v 39-40 gg. Ugolok neba," available at [http:www.airwar.ru/history/locwar/europe/eng-fr/eng-fr.html].
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prises to the manufacture of defense production. By the beginning of the winter of 1941, the manufacture of 50mm mortar launchers, hand-grenade casings, aerial bombs, mines, as well as the legendary Shpagin submachine guns (PPSh-41) had been established.5
The tempestuous development of military technology and the arms race that unfolded during the Cold War promoted a further increase in the importance of the Baku industrial district and particularly of Azerbaijan as a whole in the Soviet military-industrial complex. It was during these years that laser aiming devices, as well as various devices for military aviation and the navy were produced in the republic.6
When the Karabakh conflict began and the Soviet Union collapsed, the Azerbaijani enterprises of the former Soviet military-industrial complex were in dire straits. At first glance, this seems paradoxical, since popular opinion has it that wars help weapons manufacturers to thrive, while almost as soon as it gained its independence Azerbaijan found itself drawn into a bloody conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, as emphasized above, the main objective of the Soviet military-industrial complex, which also implies its enterprises in Azerbaijan, was to engage in mass production of the weapons systems required by the Soviet army. And the young, poorly trained and equipped Azerbaijani army of 1991-1993 mainly needed elementary types of weapons—submachine guns, armored vehicles, tanks, attack helicopters, and so on. And although the military electronics produced in Azerbaijan was an important component of different weapons systems, it could not in itself have a direct physical impact on the enemy. What is more, it should be kept in mind that the Soviet practice of training army personnel, particularly in the ground forces, did not envisage permanent use of the latest fire control and navigation systems. This was explained by the high cost of all the electronics installed in Soviet military hardware, which when it broke down caused all kinds of "headaches" for the soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army. Another important factor was that most Soviet officers were rather skeptical of electronics that could break down at any moment both under the impact of the enemy's electronic warfare and due to its own unreliability. And they managed to pass on this attitude to the personnel under their command.
It stands to reason that the "ascetic" use of military electronics migrated from the Soviet Army to the National Army of Azerbaijan. The same thing also happened in the armed forces of other CIS countries. So the drop in demand for military electronics essentially put a stop to the operation of Azerbaijan's military enterprises. This was also promoted by the breakdown in cooperative ties with other enterprises of the former Soviet Union and the transfer to new forms of economic relations.
Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces had a need for the military-technical devices produced in Azerbaijan, and on 25 December, 1993, the governments of the two countries entered an Agreement on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises of the Defense Industry to the mutual benefit of the sides. In particular, the sides agreed that "they will not sell or transfer to a third party, including foreign physical and legal entities and international organizations mutually obtained military production, scientific and technical information about it, or research results, or use know-how without preliminary mutual consent."7 However, the sides were still not ready to pool forces to develop and produce "new types of weapons and military technology,"8 which found its way into Art 7 of the above-mentioned agreement.
5 See: S. Knyazkov, op. cit.
6 See: "Baku gotov vypustit voennuiu tekhniku sobstvennogo proizvodstva na rynok," available at [http:www. izvestia.ru/news/16/news154911/index.html].
7 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises of the Defense Industry, available in Russian at [http: www.novostroy.ru/law/direct.php?num=1019482&id=105&sort=num2&type=gov].
8 Ibidem.
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By the end of the 1990s, restoration of industrial production began in Azerbaijan, as it also did in Russia. At essentially the same time, the price of raw hydrocarbons and weapons rose in the world markets. These two factors soon gave a powerful boost to the revival of Azerbaijan's enterprises of the former Soviet military-industrial complex.
The Establishment and Special Features of the Development of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Azerbaijan Republic
After oil revenue began to steadily rise, Azerbaijan started modernizing and technically re-equipping its army, without hiding the fact that the main task of its armed forces was to liberate the occupied territories from Armenian troops and restore control over Nagorno-Karabakh.
At essentially the same time, the Russian Federation began engaging in combat operations in the Northern Caucasus aimed at eradicating the separatist movement in Chechnia. Moscow's use of force to restore its sovereignty in the Northern Caucasus was met with understanding in Baku. In addition, Azerbaijan began rendering Russia all the assistance it could in fighting the terrorist groups operating in the Northern Caucasus.9 During his visit to Baku in November 1999, Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov was assured by Azerbaijan Defense Minister Safar Abiev that Azerbaijan "will not permit penetration [of militants] into Chechnia and vice versa." At the same time, the sides agreed "to step up joint efforts between the Russian and Azerbaijani military-industrial complexes" and the Russian vice premier stated that the military-industrial complex of Azerbaijan "has been kept in very good condition."10
This statement cannot be put down to mere diplomatic etiquette. The fact that the production potential of Azerbaijan's industrial enterprises was better preserved than in the Russian Federation was due to the entirely different way in which state property in the Azerbaijan Republic had been privatized.
First, mass transfer of state property into private hands began in Azerbaijan much later, not until 1995, while second, privatization primarily affected commercial, light and agricultural enterprises, as well as the service sphere. Heavy industry enterprises, on the other hand, long remained under state control and although the delay in privatization cost Azerbaijan 62% of its GDP, according to some data,11 much to its own surprise, the country managed to preserve the capabilities of its defense factories. However, at the turn of the 21st century, it was still too early to talk about Baku having a well-organized and efficient military-industrial complex. Still, one of the priority tasks for the Azerbaijani political leadership has been to establish its own military-industrial complex.
In January 2001, the Milli Mejlis (parliament) of Azerbaijan came forward with an initiative to draw up a draft law On the Military Industry. Adoption and implementation of this document was to have created a legislative base for developing the military industry, as well as to have helped resolve the problem of unemployment in the country.
9 See: E.V. Bakhrevskiy, "20 let politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii Rossii i Azerbaidzhana. Istoriia i osnovnye prob-lemy," in: Rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia za 20 let. Istoriia i perspektivy, Baku, 2011, p. 20.
10 "Rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskaia granitsa na troinom zamke," available at [http:www.lenta.ru/vojna/1999/11/26/az-erbaijan/_Printed.htm].
11 See: "Transformatsiia form sobstvennosti v Azerbaidzhane: itogi pervoi privatizatsii," available at [http:www. mcds.ru/default.asp?Mode=Review&ID_L0=4&ID_L1=43&ID_L2=400&ID_L3=982&ID=&ID_Review=59407].
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In the meantime, Russia continued to show an interest in acquiring the military-technical products it needed from Azerbaijan. And by the spring of 2002, Russian experts came to the conclusion that "it would be beneficial for Russia to manufacture military products in cooperation with the CIS countries." Head of the Department of Export Control and Cooperative Deliveries of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Science Vladimir Belukov informed the media of this, noting that the Azerbaijan Republic "is cooperatively delivering microcircuits, antenna filters, and air conditioners."12
In turn, the Azerbaijan Republic was well aware of the extent to which agreements with the Russian Federation in joint military production could promote the development of the republic's military-industrial complex. As a result, in September 2003, an agreement was signed between the governments of Russia and Azerbaijan On Preserving Specialization of Enterprises and Organizations Participating in the Military Production.13
As Baku began spending large amounts of money on modernizing its armed forces, other CIS countries began showing an interest in mutually beneficial cooperation with Azerbaijan in the military-technical sphere, the Republic of Belarus being one of the first.
In November 2004, an Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises and Organizations of the Defense Industry was signed,14 and a year later, when submitting the mentioned document to the parliament for ratification, Chairman of the State Military-Industrial Committee Nikolay Azamatov stated on behalf of the executive power of Belarus: "We have signed and begun executing a large number of contracts in modernization, major repair, and the delivery of spare parts that are not manufactured in Azerbaijan."15 In addition to this, he noted "Belarus' special interest in this agreement,"16 while the sides also held talks on restoring a tank repair factory in Azerbaijan and were willing to also enhance "cooperation on air defense systems and electronic warfare."17
After forming a legal foundation for cooperation in the military-technical sphere, the sides began establishing production and technological ties between the corresponding structures of Belarus and Azerbaijan. In July 2006, a delegation of the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic headed by Yaver Jamalov visited Minsk. This gave Azeri specialists a close look at the military-industrial complex of Belarus. By the spring of 2007, the sides no longer found it necessary to hide the fact that the "Ministry of the Defense Industry of Azerbaijan and the State Committee for the Military Industry of Belarus are planning to engage in cooperation."18
The Azeri side was particularly interested in modernizing its air defense system in militarytechnical cooperation with Belarus. In 2005, Russian military specialists were inclined to evaluate this system as "very weak," although they also declared that modernization of Azerbaijan's air defense system would be carried out with the help of Russia and the U.S.19 In the fall of 2009, the public was informed that the OSA surface-to-air missile system had been modernized in Azerbaijan with the
12 "Rossii vygodno proizvodit promyshlennuiu produktsiiu v kooperatsii so stranami SNG, schitaiut v Minprom-nauki RF," available at [http:www.mfit.ru/defensive/obzor/ob05-04-02-5.html].
13 See: Agreement between the Governments of Russia and Azerbaijan On Preserving Specialization of Enterprises and Organizations Participating in the Manufacture of Military Products, available in Russian at [www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/ 2002/09/23/2123_type72066_30521.shtml].
14 See: Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises and Organizations of the Defense Industry, available in Russian at [www.pravoby.info/megdoc/part0/megd0492.htm].
15 Quoted from: Interfax, 5 October, 2005.
16 ITAR-TASS, 5 October, 2005.
17 Interfax, 5 October, 2005.
18 "Belorusskie spetsialisty pomogut v razvitii oboronnoi promyshlennosti Azerbaidzhana," 30 March, 2007, available at [http:bpla-news.ru/belorusskie-specialisty-pomogut-v-razvitii-oboronnoj-promyshlennosti-azerbajdzhana/].
19 See: I. Plugatarev, "Baku i Erevan zapugivaiut drug druga," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 November, 2005, available at [http:www.ng.ru/nvo/2005-11-11/9_gonka.html].
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assistance of Belarusian specialists. This promoted a 20% increase in the combat capabilities of the complexes. It was also reported that "the S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missile system is being modernized in the workshops of a local factory... The first vehicles will be ready for combat duty in Azerbaijan before the end of the year [2009]."20 In the fall of 2010, with reference to the Belarusian TV channel STV, the Azerbaijani news portal "1news.az" reported that modernization would increase the combat potential of the indicated air defense system by 70% and that Pechora was undergoing enhancement at a specially built factory not far from Baku.21
Kiev could not help but notice that Baku was stepping up its cooperation with Moscow and Minsk with respect to development of Azerbaijan's military production. As early as the 1990s, Ukraine was actively selling Azerbaijan all kinds of weapons systems, both those it inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union and those manufactured in the 1990s. But this country did not rush to establish cooperation with Azerbaijan in establishing its own military-industrial complex. This was possibly associated both with the Ukrainian side's low assessment of the effectiveness of this cooperation and with fears that development of the Azerbaijani defense complex would deprive Kiev of a certain number of contracts from Baku.
Nevertheless, Ukraine's interest in close cooperation with Azerbaijan, both in petroleum product deliveries and in advancing its own technology onto foreign markets, prompted Kiev to intensify its interaction with Baku in military production.
At the end of 2006, during his visit to Azerbaijan, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich said that "Ukraine and Azerbaijan see great prospects for cooperation in the military-industrial complex and will implement several joint projects."22 In April 2009, the sides signed a Protocol on Making Amendments to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation of 24 March, 1997 in Baku aimed at promoting closer cooperation in the military sphere.23
This agreement helped to strengthen military cooperation between the sides, including in the production of various weapons systems. For example, in May 2011, Minister of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic Yaver Jamalov talked of the sides' willingness to begin joint production in Azerbaijan of guided Skif and Barier anti-tank missiles.24
The increase in the National Army of Azerbaijan's need for military products of its own manufacture, the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in military security, and the continuing standoff in the war with Armenia due to the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to institutionalization of the control system of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex. On 16 December, 2005 President Ilham Aliev's order was publicized, which said that the Ministry of the Defense Industry was being established on the basis of the Azerbaijan Republic Committee for Special Machine-Building and Conversion, which was earlier engaged in military production matters.25
20 "Belorussky voenprom proshel ispytania gorami," available at [http://news.21.by/world/2009/10/19/ 386251.html].
21 See: "Belarus modernizirovala raketnuiu sistemu 'Pechora,' sostoiashchuiu na vooruzhenii VS Azerbaidzhana," available at [http:1news.az/politics/20101026111538921.html].
22 "Pravitelstvennye delegatsii Ukrainiy i Azerbaidzhana rassmotreli sovmestnye proekty v voenno-promyshlen-nom komplekse," Elektronni visti, available at [http:elvisti.com/node/63906].
23 See: "V. Iushchenko i I. Aliev podpisali Plan meropriaty ukrainsko-azerbaidzhanskogo sotrudnichestva na 20092010 gody," available at [http:www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/13477.html7PrintVersion].
24 See: "R. Suleimanov, Ministr: "Azerbaidjan i Ukraina budut sovmestno proizvodit upravliaemye protivotanko-vye rakety 'Skif i 'Barier,'" (Minister: "Azerbaijan and Ukraine will jointly produce controllable Skif and Barier antitank missiles), available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80:_% C2%AB%D0%90%D0%B7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD_%D0%B8_%D0%A3% D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0_193180.html].
25 See: Order of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic on Creating a Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic, Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic, available at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/ content/392/].
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Establishment of the new ministry was a logical step for the Azerbaijan Republic authorities in forming the country's own defense complex. This was why Armenian authors' claim that adoption of this decision was related to political opposition in the upper echelons of power in Azerbaijan looks strange.26
Institutionalization of the control system of the Azerbaijan Republic military-industrial complex aroused not only the interest of its traditional partners—Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine— in Azerbaijan's military production, but also Iran's. On 16 August, 2006, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Azerbaijan Afshar Suleimani said that "the Iranian military industry is very developed. Iran can render Azerbaijan all kinds of assistance in creating its own military-industrial complex. Our countries could sign an agreement on cooperation in this sphere."27
However, Baku was not very enthusiastic about this proposal. There were several reasons for this.
■ First, Azerbaijan was not very happy with Tehran's position regarding settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Baku justifiably believed that were it not for Iran's assistance to Armenia, Erevan would not have been able to meet the needs of its economy for oil, which would have had an impact on the ability of the Armenian army to keep part of Azerbaijani territory under its control.
■ Second, Baku was well aware that Tehran wanted to spread its influence to secular Azerbaijan (North Azerbaijan) in order to protect itself from the growing nationalist movement in North Iran (South Azerbaijan).
■ Third, despite the statement of the Iranian ambassador, Iran's military-industrial complex would most likely be unable to offer the Azerbaijan Republic any real assistance in setting up an integrated production cycle for any modern weapons system, since it was well known that Iran itself was purchasing the latest models of military technology and weapons abroad, primarily in Russia.
■ Fourth, Baku had to keep in mind that Iran was a target of criticism of the international community due to its nuclear program and if international sanctions were introduced against this country, all the possible pluses in military cooperation with Iran could turn into a big minus.
After the Ministry of the Defense Industry was established, formation of the national military-industrial complex began to gain momentum in Azerbaijan itself. In the spring of 2007, information appeared that "a development program for the military-industrial complex will be drawn up in Azerbai-jan."28 According to the reports from Baku, since its establishment, the Ministry of the Defense Industry had been engaged in studying the experience of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and even Rumania with respect to setting up military production. Moreover, the information agency Day.az reported that a scientific research institute would be established in the ministry for drawing up a development program for the military-industrial complex.29 So formation of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex was also given a scientific boost. However, funds estimated at 300 million manats for launching operation of the defense enterprises were the driving force behind cranking up the military-industrial complex.
There can be no doubt that the necessary means were allotted from Azerbaijan's state treasury for this purpose. Direct evidence of this was the fact that Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev took part in the opening of the Peyk (Satellite) plant on 21 December, 2007, which belonged to the Iqlim (Climate) scientific-production association.
26 See: G. Melik-Shakhnazarian, "Oboronno-promyshlenny kompleks Azerbaidzhana ne sposoben pokryt potreb-nosti armii," available at [www.regnum.ru/news/830210.html], 20 May, 2007.
27 "Tegeran gotov uchastvovat v sozdanii voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Azerbaidzhana," available at [http:www.polpred.com/country/az/news.html?section=20&id=53418&type=paid&country=7].
28 "V Azerbaidzhane budet razrabotana programma razvitiia voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa," available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/75683.html].
29 See: Ibidem.
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Launching Peyk into military production was a significant event in the development of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex, since the republic was able to find the funds to finish building the plant, the production of which was to meet the needs of the Soviet army. What is more, modernization of production led to "approximately 40% of all the enterprise's equipment being replaced."30 As early as the beginning of 2008, one of the Day.az information agency's sources in the Azerbaijan government said that new military enterprises would begin operating in the republic at which "armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, as well as small-caliber artillery mounts" would be manufactured. Pakistan, Belarus, and possibly Turkey were named as partners in the production of these weapons systems.31
The increase in number of countries drawn into the production processes of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex led not only to setting up the manufacture of new product lines, but also helped to shape the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry's new goal of making its debut in the world markets, said Azerbaijani Minister of the Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov in February 2008.32 The fact that Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex had achieved its first significant success in manufacturing defense production became known on 5 April, 2008 when Yaver Jamalov reported that "mass production of 29 types of weapons and ammunition" had been set up in 2007, whereby the inventory of military products comprised a total of 212 items.33 Two days later, the head of the Ministry of the Defense Industry declared that a modernization program had been prepared in the republic for 20082011 for 53 facilities belonging to Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex.
It was also reported that "in 2008, 80 new products will be created and a product range of 44 defense items will be manufactured under the State Defense Contract Program. The Ministry of the Defense Industry is being issued 66,070 million manats from the country's state budget this year. This money is to be used to purchase 128 items for processing centers and lathes, as well as to develop defense systems ... ten types of modern technology will be bought in developed countries and 159 million manats will be issued for creating production areas for them under the Investment Program."34 In so doing, the minister emphasized that "under the State Defense Contract Program, current and future programs have been drawn up for defense production ... the needs of the Ministry of Defense and other defense and security structures for repair of small arms, military hardware, and other defense products are being studied."35
At the same time, Baku understood that even when fully established, Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex would not be able to meet all the needs of its own army for heavy weapons, primarily for aviation and armored tank hardware. However, for this reason, just as before, large amounts of money would have to be spent on purchasing these weapons systems. Nevertheless, development of the defense complex remained in the center of the Azerbaijani leadership's attention. On 26 June, 2008, speaking at a military parade dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the establishment of the National Army of Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliev said, "We must create a powerful military-industrial complex in the country as quickly as possible. We are already enjoying the first results of the efforts in this sphere. This shows that all the decisions made are being executed quickly and at a high level of expertise. However, at the moment we are buying a large amount of weapons, ammunition, military hardware, and combat airplanes abroad. This process is continuing and our cooperation with friendly
30 M. Novruzov, "Ilham Aliev posetil predpriiatia Ministerstva oboronnoi promyshlennosti," available at [http: www.day.az/news/economy/102152.html].
31 See: "V Azerbaidzhane nachnut rabotu novye voennye predpriiatia," available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/ 105647.html].
32 See: "Azerbaidzhan planiruet v perspektive postavliat produktsiiu svoego voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa na mirovoi rynok," available at [http://www.day.az/news/economy/107697.html].
33 See: "Azerbaidzhan na 55% povysil proizvodstvo produktsii oboronnogo, spetsialnogo i grazhdanskogo naznacheniia," available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/114661.html].
34 "Chto ozhidaet oboronnuiu promyshlennost Azerbaidzhana," Zerkalo, 26 July, 2008.
35 "V Azerbaidzhane podgotovlena programma po rekonstruktsii 53 ob'ektov voenno-promyshlennogo komplek-sa," available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/114661.html].
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countries in this area is getting stronger. But we want to ensure that most of the military hardware, weapons, and ammunition Azerbaijan needs is produced in Azerbaijan."36
Development of the production capacities of Azerbaijan's Ministry of the Defense Industry riveted the attention of nations that had stable political and economic interests in Azerbaijan to the republic's military-industrial complex even more. One of these nations, Turkey, began showing particular interest by the summer of 2008. During his visit to Azerbaijan in June-July, Turkish Under-Sec-retary for Defense Murad Bayar openly stated that "in Azerbaijan, the military industry is a new branch. There are enterprises remaining from Soviet times at which certain products are manufactured... We will expand our ties with Azerbaijan. In the future, we will be able to manufacture corresponding products jointly with Azerbaijan based on its needs."37
First of all, the Turkish official insistently offered services for modernizing the fire control systems of Soviet-produced Azerbaijani armored vehicles, and also called for pooling efforts to develop and manufacture tanks and drones.38 It was after this visit that information appeared to the effect that "Baku and Ankara are planning to sign a memorandum and protocol on cooperation in the defense industry."39 It should be noted that this agreement was a logical continuation of the Azeri-Turkish military cooperation that began in 1992.40
Intensive talks with the Turkish side on cooperation in military production were supplemented with specific projects. At the end of 2008, during his visit to Baku, Head of the International Cooperation Department of the Under-Secretariat of Defense Industries Lufti Varoglu openly stated for the first time that, "the main goal of my visit is to expand and develop cooperation in military production," adding that "today, the first steps have been taken toward cooperation between Turkish and Azeri enterprises operating in military production."41
At that time, Lufti Varoglu confirmed the information that "in March 2009 Rokestan and Iqlim would begin producing 107mm and 122mm multi-barreled missile launchers."42 Moreover, the representative of the Turkish military industry stated that Turkey's largest military cooperation ASELSAN had already begun installing the Vulcan fire control system on T-72 tanks of the Azerbaijani army. At the same time, he confessed that the desire of this company to participate in the new generation radio station project had still not found support with the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense. Nor could the sides come to terms on further joint modernization of the T-55 tanks removed from the arsenal of the NAA. On the other hand, according to the information of the high-ranking official from the Turkish defense department, the enterprises of his country were already successfully cooperating with Azerbaijan in modernizing the fire control system for Soviet-manufactured BTR-60, BTR-70, and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers. With respect to the possibility of Azerbaijan participating in implementing the program for manufacturing the Turkish tank, Altai, which is a modernized version of the South Korean tank, XK2, Lufti Varoglu deemed it necessary to note
36 Speech by President of Azerbaijan, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ilham Aliev at a ceremonial military parade in Baku on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the National Army, available in Russian at [http:www.prezident.az/articles.php?item_id=20080627103314818&sec_id=11].
37 "Armii Azerbaidzhana i Turtsii dolzhny byt osnashcheny odnim oruzhiem," available at [http:www.milaz.info/ news.php?id=2570].
38 See: Ibidem.
39 "Baku i Ankara planiruiut sotrudnichat v oboronnoi promyshlennosti," Novaia gazeta, 21 July, 2007, available at [http:www.ng.ru/cis/2008-07-21/5_Azerbaidzhan.html].
40 For more detail about the history of Azerbaijani-Turkish military cooperation, see: M.F. Öztarsu, "Military Relations of Azerbaijan and Turkey," available at [http:www.turkishforum.com/content/2008/11/24/military-relations-of-azerbaijan-and-turkey/].
41 L. Varoglu, "Galan il Azarbaycan Türkiya ila birga harbi mahsullar istehsal edacak" (Next year Azerbaijan and Turkey will Produce Joint Weapons), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=3868].
42 "Azerbaidzhan i Turtsiia budut proizvodit sovmestnoe vooruzhenie," available at [http:www.day.az/news/econo-my/141759.html].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
that this was a good idea, but it was up to the Azeri side to decide whether it wanted to join the project.43
At the end of 2008, Minister of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic Yaver Jam-alov said that the country would also be ready to begin manufacturing "the first helicopters"44 in 2016. It is possible that use will once more be made of the experience and technology of the Turkish side, which in September 2009 also announced that it would begin manufacturing its own helicopters between 2009 and 2016, without excluding in so doing the possibility of cooperating with other states.45
While augmenting the volumes of joint production with Turkey, Azerbaijan is not forgetting about the possibilities of its other allies, including Pakistan and Jordan. From the very beginning of military cooperation with these countries, Baku showed a great interest in Pakistan's military technology. In 2006, the Pakistani side expressed its willingness both to sell Azerbaijan certain weapons systems and to set up joint manufacture of several types of weapons. This was announced by the then Pakistani Prime Minister Shovkat Aziz during a visit to Baku.46 In November 2008, Yaver Jamalov paid a visit to Pakistan, during which he met with "ministers of the defense industry and defense of Pakistan and other officials ... of the defense industry."47
Some time later, the head of the Ministry of the Defense Industry said the country was ready to manufacture aerial bombs based on Pakistani technology.48 In May 2009, with reference to the Azeri ANS Information Agency, the Regnum Information Agency reported that talks were going on between the ministers of the defense industry of Azerbaijan and Pakistan on providing Azerbaijan with technology for the mass production of 85mm to 152mm-caliber ammunition to be used by tanks and artillery. It was also noted that the Azerbaijan Republic would receive licenses to produce 50, 100, 250, and 500 kg aerial bombs.49
At the beginning of March 2010, the Azeri media reported on Ilham Aliev's participation in the opening ceremony of the country's new or reconstructed military-industrial complex enterprises. A photo posted on the Azerbaijan president's official website showed Ilham Aliev and Yaver Jamalov viewing samples of the products manufactured at one of country's defense complex enterprises that clearly show an aerial bomb and air missile.50 Judging by everything, they were manufactured on the basis of Pakistani technology.
In the fall of 2009, a Pakistani military delegation headed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff Committee of the Armed Forces of Pakistan General Tariq Majid arrived in the Azerbaijan capital. In addition to meetings with the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan, the high-ranking Pakistani military official also visited the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic. At the meeting, the sides exchanged opinions "about the further development of relations ... in the defense industry."51
43 See: L. Varoglu, op. cit.
44 "Azerbaidzhán nameren nachat proizvodstvo bespilotnikov," available at [http:lenta.ru/news/2008/12/24/drones/].
45 See: U. Enginsoy, B. Bekdil, "Turkey Eyes Light Utility Helicopter Production," available at [http:www. defensenews.com/story.php?i=4268573&c=EUR&s=TOP].
46 See: J. Sumerenli, M. Mamedov, "Pakistan gotov predostavit Azerbaidzhanu voennuiu tekhniku v obmen na neft," Zerkalo, 5 May, 2006.
47 "Zavershen vizit ministra oboronnoi promyshlennosti Azerbaidzhana v Pakistan," available at [http:www. regnum.ru/news/1090853.html].
48 See: "Azerbaidzhan nameren nachat proizvodstvo bespilotnikov."
49 See: "Azerbaidzhan pristupaet k seriinomu proizvodstvu artilleriiskogo vooruzheniia," available at [http:www. regnum.ru/news/1165617.html].
50 See: "Prezident Ilham Aliev prinial uchastie v otkrytii novykh proizvodstvennykh uchastkov na predpriiatii 'Ig-lim' Proizvodstvennogo ob'edineniia 'Sharg,'" available at [http:www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=2010030501393 4349&sec_id=20].
51 "V Ministerstve oboronnoi promyshlennosti sostoialas vstrecha delegatsii Islamskoi Respubliki Pakistan," available at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/news/view/37].
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A direct result of the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Jordan in military production was the start of mass assembly in Baku, at the Computer Plant, of Marauder and Matador armored vehicles withstanding high explosives that are a joint product of Jordan's KADDB52 and South Africa's Paramount Group, which has the exclusive right to distribute these vehicles in the international market.53 This was why at the end of 2008, Yaver Jamalov announced the start of mass production of "armored hardware under a contract with South Africa,"54 and not with Jordan.
The above-mentioned statement by the minister of the defense industry also mentioned that Azerbaijan would soon begin manufacturing drones. Although Yaver Jamalov "did not specify whether ... the drones would be entirely of the country's own development or whether foreign technology would be used to manufacture them,"55 most military analysts agreed that the country would most likely make use of Israeli technology in the mass production of drones.
At the end of June 2009, Israeli President Shimon Peres visited Azerbaijan. One of the members of the delegation he headed was Director-General of the Ministry of Defense of Israel Pinchas Buchris. On 29 June, he and the Israeli experts accompanying him were welcomed by Yaver Jamalov.56 A little later, the Azerbaijani Information Agency Milaz.info reported with reference to the Turkish press that after four years of talks Azerbaijan and Israel had signed an agreement that envisaged the possibility of manufacturing military equipment in keeping with Israeli technology at the enterprises of the Azerbaijan Republic's military-industrial complex.57
In September 2009, it became known that the Israeli concern Elbit Systems had opened its representative office in Azerbaijan. This information may not have drawn particular attention had it not been known that "two defense concerns—Israel Airspace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems—are manufacturing drones in Israel."58 At that time, it was openly stated that Elbit Systems was working with the Ministry of the Defense Industry of Azerbaijan on a project for manufacturing drones.59 It was also noted that the manufacture not only of surveillance drones, but also of drones capable of carrying "small missiles" would be launched.60 At the end of 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that drones would begin being manufactured in 2010.61 With some delay compared with the scheduled date, on 3 March, 2011, the AZAD Systems Co. enterprise of the §srg Production Association of the Azerbaijan Ministry of the Defense Industry, at which the manufacture of Israeli-developed drones began, opened in Baku.62
The Azerbaijan Ministry of the Defense Industry actively cooperated with Israeli defense enterprises not only in the manufacture of aviation systems, but also of other types of weapons and military hardware. In September, when Elbit Systems opened its representative office in Baku, the Azeri me-
52 [http:kaddb.mil.jo/static/about1.shtm].
53 See: S. Wei, "Proizvodstvo novykh bronirovannykh mashin," available at [www.army-guide.com].
54 "Azerbaijan nameren nachat proizdvodstvo bespilotnikov."
55 Ibidem.
56 See: "V Ministerstve oboronnoi promyshlennosti sostoialas vstrecha," available at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/ news/view/33/].
57 See: "Azarbaycanla Israil arasmda harbi sahada böyük razila§ma gözlanüir" (A Major Agreement is Expected Between Azerbaijan and Israel), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=9714].
58 I. Konovalov, "Bespilotniki stolknuli izrailskie ministerstva. Minoborony i MID possorilis iz-za kontrakta dlia Rossii," available at [http :vpk.name/news/23667_bespilotniki_stolknuli_izrailskie_ministerstva_minoboronyi_i_mid_possorilis_ izza_kontrakta_dlya_rossii.html].
59 See: "Krupneishaia voennaia kompaniia Izrailia otkryla predstavitelstvo v Azerbaidzhane," available at [http:ru.apa. az/news_KpynHeHmaa_B0eHHaa_K0MnaHHa_H3paHna_143983.html].
60 See: "Azarbaycan pilotsuz tayyara istehsalina bajlayix" (Azerbaijan Begins Manufacturing Drones), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=6753].
61 See: "Azerbaidzhan naladit v 2010 godu proizvodstvo bespilotnykh letatelnykh apparatov," available at [http: www.milaz.info/ru/news.php?id=13006].
62 See: "A New Enterprise, AZAD Systems Co. of the §arg Production Association of the Azerbaijan Ministry of the Defense Industry, Goes into Operation," available at [http:www.azerbaijan.az/portal/newsru.html?action=GetFullN ews&ldid=2005-07-26<id=21:42:12&ndid=2011-03-04&nid=4].
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dia reported that the country "is holding talks with two Turkish and one Israeli company" on the joint production of armored vehicles. Admittedly, it was not clarified whether they would be new generation combat vehicles or whether it was a matter of creating "full-tracked combat hardware, self-propelled bridges, and armored combat freight hardware on the basis of T-54 and T-55 tanks removed from the arsenal."63
So Azeri-Israeli cooperation in military production began to gain momentum, and at the beginning of 2010, it became known that a new agreement was to be entered between these countries64 that would promote expansion of military cooperation between the sides. And indeed, in 2012 an agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and Israel on deliveries of various weapons systems totalling more than $1.5 billion. It can be presumed that several types of hardware and weapons intended for the NAA were to be assembled on the basis of Israeli parts at enterprises of the Azerbaijan military-industrial complex.
After the August events of 2008, Russia, which had stepped up its Caucasian foreign policy, also began to offer Azerbaijan closer cooperation in defense production. This is possibly why the Georgian information portal Gruziia Online, under the almost panic-striken heading "Russia Wants to Make Azerbaijan Militarily Dependent on It," published information on 21 October, 2008 from the Doktrina Research Center, which in part said that during the meeting between Azeri and Russian Ministers of Defense Safar Abiev and Alexander Serdiukov, the Russian side suggested that Russian companies participate in Azerbaijan's defense industry. Analysts of the Doktrina Center claimed that "Moscow believes that Russian companies should take active part in creating Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex. Otherwise Western companies will come to the Azeri market and put an end to Azerbaijan's military dependence on Russia."65
Despite the slightly populist tone of this conclusion, it should be noted that it is largely true, however with the stipulation that not only Western countries are trying to penetrate the Azeri market of weapons and military production, but also arms manufacturers from the East European countries. From this viewpoint, it must be confessed that Russia already lags far behind Belarus and particularly Ukraine in the joint production of various weapons systems at the enterprises of Azerbaijan's Ministry of the Defense Industry. Admittedly, the Russian side still has one advantage, which is that the Russian Federation can offer Azerbaijan joint production of more up-to-date types of weapons than Belarus, Ukraine, and in part Turkey. Contemporary economic reality is such that Russia cannot ignore the fact that Azerbaijan, in contrast to many other countries interested in developing militarytechnical cooperation with Moscow, also has the financial possibilities for this.
The increase in the production capacities of the Azerbaijani military-industrial complex has made it possible for it to begin manufacturing weapons systems based on its own developments. The large-caliber Istiqlal anti-material sniper rifle has become an indisputed leader among them.This rifle was first demonstrated at the iDEAS-2008 International Defense Exhibition held in the Pakistani city of Karachi. As was to be expected, the 14.5-mm sniper rifle capable of reaching a target 2,400 m away aroused great interest among military specialists.66 The rifle was next successfully demonstrated at the IDEF 2009 international exhibition of technology and production of the defense industry held in April 2009 in Istanbul. Before it opened, Azeri gunmakers also showed "optical targets, armored personnel carriers, automatic missile launchers, and electronic circuits of Azeri manufacture" in Tur-
63 "Azerbaidzhan, Turtsiia i Izrail naladiat sovmestnoe proizvodstvo bronemashin," available at [http:news. bakililar.az/news_azerbayjan_turciya_i_25038.html].
64 See: "Azarbaycanla Israil arasmda harbi sahada böyük razilajma gözlanilir" (A Major Agreement is to be Signed between Azerbaijan and Israel).
65 "Rossiia khochet postavit Azerbaidzhan v voennuiu zavisimost ot sebia," Gruziia Online, available at [http: apsny.ge/news/1224649308.php].
66 See: "Milli 'Istiqlal' snayper tüfangi maraga sabab olur" (The Istiqlal Sniper Rifle Arouses Great Interest), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4296].
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key.67 During the exhibition, enterprises of Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey, Egypt, and the U.S. defense industry showed an interest in the products of the Azerbaijani military-industrial complex. "Talks were held [with the latter] on the purchase of certain types of production of the Azerbaijan defense industry."68
It was in Istanbul that Azeri specialists first heard the opinion that predominated in the military circles of most countries of the world that the desirable caliber for heavy sniper rifles is 12.7 mm, since a larger caliber make this weapon difficult to handle on the battle field.69 Judging by everything, this was why the decision was made to manufacture the 12.7-mm version of the Istiglal sniper rifle.70 However, in so doing, the experience of its own Karabakh war, which at the beginning of 2010 assumed the nature of a protracted and positional conflict, prompted the Azeri side to reach an entirely different conclusion, specifically that the caliber of the sniper rifle should be increased. For this reason, Azerbaijan set to work manufacturing sniper rifles of 23mm and 30mm caliber in 2010-2011. This was reported by Minister of the Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov in an interview with the Lent.az Information Agency.71
The Azerbaijan military-industrial complex is successfully assimilating not only manufacture of large-caliber sniper rifles, but also new generation inam, Zafar, and Zafar-K pistols. Information about the successful testing of the new pistols, which in terms of their performance characteristics are superior to Soviet-made TT and Makarov pistols, first appeared in October 2009. It was noted that "both pistols were manufactured jointly with the Turkish TiSA§ Company."72 In mid-December 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that mass production of the new pistols had already begun, once more emphasizing that they meet NATO standards.73 In so doing, the minister also stressed the high quality of the products being manufactured.
It is interesting that in March 2009, when the development plans of the Azerbaijani Ministry of the Defense Industry were essentially voiced for the first time, not a word was said about beginning mass production of large-caliber sniper rifles and pistols. On the contrary, more was said about the manufacture of "modern armored personnel carriers, various anti-tank mines, optical targets, aerial drill bombs, and so on." It was also emphasized that the total range of products to be manufactured at the Ministry of the Defense Industry enterprises would comprise 435 items, and that 163 machine tools and technological equipment, as well as 5,000 different instruments had been purchased in Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Ukraine, Turkey, China, Russia, Belarus, and South Korea for successful execution of the production plans.74 It is interesting that this information published in Russia's Krasnaia zvezda was earlier published in the Azeri media too.75
In the fall of 2009, it became known that the Azeri Telemekhanika plant and the Turkish Company of the Machine and Chemical Industry (MKEK) had set up joint manufacture of ammunition "for firearms."76 While in December 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that Azerbaijan had "completed talks and entered an agreement with one of the Turkish companies on the sale by this company of 30 mil-
67 "Na vystavke v Stambule budut prodemonstrirovany snaiperskie vintovki i bronetekhnika azerbaidzhanskogo proizvodstva," available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4088].
68 "Azerbaidzhan pristupaet k seriinomu proizvodstvu artilleriiskogo vooruzheniia."
69 See: B. Kalinichev, "Krupnokalibernye snaiperskie vintovki VS zarubezhnykh stran," Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrrenie, No. 11, 2005.
70 See: "Gotovitsia novaia versiia azerbaidzhanskoi snaiperskoi vintovki 'Istiglal,'" available at [http:ru.apa.az/ news _144348.html].
71 [http:www.lent.az/news.php?id=19291].
72 V. Suleimanov, "Dva pisotleta azerbaidzhanskogo proizvodstva proshli uspeshnye ispytaniia," available at [http: ru.apa.az/news_^Ba_nHCT0neTa_a3ep6aHfl^aHCK0r0_np0H3B0flCTBa_144798.html].
73 See: "Azarbaycan dunyada an boyukgapli snayper istehsal edacak" (Azerbaijan will Manufacture the Largest-Caliber Sniper Rifle in the World), available at [http:www.lent.az/news.php?id=19291].
74 See: "Azerbaidzhan. Vnimanie k oboronno-promyshlennomu kompleksu," Krasnaia zvezda, 20 March, 2009.
75 [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4665].
76 R. Suleimanov, "Azerbaijan zakupit u Turtsii snaiperskie vintovki," available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_A3ep5a0H^aH_ 3aKynHT_y_TypuHH_145358.html].
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lion units of ammunition of 7.62-mm caliber."77 It is difficult to say if the matter concerns the same company or different ones, but the information on the volume of this transaction shows the colossal production capacity of the enterprise manufacturing the ammunition, and this means that if hostilities are resumed in Karabakh, the National Army of Azerbaijan will not suffer from "bullet starvation," as was the case in 1992-1994.
At the very beginning of 2010, Yaver Jamalov said that in the coming year, the Ministry of the Defense Industry was planning to reconstruct "12 types of production branches," as well as purchase "state-of-the-art equipment from several developed countries for manufacturing eight types of defense products." It was also holding "talks on purchasing the latest equipment for setting up mass production of another five or six products."78
Yaver Jamalov was encouraged in his endeavors by the fact that even in the conditions of the world crisis, the revenue of the department he heads remained very high in 2010 too. For example, as early as November 2009 it was known that the Ministry of Finance of Azerbaijan planned to allot "2,425,271 manats for applied research in defense and security and 2,384,763 manats for the Ministry of the Defense Industry under miscellaneous expenses."79
More proof of the successful development of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex is the expansion of its territorial boundaries. There are plans to begin building new military enterprises in Ganja, Khachmas, and Nakhchivan.80
It is obvious that formation of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex is drawing close to its logical conclusion, and in the near future it will begin mass production of a large number of diverse weapons systems and other defense production.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to note that for the moment the leading research centers engaged in the problems of international security, military-technical cooperation, and so on, do not deem it necessary to pay serious attention to the achievements of Azerbaijan's military-industrial complex, although they do note the increase in Azerbaijan's military spending.81
Azerbaijan's clear achievements in establishing its own military-industrial complex have also become an example for neighboring states—Georgia and Armenia, which are also actively promulgating their achievements in this sphere today. But in contrast to the Azeri side, these states do not have sufficient financial resources for organizing mass production of a large number of state-of-the-art military-technical products.
For Azerbaijan, on the other hand, equipping its army with weapons systems manufactured by its own military-industrial complex will mean an increase in the combat capabilities of Azerbaijan's armed forces and other defense and security structures, which all countries with political, economic, and military interests in the Caucasian region will have to reckon with.
77 "Minister of the Defense Industry: 'In 2010 another 12 production shops will manufacture weapons,'" available at [http:www.milaz.info/ru/news.php?id=13000].
78 "Azerbaidzhan vedet peregovory ob eksporte 27 vidov oboronnoi produktsii," available at [http:www.day.az/news/ economy/188052.html].
79 R. Suleimanov, "Representative of the Ministry of Finance: 'In Azerbaijan's state budget for 2010, defense expenses have not been cut back,'" available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_npeflCTaBHTenb_MHHHCTepcTBa_$HHaHCOB:_«B_
146431.html].
80 See: R. Suleimanov, "Azerbaijan will Buy Sniper Rifles from Turkey."
81 See: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at [http:milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4].
