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justified (from the point of view of development's objectives, existing resources and chances) strategic perspective of the state's development. The due account of local peculiarities facilitates definition and the best use of social-cultural features of the state and society needed for their reformation. The international experience allows Kyrgyzstan successfully to integrate itself in the world system with full comprehension of universal and generally accepted "code" and, in its turn, in the atmosphere of being comprehended. A significant element of implementation of this program becomes the creation of the modern state adapted to realities of globalization and being able to carry out the program of long-term reforms.
The other scenarios of economic development are characterized by the trend to reduction of specific meanings of the factor, which in practice means the aggravation of division to the north and the south, the fragmentary development, i.e. the lack of the united economic space of the country. For the midterm perspective, the small size of the country will be a sign of backwardness.
"Vnutripoliticheskoe i sotsialno-economicheskoe razvitie Kyrgyzstana", M., 2011, pp. 245-256.
Victor Korgun,
D.Sc. (Hist.) - IOS of RAS
THE AFGHAN CONFLICT AND CENTRAL ASIA
The region of Central Asia is connected with Afghanistan in terms of ethnic origin, history, politics and economics. For the last quarter of century after the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 the political destinies of the Central Asian countries and this country were to some extent reciprocally connected and depended.
At present, Afghanistan represents one of many factors, which threaten sustainable development of the countries in the Central Asian region. The existing military-political situation in the state shows that the conflict is still far away form the final solution and as usual continues to create tension in the region, represents a real threat to stability and security of Central Asia and the whole world community. The events in Afghanistan have a significant impact also on the regional system of international relations. Before disintegration of the Soviet Union the republics of Central Asia lacked the independent course of foreign policy, including policy relating to Afghanistan. It was reduced to cultural conflicts and a small size of economic cooperation.
The countries of Central Asia, having attained independence in 1991, worked out their own course of foreign policy. At the first stage (1991-1996) after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime of President Najibullah and the seizure of power by mudjaheds they carried out policy of self-isolation from the Afghan events. For the first half of the 1990s, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan established consulates in the north of the country in the city of Mazari-Sharif. After coming to power of talibs in 1996, Central Asian countries had to define a new course in relation to Afghanistan. The meeting of the leaders of the CIS countries in Central Asia (except Turkmenistan) was held on 4 October in Almaty, and the Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin represented Russia. The participants of the summit disapproved activities of movement "Taliban" and took the decision not to recognize officially the extremist regime.
However, under conditions of military successes of talibs the policy of isolation gradually was changed for attempts to establish contacts with the regime of talibs. Turkmenistan occupied a separate position carrying out the policy of neutrality under conditions of
military antagonism between talibs and the Northern Alliance. Seeking to find out the peaceful way of solving the conflict, in 1998 the group "6+2" (neighbors of Afghanistan plus Russia and the U.S.A.) was established under the aegis of the UN General Secretary's representative L. Brahimi, who tried to play the role of negotiator between the conflicting parties. However, the repeated attempts to start negotiations failed.
For the end of the 1990s the informal coalition of regional states was formed consisting from Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India, which came forward in support of the Northern Alliance headed by its leader, legendary hero of Afghanistan Akhmad Shakh Masud. The Alliance received material, political and military assistance. A new situation was shaped in the region following the defeat of the regime of talibs in 2001. The countries of Central Asia started to establish diplomatic relations with new Afghanistan headed by the president H. Karzai. The multilateral cooperation was started among them, primarily in the sphere of deliveries of energy resources (oil products and electric energy) to Afghanistan.
At the same time, the events in Afghanistan have a significant impact on political processes in Central Asia. As a whole, it is possible to underline four main spheres of this negative influence: 1) political instability (Islamic extremism and terrorism); 2) narcotics traffic; 3) corruption; 4) external (extra-regional) factors.
The going on military conflict in Afghanistan as usual represents the main threat to security of Central Asia. The West, represented in Afghanistan by the forces of the international anti-terrorist coalition, starts to understand that the military way to liquidation of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region leads to the deadlock. Besides, as dynamics of developments of events in Afghanistan relating to the struggle against talibs and their allies show, the planned increase
of the number of American troops owing to additional 20-30 thousand servicemen withdrawn from Iraq would hardly radically change the military-political situation in the country and will cause a new splash of activities of enemies of H. Karzai regime and its western allies.
Carrying out their struggle against H. Karzai regime, Afghan talibs actively cooperate with the close-in-spirit radical groups and organizations, in particular with Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by G. Khekmatiar, the radical Islamic group headed by J. Kakkani. They maintain close cooperation with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), having established contacts with it long since the end of the1990s. D. Namangani, the former leader of IDU in the period of 1998-2000, occupied the post of deputy commander of talibs and was in charge of military operations of talibs in the north of Afghanistan. In 2001 he was killed in the course of military clashes. A rather large number of IDU fighters headed by their spiritual and military leader T. Yuldash take part at present as members of groups of fighters of talibs and Al-Qaeda.
At the same time, Afghan talibs do not represent a direct threat to the countries of Central Asia. It is the more so, as their ally IDU remains underground and is marginalized to a great extent. However, the danger of dissemination of ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and correctly speaking "Jihadism" coming from Afghan extremists still remains. It should be said that the more so, as the favorable conditions exist for dissemination of it in the region. The special danger represents in this context Fergana valley, where a great potential has been accumulated for troubles and mass dissatisfaction on the religious basis.
The trans-border connections between talibs/Al-Qaeda and Jihadists of Central Asia are nourished by Afghan narcotics traffic. The prolonged and multilateral struggle against production and spread of
narcotics in Afghanistan does not bring results up to present. The production of opium in Afghanistan continues to grow and makes 90% of heroine consumed in the world. And what is more, for the last years, given the highest harvests, its offers in the world markets by far exceeded the demand, which accounts for 4 thousand tons. In Afghanistan 3.3 million people (14.3% of the population) are engaged in production of narcotics. The cost of illegal export makes $ 3.4 billion, which account for one third of the Afghan gross national product ($ 11.5 billion).
Almost total amount of the produced narcotics is illegally exported by three flows abroad: to Iran and further to Europe (34%), to Pakistan and further to India and Europe (about 40%), to Central Asia and further to Russia and Europe (21%). As a result, Russia turns out to be the biggest aim of Afghan narcotics (more than 3 million people consume them). In the countries of Western Europe from 90% to 95% of the consumed heroine comes from Afghanistan.
To all appearances, the territory of Central Asia is part and parcel of the control executed by Afghan narcotics mafia, which naturally takes actions in close cooperation with local narcotics groups. The prevailing part of narcotics shipped by Afghan narcotics groups is delivered by the northern route through the territory of Tajikistan. Further narcotics are sent to Kyrgyzstan to Osh (by Khorog route), further to Bishkek and by railway or by air are shipped to the territory of Russia. Naturally, a part of narcotics remain in the republics of Central Asia.
The main danger of Afghan narcotics business consists in the following fact: it is not interested in keeping regional stability. The huge profits received by illegal narcotics traffic support the forces, which have destructive impact on the states in the region and outside it. Narcotics destruct the traditional spiritual and moral values and norms as well as the state system, raising the level of corruption
and criminality of power. The profits accumulated by narcotics illegal traffic will always nourish various radical and terrorist organizations.
As is shown by events in Afghanistan, narcotics business is closely connected with underground activities of talibs and other enemies of the regime of Kabul. Talibs promote production of narcotics in Afghanistan, provide Afghan peasants with money and seeds and ensure their security and protect them from abusive actions of local authorities. The Afghan narcotics represent one of the main financial sources of the destructive activities carried out by the enemies of the government. According to NATO, from 40% to 60% of incomes received by talibs are formed by illegal narcotics traffic. However, the dealers of narcotics trade regard these estimations as understated. Talibs impose the tax (10% of the crop) for the peasants producing poppy. In their turn, narcotic barons deliver extremists with arms, money and recruited bandits in exchange for protection of narcotics routes, poppy harvest and members of their groups. As a result, narcotics barons and their criminal business flourish under conditions of the lack of security and of sustainable state governance in the regions controlled by talibs. Many representatives of local and central authorities are connected with narcotics traffic and get big dividends. The corruption connected with narcotics traffic is a quite evident feature of local and provincial authorities.
For the last years the corruption in Afghanistan acquired the total dimension and is nourished by activities of criminal structures and groups connected with talibs. The highest rate of corruption characterizes the functioning of law enforcement bodies, first of all the organs of internal affairs. For instance, the post of the chief of police in the narcotics producing province is estimated in Afghanistan as $ 150 thousand. The police officers quite often not only "cover" the narcotics business but directly participate in it.
An interesting detailed description of corruption at different levels of political hierarchy is presented in the report of American researchers B.R. Rubin and J. Sherman on the struggle against narcotics in Afghanistan, published in 2008 by New York University. The small traders visiting a village have to pay the police or bandits. The policeman, in his turn, has "to unfasten" a part of it to his commander, who makes payment to the ministry of internal affairs. If he wants to occupy the post of the chief of police in the district of the narcotics producing province, he should make payment to a deputy of the parliament or any other important official in order to be presented to the needed official in Kabul. This official correspondingly should give the bribe ("political contribution") for getting the post, which is connected with the chance to get big money. In order to have a laboratory for transformation of opium into heroin it is necessary to pay those, who keep under control the local territory (an influential local authority or an official or talibs). To bring to Afghanistan the chemicals for heroine production one should pay the body guards often in two sides of the border or a group of armed people to cover the crossing of the border. The illegal narcotics traffic needs an access to the airport or to the border guards' point, which are controlled consequently by national air company "Ariana" and by border guards. Both get a lot of money owing to the illegal narcotics traffic. Much money should be paid for the services of guides and expensive assistance of packing specialists, who utilize packages for legal export. Finally, high officials of military and political structures also claim for their share in profits, although the higher is the level of the official, the less evident is his connection with the original source of narcotics business.
In Afghanistan we see the trend to merging of narcotics business, corruption and political extremism - the phenomenon acquiring the trans-border characteristic. A clear example of close reciprocal action
of corrupted officials involved in narcotic business with talibs may be proved by functioning of arms market on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is located on an island of the bordering river Pyandzh. The actually legal exchange of arms for narcotics is made there. The police from both sides protect the trade operations. The corresponding official structures of both states cover these actions. The arms are delivered to the market by Russian mafia groups, while heroine is brought from southern provinces of Afghanistan, primarily from Gilmend province, which produces 40% of Afghan narcotics. The change of narcotics for arms is in charge of Afghan narcotics dealers, who share their profits with the local police and officials. The proposed arms for sale include sniper rifles, Kalashnikov automatic rifles, grenade launchers and explosives. The arms bought at the market are further sold to talibs in the south of Afghanistan. At the market one kg of heroine of high quality costs 600 Pound Sterling, the automatic rifle AK costs 50 Pound Sterling, while in the south and the east under conditions of military actions the price is much higher.
The narcotics business flourishes in the corrupted environment, supports terrorism and corrupts state and other structures on the territory of adjacent countries, first of all in Central Asia.
Finally, one other channel of the Afghan conflict on the situation as a whole and security in Central Asia should be considered as an external, extra-regional factor. The question is the military presence of the U.S.A. and NATO both in Afghanistan itself and in countries of Central Asia. The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan has a dissimilar effect for the region's countries. On the one side, the U.S.A. and NATO, according to the declared by them objectives, conduct the armed struggle against Islamic extremists and terrorists presented there by talibs and Al-Qaeda fighters and render assistance to Afghanistan
for restoration of economy. From this point of view, the political leadership of Russia gives support to NATO actions.
However, the prolonged military presence of the Alliance in Afghanistan did not result in liquidation of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the country. And what is more, as far as the number of foreign forces in Afghanistan rises, the scales of the armed struggle of talibs against H. Karzai government and its western allies grow. The number of victims of the civil population increases as a result of military actions. Thus, the presence of NATO forces did not become a stabilizing factor in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S.A. apart from the officially declared aims in the country carry out its policy for its own geopolitical, economic and military-strategic objectives. Washington created on the Afghan territory a network of military bases, which are supposed to be used for deterrence of Iran, Russia and China. Having signed in 2005 the agreement on strategic partnership with Afghanistan, the U.S.A. urges towards consolidation of these bases for itself on the permanent basis.
And what is more, after the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 the U.S.A. succeeded to strengthen its position directly in countries of Central Asia. Having got privately "all right" from Moscow, which declared its support of international anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan, Washington located its forces in military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for the rear ensuring military operations of Pentagon. However, side by side with realization of the declared aim, the U.S.A. pursues other objectives within the framework of "protection of national interests": to ensure access of American business to the fuel-energy resources of Central Asia, to create the situation of "protection of energy interests" of American oil corporations in the Caspian region, to open markets of Central Asia for American investments, goods and services and to stimulate structural economic reforms.
Having consolidated its positions in economic terms in Central Asia, Washington tries to have its direct influence on the type of internal development of the region's states and to direct it in the needed channel. As a result of its activities, actually of its interference in their internal affairs became actions of provoking "a tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. The role of the U.S.A. in events in Andijan in 2005 is known as well. The attempt of Washington to initiate an international investigation of these events in order to exert pressure on the government of Uzbekistan resulted in a rapid aggravation of American-Uzbek relations. Tashkent refused to give the U.S.A. the right of keeping its forces in military base Karshi-Khanabad. The countries-members of ShOS at the summit, held in 2005, formulated their demand to the U.S.A. and other NATO members to define their final terms of their military presence in the bases of Central Asia.
The policy of the U.S.A. is directed also to weakening and in perspective to excluding Russia from Central Asia and to occupying the key geopolitical positions ensuring the complete control over the access to the main world deposits of hydrocarbon resources, as well as to further isolation of Russia. However, for the recent period of time, Moscow consolidated its positions in the region both on the basis of bilateral relations with the region's states and within the framework of regional organizations (ODKB and ShOS). Concerned with such development of events, Washington advanced a new international initiative. The question is the project of "Great Central Asia" proposed in 2006 by the Institute for Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus at J. Hopkins University in Washington. The main aim of the project is as follows: to connect Central Asia and Afghanistan in a united military-strategic and geopolitical entity and further to unite Great Central Asia with the so-called "Great Near East" under control of the West. The other aim of the project consists in isolation of this enlarged region and
its withdrawal from influence of other great powers - Russia and China. At the same time, according to the intention of the project's authors, NATO should come forward as one of the main instruments of implementation of this American strategy. This project is summoned to transform Afghanistan and the region as a whole into a safe zone of security for sovereign sates developing in the channel of efficient market economy, based on secular and open systems of state governance, and maintaining positive relations with Washington.
However, after some years of the project's elaboration it is becoming clear that the idea of creation of Great Central Asia as a component of American foreign policy conception is called up for becoming a new geopolitical and geo-strategic reality. The project's authors intend to place Afghanistan with all its threats and problems in the center of a new geographic entity and by means of it to have influence on the processes of political, economic and military development of the whole region. It is easy to see here the long-term strategic interests of the U.S.A. aimed at creation of certain artificial structure, which may become an obstacle on the way of extension of cooperation of the region's states with Russia and China. And the rather evident contours of the U.S.A. urge towards establishment of control over extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asia is seen again in this project
Thus, the U.S.A., having appeared in 2001 in Afghanistan as a "liberator", "peace maker" and "standard-bearer of democracy", transformed in the region in the biggest foreign policy player, claiming for dominant positions and striving for imposing on peoples of Central Asia the model of social development, which suits Washington.
"Rossiysko-turetski dialog po problemam Tsentralnoi Azii I Kavkaza: Istoriya i sovremennost",
M, 2010, pp. 239-248.
