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THE 2008 GEORGIAN CRISIS AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Yelda DEMiRAG
Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations Department, Ba§kent University (Ankara, Turkey)
Burak TANGOR
Associate Professor, Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) (Ankara, Turkey)
Introduction
The clashes in the ethnic regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not only about Georgia’s territorial integrity. Moreover, when analyzed from a different perspective, it becomes clear that the ethnic problems in the region are not only an issue between the ethnic groups and the central government. The ethnic problems in Georgia also depend on a change in the perception of the external actors’ interests. This means that when the solution to problems coincided with the interests of the international actors, Georgia was able to solve the problem, as in the case of Ajaria.1
1 Aslan Abashidze, leader of the Ajarian Autono-
mous Republic, created tension by declaring that he did not
However, when the solution contradicted the interests of the international actors the clashes
recognize the Saakashvili administration that came to power on the coattails of the “velvet revolution.” Later, Saakashvili, who wanted to enter the region with “armed forces” before the 28 March, 2004 elections, was turned back at the Chorokhi River, the border between Ajaria and the Georgian region of Guria. The crisis almost escalted into an armed conflict when Saakashvili’s response was to impose an economic embargo. When the U.S. and Russia intervened, the crisis was subdued and temporarily settled when the sides reached a consensus on 18 March, 2004. The tension between Saakashvili and Abashidze ended on
5 May, 2004 when Abashidze left Batumi for Moscow in the company of Igor Ivanov, the former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and Secretary of the National
could not be resolved and the Georgian government was ineffective, as in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The clashes determined not only the domestic policy of the Georgian government and the country’s social and economic development, but also Georgia’s foreign policy.
Consequently, in order to strengthen its position and maintain its territorial integrity, Georgia shifted to the EU-U.S. axis in order to counterbalance Russia, which supported the ethnic minorities in the region. So it was argued that the democratic breakthrough in Georgia in 2003 happened because the local activists appealed to EU norms and standards and because they received strong support from the EU and its member states.2 Moreover, the EU supported the multilateral efforts to constrain the use of force through arms control and disarmament initiatives and provided financial and technical assistance to projects aimed at combating the accumulation and spread of small arms in Georgia and South Ossetia. The EU set up a rule-of-law operation in Georgia, the EUJUST Themis operation (July 2004), which was not a military mission. Georgia views
Security Council. After this development, President Saakashvili imposed direct presidential rule in Ajaria on the basis of the power vested in him by the Georgian parliament on 6 May, 2004.
2 See: E.J. Kirchner, J. Sperling, EU Security Governance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, p. 51.
its relations with the EU as an economic and political partnership that will culminate in EU membership in due course.3
In 2004, the EU and NATO expanded into the former Soviet expanse. The Russians regarded NATO membership of the Baltic countries as an encroachment on the country’s traditional periphery. The Russian leadership was alarmed by the West’s active support of the regime change in Georgia. The West was keenly interested in Russia’s own neighborhood. As the primary Western security organization, NATO epitomizes Russia’s insecurities.4
The first part of the study describes the theoretical framework of governance and explains the management, coordination, and regulation procedures practiced by the security-related international institutions. The second part discusses the Georgian crisis and its historical background, to provide a better understanding of the crisis, and analyzes the interests of the international actors that triggered the crisis. The third part takes a look at the programs being implemented by international institutions with respect to Georgia. The concluding part evaluates the roles and impact of the international institutions during the crisis.
3 See: Ibid., p. 58.
4 See: K. Mirwaldt, V.I. Ivanov, “Russia: Struggling for Dignity,” in: Global Security Governance, ed. by E.J. Kirchner, J. Sperling, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 240.
The Security Governance Approach
Security governance within the discipline of International Relations implies the shared use of administrative, economic, and political powers to ensure ongoing peace and stability in the international arena.5 The concept of shared understanding should be added to this description. Security governance requires both ideational and institutional bases.6 In other words, security governance depends on discourses as well as material components. Security governance includes three factors.
5 See: E.J. Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” in: Global Security Governance, p. 3.
6 See: M. Webber, “Security Governance and the Excluded States of Postcommunist Europe,” in: New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East, ed. by D. Averre, A. Cottey, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002, p. 44.
■ Firstly, it is based on a horizontal (heterarchical) understanding of interaction among many actors.
■ Secondly, it includes institutionalization with its ideational and material (organizational structure) components.
■ Thirdly, it requires a common goal despite the existence of different interests.
It is seen that states cooperate either to combine their capacities to resist another state or to realize interests they could not realize if they operated alone. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin have stated that interstate cooperation is possible when the important interests of states are at stake.7 When states jointly benefit from cooperation, they form institutions to ease this cooperation and carry on cooperating. At this point, the efforts of many international institutions help to enhance governance in international relations. The concept of institution mentioned here not only covers organizations, but also includes repetitive and accepted behavior. Keohane defines institutions as formal or informal convincing and linked sets of rules which determine behavioral roles, defines the boundaries of activities, and shapes expectations.8 Understanding institutions as such depends on the prerequisite that they are voluntary formations.
The international anarchical structure prevents cooperation among states due to their natural survival instinct; however, cooperation improves to the extent that institutions rehabilitate the problem of anarchy. The concept of “anarchy” in International Relations means the absence of a central authority. Anarchy has neither a positive nor a negative connotation. Even though anarchy is a concept describing the absence of a central authority over state authorities, it also describes the absence of rules and shows disrespect for common ideals, norms, regulations, and discourses. Nevertheless, states act in compliance with agreements and international institutions. When and if cooperation is reached and sustained, two major obstacles necessitated by anarchy have a significant presence in the realist thinking of international politics. The first of these is the state’s fear of being cheated and the second is its fear of the relative gains acquired from cheating. In terms of cooperation, the fear of being cheated is related only to the cooperation issue, but in terms of security the fear is constant, because a change in weapons allows shifts in the balance of power. If a state might gain an advantage by giving up on cooperation in security issues, it may cheat the state or states it cooperated with. To this end, states have to be alert with respect to observing the rules of cooperation agreements and must take measures against being cheated.9 This limits interstate cooperation.
At this point, institutions lessen the fear about being cheated in a multitude of ways. Institutions enable intelligence gathering among cooperating states and increase the parties’ information about each other. As a result, states which have a tendency to cheat are more easily recognized and states which will be harmed by cheating become more aware. Moreover, rules cause an increase in the number of transactions. Institutionalized iteration makes cheating a high-cost option because states would be deprived of their future gains. Repetitive transactions also enable other states to condemn the cheating side. To explain, the cheating state is ousted from cooperation schemes while confidence-enhancing states easily find a place for themselves in such mechanisms and optimize their gains. Institutionalized rules increase dependency by enabling transactions in many issues. Therefore, a state which chooses to cheat may be punished on several other occasions. This factor limits the will to cheat, if it does not eliminate cheating altogether. Just as institutions make the time and expenses required for negotia-
7 See: R.O. Keohane, L.L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, No. 20 (1), 1995,
p. 39.
8 See: R.O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,” in: International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, ed. by R.O. Keohane, Westview Press, London, 1989, p. 3.
9 See: J.J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, No. 19 (3), 1994/95, pp. 10-12.
tions unnecessary, they also limit the running costs. In this context, institutions decrease the cost of cooperation and increase profitability.10
The anxiety over relative gains is mainly caused by two factors. The first of these is the number of major actors in the system. When the conflicting interests of only two states are in question, relative gain becomes important and cooperation becomes difficult. However, when there is a system in which many actors of relatively equal strength are present, the importance of relative gain decreases as each state finds ways to develop coalitions. The second factor is military relations. At times when use of military resources to solve a conflict is ineffective, the relative gain of states becomes less important and therefore cooperation becomes easier.11
Institutions ease the obligations dictated by anarchy. Institutions lower the running costs by providing information and hence provide states with easier-to-shoulder loads. In addition to this, as they create an area of cooperation, they furnish suitable points of coordination and promote mutuality and multilateral relations among states. The idea that institutions have to be active and convincing in order to operate stems from behavioral expectations.12
Since the rational prudence thought to be behind the actors’ behavior cannot fully explain cooperative interactions, beliefs and ideas also become important in explaining an act.13 That is why the governance approach also emphasizes discourses and identities. Discourses play an important role in the creation of threats. The meanings of discourses are cultural phenomena. In that context, threats are social and cultural products rather than social realities.14 Threat perception does not arise from the so-called objective international power structure. The discourses of actors who enjoy a superior position are more easily accepted in the international arena. At times when there are material threats, states choose to form alliances. When these material threats are disbanded, harmony within the alliance weakens. Therefore, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the absence of a worthy enough replacement, NATO should have become unimportant. An alliance is shaped by the values shared after it becomes functional. The institution of these rules shows resilience when faced with political change, because it is easier to reform the existing structure, which contains sets of values and rules and discourses, than to establish new institutions of international security cooperation.15 International institutions can be the major representatives of values.
Finally, the understanding of security governance is backed by unity of aims. This unity of aims may be understood as the results obtained from both the structure and the process. Structurally, governance includes institutions, and these institutions, by dictating the entry rules, interaction rules, and behavior, establish special behavior patterns among the parties. In terms of process, governance is interested in following the results obtained by the actors and the methods they pursue to obtain them. This shows that in governance, aims reflect a composite of actor preferences. These preferences are similar most of the time, however, they may also sometimes compete with each other. Nevertheless, the obtained results, by necessity, do not cover all the aims of all the actors, but only those of most of the actors.
10 See: R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, New York, 2001, pp. 1-31.
11 See: R. Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations,” in: Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. by D.A. Baldwin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 209-233.
12 See: R.O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” The American Political Science Review, No. 95 (1), 2001, pp. 1-3.
13 See: Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. by J. Goldstein, R.O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, London, 1993.
14 See: J. Weldes et al., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in: Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, ed. by J. Weldes et al., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, pp. 10-17.
15 See: T. Risse-Kappen, “Identity in a Democratic Security Community: The Case of NATO,” in: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. by P.J. Katzenstein, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 357-399.
In post-Cold War conflicts in Europe, multinational institutions (the most effective ones being the U.N., NATO, the EU, and the OSCE) have assumed shared responsibilities in order to stabilize the political and economic environment in Europe. Division of labor among these organizations can be spontaneously determined by their capacity and organizational role, where there is no formally established hierarchy among the institutions. We shall argue these claims by adopting a deductive method. We shall largely rely on official documents to demonstrate how governance works among security-related international organizations.
It appears that security-related international institutions somehow share the responsibility for overcoming the threats to Europe: as already mentioned, there is no formally established hierarchy among the institutions, and the functions of each institution can be determined by its capacity and institutional role. For example, NATO is mostly perceived as the best organization for military operations, whereas the EU is generally perceived as the best one for reconstruction in the post-conflict era. The crises in the Balkans provide evidence of this argument.
The main focus of this study is to question whether the necessary conditions for security governance were established in the 2008 Georgian crisis. We argue that the different threat assessments made by the two most important actors, the U.S. and Russia, impeded the achievement of specific policy outcomes. This diminished the role of the international institutions in the conflict. The U.N. and OSCE had a low-profile role, since one of the sides in the war was the Russian Federation, while NATO and the EU, in neither of which Russia is a member, showed different profiles during the conflict: NATO, under U.S. control, seemed unsuitable, since it represented “hard power,” while the European Union was perceived as more appropriate since it represented “soft power” and pursued a more active role. To better understand the 2008 Georgian crisis and the role played by the international institutions, we will now focus on the historical and contemporary foundations of the conflict.
The Causes and Historical Foundations of the South Ossetian Problem
The most important reason for the Caucasian conflicts is the “divide and conquer” policy originated by the Tsarist Russian, continued by the Soviet Union, and now used by the Russian Federation. The Caucasian nations were artificially divided after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and borders were drawn between them. However, the Soviet system unwittingly promoted ethnic consciousness among the Caucasian peoples, and this consciousness grew even stronger after the fall of the system.
The south of Ossetia was joined to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922 as an autonomous region and North Ossetia was joined to the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in 1925 with the same status. In 1936, North Ossetia was promoted to the status of an autonomous republic. The rising nationalistic demands during the breakup process of the Soviet Union affected the Ossetians in 1989, and South Ossetia claimed it wanted to break away from Georgia, unite with North Ossetia, and become the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union. In 1990, the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was declared. The central Georgian government led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia responded to this by removing its autonomy and, in 1991, Georgia sent armed forces into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians appealed to the Union Government for protection of their constitutional rights during the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, but to no avail. In 1992, the South
Ossetians appealed to Russia once again, asking to join Russia, but the Yeltsin administration did not respond enthusiastically to their demands.
Gamsakhurdia, who came to power in October 1990 and led Georgia to independence, pursued radical nationalistic policies against the minorities as he thought the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems were Russia’s making. As the territorial integrity of the country began to be threatened by domestic disturbances, he was relieved from duty on 2 October, 1992.1<s Eduard Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister of the U.S.S.R., who became the country’s leader, used his expertise from the Soviet era to promote Georgia to a positive position in the international arena. During the first years of his rule, Shevardnadze had to deal with both the supporters of former leader Gamsakhurdia—called the Zviadists—as well as the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems,17 so he was forced to seek peaceful solutions. He especially blamed the Russian Federation for its support of the separatist movements and refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, he, like many other Georgians, knew that Georgia was not fighting against Ossetia or Abkhazia, but against Russia, the military power of which was much stronger than the Georgian armed forces. He also understood that the solution to the problems lay in Moscow and so tried to protect his country’s territorial integrity by starting talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In the end, he had to approve Georgia’s membership in the CIS as a requirement for his country remaining independent.18 Alongside these developments, Shevardnadze adopted pro-Western policies in order to counterbalance Russia’s influence on Georgia and because he believed he needed Western help to achieve real independence for his country. Shevardnadze, who contacted Russia to end the Georgian-Ossetian clashes, entered the Dag-omys Treaty with South Ossetia and agreed to the establishment of a peace force made up of Georgians, Russians, and North Ossetians.19 However, the South Ossetian demands to join the North and become part of the Russian Federation continued. The Russians, Georgians, and North and South Ossetians came together in 199б and signed a memorandum on the re-establishment of Georgian-South Ossetian economic relations and on solving problems between the sides by peaceful means. The 1999 South Ossetian elections and the 2001 election of Kokoyty as South Ossetian president were declared illegitimate and rejected by the Georgian authorities. In the post-9/11 period, the U.S.’s presence in the region under the excuse of conducting a “war on terror” and the enhanced relations between Georgia and America prompted the Ossetians and Abkhazians to further improve their already good relations with Russia.
Shevardnadze was forced to resign and was replaced in the January 2004 elections by Mikhail Saakashvili, who received 9б% of the votes. This was prompted by Shevardnadze’s failure to deliver on his promises regarding democratization or to prevent bribery and nepotism in Georgia, in addition to the energy shortage crisis, public poverty, and the rising pressure of the opposition.20 Saakashvili
16 See: S. Cornell, “Georgia: From Unitary Dreams to an Asymmetric Federation,” in: Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-Political Conflict in the Caucasus, ed. by S. Cornell, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2000, pp. 143-196.
17 For more detailed information on the roots and the development of the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, see: Y. Anchabadze, “Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement,” Caucasian Regional Studies, No. 3 (2&3), Special Issue, 1998, pp. 4-12.
18 See: A. Rondeli, “Regional Security Prospects in the Caucasus,” in: Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by G. Bertsch et al., Routledge, London, 2000, p. 49.
19 See: F. Corley, “South Ossetia between Gamsakhurdia and Gorbachev: Three Documents,” Central Asian Survey, No. 16 (2), 1997, p. 270.
20 In a research study about fighting corruption carried out by Transparency International (see: Transparency International, The 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at: [http://www.transparency.org.html], 22 June, 2010), Georgia is 5th from the bottom among 133 countries. In another research study carried out by the United Nations in 1999, only
20 percent of the government budget was spent on targeted expenses (see: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Early Warning Assessment, November 2003). Fifty-one percent of Georgia’s population lived below the poverty line and 23.6 percent of the people were unemployed. Between 1989 to the present day, a large number of people have
addressed the U.N. General Assembly in September 2004 and declared that economic development would be the basis of long-term peace and his administration would seek resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia problems based on talks.21 However, the events that took place during the same year caused further tension between South Ossetia and the central government. Russia’s will to continue its presence in the region due to the ethnic tension and to add the region to its sphere of influence were the primary reasons for all this tension. Saakashvili, who was aware of this situation, stated several times that if the South Ossetian problem turned into war, it would be a war not between Georgia and South Ossetia, but between Georgia and Russia.22 The developments in the summer of 2008 did indeed confirm his remarks.
Historical Sources and Development of the Abkhazian Problem
Abkhazia, which was a Soviet Socialist Republic between 1921-1930 and was federatively joined to Georgia, became an autonomous republic within Georgia in 1930. The Abkhaz-Georgian tension began in 1978 with Abkhazia’s demand to form a separate Soviet Republic and leave the Georgian S.S.R. This turned into a conflict when the Soviet Union began to collapse.23 In the Lykhny Letter published on 18 March, 1989, the Abkhazians asked the U.S.S.R. authorities to reevaluate their nation’s regime and to turn Abkhazia into a republic on equal terms with Georgia; in 1990, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet accepted a motion that envisaged the status of state sovereignty. The Abkhazians did not take part in the elections won by Gamsakhurdia that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union and declaration of Georgian independence. At that time, Abkhazia’s attempts to secede from Georgia were supported by Russia, which wanted to punish Georgia for refusing to be part of the CIS. In 1992, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared it accepted the 1925 Constitution, which recognized Abkhazia as a separate republic. Upon this declaration, Georgia declared war on Abkhazia; however, by September 1993, Abkhazian forces had taken complete control of Abkhazia.24 After Gamsakhurdia was overthrown, Shevardnadze, who replaced him, accepted Georgia’s membership in the CIS on 22 October, 1993, which led to Russian-Georgian rapprochement and an appeasement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The Georgian-Abkhazian talks held on 1 December, 1993 in Geneva under U.N. supervision, which were also attended by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, had a positive outcome and the sides adopted a memorandum. It envisaged establishing a cease-fire in the region, accepting the presence of an international peacekeeping force, exchanging prisoners, and allowing forced migrants to return. The rapprochement between Russia and Georgia became official
left Georgia to work in Russia and Ukraine (see: D.L. Philips, Stability, Security and Sovereignty in the Republic of Georgia. Rapid Response Conflict Prevention Assessment, Center for Preventive Action, January 2004, available at [http://www. ciaonet.org/wps/phd01], 15 December, 2004).
21 See: Kasim K. Soguk Sava§ Sonrasi Kafkasya (The Caucasus in the Post-Cold War Era). Ankara: USAK, 2009,
p. 71.
22 See: G. Ozkan, “Gurcistan’da Yeni Yonetim, Etnik Ayrilikgi Bolgeler ve Guvenlik” (New Government, Ethnic Secessionist Regions and Security in Georgia), in: Orta Asya ve Kafkasya’da Guq Politikasi, ed. by M.T. Demirtepe, USAK Yayinlari, Ankara, 2008.
23 For detailed information on the cause, roots, and development of the Abkhazian problem, see: D. Lynch, “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” International Affairs, No. 78 (4), 2002, pp. 831-848; B. Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, No. 4 (4), 2001, pp. 73-94.
24 See: Kasim K. op. cit., p. 67.
with the Declaration of Measures for Political Settlement of the Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict concluded in 1994. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own state symbols, such as a constitution, parliament, government, coat of arms and flag, as well as domestic sovereignty. In issues such as foreign policy and foreign economic relations, the two sides would act together.25 Another important development after this declaration was the deployment of the Russian “peace corps” in Vaziani, Gudauta, Batumi, and Akhalkalaki.26 In other words, Russia used the Abkhazian problem to ensure Georgia’s membership in the CIS, establish its military presence in the country, and obtain a position of authority in the whole process with the help of its military presence under the guise of a peace corps. Another development was the Tbilisi Declaration concluded between Shevardnadze and Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba on 14 August, 1997. According to the conclusion the sides reached, the parties declared they would not resort to arms to solve the problem. At this point, Russia, which had achieved great success, focused its efforts on signing a conclusive peace treaty. Despite the peace process supported by all the parties involved, the armed conflict between the Georgians and Abkhazians started again on 23 May, 1998, however it soon ended. At the end of the second series of talks between the two sides in Geneva under U.N. supervision on 23-25 July, 1998, the 1997 Tbilisi Declaration was confirmed. Political talks continued under U.N. supervision in Geneva, with the inclusion of Russian and OSCE delegations. Russia joined the talks with the title of “facilitator” and as part of the Friends of the U.N. Secretary General group.
On 3 October, 1999, a referendum on the presidential elections was held in Abkhazia and its result showed that 97% supported the independent and democratic state of Abkhazia. However, this result was not approved by the U.N., U.S., and European countries and was declared illegitimate. With the change in power in Georgia after the “velvet revolution,” a new period started in the Abkhazian problem. The continuous Abkhazian declarations stating that they refuse to be an autonomous part of Georgia and the 2006 Georgian capture of the Kodori Valley, which has strategic significance with regards to Abkhazia, put a halt to the peace process once more. The plan proposed by Saakashvili just before the April 2008 NATO Summit, which basically envisaged a return to the status quo enjoyed before the start of the conflict, was not accepted by Abkhazia. Indeed, the process which would end with the August war began in April 2008.
Conflicting Interests of Russia and the U.S. in the Southern Caucasus
The unique geographical location of the Southern Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea has indeed served as a bridge or a barrier for Russia throughout the centuries. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Southern Caucasus was supposed to be cordon sanitaire against the instability emanating from the south.27 In particular, Georgia was perceived by Russian strategists as a key component in Russia’s security policy in the Southern Caucasus. Thus, a pro-Russian Georgia was crucial for Russia to have a land access route to Armenia. In addition to this, the Caspian
25 See: V.A. Chirikba, “Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and Its Aftermath,” in: Caucasus: War and Peace, ed. by M. Tutuncu, SOTA, Haarlem, Netherlands, 1998, p. 79.
26 See: D. Darchiashvili, “The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes and Prospects,” Caucasian Regional Studies, No. 2 (1), 1997, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0201-04.htm], 10 June, 2010.
27 See: D. Bazoglu-Sezer, “Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,” European Security, No. 5 (2), 1995, pp. 303-323.
energy resources are also a component of Russia’s sphere of interests.28 Russia wants to be active in the Caucasian region, which is important in itself, and aims at playing a crucial role in the solution of conflicts. From 1991 to date, Russia has been trying to establish its power in the region and, to this end, it supported pro-Russian groups in the South Caucasian states. However, this wish of Russia came up against serious resistance, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Another card Russia could play in the Southern Caucasus was ethnicity. Russia perceived the West’s move to the region via Georgia and Georgia’s desire to achieve rapprochement with the West, especially after the “velvet revolution,” as unacceptable.
The Southern Caucasus is crucial for the United States both with respect to the transfer of Caspian energy resources to the international markets and to the region’s proximity to Middle East and Central Asia. In the wake of the 1993 Russian declaration of its Near Abroad Doctrine, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright, who visited Baku in September 1994, declared the region within the U.S.’s sphere of interests with her statement that “the U.S. cannot accept Russia having a special role in the Caucasus.” In 1996, when Russia’s military weakness was noticeable after the First Chechen War, the U.S. declared the Caucasus and the Caspian region an area of its own vital interests. The U.S., which wanted the South Caucasian states to adopt democracy and a free market economy, used aid programs as an important tool to support its aims regarding the region.29 The U.S., which wanted to increase its activity in the region, was in favor of pro-Western formations in addition to aid programs. In this context, NATO’s enlargement to the east was supported, and the U.S. tried to get the regional states to rely on it using the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project. In addition to PfP, GUUAM, another anti-Russian establishment in the region, was supported. Whereas the U.S. was interested in the Caucasian region with regards to the transportation of Caspian energy resources to the international markets before 11 September, 2001, after 9/11, security concerns took priority in America’s Caucasian policy. In addition to the issues mentioned, it can be claimed that the Black Sea also had an important role to play. The United States, which established bases in Bulgaria and Rumania and supported the region’s Color Revolutions that brought pro-Western and pro-American regimes to power, also wanted to keep the Russian Federation away from the Black Sea.
Probably the most definitive aspect of America’s focus on the region is its economic interests. The Americans, who do not want to depend solely on Persian Gulf oil, would like to acquire new resources in Asia and Africa and diversify energy flows to the West. As President Bush declared on 17 May, 2001, “diversity is important, not only for energy security but also for national security, overdependence on any one source of energy, especially a foreign source, leaves us vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions and, in the worst case, blackmail.”30
28 When the Soviet Union dominated regional sources, it was the second largest oil and natural gas producer before 1990. Later Russia sold the oil and natural gas bought cheaply from the Central Asian, Caspian, and Caucasian regions primarily to Europe and to the rest of the world at its market value. While the West was trying to create an Eurasian energy corridor from east to west to export the Caspian’s energy resources, Russia tried to preserve its monopoly on the existing pipelines and particularly objected to the U.S.-supported East-West pipeline project. If the regional resources went along the East-West route instead of north, the regional states could transfer their natural resources to the world’s market independent of Russia. Moreover, as a result of the income that was obtained in the long term from this action, these states could act more independently and adopt a policy supported by the West. Therefore, Russia used every tool at its disposal (political, military, and diplomatic) to retain control over the regional resources and states and to prevent the participation of the West in these resources (for more information, see: M.P. Amineh, H. Houweling, “Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, No. 2 (3&4), 2003, pp. 391-406; G. Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region,” International Studies Perspectives, No. 3 (3), 2002, pp. 310-327).
29 See: A. Cohen, “U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New ‘Silk Road’ to Economic Prosperity,” 1997, available at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1997/07/BG1132], 10 June, 2010.
30 M.T. Klare, “Global Petro-Politics: The Foreign Policy Implications of the Bush Administration’s Energy Plan,”
Current History, March 2002, p. 102.
The Georgian-Russian War
While the entire world had its attention focused on the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing, Georgian President Saakashvili launched a military operation against South Ossetia. This attempt, which could be described as mastery in the art of timing, did not in fact come as a surprise, since the declarations that began in early April hinted at what was to come in August. If we look back a few months before August, Russia announced that it would increase its military presence in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian autonomous regions and that it would go to all lengths to protect the Russian citizens (those given Russian passports by Russia) in the region. Georgia’s accusations that this essentially meant annexation increased the tension between Russia and Georgia on a daily basis. Russia’s harsh response came as a surprise. The process leading to the Georgian crisis intensified when Georgia’s membership in NATO was not given the green light at the 4 April, 2008 Bucharest Summit, the implication being that Georgia should first achieve territorial integrity. The result of the summit disappointed the Georgian side, on the one hand, and encouraged Saakashvili to make his move to solve the “frozen problems” in the region, on the other. In fact, Russia was to blame by supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the beginning and encouraging them to rebel against the central government, thus supporting Georgia’s dismemberment and making the situation worse.31 Russia perceived the steps taken by the West, such as the Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, NATO’s enlargement efforts, the attempts to implement the missile shield project in Eastern Europe, and recognition of Kosovo’s independence, as a challenge. The events in the Caucasus can be seen as a natural outcome of this tension.
When we look at the events that took place in the Caucasus in 2008, it can be said that they went well beyond the region and that Russia entered a new period. Indeed, the new foreign policy concept approved by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev shows this more clearly. The concept document, which stated that Russia should intervene in world affairs as a great power and that the unipolar structure in world politics was over, also stated that the U.N. was central in solving international problems and that NATO’s enlargement was perceived with unease. Russia, which has declared the region as its backyard since 1993, was against the transfer of the region’s natural gas and oil resources to the world markets bypassing Russia. For Russia, the 2008 Georgian Crisis was important in that it helped to strengthen its influence in the region and announce to the world that it was now a power to be reckoned with. Russia, which advocates territorial integrity within its federative structure, supported Serbia regarding Kosovo and now supported South Ossetian and Abkhazian secession from Georgia. Abkhazia with its extensive Black Sea coast plays a vital role in Russia’s domination of the Black Sea. When Russia attacked Georgia, it gave protecting its 70,000 South Ossetian “citizens” as its excuse.
When Russia attacked the region, the security-related international organizations reacted. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer renounced this move by describing it as “a direct violation” of many U.N. Security Council resolutions to which Russia itself was a signatory. Moreover, de Hoop Scheffer also questioned Moscow’s commitment to peace and security in the Caucasus.32
31 It can be stated that Russia achieved more than one goal by entering Georgia. For Putin, who often states in his speeches that the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. was the greatest disaster/tragedy of the twentieth century, the creation of a Great Russia designed to regain Russia’s strength and save the Russian people from a feeling of defeat and give them the dynamism became his most important objective after coming to power. In this context, Putin’s speech in February 2007, which criticized the U.S. and the unipolar world system, stirred up an acute response.
32 See: “North Atlantic Council Discusses Situation in Georgia,” NATO, 12 August, 2008, available at [http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0745DD58-902BDC72/natolive/news_43416.htm], 20 August, 2008.
Taking NATO’s cue on the Georgian crisis, the leaders of the EU also denounced Medvedev. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel labeled the move as “unacceptable;” France, which carried out periodic EU leadership, emphasized that Russia’s move was “against Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, and the principles of territorial integrity” and called for a political solution.33 Right afterwards, the EU leaders discussed the matter at a special meeting in Brussels at the request of French President Nicolas Sarkozy.34
The OSCE, on the other hand, branded this act as a violation of the principles of an organization of 56 members, one of which was Russia.35 This shows that the international security institutions shared the idea that Russia was violating the law and assuming an aggressive position.
The Role of the European Security Institutions
The U.N., which is seen as being responsible for preserving international peace and stability, and the regional institutions, which have obligations under Chapter 7 (Art 52) of the U.N. Charter, were expected to play their respective roles. Due to its organizational structure, the U.N. could not play a part in the Georgian crisis. The most important reason for that is surely the structure of the U.N. Security Council and its decision-making mechanism. The differences in opinion among the great powers prevented the Security Council from adopting a resolution. Again, in the OSCE, which is a pan-European establishment, such issues as organizational structure, the decision-making process, and differences in opinion among the great powers played an important part and the pre-crisis activities of the OSCE stopped after the crisis. The activities of NATO and the EU prior to, during, and after the crisis are significant and the acts of these two institutions are analyzed within the framework of governance below.
The Role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Georgia
The history of NATO-Georgian relations dates back to when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). In 1994, these relations further developed when Georgia joined PfP. Georgiajoined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999, thus further increasing the interaction between Georgia and NATO. Georgia is the first South Caucasian state to join the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the focus on supporting Georgia’s domestic reforms intensified, in partic-
33 See: “West Voices Dismay at Russia’s ‘Unacceptable’ Move,” Spiegel, 26 August, 2008, available at: [http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,574537,00.html], 6 April, 2011.
34 See: “Sarkozy Calls Special EU Meeting on Georgia/Russia,” Euronews, 24 August, 2008, available at [http:// www.euronews.net/2008/08/24/sarkozy-calls-special-eu-meeting-on-georgiarussia], 6 April, 2011.
35 See: “Press Conference on Georgia by Heikki Talvitie,” OSCE, 14 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/ cio/12323], 23 August, 2008.
ular through the development of Georgia’s first IPAP with NATO in 2004. Georgia was granted the position of Intensified Dialog on Membership Aspirations in September 2006. At their summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the NATO leaders agreed that Georgia would become a member of the Alliance.
After the August War, on 12 August, 2008, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Eka Tkeshe-lashvili and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Ms. Eka Zguladze visited NATO headquarters. They met with Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.36 At an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 12 August, 2008, the NATO ambassadors discussed the situation in Georgia. At this meeting, the alliance expressed its concern over the escalation of the crisis in Georgia, as well as its regret over the civilian losses and infrastructure damage. Moreover, it supported the EU and OSCE efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the problem and quickly ending the violence. The NATO ambassadors claimed Russia was using disproportionate power and asked Russia to respect Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Here an example of mutual support and cooperation is seen in NATO’s declaration of its support of the EU and OSCE efforts. On 19 August, 2008, the North Atlantic Council foreign ministers analyzed the situation in Georgia and its effects on Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, who was OSCE President at that time, told French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner about the diplomatic efforts carried out to date so that the EU chairing state and the NAC would know. The NAC was satisfied with the agreement between Russia and Georgia and emphasized the need for the agreement to be implemented at once and in full. NATO once more announced it supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence and agreed to assist the civilians affected by the conflict. The council denounced the use of force against the PfP and other international treaties.
It is also stated that Russia was using excessive military force disproportionate to the peacekeeping role it pursued in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Under the six-article agreement, Russia was asked to remove its troops from the region. NATO declared it would provide military assistance if Georgia asked for it. This assistance would be rendered in the form of restoring damaged civilian infrastructure, evaluating the Defense Ministry and armed forces, reestablishing the air traffic system, and providing advice in cyber-defense issues. NATO Special Envoy to the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons paid an official visit to Georgia between 20 and 23 August. This visit showed how important Georgia was to NATO. On 27 August, 2008, the North Atlantic Council denounced Russia, which recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and demanded that Russia revise its decision.
Moreover, the decision of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit adopted by the alliance leaders envisaged intense cooperation in order to prepare Georgia for its ultimate membership in the Alliance by means of democratic, institutional, and defense reforms. In September 2008, NATO enhanced its assistance to Georgia by establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers right after the crisis with Russia, thus paving the way for implementation of the measures envisaged by the Bucharest decision. To this end, Georgia was asked to prepare an annual national program. In December 2009, the NATO-Georgia Commission decided to accelerate its efforts. To this end, a yearly national program was created. This program was to replace the individual partnership plan.
The basic priorities of cooperation between NATO and Georgia focused on transforming Georgia’s private and public sectors by redefining democracy, pursuing good governance, the rule of law, and sustainable social and economic development, and restructuring the defense sector. In the wake of the August 2008 crisis, reforming Georgian security by improving the country’s national defense
36 See: “Visit to NATO by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of the Interior of Georgia,” Press Release,
12 August, 2008.
plans also became a priority. Georgia engages in many cooperation activities with NATO and other partner countries through the PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
Georgia served with the NATO troops in Kosovo between 1999 and 2008 and provided critical support of the ISAF troops in Afghanistan, since the goods transported to these troops were delivered through Georgia. However, Georgia’s cooperation with NATO was not limited to this; it also assisted NATO in the war on terror. In this framework, Georgia became a member of the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T). This includes sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-terrorist capabilities, and improving border security. Georgia participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, an antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea, primarily through intelligence exchange. NATO supports Georgia, especially in terms of defense and security reforms. For Georgia, the priority is democratic inspection of its armed forces. The Partnership of Action plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) supports these efforts. NATO and its allies allotted Georgia over €1 million to modernize its army. Georgia is strengthening its civil defense and natural disaster governance capabilities in cooperation with NATO and coordinating these efforts within the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC). After the August 2008 crisis, the EAD-RCC coordinated the transfer of tons of material aid to Georgia.37
The Role of the European Union in Georgia
Relations between the EU and Georgia started in 1992 right after Georgia regained its sovereignty in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Bilateral relations further intensified after the 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought to power a new Georgian administration committed to an ambitious program of political and economic reforms.
EU-Georgian bilateral relations are regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force on 1 July, 1999. The agreement is based on common values, such as respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights, as well as on adopting a market-oriented economy.38 The PCA provides the legal framework for wide-ranging cooperation in political dialog, trade, investments, and economic, legislative, and cultural cooperation. The joint structures set up under the PCA (Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee, and Subcommittee on Trade, Economic and Related Legal Affairs, as well as the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee) meet on a regular basis in order to monitor the implementation of the PCA. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council of 14 November, 2006 aims at fulfilling the provisions of the PCA, contributing to closer relations with Georgia, promoting a significant degree of economic integration, and deepening political cooperation.39 The implementation
37 It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005, when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, and in 2006, when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia.
38 EU assists Georgia financially through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). By means of this instrument, the EU supports the development of democracy, the rule of law and governance, economic growth and reduction of poverty, and peaceful settlement of internal conflicts. Total EU grants to Georgia from various EU financial assistance instruments amounted to 505 million euro between 1992 and 2006. Moreover, Georgia participates in thematic regional programs with respect to democracy and human rights under the ENPI. Georgia has also benefited from assistance under the TACIS Regional Cooperation Program (Interstate Program), and also under the issue-related programs, such as TRACECA, INOGATE, and the Regional Environmental Center for Southern Caucasus in Tbilisi.
39 The inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighborhood Policy marked a significant step forward in EU-Georgian relations. As a first step in this direction, a Country Report assessing Georgia’s progress toward political and economic
of the Action Plan further intends to significantly advance harmonization of Georgian legislation, regulations, and standards with those of the European Union.40
Before the 2008 Georgian crisis, the European Union did not pursue an active policy aimed at reaching peaceful settlement of the armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nevertheless, the EU granted some financial assistance to economic rehabilitation and confidence-inducing measures.41 The EU contributions were distributed by specialized U.N. institutions, as well as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.
The situation in Georgia was discussed at the EU Summit on 1 September, 2008. The EU leaders declared that talks with Russia on a new partnership pact would be postponed until Russia withdrew its troops to their pre-conflict position. Moreover, they asked Russia to revise its decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as two independent states. The EU sent a team of specialists to review the humanitarian needs in the crisis area. After that, civilian observers monitored the implementation of the peace agreements entered under EU mediation. The EU leaders agreed to grant Georgia construction help, a free trade agreement, and a flexible visa regime for the citizens of Georgia.42 Moreover, they withdrew their support of Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization.
On 15 September, 2008, the foreign ministers of 27 member states decided to send an unarmed civilian observation team to the region to supervise the implementation of the peace agreements dated 12 August and 8 September, 2008 and to help achieve normalization in the region. A civilian European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was deployed in Georgia on 1 October, 2008,43 which included 200 observers from 22 EU member states. The EU deployed this Mission in the shortest time so far. By August 2010, the EU Monitoring Mission had members from 26 member countries.
EUMM Georgia supervises implementation of the articles of the Six-Point Agreement and subsequent implementation of measures throughout Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In doing so, the EUMM pursues close cooperation with the U.N. and the OSCE.44 One of the main tasks of EUMM Georgia is to monitor, analyze, and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, focusing on full compliance with the Six-Point Agreement, including troop withdrawal, and on freedom of movement, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The second main task is to monitor, analyze, and report on the situation pertaining to the normalization of civil governance, focusing on the rule of law, effective law-enforcement structures, and adequate public order. The Mission will also monitor the safety of transport routes and energy infrastructures and utilities, as well as the political and security aspects pertaining to the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. The third main task is to promote a reduction in tension through liaison and facilitate contacts between parties and other confidence-building measures. And, lastly, it has pledged to inform the public about European policy and pro-
reform was published on March 2, 2005. The Country Report highlighted areas in which bilateral cooperation could be feasibly and significantly strengthened. The ENP Action Plan covers a period of five years. The main EU cooperation objectives, policy responses, and priority fields can be found in the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. On the basis of bilateral priorities, a National Indicative Program (NIP) was also adopted in agreement with the Georgian authorities. The NIP covers the period from 2007 to 2010. For this period, an indicative total sum of €120 million has been allocated; in addition to the ENPI national program, Georgia will also benefit from the ENPI regional and interregional programs, plus a number of thematic programs, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
40 The Action Plan focused especially on strengthening democracy, adhering to the rule of law, human rights, and socioeconomic reforms, improving the business climate, alleviating poverty, settling conflicts, resolving justice and security issues, including border management, harmonizing regulations in various sectors, including energy and transportation, and enhancing regional cooperation.
41 Between 1997 and 2006, the EU contributed 33 million euro.
42 [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010.
43 [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010.
44 [http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate], 6 July, 2010.
mote the EU’s future engagement. The EUMM is a civilian, unarmed mission and cannot use force anyway. It reports on the grievances of the local population, on problems relating to the approaching winter, on gender and human rights issues, on the security situation, and on the presence of military and police forces in the area.45
New concerns have arisen over the so-called frozen conflicts in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. The situation in Georgia with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia has escalated, leading to the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response through mediation between the parties, humanitarian aid, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support.46 The Georgian crisis has demonstrated what can be achieved when the EU member states act collectively with the necessary political will. EU engagement continues with the EU leading the Geneva Process. Possible settlement of the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format and the EU Border Assistance Mission.47 But the more complex the challenges the EU faces, the more flexible the EU must be.48
Lasting stability in the neighborhood requires continued effort by the EU, together with the U.N., OSCE, the U.S., and Russia. The conflict with Georgia has adversely affected the EU’s relations with Russia. The EU expects Russia to honor its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. A potential partnership between the EU and Russia should be based on respect for common values, particularly human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and market economic principles, as well as on common interests and objectives.49 The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. Since 2003, the EU has also deepened its relations with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.50
Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies has prevented the EU from threatening to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions on Russia. The main EU countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain) embody different sets of preferences in the way they choose to deal with Russia.51 The unwillingness of the EU to impose economic sanctions was viewed as a vindication of sorts for Russia’s position regarding Georgia and a grudging acceptance of its privileged interests in its immediate neighborhood.
The Role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Georgia
The OSCE Mission to Georgia started on 13 December, 1992. Its basic activities can be divided into two categories: firstly, the political and military dimension of security and, secondly, the humani-
45 See: [http://eumm.eu/en/intro], 6 July, 2010.
46 The EU has provided €6 million in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict in Georgia. An international donor’s conference for assisting Georgia’s economic recovery was held in Brussels on 22 October, 2008.
47 See: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 December, 2008, p. 6, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf].
48 See: Ibid., p. 9.
49 See: Ibid., p. 10.
50 See: Ibid., p. 11.
51 See: F. Parmentier, “Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia: Lessons from the Russian-Georgian War,” European Political Economy Review, No. 9, 2009, pp. 49-61.
tarian dimension of security. The main task of the OSCE Mission to Georgia was to help find a peaceful solution to the Georgia-Ossetia conflict. To this end, the OSCE Mission implemented economic rehabilitation programs in both regions. The OSCE Mission also contributed to the efforts conducted under U.N. leadership to promote peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The OSCE Mission to Georgia began observing the U.N. operations in Abkhazia in 1994 and reported the developments to the OSCE and its member states in order to facilitate the Organization’s inclusion in the negotiations conducted under the U.N. umbrella. In 2006, it joined the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz Parties under U.N. supervision and designed to resolve such issues as security problems, the return of displaced persons and asylum seekers, and social and economic issues.
The OSCE Mission representative also attended the meetings of the Joint Control Commission composed of delegations from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and Russia. It made proposals concerning demilitarization of the conflict areas and cooperation between the law-enforcement forces of the sides. One of the Mission’s important duties was to observe the Joint Peace Keeping Forces and the situation in the conflict zone and report back to the OSCE member states. It also implemented programs to sustain the OSCE’s aims: restoring infrastructure and the economy; developing a civil society and human rights by providing financial aid to non-governmental organizations (NGOs); encouraging objective presentation of the events in the media by educating journalists; and publishing the Joint Control Commission (JCC) newspaper.
As part of the OSCE’s comprehensive response to the global threat of terrorism, the Mission assisted the Georgian Government in implementing United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1373 on antiterrorist measures and the U.N.’s 13 universal conventions and protocols against terrorism, to which Georgia has been party since June 2006.
The Mission’s projects aimed to help the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop its capacity to fight terrorism. A series of OSCE-organized crisis management training programs began in April 2006. In addition, the Mission assisted the Georgian authorities by offering examples of the best practices in the fight against terrorism from the experience of other OSCE Participating States.
The Mission supported the Georgian Government and NGOs in developing and implementing an effective framework for anti-trafficking activities that is in line with OSCE anti-trafficking commitments and focuses on protecting the human rights of victims. After a series of OSCE-supported discussions, Georgia passed a new Law on Combating Human Trafficking in June 2006, which led to the approval of a new referral mechanism and a state fund to compensate and provide shelter for victims.
The OSCE Mission to Georgia worked to strengthen the capacity of Georgian society and its institutions to move the democratization process forward, boosting their ability to conduct free and fair elections and establish democracy at all levels. The Mission supported the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in its efforts to bring Georgia’s Election Code into harmony with international standards and improve its consistency. In 2007, it held a series of working sessions jointly with the Council of Europe and under the leadership of the Deputy Speaker of the Georgian Parliament with all the relevant election stakeholders about reform of the Election Code. The discussions facilitated agreements among the political parties about the electoral issues that were introduced in the December 2007 Election Code amendments.
After Russia blocked the extension of the Mission’s mandate at the 22 December, 2008 meeting in Vienna, the OSCE began wrapping up its operations in Georgia at the beginning of2009, thus ending its 16 years of service in the region. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb said he deeply regretted that the 56 countries were unable to find a solution to the tension with Russia regarding the issue of breakaway South Ossetia. Stubb, who said “the OSCE still has much work to do in the region,” also
stated that he hoped the talks about OSCE activities in the region would continue in 2009.52 To prevent loss of the Mission, the OSCE offered to establish parallel and reciprocal field offices in Georgia and South Ossetia and, as an alternative, Finland demanded a three-month extension of the Mission’s mandate. However, Russia, which prohibited OSCE monitors from entering South Ossetia, declined the offers.
The OSCE Mission to Georgia began working in 1992 to help Tbilisi with conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, and the rule of law. The Mission had about 200 monitors, 20 military observers from among whom were allowed to stay until February 2009 in the wake of the August crisis between Russia and Georgia.
Prior to the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, the number of Military Monitoring Officers in the OSCE Mission to Georgia amounted to eight, five of whom were permanently deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Following the August 2008 conflict, twenty additional Military Monitoring Officers were deployed. The twenty-eight Military Monitoring Officers operated in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia. Following the decision on 12 February, 2009 to extend this operation until 30 June, 2009, the number of Military Monitoring Officers was reduced to twenty. During its administrative closure, which was to be completed by 30 June, 2009, the reduced staff of the OSCE Mission to Georgia provided administrative and logistic support, as well as information and political guidance to the Military Monitoring Officers.
Conclusion
In the new political order established after the breakup of the Soviet Union, international security organizations have been functioning in the region to help sustain stability by strengthening the weak state structures and liberal market economy in Georgia and the disputed states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 showed quite clearly that the initiatives designed to pacify the region had not produced a security system capable of preventing or containing internal and inter-state conflicts.53
The activities of the international security institutions are shaped by internal and external elements. The internal elements include the institution’s membership structure, organizational mechanisms, aims, and scope and authority. The external elements cover the expectations and perceptions of the international actors—primarily states—regarding the role of the international institutions. These elements also defined the operational framework of the international security institutions during the 2008 Georgian crisis.
If the internal factors of the international security institutions are analyzed, the Russian Federation’s membership in these institutions played a decisive role. In this context, the participation of both the U.N., which played a pivotal role in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and the OSCE, which played a stimulating role for cooperation and coordination during the conflict, was stymied due to the Russian Federation’s involvement in the problem. Due to the fact it was involved in the conflict and due to its membership status, Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, prevented the Council from making a specific decision on behalf of the international community. Even if other factors came into play here, the U.N.’s organizational membership structure and its decision-making
52 See: “OSCE Chairman Regrets Disagreement on OSCE Future in Georgia,” OSCE, 21 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/cio/50525], 23 December, 2008.
53 See: M. Qelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region,” Commission on the Black Sea Policy Report II, 2010, available at [http://www.blackseacom.eu/uploads/media/Black_Sea_Policy_Report_II_Security.pdf], 19 June, 2010.
mechanism were instrumental in this situation. When the U.N., which is a universal organization, fails to respond to a crisis that threatens peace and stability, regional organizations, based on Chapter 8 (Art 52) of the U.N. Charter, may intervene provided they follow the U.N. Charter’s rules and inform the U.N. Security Council of the developments. Hence, the U.N. protects international peace and stability by delegating power to a more appropriate international security institution.
The OSCE, which is an Atlantic-Eurasian organization of which Russia is a member, played a passive role during the crisis and became an unwanted actor in the region after the crisis. Its excessive staff, its inability to compel its members to come to a consensus during decision-making, and the difficulties it has with putting decisions into practice undermine the OSCE’s ability to tackle major problems. While the OSCE may carry out its activities regarding issues that involve Georgia and the dominant actors in the conflict zone, it cannot become a reliable negotiator when these actors are in conflict. In the 2008 Georgian crisis, the OSCE failed to play a central role.
Despite being an intergovernmental regional organization of similar and geographically close countries, NATO is the institution that contributes the most to maintaining international peace and stability and upholding the U.N.’s basic principles. The fact that the United States leads this organization is undoubtedly a vital factor. Under U.S. leadership, the allies work in cooperation in most cases that threaten international stability. During the 2008 Georgian crisis, these qualities helped NATO play a key role. However, the same qualities also prevented it from playing a dominant role, because NATO, which represents the West’s and, especially, the U.S.’s “hard power,” shied away from making a move that might change not only the regional, but also the global political balance. Moreover, the discussion of Georgia’s membership in NATO before the crisis and the fact that the other side of the conflict, Russia, is not a NATO member also prevented the Organization from appearing unbiased during the crisis. These factors forced NATO not to pursue a more active role.
Since it has a sui generis polity, the EU also has a complex foreign policy structure. The EU, which has 27 member states, pursues the Community method in some cases and intergovernmental decisions in others. The EU, which tries to improve its capabilities and capacity from year to year in security and defense, is considered the most efficient international security institution in crisis management thanks to the instruments it possesses. The dependency of its members on Russia, especially in energy supply, prevents the EU from adopting an anti-Russian stand. However, the geographic locations in which EU and Russia are in competition with each other also prevent the EU from being pro-Russian. These factors obviously contributed to the EU being accepted as a mediator between the two clashing sides.
In terms of external factors, even though the United Nations as mediator would be a solution sustained by the global community, the issues on which the international community could not agree, such as the right to self-determination, territorial integrity, and recognition, caused the Organization to be passive during and after the crisis. The OSCE failed to build confidence through the activities it began performing in 1992 and continued performing until the crisis, especially with Russia. This prevented the OSCE from playing a primary role in establishing confidence between the sides. Therefore, even though it is the most comprehensive of the regional security organizations, the OSCE, just like the U.N., was stymied in its activity due to the disagreement on crucial issues among its member states. As for NATO, despite being the organization with the greatest capability and number of soldiers, it was ineffective in the 2008 crisis since it was seen as an organization that looked after Western, and particularly American, interests. Russia perceived NATO’s activities as reducing the former’s security and hence saw NATO as the other side of the conflict. Therefore, NATO was unable to play a security-establishing role in the crisis. After the crisis, even though its relations with Georgia tapered off, it kept the possibility of Georgia’s membership on the agenda and wants to be a crucial actor in the conflict zone. Since the EU cannot be a “hard power” due to its lack of military presence, it still has the presence of a “soft power” or normative power in crises. During the 2008 Georgian crisis, this
image facilitated its role as a mediator between the parties in the conflict. The multidimensional aspect of its relations with Georgia and the nature of its relations with Russia made it the ideal mediator in this crisis.
In conclusion, in light of the external and internal factors, the U.N., NATO, and the OSCE saw a decline in their role in Georgia during and after the crisis, while the EU, in contrast, stepped up its activity. Such diversification among the international security institutions occurred due to the differences in their organizational structure and capabilities, their viewpoints, and their perceived roles. These institutions need to revise their programs in order to involve all the regional actors in stabilization of the region.
