CC BY
37
guments to expect retributive justice, the leaders are unlikely to use it against the members of the previous regime. They will be guided by the same arguments that were used in most Latin American countries: continued stability. We should never forget that the Georgians are less insistent in their demands to put Shevardnadze’s people into the dock than the Latin Americans, therefore the present Georgian rulers’ obvious unwillingness to use retributive justice is highly justified. This is justified, among other things, by the removal of Eduard Shevardnadze (whom the Zviadists never accepted as a legitimate president) from the political scene. We cannot exclude the possibility that Shevardnadze left in exchange for specific guarantees; besides, it will be hard to support the accusations with concrete evidence.
This means that the retributive justice model was rejected because, on the one hand, the practice of criminal prosecution was discontinued and the Zviadists released from prison under Shevardnadze and, on the other, by the fact that he was removed during the Rose Revolution. More than that, the people at the helm today have many more serious concerns.
The Georgian leaders are obviously trying to avoid the “punish or not to punish” format. This explains why they are demonstrating restraint when assessing the events of 1991-1992, showing no haste in investigating Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s death, concealing the details from the public, limiting their financial support of the victims of political repressions by social protection measures, and refusing to institute court proceedings and repay their losses. This is explained by the fact that the legal responsibility issue and legal prosecution (no matter how unrealizable) should follow if the above measures are realized.
The rejection of the retributive justice model in relation to the members of the previous regime does not exclude, or even presupposes, that the course toward stronger justice will be carried out in relation to all other issues of the past. Since the national reconciliation issues in Georgia are inevitably connected with reconciliation between the Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossets, we can expect that the process will continue in keeping with the restorative justice model.
Archil GEGESHIDZE
Ph.D. (Geogr.), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
THE CONFLICT IN ABKHAZIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GEORGIA’S INTEGRATION INTO NATO
A b s t
This article aims to analyze the possible cause-and-effect relations between Georgia’s integration into NATO and dynamic settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.
r a c t
The author believes that, in this context, a course aimed at membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is the best way to promote Georgia’s state-building and modernization.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The growing number of different undertakings recently devoted to the topic of Georgia’s integration into NATO shows that people understand the importance of the change this will cause in the balance of forces and interests in the Southern Caucasus. Despite the differences in opinion about the expediency of the impending changes, which, in the words of Russia’s foreign minister, “will mean a huge geopolitical shift,”1 many nevertheless share the opinion that Georgia’s entry into NATO is only a question of time, and the changes are inevitable. Keeping in mind the urgency of the topic, this article is devoted to a review of the issue based on the example of the conflict in Abkhazia.
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Choice
One of the main factors determining the steadiness of Georgia’s course toward integration into NATO is solidarity of the political sector. Recently, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved a memorandum stating the need for the country to become a member of NATO as soon as possible, which all the political parties and factions, as well as representatives of the parliamentary majority and opposition signed without exception. But the population’s high level of support of this course is a decisive factor in the issue. The latest sociological poll data show that 81%2 of the Georgian population wants the republic to join NATO.3 It is interesting that this is the highest index among the applicant countries during the past decades. For example, in Rumania, 80% of the population supported integration into NATO, in Estonia 69%, in Slovenia 66%, in Latvia 60%, in Lithuania 46%, and in Slovakia the lowest number at only 30%. It is worth noting that 57% of the respondents were sure that Georgia would join NATO in the next five years, and 41% refrained from giving any precise forecasts.4
How conscious is this choice? Judging from the data of the polls, the choice in favor of Georgia’s integration into NATO is determined by the population’s intention, first, to acquire a guarantee of the country’s security (57% compared with 51% in 2006); second, to restore territorial integrity (42% against 52%); third, to raise social prosperity (22% against 24%); and fourth, to strengthen democracy (16% against 20%).5 The presented indices essentially show the population’s adequate perception of the prospects relating to Euro-Atlantic integration. But it is clear from the same polls that the population is experiencing a certain amount of “information starvation.” For example, 72% of those polled think that they do not receive enough information to make an objective decision regarding support of Georgia’s entry into NATO.6 Despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has two information centers about NATO functioning in the country (in Tbilisi and Batumi), and there are plans to open a third soon, in Telavi, this is not enough to promote an efficient information campaign. Nor is it apparently enough that the topic of NATO membership is taking up a significant amount of air time on national television stations and is covered in detail on the pages of the most popular newspapers. Despite the fact that the public awareness campaign has been approved by the government, it appears to be very ineffective. An efficient information campaign implies carrying out explanatory work, which would permit the population to find answers to the following questions: what will joining the alliance do for Georgia? What obligations should Georgia assume when it becomes a NATO member? What should be done to accelerate integration? How are the reforms under the Individual Part-
1 See, for example: [http://www.kreml.org/news/120169477?user_session=f92d5493ddaa51a8b9d613875005ab14].
2 Survey of Georgian Public Opinion, 8-16 February, 2007, available at [http://www.iri.org/eurasia/eurasia.asp].
3 It is worth noting that last year this index was equal to 74% (ibidem).
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem.
nership Action Plan (IPAP) going? In so doing, special target groups should be correctly defined with the participation of decision-making officials, people forming public opinion, students, and the representatives of national minorities. Incidentally, the studies carried out recently on national minorities revealed that 72% of the Azeris polled, who live in Georgia, are in favor of Georgia joining NATO. As for the Armenian minority, more than half of the respondents do not support this course.7 There are various reasons for this, in particular, the fact that the Azeri community prefers Georgian and Azeri television stations, while the Armenian population of the southern regions of Georgia is under the strong influence of Russian television programs. Keeping in mind that Russia and Azerbaijan have diametrically opposite viewpoints on NATO’s enlargement, it is not difficult to guess why this situation developed. In summary, we will note that the population’s strong choice in favor ofjoining the North Atlantic Alliance is primarily explained by the instinctive desire to protect the country against the threats coming from Russia, and to a lesser extent by the people’s understanding of the modernizing effect of rapprochement and eventual merging with NATO.
At the level of state policy, Georgia’s striving to integrate into the Alliance is aroused by the following circumstances8:
a) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former republics were offered a false model of integration in the form of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Due to Russia’s hegemonic strivings and a few problems inherited from the totalitarian past, this model proved to be incapable of meeting the national interests and development goals of its individual member states, including Georgia. As a result, the CIS became a formation incapable of deciding anything at all. Against this background, an extremely positive transformation process was going on in Central and Eastern Europe, during which the region’s countries, while coming closer to NATO, overcame the difficulties of shock therapy, reorganized the outmoded security structures, and created efficient state institutions and a vital market economy. This was not an easy process, but nevertheless, due to the common vision of the joint future offered by the prospect of membership in the Alliance, it was conducive to resolving many inter- and inner-state problems. As a result, these states integrated into the European Union, the most successful regional organization in the history of mankind.
b) Georgia, as a multinational and multi-cultural society, can only successfully develop its own state by means of democratic forms of management. During the past sixteen years, two authoritative governments have been overthrown, which shows the Georgians’ intolerance for autocracy and a corrupt regime. For Georgia, NATO in particular and Western institutions in general are a necessary tool that can be used to help build a democratic state. The present-day requirements for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance differ from the standards of the 1950s. The country recognizes that full-fledged integration into NATO can only occur if real democratic reforms take place. Any other state-building policy is inevitably doomed to failure.
c) Georgia, as a former part of the empire, suffers from an instability complex and the absence of security. It is of course striving to ensure a safe environment for the vital activity of its citizens. NATO, being primarily an organization that ensures security, has been called upon to offer states all the necessary conditions for this. It is worth noting that, while observing the general trend toward the decline in authority of the U.N. and OSCE, small countries are placing ever greater hopes on the Alliance, which has proven its viability and functionality by becoming the most prestigious organization for integration.
7 See: Information Agency Trend, 10 June, 2007, available at [http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/en/print.pl?printid= 938928].
8 For more detail, see: T. Yakobashvili, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” in: Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, ed. by R. Asmus, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 2006, pp. 187-188.
Rapprochement with NATO: Path to Modernization?
At present, noticeable shifts can be seen in all the main areas of reform within the IPAP: the main conceptual documents have been drawn up—the National Security Conception, the Foreign Policy Strategy for 2006-2009, and the National Defense Strategy; work has been completed on the Review of Strategic Defense; all the defense structures and management systems have been reformed in keeping with NATO recommendations; social conditions have been improved for servicemen; wages have been raised; the degree of inoperability with NATO and the Alliance’s member states has significantly risen; a legislative base of democratic control over the armed forces has been created; and overall security of the armed forces has been noticeably strengthened, as well as their reputation and society’s trust in them (in 2007 the army reached second place after the church in terms of level of trust (86%), outstripping popular mass media organizations).9 In the economic sphere, a liberal Tax Code was adopted, the customs service was reorganized, privatization of state property was carried out, the license-issuing system was simplified, and the number of controlling departments was reduced. The budget increased three-fold, steady GDP growth is obvious, and the volume of foreign direct investments is increasing. The reforms are yielding positive results: in 2006, the World Bank put Georgia in first place in the world in terms of reform rates, while in terms of the Index of Economic Freedom, the republic was given the status of a “mostly free” country. It is worth noting that when carrying out innovations, the experience of other countries is taken into account, particularly of the Baltic states, which are eager to render corresponding help, just like NATO and the EU, particularly during the transition period. The Alliance’s evaluation missions have given the reforms being carried out within the IPAP a high assessment for the second time in a row. In particular, the Assessment Document presented by NATO to the Georgian side after the last review of its IPAP performance says that the elections to the local self-government bodies in the fall of 2006 were successful, the decentralization process is developing positively, relations between the ruling party and the opposition have improved, and the peace policy being carried out by the Georgian government in the conflict zones is noted in particular. The document also registers the progress in judicial reform. Three of the five consultation stages in the intensive dialog have already been passed.10
Nevertheless, experts note that the transition period cannot come to full fruition since lack of will or incompetence are causing lags in certain areas of the IPAP and there are still problems in the legal justice sphere and in ensuring private property rights. Against the background of the economy’s dynamic development, the level of inflation remains high, government spending continues to grow, while unemployment and poverty encompass broad strata of the population. These and other tasks are the main topics of criticism by the opposition, as well as by international organizations and individual states. Despite this, experts share the same opinion that, with the ups and downs of politics, the country is generally ready to move on to the next integration stage—participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Admittedly, rapprochement with NATO has so far only promoted the strengthening of Georgia’s state institutions and, to a lesser degree, intensification of democratic reforms, but in terms of the general level of reform progress, the republic is in no way inferior to the countries of the Western Balkans.
Influence of Euro-Atlantic Integration on the Conflict: Various Scenarios
As the country moves closer to NATO, it is becoming more urgent to find an answer to the question of whether Georgia’s institutional integration into the alliance is possible before settling the
9 Survey of Georgian Public Opinion, 8-16 February, 2007.
10 See: “Baramidze: NATO Positively Evaluates Reforms Carried Out by Georgia,” Prime News, 11 June, 2007.
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If it is, how can Georgia’s membership in NATO influence settlement of these conflicts? The answer to the first question has been heard more than once, including from NATO’s Secretary General. The last time, it was voiced from the podium of a prestigious meeting by President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Jose Lello, who said that Georgia’s membership should not be contingent on settlement of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, if Georgia is conscientiously trying to eliminate the known contradictions.11 Against the background of the peace initiatives subsequently approved by the international community for both conflicts, as well as refraining from reacting to clearly provocative actions, like the events of 11 March, 2007 in the Kodori Gorge, it is believed that Georgia is tending increasingly toward an exclusively peaceful resolution of these problems.12 As a result of this, non-settlement of the conflicts as an argument against Georgia’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance loses its force. As for the second question, an unequivocal answer is not easy to find—there could be several alternatives: according to some of them, Georgia’s membership in NATO will have a direct influence on the conflicts and will lead to their rapid settlement, according to others, there will be no direct effect, but in the long term, there is the higher likelihood that a compromise will be reached. The first group of alternatives can provisionally be boiled down to the following scenarios:
I. To avoid complicating relations with Russia, NATO will invite Georgia to join the Alliance providing it releases its hold on the conflict zones. The conflict will be settled by Abkhazia gaining its independence.
We will immediately note that this alternative is impossible, since if Georgia is faced with such a dilemma, the answer will be unequivocally in favor of continuing the conflict settlement process and freezing the orientation toward Euro-Atlantic integration. In the foreseeable future, neither Georgian society, nor any political force in the country will be willing to discuss the question of granting Abkhazia or South Ossetia their independence.
II. As a member of the Alliance, Georgia will receive a carte blanche, since Russia, keeping in mind the possibility of applying Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, cannot interfere in the way Georgia deals with Abkhazia or in the republic’s convincing NATO to use military force to repress the resistance of the separatists and restore territorial integrity.
This scenario is also very unlikely. Understanding very well that internal ethnic disputes cannot be resolved by force in a democratic state, the Alliance will never seriously review this alternative. If this alternative were acceptable, the separatism problems in Spain, France, and other regions of the Euro-Atlantic expanse would have long been settled using this method. As for the possibilities of applying Art 5, Russia has a multitude of political, diplomatic, energy, and other levers of pressure on NATO and Georgia at its disposal, which will definitely be applied in order to prevent the development of undesirable events. Here we are talking about the Russia-NATO Council, the G-8, other forums and formats, as well as the Russian Federation’s possession of the energy weapon, which has been repeatedly tried out in the recent past.
III. In the event of unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Western nations and organizations, Russia will take a similar step with respect to Abkhazia and, perhaps, to other conflict zones. Russia will try to justify this decision by the desire, first, to punish Georgia for its Euro-Atlantic choice and, second, to eliminate the prospects for Georgia’s integra-
11 See: Georgia Towards Euro-Atlantic Integration. Secretariat Report, 65th Rose-Roth Seminar, NATO PA, Tbilisi, 19-21 April, 2007, p. 4, available at [http://www.folketinget.dk/samling/20061/almdel/NPA/Bilag/85/377013.PDF].
12 The polls show that most of the population (more than 90%) supports the course of the talks and peaceful methods for settling the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, it is worth noting, an increase is being seen in this mood (see: Survey of Georgian Public Opinion, 8-16 February, 2007).
tion into NATO. After all, in this case, the republic will find itself technically at war with Russia, at least, and it is unlikely that the Alliance will want Georgia to join it in that state.
This development scenario is theoretically possible. What is more, Georgia believes that this is Russia’s very momentous and crucial political trump card, which could really destabilize the situation in the country and even cause the replacement of Saakashvili’s regime, which is so unacceptable to Moscow. According to logic, this is not to official Moscow’s advantage. First, Georgia will become one of the most Russophobic states located in the direct proximity of the internal potential hotbeds of Russia’s disintegration, second, it will develop military political cooperation in a bilateral format with the Western countries, and, third, it will seek deployment in its territory of elements of the U.S. strategic arms systems. Nevertheless, there is still the likelihood that, infuriated with Georgia and losing the geopolitical game in the Southern Caucasus, Russia might act against the laws of logic.
IV. In the event Georgia joins NATO, Russia will lose interest in further keeping the conflict “frozen” and, in order to avoid further undermining of its international authority, will stop playing the recognized role of enthusiastic broker in favor of the Abkhazian side. Georgia, taking advantage of Russia’s neutrality, will force “orphaned” Abkhazia to agree to the conditions it offers.
The certain likelihood of this scenario transpiring is also obvious. Tbilisi is counting on this development of events and is placing certain hopes on it. This partly explains the fact that “all the eggs are being placed in one basket,” to the detriment of looking for a compromise in the direct dialog with the other side of the conflict, and in particular the main political and diplomatic efforts are being directed exclusively at using the “external factor.” If the Kosovo problem is resolved according to the Western scenario, a precedent will be created of one side in the conflict having an undesirable “settlement” formula imposed on it, which will be a decisive argument in favor of using a similar approach to settle the Abkhazian issue.
Do the Separatists Need to Support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Choice?
The main general shortcoming of the above scenarios is the absence of a voluntary compromise between the sides in the conflict. They are all characterized by an element of compulsion in detriment to the interests of one of the sides, which leaves serious reasons for the possibility of a new conflict arising in the future. Against this background, an optimal decision will be based on mutual compromise and voluntary conciliation. But in mature democratic societies, this alternative is essentially excluded on both sides of a conflict. The Cyprus example and the situation involving Kosovo show that when one or, moreover, both sides do not have sufficient democracy, even the presence of such a “carrot” as membership in the EU is not enough for reconciliation. In this respect, further profound democratic changes in the Georgian and Abkhazian societies are absolutely necessary. This is precisely how Georgia’s choice in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration should be viewed. By participating in the IPAP or the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Georgia will be moving toward becoming a lawful and democratic state, whereby even despite the huge number of mistakes and missed opportunities, the vector of the republic’s development is still headed in the right direction. It will definitely lead to a state where society and the political forces will make the long-anticipated choice in favor of exclusively peaceful settlement of conflicts, taking maximum account of the interests of the other side. In this situation, Georgia will better understand the need to change the paradigm of competitiveness, which implies the principle of a zero sum game, for the paradigm of cooperation, when the other
side in the conflict is seen as a potential partner. But the Abkhazian side must still move toward the same values and strive to build the same legal, political, and administrative systems. It is obvious that Abkhazia’s current artificial and, I am sure, forced proximity to Russia is not the path that will lead to the indicated values, but more likely to a breakdown in traditions, loss of language, acculturation, and extreme difficulties of physical survival. For this is very possible in the long term due to the passive demographic behavior of the Abkhazian ethnos and the objective limitation of the immigration resource of repatriates. They can only survive in a democratic Western-style system, in a family of democratic societies. The actual state of affairs does not allow Abkhazia to become member of this system independently. No matter how great its desire to become a democratic system, nothing will be gained if the process is not institutionalized. By moving closer to NATO and the EU, Georgia is sort of also paving the way for Abkhazia, so the latter, despite all the dubious and at times aggressive actions of the Georgian side, should be rooting for the success of the democratic changes in Georgian society and support intensification of its relations with NATO and the EU.
Below, I will give several additional reasons why, based on the indeterminate nature of the current political moment and the difficulty with forecasting the future development of events, Abkhazia should be interested in Georgia’s further rapprochement with NATO, and what is more, its joining the Alliance as quickly as possible:
a) Apart from its modernizing nature, integration into NATO also has the effect of a sort of “corset,” which is making the Georgian state an increasingly responsible partner, including with respect to conflict settlement. The corset phenomenon is currently almost the only factor that is keeping aggression on the part of the “war party” at bay. This is largely responsible for the fact that belligerent statements in the official rhetoric of the Georgian side have disappeared and it is refraining from carrying out fatal mistakes when reacting to clearly provocative actions by the destructive forces. A further increase in the intensity of cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance is promoting a change in the principles of official Tbilisi’s approach to the conflict settlement.
b) Georgia, which has significantly progressed in its integration into NATO, has gained an advantage in its relations with Russia. The matter concerns the fact that, if the Georgian side so wishes, the Russian Federation could have a very serious attitude toward the conflict settlement in Abkhazia based on the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity in exchange for the latter’s rejection of its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. It is no accident that the Russian ambassador to the Republic of Georgia expressed his desire to see Georgia as a neutral country.13 What is more, the example of Moldova, where talks closed to the broad public are going on with Russia about restoring the country’s territorial integrity under Russian guarantees and conditions, unequivocally points to its unreliability with respect to support of the separatist regimes. At the same time, what is going on is a signal for Georgia that, with a corresponding change in the strategic course of the country’s development, Russia could help to settle the conflicts under the same conditions. Abkhazia’s interest in retaining Georgia’s steady course toward integration in NATO should be based on this.
c) Taking into account the inherent and to a certain extent understandable desire of the ruling team to stay in power as long as possible, it can be expected that, after ensuring the country’s entry into NATO, the first priority will be integration into the European Union (EU), which is popular among the population. From the viewpoint of the tough demands on the applicant country within rapprochement with the EU, Euro-integration (in contrast to NATO integration) implies in-depth changes and incomparably high standards of the country’s economic and political development. The matter concerns modernizing the country to a level close to a
13 [http://www.vsesmi.ru/news/506829/].
mature democracy. In this context, integration into NATO is a kind of preliminary and to a certain extent preparatory stage along the path to the EU. This is one more argument in favor of Georgia’s rapid entry into the North Atlantic Alliance.
C o n c l u s i o n
The severity of the military clash led to an actual breakdown in centuries-long ethnic contacts between the Abkhazians with their culturally closest southeastern neighbors, the Georgians. A thesis is put forward that the Abkhazians and Georgians are alien nations, and that the Adighes are the closest nation to the Abkhazians. Of course, this newly invented mythologeme is not entirely true, and everyone who knows how close the traditional and everyday culture of the Abkhazians and Georgians is understands this. These nations mainly differ in their language.14 Recently, the vector of economic, political, and ethnic ties of Abkhazian society has changed its course: now it is aimed toward Russia. It can be said that this is a new situation for Abkhazian society: the age-long ethnic contacts with Georgians have been rather abruptly and in general artificially broken, the restoration of which would be a victory of that historical justice we are very much in need of. An old saying has it that true love is not when two people look into each other’s eyes, but when they are both looking in the same direction. For the Georgians and Abkhazians, the Euro-Atlantic space, both in the geographical and the axiological sense, is the direction they should be moving in to reach a compromise.
14 See: L. Solovieva, “Traditions in the Globalization Era: Abkhazia in the Early 21st Century,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (2), 2007.
Svetlana CHERVONNAYA
Professor, Department of Ethnology, Faculty of History, the Copernicus University
(Torun, Poland).
RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH CAUCASIAN PEOPLES: ITS TRANSCAUCASIAN ADDRESS AND CONTEXT
Abstract
The author discusses the most important aspects of Russia’s Caucasian policy toward the separatist—or to use a different term and axiological interpreta-
tion—national liberation movements of the Caucasian peoples who want to restore or create national statehoods and withdraw from the state (the former Union republics)
