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TAIWAN POLITICAL PATTERN AND GEOPOLITICAL WEAKNESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN TO SEE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CROSS-STRAIT-RELATIONS AND SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS UNDER THE THEME OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (SCO)
Hu Feng-Yung
I. The Trends of Cross Strait Relations between Taiwan and Mainland China
After the Taiwan Presidential Election combined with parliamentary election (legislative Yuan) was held on January 14 of 2012, the president Ma Ying-jeou was successfully re-elected with the 51.6% vote to be the second term president of Taiwan. It seems that the principle of “One China Policy with the different interpretation by each side” is recognized by the half of Taiwan citizens despite of the strong opposing party which has occupied the unavoidable power in Taiwan political ecology at the same time.
When KMT (Kuomintang, Nationalist Party) came back to the ruling regime again after eight years’ ruling vacuum from 2000 to 2008, in which period the ruling party DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) resorted to the Sovereignty independence of Taiwan with the slogan of “lighting the fire” foreign policy to provoke nationalism and hatred emotion of the Taiwanese people against the Mainland China for winning the domestic elections, peace in the cross-strait region has been put into the agenda. The result of the tactics of election campaign which were taken by the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) in his ruling period has been leading Taiwan into more isolated position in the Asian-Pacific region with the down-going economy and living standard, eroding the civil society and democracy in Taiwan.
Democracy is turned out to be the internal ethnicity fighting between the natives of Taiwanese and mainlanders. The power struggles were reflected by the covering of media which were full of words war and considered with no facts and justice but only the political ideological positions by the majority of the audience. The crossstrait relationship is stuck into uncontrolled and unaccountable situation to the most Taiwan media and political analysts under the intensive US and China’s economic partnership.
Taiwan Media Reflects the Diversity and Chaos of Ideology
Pan DPP newspaper The Liberty Times covered the opinion of DPP director-general of legislative Yuan Caucus Pan, Men-an, saying that the failure of DPP had nothing to do with the Party’s sovereignty claim and impact of the “92 Consensus” but with the exiting “China’s economic threat” which is intimidating the security and national defense of Taiwan. He said that he cannot accept and recognize the virtual conception of “92 Consensus” which actually doesn’t exist at all1. This is the mainstream attitude of the pan green partisan (supporters of DPP).
Another opposite opinion before the Taiwan 2012 presidential election was covered by the entrepreneurship newspaper The China Times which is belonged to
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the biggest media groups has the widest circulation in Taiwan. The chairman HTC Company Cher Wang was standing up openly and addressing her supporting president Ma in the press conference. Mrs. Wang said that she cannot imagine without the “92 Consensus” and will support Ma to improve the cross-strait relationship and promote the peace in this region2. Her claim reflects the biggest entrepreneurs in Taiwan.
In the eve of Taiwan presidential election, the editorial opinion of The United Daily News Newspaper, which is belonged to the one of the four biggest Taiwan media groups, noted that tomorrow people will use their votes to decide whether they will switch on or off the “92 Consensus” institute, stressing that the “92 Consensus” domestically represents the national identity of Republic of China and outsides the island reflects the connection with the cross-strait relationship3. The United Daily News Newspaper traditionally is the anticommunism newspaper but asserting the unification of China.
Economic Integration without Political
Mutual Trust between the Two Sides in the Cross-strait Region
The relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China has developed from the era of slogan on “Counterattacking against the Mainland China and reclaiming the lost homeland” in Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s ruling period, “One China Policy with the different interpretation by each side” in Lee Teng-hui’s first period of presidency 1992 and the drama change to the total opposite assertion of “Special State to State Relations” in his second presidency in 1998 which was the basic foundation of Chen Shui-bian’s “One side one country” ,which led to the crossstrait relationship into the edge of war broking. Now Ma Ying-jeou’s difficulty is how to avoid entering the fast negotiation process in Ma’s recent presidency with the Mainland China after the opening policy for Chinese Tourists on Taiwan on July 18 of
2008, three links including the direct postal, transportation and trade on December 15, 2008 and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed on June 20, 2012 in Chongqing which means the more closed economic integration in the cross-strait relationship.
According to some annalists’ viewpoints, Ma’s desire is signing the Peace Accord and Permanent Peace Agreement with the Communist Party without negotiating the unification issue. While he was at that time the chairman of the opposition Kuomintang, Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would sign a Peace Accord between Taiwan and Mainland China4. The think Tanks surrounding him expressed the kind of opinions that KMT has the historical mission to complete the responsibility of unification of China.
An opinion article in HK Takungpao, which was written by Prof. Wu Fei, suggests that the “92 Consensus” of “One China Policy with the different interpretation by each side” should be written into the text style but not the nowadays oral consensus which actually doesn’t exist despite this idea is accepted by two sides. Wu Fei thinks that the “92 consensus” has serious disputes in Taiwan among the majority of the Taiwan people, if China authority doesn’t put “One China policy” into the realistic paper agreement, the peace could not be carried out in reality under the influence from the DPP’s Taiwan independence assertion5.
President Ma only has the 51.6% supporting vote, it means that KMT has no the obvious priority to sign the Peace Accord in the foundation of the “One China policy”. Wu Fei told the author that the atmosphere of China is concentrating the power to establish Xi Jinping ‘s future ruling priority to reduce Hu Jintao’s administration and the key element is to improve the Relationship with Russia. Now the HK media which is closed to the China political high administration is brewing and covering this opinion and direction toward the closed Sino-Russian Relations. Taiwan should pay attention to the Russian strategy toward the Asia. The
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implication for Taiwan is to know well the role of Russia in the cross-strait region and Russian influence is latent and potential in no doubt.
Geopolitical Marginalization of Taiwan under the Frame of Economic Integration
According to the Taiwan Governmental Information Office for the introduction of the cross-strait relations6, claiming that since Ma Ying-jeou came to power, the two sides in the “putting aside disputes and mutual non-denial “based on cross-strait talks and consultation show both sides of the interaction mode is setting aside disputes and creating a win-win situation.
In trade relationship, cross-strait trade from January to December of 2010 (including Hong Kong) totaled 1,523.3 billion U.S. dollars (39.4% growth over the same period of last year), of which from Taiwan side with the mainland (including Hong Kong) exports 1147.5 billion U.S. dollars and imports 375.8 billion U.S. dollars, Taiwan square trade surplus $ 771.7 billion. The crossstrait trade (including Hong Kong) occupies the biggest part of Taiwan’s foreign trade accounting for 29.0%, of which exports to the mainland (including Hong Kong) is accounting for 41.8% in the share of total exports. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner and largest trade surplus source.
Since March 1 of 2004 was the opening date of the two sides’ signing the agreements for educational collaboration, Taiwan has 163 schools and Mainland China has 680 schools completed 2600 cooperation agreements signed. In personnel exchanges, from January to December of 2010 the people from Taiwan going to Mainland China for visits has over 5.14 million passengers, a total number of passengers accumulated to the 61.05 million; people from the mainland to Taiwan have over 1.58 million, with the total accumulation reached 4.8 million people. The potential of Mainland China’s passengers has become one of the most important economic growths in Taiwan. The disputes over the national safety and
the negative images of Taiwan people have from the Mainland China’s passengers has threatened Ma’s authority too. Taiwan people started to doubt Ma’s economic policy is too relied on the mainland and this will make Taiwan lose its core competitiveness. It means that many policy-makers will make decisions to cope with China rather than the long-term strategy that Taiwan need to go. The closer relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, the more marginalized Taiwan’s geopolitical value it has in the East Asian region.
Ma’s Foreign Policy is Stuck into the Quagmire
On June 2, 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affair Francisco Ou on his Tea Reception with the mass media said that fighting for the new diplomatic allies is no longer the priority of Taiwan. The “Diplomatic Truce” is the new strategy of Taiwan toward the international Participation. This idea came from the “Flexible Diplomacy” which was addressed by the Ma Ying-Jeou at Harvard University Fairbank Research Center when he was elected to be the chairman of KM . He proposed five principles of the crossstrait relations: resume the negotiations on the base of “92 Consensus”; reach 30-50 years’ peace by signing the Peace Accord; promote the three links to enhance the economic exchange; build Taiwan’s international participation under the frame of cross-strait relationship; broaden the cultural and educational exchange between two sides7.
Of course, Ma Ying-jeou government is trying to avoid the practice of cross-strait political negotiations, and this policy may not be able to meet the needs of the mainland. Ma Ying-jeou accept the Associated Press interview on October 19 of 2010, and the Associated Press reported that negotiations for economic is the basis of political basis for negotiations, causing Taiwan’s major political storm, showing that the people of Taiwan for the political negotiations of suspicion.
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According to the Transcript of President Ma’s Associated Press interview, “President Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed on October 19 by the Associated Press (AP). As the AP reporting turned out differently from what the president meant in his remarks during the interview, the Office of the President has the Government Information Office under the Executive Yuan to contact the AP and request a correction”8.
Professor Shi, Chih-Yu9 founds that the different conceptions of “Diplomacy of the big country” exits in Taiwan and Mainland China. Taiwan presumes that “China threat” conception was used and produced by media propaganda to explore the supporting from the outside world to balance the uprising of China which could be explained by the research theory of structural realism. Under this theoretical framing, part of Taiwanese scholars would stress this idea to strengthen the role of Taiwan in geopolitical sphere. From the other side, Mainland China tends to negotiate with others under the political theory of classical realism, emphasizing that the big countries should develop the hard power to maintain their national interests and promote the multiple polar foreign policy to play the influential role in the international society. The soft power such as human rights and environmental protection might be sacrificed under the conception10. Russia provides another experience concerning of democratic reforms and economic recovery that might cause the interest both in Taiwan and Mainland China.
Professor Wu, Yu-shan11 was interviewed by the Radio Taiwan International and took the example of the Georgian War between Georgia and Russia in 2008, saying that USA didn’t intervene the Georgian War because of considering the realistic strategy and national interest, so if the war broke out in cross-strait region, USA might sit and see it to happen without intervention. He supports Ma’s foreign policy to think about the cross-strait relations in the broadened international pattern12.
The Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Frederic Chien Fu who was invited by
Yuan Ze University to attend the YZU-MGIMO Forum in December of 2009 said that although he agreed with Ma’s big pattern to develop the foreign affairs but innovating new diplomatic terminology such as the “Diplomatic Truce” was confusing the diplomats with no working and hindering the foreign affairs. He promoted the conception of “Flexible diplomacy ” in the late 1970’s and broadened widely economic and educational exchanges with many countries by establishing the Representatives commissions in both sides.
Ma’s foreign policy is stuck into quagmire under the period of China’s changing political administration. Prof. Ekaterina Koldunova shared her opinions in 2012 YZU-MGIMO Forum in Taiwan and said that after 1991 Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was advocating to the West to integrate with Europe. Now Putin’s Asian Policy will be strengthened in his new term presidency by using his resources capacity. The 2012 APEC which is held in Vladivostok will put this idea into effect. This might be the opportunity for the small countries to cooperate with Russia.
From this viewpoint, it will be the implication for Taiwan to participate in the Asian-Pacific region to understand appropriately the role of Russia in this region and world. The BRICS is the coming future’s international system for Taiwan to prepare for the challenge. The concrete foreign policy in response to the new trend in Asia and world but not stick to the Conception of “Diplomatic Truce” which might lead Taiwan to the dilemma when facing the negotiations with the Mainland China. China’s military threat exists in the crossstrait region as many analysts think that Taiwan might face the isolation if the quo-status changed from each side.
Russia’s integration in Asia as a Balancing Factor
To take use of the opportunity of Russia’s integration in Asia as the balancing factor and new cooperative partner for many Asian
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countries, Taiwan is located in the important traffic and geographical place of the East Asia, neighbored with China, Japan, Korea and the east-southern Asia across the sea. In its western and northwestern across the Taiwan Strait, the average distance from the coast of Fujian Province is about 200 km; In its northern side across the East China Sea is the Korean Peninsula; in its northeastern side across the sea are the Ryukyu Islands of Japan; across the South China Sea from the coast of Guangdong province of Mainland China with about 300 km to Taiwan; Its eastern side is the Pacific; across the Bashi Channel in its southern side are the Philippine Islands. From a geopolitical point of view in theory, Taiwan Island is located in the central region of East Asia, possessing an important transportation hub for the Asia-Pacific trade and an important strategic location.
However, in case of political tension with Mainland China and instability situation across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has not functioned as it should be playing the role of the Asia-Pacific economic operations and transportation center. For example, in the beginning of 90’s in the last century, between Moscow and Taipei established representative offices, the negotiation of direct flight was initiated but interrupted by many reasons. One of the domestic reasons in Taiwan is the transferred regime in 2000 and those who participated in the negotiations didn’t want to work for Democratic Progressive Party while DPP just came to the regime. That is the internal opinion from one of the old KMT party member. The ideological difference and provincial emotional conflict formed in the process history after the Second World War. DPP and KMT are hostile on the definition of Taiwan’s national sovereignty and status. Taipei didn’t get direct flight with Moscow and it means the failure of Taiwan’s practical diplomacy.
Russia’s integration in Asia also worries China and the United States. Russia’s arms sales threatens U.S. presence in the competition, and influence China’s position
in Asian- Pacific region. Taiwan’s relations with Russia might function as the regional balance if the friendship could be developed in the long-term period. Taiwan is seeking to expand its relations with Russia and that is beneficial for both sides, prior in the areas of science, technology and education for cooperation. The problem is that during the cold war from nowadays Taiwan’s talent is developed in USA and exits the ideology gap between two sides. Students leaning in Russia goes back home will not be trusted by its own country. In this situation, if they cannot find jobs and be trusted, who will want to go to Russia?
For Taiwan students, it’s difficult to accept Russian education for the language barrier, it’s meaningful to process the cultural exchange and educational cooperation for establishing the scientific and technological collaboration in the future. Establishing long-term friendship between Taiwan and Russia might be beneficial to Russia’s Asian integration policy, no matter Taiwan has small economic market but with its market integration with China, democratization atmosphere is suitable to provide different viewpoints from China Mainland
Nodaway in any campaign of the elections people in Taiwan prefer to choose the candidate rather than parties. With the weakness of party concept, voter might ask any candidate to work for people’s welfare and national interests prior to the party’s interests. To strengthen Taiwan’s geopolitical value might rethink the Russia factor in the balance of the region powers. To facilitate Taiwan-Russian relationship, Taiwan might start from the establishing real and beneficial collaboration with Russia in many kinds of areas. From the viewpoint of geopolitics, the value of Taiwan’s international role and influence might be reflected in the interactions among Washington — Beijing — Moscow and Washington — Beijing — Taipei. Taipei is cautious about any national interests lost and national safety might be threatened in those interactions. Besides, the ideology of leaders has also influenced the
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changes in cross-strait relations. We can say that the cross-strait relationship is dependent on the international environment, but also by the Taiwan leader’s ability to govern the country.
II. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects and Problems in Sino-Russian Relations
Concerning of this topic, the name of Shanghai Cooperation organization shows on the one hand the ambition of China to be a regional power instead of the vacuum that the collapse of Soviet Union brought to, on other the hand China needs Russia and Central Asia to formulate a quasi-alliance to balance the unilateralism of United States which was regarded the most powerful hegemony in the world. China remains a communist-ruling party regime that symbolizes totalitarian country for the majority of the world. China’s economical capacity makes her to face the responsibility which she should take. China and Russia are the BRICS countries and their cooperation in some how degree causes the doubt from other countries. It seems to be bad news for the neighboring countries if in this region China and Russian work for military alliance to confront any other countries, such as first of all USA and its alliance in East Asia. Neither China nor Russia thinks it’s a good idea to organize a military alliance to produce the cold war’s bipolarized confrontation against other countries because there is no country could be the opponent of USA.
Facing the pressure from the western world led by the United States, it is a strategy for China to support his anti-separatism policy to cope with any possibility coming from outside world’s interference in his territorial and ethnic disputes with Taiwan, Tibet and Xingjian. Jiang Zemin was active in developing Russian relations with Yeltsin to fill the vacuum of regional unbalance after the cold war. China is afraid of being the next target from the western country if Russia was no more the opponent. For Russia, in Yeltsin’s ruling period, the normalization
with China is crucial for the hard time to reform the domestic regime after the collapse of Soviet Union.
In 90’s these two counties tried to confirm the boundary that was controversial in the last century. Basically, China has resolved part of the boundary with Russia, but for the majority of the Chinese people, getting back a little part of disputed Boundary means the recognition of giving up the majority of territory that was belonged to the China’s jurisdictions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was unable to confront China with financial crisis and reduce the border troops of army deployment is the consensus of these two countries. We might say that Putin has his own idea about the collective security organization; SCO is not the idea of Russian style but a kind of dialogue mechanism to cooperate with China and strengthen the leader status of Russia in central Asia with expelling American influence in the region. Russia established its own collective security organization — the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. Compared with CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the regional international organization with multiple functions and missions. China and Russia play the key roles in this organization with different national interests. Where do they want to bring SCO to and how USA view SCO? This will be discussed in this paper.
Who Needs SCO?
Hung Nguyen13 thinks that Russia is unhappy with the expansion of NATO and the growing role of the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia. China is displeased with U.S. actions regarding Taiwan’s political status and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security agreement. Each country lends rhetorical support to the other’s case against the United States. However, neither country is willing or able to offer substantive assistance that might help the other. Furthermore, even if China could have an impact on the expansion of
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NATO, it does not have a sufficient interest in the issue to risk open conflict with the United States. China will continue to have compelling reasons for maintaining stable relations with Russia and the countries of Central Asia. As noted earlier, Russia has the potential to become an important source of energy resources for China. More generally, China will continue to have a strong interest in maintaining a stable region in order to focus on economic development.
Alexander Frost14 thinks that the Soviet collapse of 1991 which resulted in the independence of the five Central Asian states has forced subsequent Russian governments to find new ways to manage security policy in the region. The logical assumption is that using two organizations somehow is a greater benefit to Moscow than simply one. SCO is the common anti-terrorism mechanism and CSTO is the training academic institute for Russia strengthening its influence in central Asia to exclude or limit American and Chinese influence from this region which was traditionally the Russian territory and influential sphere.
For Russia’s strategy, the SCO shows Russian friendship with China. It could be viewed as the common cooperation platform in anti-terrorism and play the role the quasialliance to confront USA if the both country thinks it is necessary. It might be the site for both countries to talk about the weapon and energy sales that Russia might need china’s market and China might need Russia’s low price. Anyway, the both countries need good atmosphere to enhance their foreign trade amount and process their dialogues to meet each side’s demands geopolitically and political-economically.
For China’s strategy, it seems to show China to be the regional leader to react any military operations in needed moment. Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai factions could still influence China’s military in Hu’s regime. Hu Jintao could hardly promote SCO due to the limitation of its own domestic fighting between Shanghai and Beijing.
Russia has due security bodies and is limited to each one. SCO is an international
organization that could be broaden and multiplied. CSTO is an internal military training system that Russia providing the former central Asian countries experts and national defense to consolidate the integration with those former Soviet Union countries. SCO still relies on Russia’s attitude and support if China wants to maintain its function and missions, China needs to improve their trust and relationship with Russia.
The Aim and Discourse of SCO
Selbi Hanova15 thinks that Major research questions of the study, which was based on the analysis of data derived from SCO official documents as well as academic and newspaper articles, from the period from 2001 to 2008 included the following:
• How is the SCO’s image being constructed?
• How does SCO image construction contribute to the perception of the organization in the West?
• How is the SCO perceived by its member states (and observers)?
Selbi Hanova16 assumes that the economic factor might plays the more important role in anti-western perception of SCO created for anti-enlargement of NATO. In fact, enhancement of the economic dimension of cooperation within the organization was frequently mentioned in many official documents of the organization, such as the 2002 SCO Charter and the Astana Declaration of 2005. However, closer examination of the comprehensive energy policies in the region might suggest that “multilateral agreement that integrates energy policy throughout the entire region is a difficult proposition, and that the agreements which have emerged are not products of the SCO, even if they are influenced by the SCO process.”7 Rather, bilateral agreements between the member countries seem to be dominating, while the SCO serves as a context or framework for such agreements. For Russia it appears that EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Community) and the CIS fulfill the role of concluding agreements.
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From the geopolitical factor, it seems to be that Russia and China with the central Asian countries united as entity to confront NATO. But the cold war finished, why they need to create a new cold war? So the energy cooperation and economic factor encourages them to cooperate to maintain the regional security to support the energy cooperation benefit. So neither of them recognizes SCO plays a military institution. US regard the Afghanistan as the unstable region for the US security after 911 attacks after 2001. Anti-terrorism might be new international consensus for these countries. If that, does US participate in SCO, neither Russia nor China want US to enhance influence in this organization. Russia and China have their traditional territorial border disputes and this will be the institute for them to discuss their own national interest. SCO is not like other international organization but more like the multilateral dialogue institute for these countries to solve their own problems.
The Perspective of SCO
Nicola P Contessi17 thinks from the perspective of the organization’s internal power relations, Russia appeared to have acquired a more prominent role, while China, the driving force behind the creation of the SCO, and its leading member in the years following its establishment appeared to have receded to a more discreet role. First, On the other hand, Russia has been boosting its profile in Central Asian security affairs throughout the year 2008-2009 even outside of the SCO. Second, reports suggest that as of 2006, China has allegedly shifted its interest to cooperation in the economic sphere.2 Moreover, China has traditionally been a cautious actor on the international scene, and the present international juncture may be suggesting the expediency of maintaining a low profile in the face of the financial crisis and security challenges on the home front. A further consideration may be that China is willing to appease Russia on the security front after refusing to endorse its August 2008 Georgian venture. The expansion of
the SCO’s areas of responsibility in recent years may have been dictated by this implicit deal. This could suggest that a more accurate reading of the current trend within the SCO may be of an emerging “division of labor” between the two powers in the context of a broader reframing of the organization’s mandate and positioning.
Alyson J. K. Bailes and P l Dunay18 think that established in 2001 with China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has remained one of the world’s least-known and least-analysed multilateral groups. It makes little effort itself for transparency and is only patchily institutionalized in any case. The SCO’s founding documents already signalled the special interest of the member states in fighting what they defined as ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’. Security relevant areas are the most frequent subjects of working-level meetings, which now include experts on information security, secretaries of national security councils and heads of supreme courts.
Pan Guang19 who is the Director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies Center in Shanghai, the Shanghai Center for International Studies, and the Institute of European and Asian Studies at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences think that the SCO provides a good framework for China to cooperate closely in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism and various other cross-border criminal forces. The primary target of the Chinese anti-terrorism campaign is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which advocates the independence of Xinjiang and is said to be supported by Osama bin Laden.1 From the Chinese perspective, it is of particular importance that China has been able, in the SCO framework, to count on the support of the other nine member and observer states in its campaign against ETIM. Moreover, China has also been able to draw support from SCO partners in its efforts to frustrate
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other conventional or non-conventional security threats and to eliminate or ease the external factors of disruption to China’s stability and development.
Mikhail Troitskiy20, associate professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) thinks, in the economic realm, Russia represents a moderating force vis- -vis the ambitious Chinese free-trade agenda. Russia endorsed a framework agreement on enhanced economic cooperation among SCO member states in September 2003, and in September 2006 a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman outlined an extensive list of joint economic projects that Russia would be interested in promoting through the SCO.8 These included expanding Eurasian telecommunications networks and a transport corridor to connect the Caspian Sea with China through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; developing agreements for exports of electrical power from states and regions with a surplus to interested SCO countries; and developing structures to coordinate trade in and transit of hydrocarbons among SCO member states, such as the SCO Energy Club that was proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai summit in June 2006. However, Russia’s vision of the SCO’s economic ambition falls short of creating the free-trade area that China called for at that summit. This controversy is discussed below in greater detail. The two countries have expanded bilateral trade and negotiated a number of deals in the energy field.
Wu Fei21, the researcher on international issues of Guangdong Provincial government and the associate professor of Guangzhou JiNan University thinks, if SCO turns to be an organization of energy, it will arouse the tension from USA and impact the uprising of China. China and India both get benefit in the trend of globalization, and China is promoting the political reform. Democracy and national interest will be the core of US foreign affairs. China using SCO as the approach of getting energy will affect US and
NATO energy interest and anti-terrorism operation. China will pay more cost with the relations with the Unite Sates of America.
Simbal Khan22 thinks that in March 2009, President Obama presented the draft of a new U.S. policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which aimed to address the security slide in Afghanistan with a spate of new strategies. One aspect of this new thinking was to address the increasing instability by addressing the regional dynamics and engaging the main regional actors. The SCO Special conference on Afghanistan was held in March 2009 in Moscow. The participation of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh along with the U.S. envoy at the conference was a testament to the fact that cooperation with the SCO offers the U.S. and NATO an acceptable format to bring Iran into the dialogue on Afghanistan. The SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan called for joint operations in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and for involving Afghanistan in a phased manner in SCO-wide collaboration in fighting terrorism in the region. The conference reiterated the SCO’s known opposition to the expansion of U.S. military interests in Central Asia, but indicated its willingness to expand cooperation with the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan albeit short of sending troops. Interestingly, President Obama announced a shift in U.S. policy emphasis on the same day as the SCO summit, promising greater consultation with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Following this greater interaction, U.S./NATO have recently signed transit agreements with Russia and Central Asian states which allow for military and nonmilitary supplies to transit their territories en route to Afghanistan.
The Problems of SCO
Several problems of SCO for China will be discussed as following:
1. Military union: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) units China, Russia and the Central Asian countries, every state member has its own national interest
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and attitude toward the military cooperation. China remains need Russia’s military support both in strategic and technological aspect. China has the territorial disputes with its neighbors and facing the threat from Japan’s militarism and Taiwan’s independence. SCO is the framework to cooperate with Russia. At the same time with the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Russia plays the key role in China’s decisions.
2. National security: All the members are facing the same problems of terrorism and separatism. The security problem will have impact on the national stability and economic development in the west area of China. China regards the terrorism in central Asia as the main source of terrorism connected with the Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang. The antiterrorism cooperation with the central Asian states should be strengthened. The situation in Afghanistan is cared.
3. Economic interests: China needs the energy import from Russia, Central Asia and Middle East countries. The building of oil pipeline will provide long-term and stable resources for China. Russia also plays the key role in energy sales.
4. Neighboring relations The problem is that China views SCO as its energy and military provider and at the same time as the security umbrella for developing economy and balancing US-Japan union in the eastern Asian region. SCO will be regarded as the similar military union against NATO. Its intransparency will arose doubt from the west countries. China wants to highlight its international status especially in Asian-pacific by replacing US after the 2008 global financial crisis. The tension between China and US will not benefit China.
5. Interest conflict: For Russia, SCO should be the base of enlarging cooperation with the east-south Asia and south Asia. If China cannot enlarge the free trade cooperation range for the SCO members, there will be neither prospect of SCO in economic prosperity nor military trust between Russia and China. If the direction
and function cannot be confirmed, the function of SCO must be weakened.
Conclusion
The atmosphere of China is concentrating the power to establish Xi Jinping’s future ruling territory to reduce Hu Jintao’s administration and the key element is to improve the Relationship with Russia. Now the HK media which is closed to the China political high administration is brewing and covering this opinion and direction toward the closed Sino-Russian Relationship. Taiwan should pay attention to the Russian strategy toward the Asia. The implication for Taiwan is to know well the role of Russia in the cross-strait region and Russian influence is latent and potential.
From the content of this paper elaborated above, the author thinks that it will be the implication for Taiwan to participate in the Asian-Pacific region to understand appropriately the role of Russia in this region and world. The BRICKS is the coming future’s international system for Taiwan administration to prepare for the challenge. The concrete foreign policy is in response to the new trend in Asia and world but not stick to the Conception of “Diplomatic Truce” which might lead Taiwan to the dilemma when facing the negotiations with the Mainland China. China’s military threat still exists in the cross-strait region as many analysts think that Taiwan might face the isolation dilemma if the quo-status was changed from each side. SCO is one of Russia’s Asian strategy and China’s military aspect tends to strengthen its role to balance the US power in case of their intervention into the negotiations of two side in the cross-strait region. USA is recovering from the 2008’s financial crisis and cooperation USA with Russia might influence on the handover of China’s stable political regime. The priority of China’s foreign policy might toward Russia to reduce the cold relationship between China and Russia after the 2008 Georgian War. This intention trend should be carefully taken into consideration by Taiwan administration.
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сравнительный анализ локального опыта
1 А — #l£^l#The Liberty Times, 2012-2-16. URL:http://www.libertytimes.com.
tw/2012/new/feb/16/today-pl-2.htm
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3 On? Ofl? The United Daily News 2012-01-13. URL:http://www. udn.com/2012/1/13/NEWS/OPINION/OPI1/6843163.shtml
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5 Wu Fei. ^#, URL:http://source.takungpao.com/news/12/01/28/LTA-
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6 URL:http://info.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19882&ctNode=2841
URL: http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/4348
8 URL:http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=89446&ctNode=5909&mp=3
9 2000 12Л°
10 2000 12Л-. URL:http:// ntupsr.s3.amazonaws.com/psr/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/13-06.pdf
11 ^ii: tl#- 2012-03-11. Radio Taiwan International. URL:
http://news.rti.org.tw/index_newsContent.aspx?nid=165373
12 ii: tl#1 2012-03-11. Radio Taiwan International URL:http://
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13 Nguyen H. Russia and China: Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo// Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993,
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14 Frost A. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia’s Strategic Goals in Central Asia // China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 2009. Volume 7. No. 3. P. 83-102.
15 Hanova S. Perspectives on the SCO: Images and Discourse // China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 2009. Volume 7. No. 3. P. 63-81.
16 Ibid.
17 Contessi N. P. China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: A Tacit Deal Scenario// China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 2010. Volume 8. No. 4. P. 101-123.
18 Bailes A.J.K., P l Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization // SIPRI Policy Paper. 2007. No. 17. Р. 1.
19 Ibid, p. 46.
20 Ibid, p. 32.
21 Wu Fei. 2006/6/28( Should China use SCO for searching
energy, Takungpao daily newspaper, HK).
22 Khan S. Stabilization of Afghanistan: U.S./NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of SCO// China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 2009. Volume 7. No. 3. P. 11-15.
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COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 4 (10) / 2012
