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Section 3. History
Gadzhimuradov Murad Tagirovich, Dagestan State University, Russian Federation, Assistant Professor, Department of Russian History, Candidate of science (History) E-mail: murad-docent@mail.ru
Aligadzhieva Nuriyat Umakhanovna, Dagestan State University (Branch in Izberbash), Senior lecturer, Department of General Subjects E-mail: elpeli@rambler.ru
Tactics and armament of the Russian troops in the capture of Derbent fortress in 1796
Abstract: The article describes the composition and armament of the Russian Imperial Army during a campaign to the South Caucasus in 1796, and analyzes the tactics of the combat operations during the capture of the heavily fortified Derbent fortress.
Keywords: Russian Imperial Army, war, Caucasus, Derbent, artillery, grenadiers, jaeger, storm the fortress.
During the reign of Catherine II the Russian Empire had grown into one of the strongest powers of the time, able to solve almost any foreign policy objectives. Powerful army and the galaxy of brilliant generals led to huge territorial gains in the south and west, and let Russia stand firm foot on the Black Sea. Catherine’s army alternately defeated its opponents — the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and as a result, Crimea, Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, Kurland, Azov steppes, Kabarda and a number of other areas became Russian territories.
Along with the other directions of foreign policy, the government of Catherine II made its efforts to master the flanks of the Greater Caucasus — the Eastern Black Sea region and the Western Pre-Caspian region. In the beginning of the XVIII century Peter I drafted the paving an international transit trade route from India through Iran then the Caspian Sea and along the Volga route to the White Sea and beyond [3, 56]. In these plans an important place was given to the western coast of the Caspian Sea the ports of which in the long run should become a transshipment base for merchant boats.
An impressive victory of the Russian army over the Ottoman Empire, which considered itself a “master” of the Caucasus, contributed the implementation of these ambitious plans. The victory over the head of the Sunni world, the Turkish Sultan, made an indelible impression on the highlanders of the Northern Caucasus and raised greatly the prestige of Russia in their eyes. After the approval of the Russian protectorate over the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in 1783, Dagestani feudal lords alternately began to contact St. Petersburg for the patronage, seeing in that some economic and political benefits. Among them were some influential khans including Fet-Ali-Khan of Derbent, Umma-Khan Avarian, Mohammed-Khan of Kyura, Surkhay-Khan of Ghazikumukh [15, 45], Mohammed-Sham-hal of Tarki [5, 1].
These events seriously alarmed the Iranian Shah Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar who nurtured his own plans for
subordinating the southern and eastern Caucasus to his authority. In the spring of 1795 his 60,000-strong army struck the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and started a severe pogrom as a punishment for the pro-Russian position of Irakli II. Tens of thousands of Georgians were killed in the massacre, and twenty-five thousand were driven into slavery [6, 131].
Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar’s challenge was accepted by Catherine II without any hesitation. Russian literary and political magazine “Herald of Europe”, which was published twelve years after the events described, not impartially informs the following: “The news about this incident prompted Empress Catherine’s anger. Great Empress determined to avenge the insult inflicted on Her Majesty in the face of the Ruler She patronized. It seemed that the time had come to humiliate the arrogant Persian, and to pave a new path for the communication between India and Europe” [17, 154].
Catherine II ordered the head of the Military Collegium Count Nikolai Saltykov to prepare an immediate campaign in the South Caucasus. Delay was impossible because there was a real threat of the capture by Agha Mohammad Khan a key point for the entire Caucasus, which certainly was Derbent, at all times represented a kind of “gateway” from Asia to Europe. In addition hitherto loyal to Russia the ruler Sheikh-Ali-Khan of Derbent began to vacillate in his political orientation, having found himself in a very difficult situation — from the north powerful Russia pressed on him, from the south Agha Mohammed Khan threatened to ruin the land if he did not recognize his power. In the end, fearing the fate of Tbilisi, Sheikh-Ali-Khan of Derbent defected to Agha Mohammad Khan. The Commander of the Caucasian line of General-inChief Count Ivan Gudovich reported to St. Petersburg that the ruler of Derbent “already having his envoy at the Imperial Court, having betrayed, went over to the side of Agha Mohammad Khan” [18, 70].
Sent to Derbent in December 1795 Major-General Saveliev’s four battalions were forced to go back to Kizlyar
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Tactics and armament of the Russian troops in the capture of Derbent fortress in 1796
with nothing [3: 63, 106, 115]. The eyewitness of the events General Bakunin’s wife Varvara Bakunina who were with her husband during the Persian campaign in 1796 wrote later in her memoirs that “Sheikh-Ali-Khan was so rude that he ordered to lock it (gate) in Russians’ face” [13, 347].
And then it was decided to speed up preparations for the march. According to the plan, it was supposed to take Derbent by forced march from Kizlyar, afterwards having moved further south to reach the Kura River and to gain a foothold on its shores.
From January to April there was a scrupulous preparation for the march — the troops were moving up, the purveyance was procured, Rear Admiral Fyodorov’s ships of the Caspian Flotilla approached to the mouth of the Terek River [18, 71]. There were twelve ships in total [3, 85]. Gathered in Kizlyar 30,000-strong Expeditionary Corps was composed of “the Caucasian Grenadier Regiment, two Musketeer Regiments, one Jaeger Corps, 30 squadrons of dragoons, 3,000 men of the best light troops, 33 guns and 20 pontoons” [16, 24].
On April 10th Lieutenant-General V. Zubov’s Expeditionary Corps moved southward with a specific goal — to take Derbent by storm and dislodge the Persian troops of Agha Mohammad Khan behind the Kura River. At the same time 8,000-strong detachment of General Gudovich moved to Georgia. He was tasked not only to protect the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti from the repeated invasions of Iranian troops, but in the case of motion of Agha Mohammad Khan’s army to Derbent, hit him in the rear, cutting way for supplying the troops. Thus was supposed to take the military initiative from Iran.
In this campaign V. Zubov’s troops were divided into four brigades: the 1st Infantry Brigade under the command of General Bulgakov, the 2nd Infantry Brigade of General Rimsky-Korsakov, the 1st Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Count Bennigsen, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of General Apraksin [14, 138].
As for the types of the troops that took part in that expedition and the nature of their armament, then we should say that the core of the army was consisted of the most capable at the time Grenadier units, which were a striking force of the Russian infantry. Armed with the rifles with a fixed bayonet and sabers, grenadiers were excellent attack and defense warriors, they were specially trained melee fighters, masters of storming the fortified fortresses. Grenadiers wore red epaulets which were considered to be a hallmark of the elite units [9,121].
The Musketeers were linear infantry. They were armed almost the same way as grenadiers with smoothbore gun with a bayonet attached.
Light infantry of the Expeditionary Corps was represented by jaegers. As a rule in European armies of that time jaegers were the best riflemen, usually not tall and able to move quickly over rough terrain. They were used as snipers, scouts, patrol men or cavalry support. In contrast to the grenadiers and musketeers, the jaegers were not often used in close
combat. Jaeger’ rifles had greater range and accuracy, so they could deliver aimed fire at long distances [1, 36].
The cavalry in this campaign numbered 30 squadrons of dragoons, the total number of which was about 4 thousand riders. They had almost the same weapon as that of the grenadiers, with a small pike in addition [12, 152].
Referred to in historical literature as “3,000 men of the best light troops” apparently were Cossacks and hussars.
The artillery should be also touched on, because it is always a determining factor in choosing combat tactics. Russian troops in this campaign were armed with 33 artillery guns [16, 24]. As to the nature of these weapons, in Issue 27 1827 of “Russian History” magazine in the article about Zubov’s campaign “heavy guns” and “mortars” are mentioned to be under the walls of Derbent [6, 147]. Presumably, under the “heavy guns” it is understood the 12-pounder field guns and howitzers — “licornes”, invented by Count Shuvalov, because they were the weapon that the Russian army had in Catherine’s era.
It should be noted that the licornes were being produced of various calibers — mostly 8-and 12-pounder, more rarely 24- and 48-pounder. Licornes were able to fire the solid shot weighing up to 40 kg., as well as the bursting shell and the buckshot. It was a very effective weapon of siege and battlefield, which had enormous destructive power and the ability to fire at high elevation angle [8, 36]. Thus, Zubov evidently used them at Derbent for firing urban neighborhoods over the fortress walls. The licornes of a smaller caliber would be less effective, but the ones of a larger caliber were difficult for transporting over rough terrain, thus, 12-pounder licornes were used.
Mortars had a shorter barrel and usually a less caliber and were applied for high-angle fire [3, 95].
Russian troops were to capture the city fortified with heavy stonewalls, rather large at the time, a trade and craft center of the Eastern Caucasus. In Derbent there were 2,189 houses, 450 shops and 6 caravanserais, 30 factories producing silk, 113 paper mills, more than 50 craft workshops, 15 mosques, a mint, etc. [2, 137]. All ofthis suggests Derbent was a crowded city. It gathered merchants not only from the Caucasus, but also from Russia and the Middle East.
To defend the city Sheikh-Ali-Khan managed to gather 10,000-strong army. Reinforcements were sent to him by Dages-tani feudal lords Surkhay-Khan II ofGazikumukh [11, 104-107], Qadi ofAkusha-Dargo and Ali-Sultan ofJengutai [10, 225]. His appeals to other khans of Dagestan and to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire remained unanswered: they chose neutrality. Agha Mohammed Khan even left the South Caucasus, having retreated within his own country, though he had promised to put up 100,000-strong army against the Russians [3, 95]. It can be assumed that the Shah simply was just afraid of the open confrontation with the powerful Russia, whose army gained a victory over the Ottoman Empire.
Sheikh-Ali-Khan was armed with a few small cannons and falconets weighing about 250 kg. and with a bore diameter
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Section 3. History
of about 50 mm. Actually, as E. I. Kozubski wrote, these cannons caused virtually no harm [10, 231].
Sheikh-Ali-Khan had been intensively preparing for defense for several months — moving troops up, fortifying the gate, filling it up with stones from the inside, delivering ammunition and food to the city. In a couple of hundred meters from the north wall he built another, the third stone tower, that allowed to keep under rifle fire the approaches to the city walls. The round tower contained four floors, it was 3 fathoms (4 m.) high and 4 fathoms (5.3 meters) in diameter, the walls were 2 yards (70 cm.) thick [10, 226]. Between the towers and walls, the trench was dug. It was occupied by Sheikh-Ali-Khan’s riflemen, whose task was not to allow the enemy to come up to the tower.
On May 2nd, 1795 the Russian troops were under the ancient walls of Derbent ready for the storming. Command Headquarters decided to block the city from all sides, so as to eliminate the possibility of receiving reinforcements from outside and possible retreat in the case of the successful development of the attack.
Caspian Flotilla blockaded the city from the sea, and General Bulgakov with a unit of the troops consisting of 7 battalions, 4 companies of grenadiers and 6 artillery guns carried out a turning movement to go around the city from the flank along the upland in order to attack the southern walls [6, 140-141]. During the march General Bulgakov’s battalions were suddenly attacked by highlanders. But not distracted by the response, Bulgakov hurried out to the plain, and blockaded the southern wall of Derbent. On the north from the sea to the mountains at a distance of 4 km. the brigades of General Bennigsen, General Saveliev and General Rimsky-Korsakov stretched.
On May 4th Zubov ordered Colonel V. Krivtsov and a battalion of infantry and two companies of grenadiers to seize one of the towers, which made it impossible to approach the city walls, and to set a battery there. However, the desperately resisted defenders of the tower did not allow capturing it. The storming ended for attackers with a loss of 25 killed and 72 wounded, including Colonel Krivtsov and Major Veryovkin who suffered serious wounds. The direct fire with 12-pounder cannon also caused no harm either to the tower or to the city walls. Bulgakov’s attempt to seize the southern gate of Derbent by march failed as well. The defenders stubbornly resisted there too [10, 231].
Only the second better-prepared attempt succeeded to take the front tower. The grenadiers of Voronezh Regiment managed to climb over the wall to the roof and there from, removing the floor slabs and shooting defenders from above, captured the tower. Grenadiers’ losses during the tower assault totaled 180 of the 250 soldiers killed and wounded.
At the same time jaegers attacked Sheikh-Ali-Khan’s riflemen seated in a trench, in order to prevent their aimed fire at the grenadiers, who were storming the tower. After the fall of the tower Sheikh-Ali-Khan’s riflemen left the trench
and retreated into the city as it did not make sense defending the trench anymore.
After that Russian troops were able to come to a sufficient distance to the city wall in order to lay breaching-batteries. On a hill to the north-west of the citadel Narynkala there was constructed a breaching-battery of four 12-pounder licornes and one mortar. The fortress turned out to be a few dozens meters lower relatively to the battery. The same breaching-battery of five licornes and one mortar was laid in 200 meters from the southern corner tower. To the west and the north from the citadel in several sites there were also staged two cannons a place that were to strike the city blocks [6, 148]. So Derbent found itself tightly blocked on all sides. Citadel Narynkala and its palace complex were in full view expecting a hard fate to be destroyed.
On the morning of May 7th Commander Lieutenant-General V Zubov ordered to start shelling the city. For four days the artillery was striking high-angle fire over the tower walls directly on city blocks, causing serious damage.
Most effectively a breaching-battery operated opposite to the southern corner tower as it was firing the tower and the palace behind the wall. Probably that was what prompted the defenders to take a desperate step: they dug an underground passage under the wall and made a night raid. The traces of that passage were discovered in 2011 by Doctor of Historical Sciences Murtazali S. Gadzhiev during the archaeological expedition of DSC RAS (the Dagestan Science Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences) [4, 56-81].
Apparently, that raid was not successful, they couldn’t capture the breaching-battery because later one of the eyewitnesses recalled that “the five-cannon battery opposite to the corner tower on the south side of the city acted so successfully that by noon the aforesaid tower was destroyed by three meters on top; equally other batteries also caused great damage to the city” [6, 151].
The number of casualties and destruction grew rapidly. Although the defenders were ready to continue defending, the city population began to demand to surrender it, as they did not want to expose the complete destruction of the city. Moreover, the inhabitants who were mostly artisans and merchants, were initially for the surrender of the city without resistance because they were interested in closer economic and trade relations with Russia.
On May 10th the defenders hoisted a white flag. The delegation came to Zubov asking to stop shelling the city and to negotiate the terms for surrender. The Russian command put forward tough conditions, in fact the ultimatum: the unconditional surrender, the surrender of all firearms by the defenders of the city and the surrender Sheikh Ali Khan into captivity. The delegation returned to the fortress to pass the terms. At the same time, in order to make Sheikh-Ali-Khan more tractable, the shelling of the city was continued [13, 357].
In case if the defenders of Derbent had not laid down their arms during the day, V. Zubov would have begun to prepare the assault, which had been scheduled on the night
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Tactics and armament of the Russian troops in the capture of Derbent fortress in 1796
of 11 to 12 of May. Under the plan, from the seaside General Bennigsen with the Vladimir Dragoon Regiment and the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment was to storm lower quarters of the city, and from the west and south Bulgakov and Rimsky-Korsakov’s infantry were to take the citadel Narynkala by storm [6, 153].
However, the assault did not take place. On the evening of May 11th the gates of Derbent was opened, Zubov was reported that the garrison was ready to surrender.
Sheikh Ali Khan was taken prisoner; the Khan gave dignity to his sister Peridzha-Khanum, with whom General Savelyev’s garrison of 3 infantry battalions and 200 Cossacks with 4 guns was kept [7, 96].
The capture of Derbent, and besides without spending a lot of effort and suffering serious casualties, had enormous military and political significance for Russia.
Since then till our times Derbent has remained the Russian city.
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