Сумма всех страхов: ядерная угроза вновь становится источником небезопасности в Европе Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

С. РОБЕРТС

СУММА ВСЕХ СТРАХОВ: ЯДЕРНАЯ УГРОЗА ВНОВЬ СТАНОВИТСЯ ИСТОЧНИКОМ НЕБЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В ЕВРОПЕ

The sum of all fears: Nuclear threats reemerge as a source of European insecurity

Аннотация. В статье анализируются угрозы, связанные с возможностью применения ядерного оружия в условиях углубления кризиса диалога между Евро-Атлантическим сообществом и Россией. Автор предприняла попытку сравнить нынешний кризис диалога РФ и коллективного Запада с наиболее острыми моментами холодной войны, когда угроза применения атомного и водородного оружия становилась реальной.

Abstract. The article analyses the challenges, which are connected with the opportunity оf nuclear weapon usage within the framework of Russian and Euro-Atlantic dialogue crisis. The author compares modern crisis in Western-Russian relations with the most dangerous moments during the «mld war», when the opportunity of atomic and hydrogen weapons usage became real.

Ключевые слова: международные отношения, ядерное оружие, холодная война, Россия, США, НАТО, политический кризис на Украине.

Keywords: international relations, nuclear weapon, the Cold War, Russia, the United States, NATO, Ukrainian crisis.

One of the striking distinctions between the last quarter century of U.S. - Russian relations and the Cold War is that periods of competition and crisis have not been punctuated by nuclear threats.

During the Cold War, every U.S. - Soviet crisis was a nuclear crisis, even if only implicitly, given the militarized and ideological basis of East -West competition. However, to the alarm of the United States and other Western governments, Russian President Vladimir Putin has resurrected nuclear saber rattling, particularly since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin issues public reminders that Russia is adding to it's nuclear arsenal, that it would use nuclear weapons to defend Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, and that Western economic «blackmail» creates destabilizing «discord between large nuclear powers».

Speaking at the pro-Kremlin National Youth Forum in 2014, he boasted that when it comes to military conflict, «it's best not to mess with us» [«должны понимать, что с нами лучше не связываться, что касается возможного вооруженного конфликта»]. «Thank God, I think no one is thinking of unleashing a large-scale conflict with Russia», - Vladimir Putin added. «I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear powers». In June 2015, after Vladimir Putin bombastically announced the deployment of 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg insisted that Russia's «nuclear saber rattling» was «unjustified» and had to stop. «It's destabilizing and it's dangerous», he explained.

Other Russian officials have been even more explicit, threatening to target Denmark with nuclear weapons if it joins the U.S.-led missile defense system and publicly boosting previous calls for Russian military doctrine to embrace a pre-emptive or preventive nuclear posture. At the same time, Russian nuclear-capable bombers are flying more aggressive patrols into or along opponents' air space, military exercises have shown integrated nuclear and dual use platforms and simulated nuclear attacks on NATO countries, and American officials believe that Russia is developing a new cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Under this important treaty, the US and USSR agreed to redeploy land-based missiles around Europe to avoid risking that their short warning times will provoke uncontrollable escalation in a crisis.

After Russia demonstrated its willingness to use force to change borders in Ukraine and challenge the European status quo, NATO had

to face the possibility of further acts of aggression. Perhaps most alarming, senior American, European and NATO officials believe that Russia may employ coercive nuclear threats or even demonstration nuclear strikes to «de-escalate» conflicts launched by Russia to support land grabs in the former Soviet space, particularly in the Baltic states.

Such nuclear threats or detonations would signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to retreat. In March 2015 in Tallinn, Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary General of NATO and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, reportedly described this scenario at a conference in Tallinn, suggesting that Moscow might use a low yield tactical nuclear weapon against a «European city or a Western tank division» to end the conflict on Russian terms while avoiding escalation to all-out nuclear war. British general Sir Adrian Bradshaw, NATO's deputy supreme allied commander in Europe similarly warns of Russian escalation dominance in future offensive regional operations [Ahmed, 2015; Farmer, 2015].

A consensus among Washington-based defense officials, analysts, and consultants supports such scenarios and perceptions of the Russian nuclear threat. Drawing on interpretations of Russian military doctrine and military exercises, the dominant view holds that Russia has adopted a doctrine to use non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) offensively, i.e., not for deterrence, but for coercion, territorial aggression, and regional dominance [Comment.., 2015].

Non-strategic nuclear weapons (sometimes called «tactical nuclear weapons») are shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads than those used for intercontinental weapons and could be used to attack troops or other targets on the battlefield. NSNW is the only category of weapons in which Russia has numerical superiority over the US / NATO, which helps compensate for its inferiority in strategic weapons [Arbatov, 2011; Saradzhyan, 2010]. It is also the least transparent capability both in terms of numbers and types and also its role in Russian military strategy1.

1 These include a variety of types from the U.S. air delivered gravity bombs forward deployed in Europe to the Russian cruise missiles of various ranges, short-range ballistic missiles, and torpedoes. Warheads for antiballistic missile systems and air defense missiles may also be included, but the non-strategic nuclear category excludes all intercontinental missiles and nuclear

In 2014, the United States and NATO began implementing military measures to bolster the credibility of the Article 5 guarantee of collective defense against a feared Russian intervention on the pretext of protecting Russian-speakers living within NATO member countries or other forms of Russian coercion or attack on a NATO member. These measures include the creation of robust NATO rapid reaction forces, small NATO headquarters in six eastern member states, including all three Baltic states, forward deployment of armor and other equipment, and persistent exercises of U.S. and allied troops.

They are designed to deter Russian aggression, in part by the creation of a new «trip wire» to the full weight of NATO's military power. After pulling all U.S. tanks out of Europe in December 2013, the restoration of a brigade's complement of armor signals a credible commitment to the collective defense of all members of the alliance. NATO will not redress Russia's local military advantages with these deployments, and so far seems reluctant to renege on its pledge in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that the alliance has «no intention, no plan and no reason» to deploy «substantial» combat forces or nuclear weapons «on the territory of new members». Nonetheless, such measures underscore how much has changed since President Obama

warheads for strategic bombers as defined by New START and those retired from the stockpile. Russia has a significant edge over the U.S. in non-strategic nuclear weapons possessing an estimated 3,700-5,400 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, of which some 2,000 are deliverable (although the Russian government asserts that the warheads are stored apart from launch systems). Russia has never disclosed the number and types of weapons in its non-strategic nuclear stockpile. The United States now has about 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in five European countries and the rest stored in the United States. The 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) led to substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian deployments of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia was estimated to have between 15,000 and 21,700 non-strategic nuclear warheads and reduced about 75% of the total. It also declared that all ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear warheads be eliminated, but instead these systems are apparently being modernized, including the new ground-launched cruise missile that might constitute a violation of the INF Treaty being developed for the SS-26 Iskander launcher [см.: Kristensen and Norris, 2015; Woolf, 2015]. - Прим. авт.

signed Presidential Policy Directive-24 in 2013, which calls for reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in national security strategy and maintaining deterrence with smaller nuclear forces on the premise that, despite differences, «Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries and the prospects of a military confrontation between us have declined dramatically».

Besides the new show of force in the border zone with Russia, the United States signaled it was stepping up its extended nuclear deterrence obligations by redeploying two B-2 heavy bombers to Britain in the spring of 2014. In October 2015, the U.S. Air Force also started to deploy modernized B61 nuclear bombs to Germany's Buchel air force base, replacing 20 weapons as part of a broader nuclear modernization initiative launched by the U.S. in 2010. The B61 air-dropped nuclear bomb is one of the oldest atomic weapons in the U.S. arsenal, but it has a variable yield for use against small battlefield targets or large cities. NATO had begun preparing countermeasures against Russian nuclear threats prior to 2014, apparently including means to pre-empt Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons, with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon's strategic planning document, stated the objectives plainly: «Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the United States, and through extended deterrence, it... reassure[s] our distant allies of their security against regional aggression. It also supports our ability to project power by communicating to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression» [U.S. .., 2014].

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration also emphasized the role that long-range, non-nuclear systems could play in supporting «U.S. regional deterrence and reassurance goals» while reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. It envisioned a prompt global strike capability as «particularly valuable for the defeat of time-urgent regional threats» [U.S. .., 2010]. These statements followed the Bush Administration's 2006 QDR's articulation of an expanded need for prompt global strike capabilities «to attack fixed, hard and deeply buried, mobile and re-locatable targets with im-

proved accuracy anywhere in the world promptly upon the President's order».

For its part, Moscow has a long list of grievances against the West that appear to be climaxing as Russia's capabilities and military modernization programs are bearing fruit. These include not only the expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions, particularly NATO, into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space, but also the associated spread of «color revolutions» that could threaten the stability of the Putin regime. Above all, Putin could not accept «ousting» Russia from the former Soviet space, an essential buffer zone and sphere of Russian interests. This is at the core of the Russian narrative regarding both the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and the conflict against Ukraine1.

For many years, Russia's behavior has been alternately reactive and defensive, to protect core interests and its perceived rightful sphere of influence, and assertive and offensive, to erode and revise the rules and architecture of the European security order in which it has only a partial stake and that were put in place while it was prostrate from the USSR's collapse2.

Ukraine is a brighter red line than Georgia and an opportunity to demonstrate Russia's renewed power capabilities and will to use them. From the Kremlin's vantage point, the West provoked the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych's legitimate government to expand its influence on Russia's borders. Putin reportedly felt betrayed, first by Yanukovych's self-aggrandizing maneuvers, and then by the Europeans and President Obama who asked the Russian president to persuade Yanukovych to

1 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to put a positive spin on what has long been Russian policy: «We will do everything possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO and to avoid the possible worsening of relations with the alliance, its leading member states and our neighbors». -Прим. авт.

2 Cynthia Roberts shows that for a long time, the Russian leadership «failed to understand that when post-communist states negotiate to join existing regimes, the terms are essentially nonnegotiable; existing rulemakers hold all the cards and the aspirant's domestic constraints mostly hinder the necessary adjustments» [Roberts, 2010, p. 61]. - Прим. авт.

agree to the brokered deal for political change and resist further use of force, but failed to keep their end of the deal.

At the same time, the development of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe and advanced conventional global strike systems are viewed as threatening Russia's nuclear deterrent. If the U.S. can to exploit its varied technological advances to undermine Russia's deterrent, it is easier to extend its security guarantees and dominance in Russia's neighborhood.

From space-based to cyber and improvements in information and communications to exotic weapons based on new principles (e.g., beam, wave, genetic), high-tech weapons systems, according to Putin, will become «comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more 'acceptable' in terms of political and military ideology». In words that hark back to the forward-thinking 1980 s chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Putin maintains that «as high-precision longrange conventional weapons become increasingly common, they will tend to become the means of achieving a decisive victory over an opponent, including in a global conflict» [Путин, 2012].

However, Russians fear that along with other improvements in counter-force capabilities, the near-term result will be meaningful U.S. strategic advantages. Regarding NSNW, there is also concern that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will be deployed on the territories of new NATO member states, specifically Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Baltic States which may still possess storage facilities and air fields from past Soviet deployments that could be used by NATO's dual-capable aircraft [Kolbin, 2013].

Armed with grievances and closely deployed forces, the danger is that one or both sides will misinterpret threats and that an escalating arms race will intensify the emerging European security dilemma. Although unlikely, it is also no longer unthinkable that miscalculations about preemptive advantages during a crisis could increase the chance of war [George, 1991, p. 23-24; Jervis, 1978, p. 167-214].

Some knowledgeable observers dismiss such developments as «nuclear hysteria» that is partly psychological and not so consequential as to prevent rational discourse and cooperative policies. Others question Russian officials' «nuclear euphoria», noting that «even Soviet

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propagandists never allowed themselves to speak so flippantly about the prospect of nuclear war» [flBopKWH, 2015; Golts, 2015].

Although both views have merit, sound policy making requires a clearer appreciation of the contending strategic incentives and contexts underlying the return of nuclear threats. To sharpen the analysis, this article distinguishes between nuclear signaling and bluster, on the one hand, and nuclear doctrine and operational force planning on the other. The first type of nuclear tactic is more opaque and shadowy in terms of desired objectives, so it is difficult to gauge its significance or measure tangible gains.

The second creates nuclear threats in support of military objectives. In extreme cases, these can foster escalatory pressures and miscalculations that lead one or both sides to the brink of nuclear war, and in the worst case into the abyss. American strategists hold that the reciprocal fear of surprise attack increases temptations in a crisis to strike first [Schelling, 1966, p. 187-207]. This is the crux of the dilemma that may emerge from NATO's fears of an offensive use of Russia's de-escalation nuclear tactic.

Nuclear Signaling and Saber Rattling

Political leaders may engage in nuclear saber rattling to signal their interests while still being ambiguous about what actions they would take. Alternatively they may deliberately raise the risks of war, expecting the opponent will respond cautiously and concede in a geopolitical dispute instead of chancing a nuclear conflagration. This type of nuclear blackmail or coercion is extremely rare and «never as blatant as a direct ultimatum», according to an important study on this topic [Betts, 1987, p. 8].

The difference between these two kinds of nuclear maneuvers, according to Richard Betts, is equivalent to that between Russian roulette and chess. The «incautious approach», assumes that the opponent is not strongly motivated to risk war and will be dissuaded from «pushing his luck in the gamble of confrontation» when faced with a strong possibility of disaster [Betts, 1987, p. 12].

This tactic involves manipulating risks that if followed through would be suicidal or what Schelling calls the «threat that leaves

something to chance». Particularly when one side resorts to brinkmanship, Schelling is clear that «it means manipulating the shared risk of war» and «there has to be some uncertainty or anticipated irrationality or it won't work» [Schelling, 1966]. The alternative «more cautious risk-minimizing» approach assumes that the initiator is incentivized to use force to realize his objectives and is gambling that his opponent will exercise «prudence and nuclear restraint».

Although not trivial, nuclear threats have usually been «hesitant and elliptical» in practice, with ambiguous signals of intentions, constituting «a tentative sort of blackmail, something halfway between stark blackmail and shifty bluff» [Betts, 1987, p. 8]. With the notable exception of Russia's warnings that Crimea falls under the state's nuclear deterrent after its absorption in 2014, much of Moscow's recent nuclear muscle-flexing fits in the category of vague threats. Some amount to little more than cheap talk and bluff, such as the ill-informed remark by the Russian ambassador to Denmark, Mikhail Vanin, that «Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles», if Denmark joins NATO's missile defense system.

Historically, American leaders have been more prone to make nuclear threats than their Soviet or Russian counterparts. These tended to be ambiguous rather than direct coercive threats, despite mixed messages (especially by Eisenhower) and subsequent claims by the participants (e.g. Truman) [Gavin, 2014, p. 11-36]. Although nuclear brinkmanship had plenty of admirers among policymakers during the Cold War, when Schelling formulated his theory, few leaders actually practiced it and it produced only a mixed record of success. Most notably, the Eisenhower administration's threats to «respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing», including the use of atomic weapons against China, if it expanded the war in Indochina in 1954, had the desired effect: the Chinese leadership modified its position and pressured the Viet Minh to make concessions for a negotiated settlement [Trachtenberg, 2013; Roberts, 2014].

However, when President Richard Nixon tried to replicate Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's nuclear tactic of scaring «the hell out of people» to coerce the Soviet Union and North Vietnam to be more accommodating in peace talks, it had little impact. In fact, Scott Sagan

and Jeremi Suri show that when Nixon ratcheted up nuclear alert levels for coercive ends it «produced the worst of all worlds... (it was both)ineffective and dangerous» [Sagan, Suri, 2003, p. 150-183; Kimball, 1998].

After Khrushchev, Soviet leaders were more reticent about bellying up to the brink and more satisfied with maintaining strategic deterrence. This is what makes Vladimir Putin so different from Brezhnev and his successors. Putin's approach to Ukraine bears some similarities to Khrushchev's strategy in Germany. Khrushchev was confronted with a West German leadership bolstered by economic recovery, increasingly serious in its nuclear ambitions, and eager for reunification on Western terms; he also faced challenges to his authority at home and elsewhere in the communist world.

Putin, similarly, seems to have feared that Ukraine might irrevocably leave the Russian orbit after Yanukovych's exit, threatening vital Russian political, economic and security interests, and Putin's domestic popularity. For both Khrushchev and Putin, a competition in risk-taking offered an attractive chance to solve multiple international and domestic challenges in one swoop, forcing others to compromise in unwanted tests of wills [Roberts, 2014]. Otherwise, Khrushchev held a weak hand and was unable to oppose NATO effectively in a conventional war over Berlin [Fursenko, Naftali, 2006].

For his part, Putin could not restore the status quo ante, but by threatening to escalate the violence he has extracted political concessions from Kiev and may succeed in preventing it from joining NATO. The shadowy nature of Putin's threat making was captured in a television broadcast about Crimea in March 2015. This purported documentary shows President Putin recounting a tense standoff, saying he feared that NATO was not only luring Ukraine away from its close relationship with Russia, but also for the fate of Crimea «which isn't just any territory, for us, it is historically Russian territory». Asked if Russia was prepared to bring its nuclear weapons into play, Putin said: «We were ready to do it. I talked with colleagues and told them that this (Crimea) is our historic territory, Russian people live there, they are in danger; we cannot leave them». Moscow had no choice but to act, according to Putin.

How exactly President Putin might have used Russian nuclear weapons was not made clear. Would an attempt by Ukraine to reassert its control and sovereignty over Crimea have led to an attack on Kiev or a demonstration strike on some provincial Ukrainian city? If NATO countries had intervened to assist in the retaking of Crimea, as Washington had gathered a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraq's aggression in 1991, would this have provoked a major nuclear war in Europe, and possibly escalating to the U.S. and Russian homelands? That Putin was ambiguous, not explicit, about Moscow's planning may suggest the threat is not credible. On the other hand, the Eisenhower years demonstrate that even vague threats can achieve useful deterrent effects without the added costs of an unambiguous coercive threat, notably a sharply narrowed set of subsequent policy options.

Marc Trachtenberg suggests, «It might be enough to just create a big question mark in the enemy's mind». He shows that both Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, fully appreciated that tying one's own hands with direct threats could «be hard to back down from» and would alarm America's allies and own citizens [Trachtenberg, 2013].

Thus, in 1954, as the crisis in Indochina was coming to a head, Trachtenberg quotes Eisenhower as thinking «It was important that we not let the Russians think that we might not resist» but «it was not well to tell the Russians everything as to what we would or would not do» [Trachtenberg, 2013]. Perhaps an ambiguous threat in the 1950 s was sufficient, however, because of the backdrop of the well-known U.S. nuclear strategy of «massive retaliation», which Soviet leaders took very seriously. Khrushchev called it «barefaced atomic blackmail» and complained «it had to be reckoned with at the time because we did not possess sufficient means of retaliation».

If Russia's nuclear deterrent is more assured today, the larger balance of power still overwhelmingly favors the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, since NATO's 2008 decision to admit Ukraine and Georgia at some future date and the E.U.'s 2009 Eastern Partnership initiative to forge closer ties with six East European countries, the West has been advancing deeper into Russia's shrunken sphere of influence in its bor-

derlands, which Moscow considers encroaching on both its security and the natural prerogatives of any great power.

These factors suggest Russia's recent actions, including in Ukraine, may stem more from defensive expansionist impulses than revisionist territorial ambitions increasing the likelihood of nuclear bluster. An added factor insufficiently appreciated in the American defense community is that after invoking Novorossiya and protection of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in April 2014, Putin subsequently dropped such references, recognizing that the citizens of Donbas did not want to take up the fight against Kiev. Adjusting to realities, Moscow now emphasizes that the rebel Donetsk and Luhansk republics should be reintegrated into Ukraine, which of course would still give the Kremlin useful leverage over Kiev.

Geopolitical factors should not be discounted considering Russia has not held a uniform view on NATO and relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions in the last 25 years. Since the Gorbachev era, Russian views on NATO enlargement have shifted between two approaches interspersed with periods of benign neglect. What used to be called the Shevarnadze approach (associated with the Soviet foreign minister) favors a transformed relationship with East European countries based on full equality, sovereignty, and independence and accepts Western ties as a means of promoting stability, freeing Moscow from the cost of buttressing poor, ineffective governments. The alternative, known as the «Falin Doctrine»1, advocates an active policy to protect Russia's «reserves of influence», and to establish a buffer zone with neutral or finlandized states in Eastern Europe while preventing close security relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

The Falin Doctrine dominated in 1991 until the failed coup in August when the Shevardnadze line regained the initiative under Yeltsin's first Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, thus making possible new bilateral treaties with former Warsaw Pact members. But, economic crisis coupled with politically charged resentment over lost positions to the West gradually fed a benign neglect in lieu of a systematic long-term

1 Named after a report prepared for the Soviet leadership in January 1991 under the direction of Valentin Falin, then head of the Central Committee's International Department, which sought these objectives. - Прим. авт.

policy to address the implications of the East Europeans seeking to join Euro-Atlantic institutions [Larrabee, 2003]. After taking the helm, Putin displayed an openness to cooperate with Western institutions and even considered Russia's semi-political integration (without conditionally) into NATO and the E.U. However, his European strategy was premised on a Concert structure in which Russia was entitled by its great power status to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, particularly in the former Soviet republics, to assure its security and protects its interests.

Also significant in evaluating recent nuclear threats is that throughout the entire Putin era, the threat of major war has always been described as low. Putin himself has repeatedly made remarks such as «the probability of a global war between nuclear powers is not high, because that would mean the end of civilization. As long as the «powder» of our strategic nuclear forces created by the tremendous efforts of our fathers and grandfathers remains dry, no one would dare launch a large-scale aggression against us» [Путин, 2012]. Equally important, there is no concrete evidence of risky policies suggesting that Russia is on any of the «paths to war» that give early warning that the outbreak of war may be imminent [Copeland, 2000].

The most hawkish members of the Russian president's team, such as Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the FSB and now Secretary of the Security Council, darkly describe the threat from the West as the intent to «destroy Russia as a state» and demand higher military expenditures and preventive or preemptive strikes to counter it. But Putin does not go that far, preferring instead to signal that the West is on the verge of over-stepping. In an April 17, 2014 interview, Putin declared, «We have reached a point beyond which we cannot retreat». A year later at the Petersburg Economic Summit he objected to an American interviewer's use of the term «aggressive», explaining that Russia has become «more persistent in (asserting) our interests» after decades of being ignored.

Yet Russian officials are concerned that the U.S. has increasingly acquired the counter-force and command and control capabilities to deny Russia the ability to operate freely in the post-Soviet space. This may explain why Putin is trying to leverage Russia's still formidable nuclear stockpile into a political tool to contest America's superior power where it matters most - in Russia's borderlands. According to a

well-connected Russian defense analyst, «Russia's leaders know they can't respond to the United States with a conventional attack so they have to resort to brinkmanship» [NATO.., 2015]. Few Western observers have bothered to ask whether the Russian military would support a major, and thus overt, military intervention in Ukraine; but they should pay close attention to the answer. Knowing that large-scale Russian operations could provoke a U.S. and NATO armed response, one notable observer holds that under no circumstances should the Russian Armed Forces be allowed to be drawn into the conflict. Russia is not ready for large-scale armed confrontation using only conventional weapons, given America's enormous technological superiority.

According to a well-respected military commentator, they would only be able to hold out «for a few hours». The idea that Russia could then threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the Western advance into Southeastern Ukraine is a double edged sword and fantasy [Ходарёнок, 2015; Арбатов, 2015]. When the Kremlin's initial attempt at brinkmanship failed to convince the West of Russia's larger stakes in Ukraine, it resorted to nuclear bluster as a warning to NATO to stay out. As Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council, observes, «no one really knows if Putin is ready to launch a nuclear war. Maybe Putin himself doesn't know». But the President's message is clear: «We can be more decisive than our opponents and they should keep that in mind. Who is readier to escalate: Barack Obama or Vladimir Putin? The answer is evident» [NATO.., 2015].

Military Doctrine and Operational Policy

Russia's nuclear rhetoric signals it is more resolved than in the past to assert its perceived prerogatives and draw firmer red lines to defend its interests. But this doesn't necessarily translate into the adoption of a more aggressive or reckless nuclear doctrine regarding the employment of nuclear weapons [Арбатов, 2015]. The Warsaw Pact, for instance, was oblivious to Khrushchev's installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba [Mastny, Byrne, 2005, p. 20]. Nuclear threats by some American presidents, according to available information, did not necessarily correlate with shifts in U.S. nuclear doctrine, indicating a greater willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively or preventively in a

crisis. Arguably, the United States pursued nuclear superiority and counterforce options throughout the Cold War, but not all presidents embraced brinkmanship or made explicit coercive nuclear threats. None sought to exploit the U.S. nuclear arsenal for territorial aggrandizement. Kennedy believed he had a first strike option but acted prudently while Nixon cursed the loss of American superiority yet remained willing to make coercive nuclear threats [Gavin, 2012]. At the same time, extended nuclear deterrence in Europe was a more rational policy choice when the US possessed nuclear superiority and had a chance to disarm the Soviet Union. NATO's strategy of nuclear first use was meant to deter Soviet aggression even after the USSR achieved rough parity. The Alliance's objectives are defensive, but NATO declared that, if necessary, it would use nuclear weapons first on the battlefield to make its commitments credible. If that failed to deter or stop aggression by the Warsaw Pact, NATO sought to convince Moscow that it was prepared to escalate up the nuclear chain to strikes against the Soviet Union.

The U.S. pursued counterforce options both during and after the Cold War to ensure that the risks of disaster resulting from a failure of deterrence would be disproportionately higher on its opponents, and expected Moscow to act more cautiously as a result [Lieber, Press, 2006; Long, Green, 2015]. In recent decades, this pursuit of counterforce has extended to the application of advanced technologies to both nuclear and conventional weapons, prompting Russian concerns about multiple sources of vulnerability to its strategic nuclear forces and escalatory pressures. Despite improvements in Russian nuclear weapon systems in early warning and mobility that help reduce vulnerabilities to a disarming first strike, Russia's nuclear rhetoric reflects greater weaknesses than strengths.

Especially in the European theatre, Russia will never give up nuclear use if faced with the prospect of defeat. This was reflected in Russia's early doctrinal statements, and first use of nuclear weapons in regional conventional wars was specified in «The Immediate Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces RF (2003)» [AKryanbHbie.., 2003]. Russia continues to strive for last minute preemption options against NATO nuclear first use [Hines, Mishulovich, Shulle, 1995]. Whether or

not it is feasible, the objective involves a «converging or meeting strike» (встречный удар) in which there is simultaneous nuclear release by both sides' forces [Mastny, Byrne, 2005].

As recently as 2015, senior military scientists criticized the current emphasis in military doctrine on conventional deterrence, arguing that a realistic threat scenario of local wars in which Russia faces a surprise attack consisting of massive missile and air strikes, preceded by other means including space and information warfare, cannot be managed solely with Russian conventional forces. According to the authors, the threat of a major regional conflict must also involve nuclear capabilities, first for deterrence and if necessary, «literally from the first minutes», a retaliatory strike against the aggressor «буквально с первых минут действий нанести ответно-встречные удары по его» (агрессору. -Авт.) [Полетаев, Алферов, 2015].

The tables are turned in the balance of conventional forces in comparison to the Cold War when Russia held certain numerical advantages and hoped to use its superior strength to win conventionally across Western Europe before NATO resorted to the use of its tactical nuclear weapons. To deter NATO's use of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union threatened immediate escalation to all-out nuclear war. However, despite the proliferation of tactical and operational nuclear weapons, both sides sought to keep a European conflict limited to conventional forces.

By the late 1960 s, Moscow knew from its operational research the devastating impact that nuclear weapons would have on battlefield operations1. The Soviets expanded and reequipped their ground forces, established Operational Maneuver Groups and sought to develop more capable tactical aircraft to offset an obvious area of Western strength [McConnell, 1983]. NATO also reassessed the balance and pushed its own revolution in military affairs in the 1970 s-1980 s to gain significant advantages in an air-land battle, particularly in air power and precision weapons. Today, Russia would be hard pressed to challenge the U.S. and NATO conventional edge, despite their reduced capabilities in Europe, except in the border areas and only if conflicts could be

1 Thanks to Vitalii Tsygischko for reference [Tsygischko, 2006, p. 65]. -Прим. авт.

contained. Some Russian experts estimate U.S. conventional superiority ranges from 12:1 to 60:1 [Национальная оборона.., 2015]. Not surprisingly, many Russian experts embrace tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses. The catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons «strengthens their role as a political instrument in preventing regional and large-scale wars in the first place» [Хряпин, Калинкин, Матвичук, 2015, с. 18-22].

The asymmetry in comprehensive military power between Russia and NATO persists despite the fact Russia doubled its military spending between 2004 and 2014, funded a wholesale modernization of its nuclear capabilities, and plans to upgrade 70 percent of total military equipment in the decade to 2020. During the last decade, Russia made notable progress modernizing its conventional forces, in honing a spearhead capability and asymmetrical warfare tactics to create local advantages against regional opponents like the Baltic states that lack strong defenses and strategic depth.

But in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5 ISR), Russia's technological level does not allow it to dominate the battle space to permit real-time ISR and counter-force targeting at a level equivalent to the U.S. Some Russian experts also underscore Russia's present inability to even assess damage after a NATO strike employing conventional high-precision weapons [Аксёнов, Третьяков, Филин, 2015].

Strategic realities therefore suggest it would be folly for Russia to provoke a war against NATO. Nonetheless, when U.S. officials and analysts marshal the evidence and endeavor to connect the dots, the picture they see is future Russian aggression bolstered by selective use of nuclear threats or detonations to end conflicts on favorable terms. This scenario hinges in part on a perceived lack of will in NATO countries to risk major war in Europe to defend former Soviet republics that joined the alliance when Russia was too weak to recoup its imperial losses and expected to gradually converge to Western values1. The

1 At least half in three of the eight NATO countries [surveyed] say that their government should not use military force in such circumstances. The strongest opposition to responding with armed force is in Germany (58%), fol-

Western threat perception builds primarily on interpretations of Russian military exercises, selective reading of Russian military writings, and worst case assumptions about Russian intentions after Ukraine [Adamsky, If.., 2014, p. 163-188; Adamsky, Nuclear.., 2014, p. 91-134]. Given serious concerns that Moscow might threaten or use tactical nuclear weapons to conquer and hold new territory, American officials believe that they must find a way to manage escalation risks to NATO's advantage. In theory, Washington could opt to challenge Russia's presumed escalation dominance by pre-empting and destroying Russian tactical nuclear systems before they can be used.

Although not all of the evidence is in the public domain, Russian military doctrine under Putin is not unambiguously more offensive than it was two decades ago under Boris Yeltsin - despite the recent nuclear bluster and apparent lobbying by high-placed «siloviki» to make it more assertive. In September 2014, in the midst of the war in Ukraine and following NATO's condemnation of Russia's actions at its Wales Summit, Putin ordered a new version of Russia's military doctrine to be prepared by December. Here was potentially a test of Russia's nuclear intentions, and analysts debated whether it would differ markedly from the most recent version of the military doctrine that was produced in 2010.

Viewed in the context of the post-Soviet period as a whole, Russian doctrinal statements have evolved since the first version was adopted in 1993, but there has been notable consistency on nuclear issues. The most important change came right after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the country's armed forces were debilitated, and Russia chose to jettison its declaratory policy of «no first use» of nuclear weapons. In a time of severe resource constraints, President Boris Yeltsin prioritized maintaining the strategic nuclear deterrent and in 1997 replaced General Igor Rodionov as Minister of Defense, who balked at personnel cuts and advocated for the traditional service arms. Rodionov warned that NATO expansion and Russian military weakness might require Russia to increase deployments of «tactical nuclear weapons at our border» [Kipp, 2001].

lowed by France (53%) and Italy (51%). [Simmons, Stokes, Poushter, 2015]. -Прим. авт.

By the end of the decade, NATO's 1999 war over Kosovo solidified in the minds of the Russian military and political leadership the importance of nuclear weapons to deter coercion and interventions on Russia's borders. The Russians were shocked that the United States and its NATO allies, without UN approval (to avoid a Russian veto), could effectively bomb Serbian targets to protect ethnic Kosovars without engaging Serbia troops on the ground (which Russian analysts called «contactless war»). Although NATO's use of airpower was not successful by itself in achieving the desired political objective (and required then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's personal intervention to convince Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate), Russian observers focused on the implications for future wars.

The United States through its development of what Russians call a «reconnaissance-strike complex» was able to exercise real-time control and rapid kills of both stationary and mobile targets throughout the theater of military operations. Lacking any equivalent capability, Russia responded with draft security concepts emphasizing the tailored use of nuclear weapons to particular threats and various contingencies involving «aggression on any scale, nuclear or otherwise» and «to the desired extent of damage» [Blank, 2000, p. 10]. Gradually, Russia's nuclear weapons acquired a regional mission to deter or end large-scale conventional attack through limited use of nuclear weapons [Adamsky. Nuclear.., 2014, p. 91-134].

In 2000, a new version of the Russian military doctrine was adopted which embodied the new appreciation of nuclear weapons and the current constraints: «The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation» [Военная.., 2000].

Russian military exercises in the late 1990-s and early 2000-s reflected lessons from Kosovo and the earlier Gulf War between the U.S. and Iraq as well as the shift in thinking about nuclear employment policy embodied in the 2000 military doctrine and other documents. Start-

ing with Zapad-99, several exercises envisioned NATO interventions in local conflicts along Russia's periphery. This one was set in the Baltics and specified large-scale NATO «aggression against Russia and its allies», with aircraft and guided missile strikes against Belarus and Kaliningrad. To avert a possible defeat, Russia responded with limited nuclear strikes by cruise missiles launched from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers «against the countries from whose territories the offensive was launched».

In other exercises there were concurrent launches of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These simulated nuclear strikes were designed to demonstrate resolve and stop wars against NATO [Sokov, 2004; Kipp, 2001]. Afterwards, Yeltsin congratulated the participants but dismissed the threat of large-scale military aggression against Russia as «something for sci-fi books». However, the discussion and debate over how best to employ nuclear weapons in the face of regional conventional conflicts continued.

Recognizing that it would take a decade or more to reform the conventional forces, Russian military theorists were already developing non-traditional concepts for the employment of nuclear weapons, focusing on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The idea that generated particular attention and discussion concerns the use of nuclear weapons for the «de-escalation of military action». The proposal was to use nuclear weapons to stop to a conventional conflict before suffering defeat. The article that sparked the most discussion of this concept was published in1999 in the General Staff journal, «Военная мысль» and co-authored by a major general and two colonels [Левшин, Неделин, Сосновский, 1999, с. 34-37; Сиволоб, Сосновский, 1999].

The concept they laid out requires a clear chain of command from the Supreme High Command to the theater operations command and assumes the use of nuclear weapons is both to demonstrate resolve and strike the enemy. The authors recommend using nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which they assert can preclude an «avalanche-like escalation of the use of nuclear weapons up to the very exchange of massive nuclear strikes with strategic nuclear systems». They make several key assumptions, including that the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons makes it «more advantageous to the enemy to stop military actions».

In their formulation, each type of strike is associated with a specific escalation concept: demonstration, deterrence-demonstration, deterrence, deterrence-retaliation and retaliation. Each step reflects additional assumptions about the military situation. For instance, a demonstration strike would involve attacks on isolated areas and secondary military targets and would seek to inflict minimal casualties. In contrast, retaliation after deterrence fails would involve mass strikes to destroy enemy forces throughout the theatre and create a fundamental change in the correlation of forces up to the point of mutual destruction.

The authors also recommend using submarine-launched cruise missiles instead of intercontinental ballistic missiles so that the enemy does not view these as a disarming first strike presaging the start of a large-scale nuclear war. (In subsequent exercises in the 2000 s land-based missiles and long-range aviation were commonly used.) In sum, lacking modern conventional forces, these military theorists argue that the proportional use of tactical nuclear weapons (coupled with a demonstrated readiness to employ strategic nuclear weapons) can help deter regional and local wars, and if they break out anyway, disrupt precision strikes and serve as a «powerful inducement for an aggressor to de-escalate military operations» [Kipp, 2012, p. 132].

About two dozen articles discussing de-escalation have appeared in Военная мысль since the late 1990-s. However, contrary to interpretations or extrapolations of Western analysts, these works describe defensive operations, not the use of «de-escalation» after a Russia offensive operation for territorial conquest. Even if the question of who starts the war is left aside, it is notable that as the concept is debated many experts are unpersuaded that the risks of escalation can be contained. Critics of the concept warn that «controlled, limited nuclear war is not one-sided»; the enemy (whether the U.S., European powers or China) may respond differently than predicted, leading to a radical and unanticipated escalation in the conflict's scale [Крейдин, 2000; Kipp, 2001]. Others maintain that any conflict with the United States would be impossible to contain and would rapidly escalate to a nuclear conflict [Сиротинин, 2010].

Debate over «de-escalation» is also intertwined with ambiguity about the possible missions for nonstrategic nuclear weapons after the Cold War. Such uncertainty over roles and missions opens the door for bureaucratic politics among interested actors that plays back into the debate over de-escalation and controlled nuclear use. The range of bureaucratic players is not insignificant, including air, land and naval units advocating for increasing roles and missions and military industrialists seeking defense appropriations [Adamsky. Nuclear.., 2014, p. 91-134]. According to one study, early interest in a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons began in the difficult economic circumstances of the 1990 s when Russian nuclear weapons designers «utilized facts about U.S. projects to increase nuclear industry's bureaucratic weight and secure funding».

This push not to fall behind the Americans coincided with the military's interest in weapons with tailored effects that could provide a credible deterrent against conventional regional aggression. It continued into the 2000 s when it was believed that the U.S. was developing low-yield warheads and bunker busters [Adamsky, If.. , 2014, p. 175-176]. For their part, arms control specialists have been divided in their views on both the appropriate role and continued utility of nonstrategic nuclear weapons1. Retired Lieutenant General Evgeny P. Buzhinsky, a former senior official at the Ministry of Defense, publicly lobbied then Prime Minister Putin during a 2012 experts meeting to protect Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons and not permit them to be negotiated away [В.В. Путин.., 2012].

The larger issue of the appropriate level of risk Russia should accept in nuclear weapons employment policy resurfaced in October 2009, just a few months before the appearance of the 2010 new doctrine. Faced with continuous American advances in technologies improving counterforce capabilities, Russia has prioritized launch on warning, mobility, and early warning measures to protect the credibility of its strategic nuclear deterrent and avoid suffering the consequences of a U.S. disarming strike.

1 См.: Круглый стол ПИР-ЦЕНТРа. Будущее нестратегического ядерного оружия в Европе: Возможны варианты. - Прим. авт.

150

Nonetheless, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev suggested in various interviews that other major innovations would be introduced in Russia's nuclear policy. He specifically called for the adoption of preemptive and preventive strike options in large-scale, regional and local wars, and suggested they would be included in subsequent official doctrinal statements. Zapad 2009 exercises that autumn included simulated nuclear attacks on Poland, one of the NATO countries designated to house U.S. missile defense installations. However, the 2010 military doctrine signed by then President Dmitry Medvedev on February 5, 2010 proved to be consistent with the previous doctrine on nuclear use, not Patrushev's preferences for preemption. Nor did it make public references to de-escalation tactics.

The 2010 doctrine retained the possibility of nuclear first-use to bolster deterrence, but limits the possible employment of nuclear weapons by Russia to circumstances in which nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction are used against Russia «and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat» («в ответ на применение против нее и (или) ее союзников ядерного и других видов оружия массового поражения, а также в случае агрессии против России с применением обычного оружия, когда под угрозу поставлено само существование государства») This is more restrictive than the 2000 doctrine which specified nuclear use in situations «critical for national security» [Военная.., 2010].

It must be acknowledged that the new doctrine was supplemented by the «Основы государственной политики в области ядерного сдерживания до 2020 г.» (Foundations of Government Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence Until 2020), which was approved on the same day by President Medvedev. The supplement reportedly lays out the criteria for nuclear weapons use in more detail, but its contents are classified. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the Russian General Staff would directly mislead its troops about the main operational concepts informing Russian military doctrine. A clue may be found in an unsigned article «Российское ядерное оружие: критерии применения» in the journal «Национальная оборона» (№ 2, февраль 2010).

The article details two scenarios in which Russia may use nuclear weapons: a nuclear missile attack on Russia and aggression against it with conventional weapons. It specifies a massive nuclear attack would be met with full-scale nuclear counter-retaliation, but also recommends accelerating work on an automatic launch system in view of US technological advances. However, in the event of a single ICBM attack, the article prescribes use of the «hot line» for emergency consultations before retaliation. In the event of a large-scale attack against Russia with modern conventional weapons, the articles outlines a set of criteria for determining Russian nuclear weapons use against an aggressor, for example if the most important political and economic centers, early warning systems, or strategic nuclear capabilities are destroyed. Further, in the event of an invasion of Russia, nuclear weapons would provide the backstop for an inability of the Russian Armed Forces to stop the enemy's advance inland.

Given the pattern of consistency in Russian official statements on the employment of nuclear weapons, it is not surprising that even the 2014 military doctrine approved by President Putin on 26 December repeats much of the same language as found in its precursor [Президент.., 2014]. Four months earlier, Putin had demanded a new doctrine to reflect the increase in military threats as a result of the Ukraine war. But as in 2010, Moscow forecasts a reduced likelihood of large-scale conflicts involving Russia, despite the increasingly dangerous security environment.

The doctrine paints a grimmer picture of the threats and dangers facing Russia, from the reality of «color revolutions» to informational activities undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions. As before, Moscow underscores as dangers NATO's actions to deploy military infrastructure near Russia's borders and the assertion that the West uses Special Forces and foreign organizations to subvert states. The new doctrine also zeroes in more on specific threats, such as the U.S. Global Strike capabilities and efforts to attain military superiority through missile defenses, space-based weapons, and conventional precision strike weapons. At the same time, it shows increased Russian interest in improving its ability to develop and use precision strike conventional weapons but not yet a significantly higher threshold for

nuclear weapons use. As before, there is no mention of using nuclear weapons to de-escalate conventional conflicts.

This analysis suggests there is a contradiction between Russia's official doctrine and its provocative military exercises, which continue to simulate nuclear attacks, most recently in 2015 against the Danish island of Bornholm during an exercise designed to seal off the Baltic zone and control the sea lanes. Nor is it clear why Zapad 2013 did not apparently simulate the use of nuclear weapons as has been the case with exercises before and after. Perhaps Russian exercises in which there are simulated nuclear attacks correspond in some respect to the 16 year old de-escalation concept, but then why is de-escalation not emphasized in official doctrine as a key operational mechanism. Even more tantalizing is the suggestion that Russia's «de-escalation» concept «probably limited the West's options for responding to the 2008 war in Georgia. And it is probably in the back of Western leaders' minds today, dictating restraint as they formulate their responses to events in Ukraine» [Sokov, 2014]. If true, this would give greater significance to the role of implicit threats in aiding Russia underscore its strong interests in the borderland states.

Two conclusions are suggestive. First, it cannot be completely ruled out that Russian nuclear policy is broadly in harmony with recent high level nuclear signaling despite the absence of formal statements in military doctrine. Or that the Kremlin wants the United States and its NATO allies to think that policy is integrated and Russia is more resolute that its opponents. Weaker states that are more resolute have an incentive to adopt doctrines that make the use of force riskier so as to transform a contest of military strength into a test of resolve [Powell, 2013].

Less clear is whether a militarily weak nuclear state can also use the threat of nuclear escalation offensively, i.e., to engage in nuclear blackmail [Powell, 2013]? In Russia today, preemptive strike options, shows of resolve through limited nuclear use, and signaling to stop the escalation of a local war into a wider one appear at best to be outside options that are held in reserve. It is difficult to accept that they are more than possible ad hoc options when military theorists writing in the

General Staff journal as recently as 2015 complain that formal doctrine fails to embrace such assertive tactics.

Still, the military doctrine of any country only provides insight into existing plans, not how leaders will act in a real crisis. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger once commented, «In the moment of truth, when the possibility of major devastation occurs, one is likely to discover sudden changes in doctrine». It is impossible to know a priori whether leaders will act in a crisis with restraint or go to the wall, and fearing the worst, launch preventive strikes to limit damage to their homelands. Khrushchev gambled but then exercised restraint rather than recklessness when his secret ploy in 1962 to install nuclear weapons in Cuba was discovered by the Kennedy Administration. Knowing - as Kennedy did not - that the nuclear missiles were fully operational and accompanied by tactical nuclear weapons under the control of local commanders to repel a U.S. attack against Cuba, Khrushchev recognized that the potential for uncontrollable risks and unintended outcomes greatly outweighed the limited payoffs to Moscow, so he prudently backed down. In short, Khrushchev preferred political loss to the probability of nuclear catastrophe [Fursenko, Naftali, 2006].

The alternative conclusion is that the recent spate of Russian nuclear threats is a combination of bluster and signaling rather than indicators of military operational guidance. As Alexei Arbatov pointedly observed, «those who formulate official strategic documents and engage in real planning of military operations have a better realization of the stern realities of the nuclear age», in comparison to some Russian politicians and analysts who were seized with irrational exuberance and «armchair courage» in the wake of Crimea. Likewise, some Western figures may be suspending reality and giving too much credit to a Russian concocted idea about nuclear de-escalation when it's unclear if risks can be controlled to make limited nuclear war feasible. Russian critics of the concept argue that «any use of nuclear weapons except in the most extreme situations and as a last measure is adventurism» [Арбатов, 2015].

«Whether it is tactical or a strategic nuclear weapon - it will be an event on a strategic scale»1. In a conflict between nuclear-weapons major powers, the response to such a step more than likely will not be de-escalation, but the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. This could entail a rapid and uncontrollable escalation of nuclear strikes.

In the heat of a crisis in Russia's periphery, over the Baltics or Belarus, for instance, mutual fears that the other side seeks a compelling advantage could lead to a risk spiral and fatal miscalculations. Will each side correctly calculate the level of risk the opponent is unwilling to run? If there are high stakes for both sides, contests of resolve are likely to see both stand firm and the contests become more dangerous [Powell, 2013]. The US and NATO may misperceive opportunities to successfully preempt Russia's use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Perhaps the U.S. can derail a Russian tactical nuclear launch with targeted strikes tailored to the specific threat. But there is no guarantee that such actions will not provoke a more devastating Russian nuclear response in Europe, and possibly against the United States. Likewise, faced with NATO intervention in a dispute on the border, Moscow might be tempted to try a limited nuclear strike to «deescalate» the conflict. But the fact of any nuclear weapons detonating in Europe could provoke a major retaliatory response. Above all, both the United States and Russia should be careful not to trigger outcomes more devastating than the ones they seek to prevent.

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