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32Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit PREHISTORY OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO IN THE NEW ERA (1991-2012). (PART ONE)
Sanjay Deshpande, Shoaib Khan
Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India
Abstract. The article is devoted to the problem of relationship between Russian Federation and NATO in the XXI century. The relevance of the question is indisputable considering the fact that the global stability in the world depends on both positive or negative tendencies in this relationship. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the new quality of cooperation between NATO and Russia seemed to be outworked. But still there is a huge list of factors and unsolved problems between these two key actors of the international relations which cannot grant permanent security and stability in the world. The present-day crisis that forms the political and international agenda today grows on the soil of this complex of issues which were either ignored or underestimated in the 1990-s - first decade of the 2000-s and now we just yield what we've got. The article doesn't have the objection to analyze the ongoing crisis in Ukraine or disagreements between Russia and the USA on Syria e t.c. The authors wanted to analyze pre-historical backgrounds of the relationship between NATO and Russia and, maybe, reveal some crucial points responsible for turning this relationship on the road of new confrontation. That's why our research chronologically includes two decades past the collapse of the USSR (1991-2012). The authors consider that it was the crucial time when the fundamental basis of the potential cooperation between Russia and NATO was formed.
Working on the material the authors applied to the methodology of political science and international relations. The methods of political analysis, structural analysis and in-vent-analysis (studying the official documents) were used in the article.
For the better understanding of the issue and in order to prevent the readers from the danger of being "over-informed" the authors
TO in the New Era (1991-2012). Part One. divided the material into two parts. The first part devoted to the historical analysis of the Cold War is presented in this number (№1) and the second one is going to be continued in the second (№2) one.
Keywords: Russia, NATO, cooperation, missiles, disarmament, expansion, defense.
Suspicious Cooperation
Since the re-emergence of Russia as an independent state in December 1991 debates and controversies surrounding its evolving relations with NATO have been a prominent feature of the European security scene. Analysing Russia-NATO relations, during the last 20 years and investigating the nature and substance of the relations that have developed between Russia and NATO during the period. The impact of the Kosovo crisis, September 11th, the Iraq war and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council have had on this complex relationship [Masala, Carlo Saariluoma: 2006].
Since 1991 NATO has been actively pursuing a closer and more profitable relationship with Russia. However, thus far this evolution has been on NATO's terms with little regard to Russian interests and insecurities. For Russia's part, from the beginning, it has acquiesced to, if not embraced, NATO's new developments. Russian leaders have been eager to join the more affluent West and its myriad of institutions and have realized that their desire to remain a great power gives them few, if any, alternative approaches. At the same time, Russia has continually objected to not being an equal partner. Reformed or future institutions should move towards bringing Russia in as an equal partner and be sensitive towards Russian concerns precisely because NATO needs Russia's full cooperation and assistance if it is to successfully adapt to counter today's new threats.
In November 1991 the proposed creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) a forum for structured dialogue with former Warsaw Pact countries but was without concrete defense guarantees. The focus was on multilateral, political dialogue on security and defense-related issues such as arms control, civil-military relations, air-traffic management and conversion of defense industries. While a
member of NACC, Russia argued against NATO expansion and sought guarantees that would prevent the forward positioning of nuclear weapons or the stationing of alliance forces in any new member states.
Russia also advocated an alternative "strategic partnership" with the West which would be a permanent bilateral forum for consultation between Russia and NATO.
Since 1993, Russia has generally followed a realist and pragmatic foreign policy of asserting its interests where possible, given the realities of its economic and military weaknesses [Roy Allison, Margot Light and Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda: 1996].
Russia's first priority has been the development of close relations with some of the former Soviet states. It has also pursued close relation towards the West. The only serious deviation from this policy was when Russia opposed US policy in the Balkans and in 1999 broke ties with NATO over its military actions in Kosovo. And even these severed ties were being repaired in early 2001 - before the events of September 11.
Under Russia's President Vladimir Putin, a key security objective has been to develop for Russia a major role alongside the other great powers in the international system. Putin and his foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, have particularly advocated the development of a multipolar as opposed to unilateral US dominated world. However, at the same time, Russia favours developing a special relationship with the US and enhancing relations between Russia and the West [Igor Ivanov: 2001].
This policy has remained stable and was reflected during Putin's April address to the Federal Assembly where he argued for the continued pursuit of a pragmatic approach based on Russia's actual possibilities and national interest in economic, political and military spheres [Victor Platov: 2002].
Russia NATO Council was established by the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed by NATO and Russia on 27 May 1997. The Founding Act created a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for Russia and NATO allies to consult and cooperate. The
PJC met for the first time on 18 July 1997 and regular meetings have taken place almost continuously at various levels, involving heads of state and government, foreign and defence ministers, ambassadors and chiefs of defence staffs. Issues discussed at PJC have included: strategy and doctrine, arms control, proliferation, military infrastructure, nuclear weapons issues, retraining of discharged military personnel and search and rescue at sea.
However, despite some progress, the PJC has been widely criticized by both the Russian and NATO officials and even before September 11 there were repeated calls for the development of more profitable relations. Many Russian and NATO officials argue that the PJC was never adequately used for a variety of reasons including Russia's objections to
NATO's use of force in Kosovo in 1999 .
The NATO-Russia Council was created on 28 May 2002 during the 2002 NATO summit in Rome. The council has been an official diplomatic tool for handling security issues and joint projects between NATO and Russia, involving consensus-building, consultations, joint decisions and joint actions. Also, military cooperation and joint military exercises were on the plan.
RFS (Russian Federation Ship) and NATO ships joint manoeuvres and personnel training Allies and Russia attend U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accident Exercise, cooperation on Afghanistan, Russia providing training courses for anti-narcotics officers from Afghanistan and Central Asian countries in cooperation with the United Nations, transportation by Russia of non-military freight in support of NATO's ISAF in Afghanistan, industrial coop-
1 Russian and NATO troops cooperated in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo in the Balkans. Russia currently contributes about 1,200 troops to SFOR, which number 20,000 in all, and 3,150 troops to the 42,500 strong KFOR force. Despite differences over the Allied air campaign, military cooperation between Russian and NATO troops continued without interruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the air campaign in Kosovo ended, Russia agreed to contribute to KFOR. "Russia-NATO Relations NATO Fact Sheets" URL: http:// www.nato.int/docu/facts,2000/nato-rus.htm (Date of access: 2017-09-02).
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship with NATO in the New Era (1991-2012). Part One.
eration, cooperation on defence interoperability, non-proliferation, and other areas.
Because NATO and Russia have similar ambitions and mutual challenges, the NATO-Russia Council is seen by both sides as effective at building diplomatic agreements between all parties involved since 2002. The heads of state for NATO Allies and Russia gave a positive assessment of NATO-Russia Council achievements in a Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008, though both sides have expressed mild discontent with the lack of actual content resulting from the council. In January 2009, the Russian envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said the NATO - Russia council was "a body where scholastic discussions were held." A US official shared this view, stating that we want now to structure cooperation more practically, in areas where you can
achieve results, instead of insisting on things
2
that won't happen in the days to come .
Historical Clouds of the Cold War
The post war settlement in Europe made the problem of European security more complex and intricate. Europe was vertically divided into two hostile camps after the second world war and the cold war started almost simultaneously. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a great power, its rapid advances in different fields, its championing the cause of teeming millions of Asians, Africans and Latin Americans groaning under Western domination - all these were not to the liking of the United States leadership, which took upon itself the task of combating the communist menace. The rivalry between the two blocs transcended soon beyond the European boundaries and assumed global dimensions. The friction was however more acute in Europe than in any other part of the world, because the remnants of the war in Europe were still generating constant tensions [Robert Hunter: 1969].
The security of the Soviet state was always upper most in the minds of the policy makers in Moscow. The US pronouncements such as the roll back and containing communism had
an alarmingly adverse impact on the Soviet mind, harking back to its memories of intervention and encirclement. Amidst all these the US monopoly of nuclear arms had tilted the balance of power in favour of the West. The Soviet Union quickly set out to restore its war - ravaged economy and to acquire capability at a tremendous speed. At the diplomatic level, the USSR began to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe. It entered into treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the East European countries both before and after the World War II, ensuring their security, economic and political independence. These treaties were signed during the War with Czechoslovakia on 12th December 1943, Poland on 21st April 1945, Yugoslavia on 11th April 1945, and after the war with Romania on 4th February 1948, Hungary on 18th February 1948 and Bulgaria 18th March 1948.
The formation of the NATO made the problem of European security most fractious and intractable. The NATO set at naught the Soviet efforts for the creation of a unitary system of security for the whole of Europe. The Soviet Union plausibly interpreted the creating of the West European Union and the NATO as a direct threat to its own security.
The creation of the NATO, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and its subsequent joining the NATO, the creation of military pacts the world over, and US policy of confrontation towards the USSR caused anxiety and uneasiness in Moscow. In view of the adamant Western attitude, the USSR could not compromise its own security. By 1949, it had conducted its first atomic test. In August 1953 it tested its first hydrogen bomb and improved its missiles. Full range inter-continental Ballistic Missiles years later. The launching of the first sputnik in October 1957 was the cli-
3
max in the series of these events .
Conflict between the Western nations including the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries and the Communist Eastern bloc (led by the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics or USSR) began almost as
2 "Russia does not rule out future NATO mem-
bership" Euro Observer. URL:
http://euobserver.com/13/27890 (Date of access: 201705-01)
3 Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917 -
1967 Moscow, 1967, 140-145
soon as the guns fell silent at the end of World War II (1939-45). The USSR oversaw the installation of pro-Soviet governments in many of the areas it had taken from the Nazis during the war. In response, the U.S. and its Western allies sought ways to prevent further expansion of Communist influence on the European continent.
The formation of the Warsaw Pact was in some ways a response to the creation of NATO, although it did not occur until six years after the Western alliance came into being. It was more directly inspired by the rearming of West Germany and its admission into NATO in 1955. In the aftermath of World War II, Soviet leaders felt very apprehensive about Germany once again becoming a military power-- a concern that was shared by many European nations on both sides of the Cold War divide.
Like NATO, the Warsaw Pact focused on the objective of creating a coordinated defense among its member nations in order to deter an enemy attack. There was also an internal security component to the agreement that proved useful to the USSR. The alliance provided a mechanism for the Soviets to exercise even tighter control over the other Communist states in Eastern Europe and deter pact members from seeking greater autonomy. When Soviet leaders found it necessary to use military force to put down revolts in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, they presented the action as being carried out by the Warsaw Pact rather than by the USSR alone.
The Cold War had solidified by 1947-48, when U.S. aid provided under the Marshall Plan to Western Europe had brought those countries under American influence and the Soviets had installed openly communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The Cold War reached its peak in 1948-53. In this period the Soviets unsuccessfully blockaded the Western-held sectors of West Berlin (1948-49); the United States and its European allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a unified military command to resist the Soviet presence in Europe (1949); the Soviets exploded their first atomic warhead (1949), thus ending the American monopoly
on the atomic bomb; the Chinese communists came to power in mainland China (1949); and the Soviet-supported communist government of North Korea invaded U.S.-supported South Korea in 1950, setting off an indecisive Korean War that lasted until 1953.
From 1953 to 1957 Cold War tensions relaxed somewhat, largely owing to the death of the long-time Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953; nevertheless, the standoff remained. A unified military organization among the Soviet-bloc countries, the Warsaw Pact, was formed in 1955; and West Germany was admitted into NATO that same year. Another intense stage of the Cold War was in 1958-62. The United States and the Soviet Union began developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and in 1962 the Soviets began secretly installing missiles in Cuba that could be used to launch nuclear attacks on U.S. cities. This sparked the Cuban missile crisis (1962), a confrontation that brought the two superpowers to the brink of war before an agreement was reached to withdraw the missiles.
The Cuban missile crisis showed that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were ready to use nuclear weapons for fear of the other's retaliation. The two superpowers soon signed the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned aboveground nuclear weapons testing. But the crisis also hardened the Soviets' determination never again to be humiliated by their military inferiority, and they began a build-up of both conventional and strategic forces that the United States was forced to match for the next 25 years. Throughout the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct military confrontation in Europe and engaged in actual combat operations only to keep allies from defecting to the other side or to overthrow them after they had done so. Thus, the Soviet Union sent troops to preserve communist rule in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). For its part, the United States helped overthrow a left-wing government in Guatemala (1954), supported an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba (1961), invaded the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983), and undertook a
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit long (1964-75) and unsuccessful effort to prevent communist North Vietnam from bringing South Vietnam under its rule.
In the course of the 1960's and 70's however, the bipolar struggle between the Soviet and American blocs gave way to a more complicated pattern of international relationships in which the world was no longer split into two clearly opposed blocs. A major split had occurred between the Soviet Union and China in 1960 and widened over the years, shattering the unity of the communist bloc. In the meantime, Western Europe and Japan achieved dynamic economic growth in the 1950's and 60's, reducing their relative inferiority to the United States. Less-powerful countries had more room to assert their independence and often showed themselves resistant to superpower coercion or cajoling.
NATO's Perception and Strategy
The post war demobilisation by the armed forces of the western powers had resulted in the Soviet bloc acquiring overwhelming conventional superiority thus creating a conceptual threat of a Russian offensive against Western Europe, America advanced the deterrent theory to justify the retention of nuclear weapons monopoly in its own hands. In the event of an attack by superior Russian forces the Americans would retaliate by an atomic bombardment. Since the effects of such bombardment had already been demonstrated in Japan, it was felt that a counter threat of this nature would deter the Russians from launching a conventional initiative.
In the earlier phase of nuclear strategy, NATO subscribed to what it perceived as a credible and viable defensive strategy, based on the fact that it possessed a deliverable bomb and the Russians did not combined actually be used in extremis. Even when it was discovered towards the end of the first phase, it was discovered that the Russians had also acquired an atom bomb, America continued to rely on the same possessed numerical superiority in numbers of atom bombs but also because the United States heartland was out of range of Russian bombers. Meanwhile NATO made certain adjustments in tactical doctrine, such as changes in dispersal limits and targeting pro-
TO in the New Era (1991-2012). Part One. cedures; but its plans remained based on the actual use of the bomb [Grant Schnieder: 2010].
In the second phase, the whole picture changed because of the appearance of the thermonuclear bomb, first in America, followed shortly by a similar Russian capability. Russia's superiority in convent ional forces as perceived and propagated by the Western powers made their own conventional defensive posture less credible. It was at this stage that the thesis of first use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter the alleged Soviet superiority in land forces was propounded [Daryl G. Kym-ball:2010].
This new situation introduced European NATO and the Soviet bloc, in a purely nuclear United States - Soviet confrontation there was as yet no balance because the Americans still held strategic targeting advantage. Russian nuclear bombers could reach targets in Europe only; they still did not possess the requisite range to threaten the United States mainland whereas American bombers based in Europe and in a gradually expanding ring of bases constructed in Morocco, Turkey and later in Spain could threaten the Russian homeland [Rick Rozoff: 2011].
This advantage of geographical factor forced the Americans to transfer a part of their nuclear bomber force to the United States mainland to prevent them from being wiped out by a sudden first strike by the Russians. Dulles amounted his "massive retaliation" strategy as the basis of NATO's defensive posture). The strategy asserted that any attack by Russians against NATO ground forces would automatically be met with an immediate and full nuclear response.
As America and Russia approached the "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) doctrine which deterred nuclear war only; it did not deter conventional war. It became more and more difficult for European NATO powers to believe that in the event of a Russian conventional attack leading towards certain NATO defeat, the American President would retaliate on a nuclear level and thus invite Russian nuclear response against the American homeland. In 1967 the official doctrine issued
a NATO commander directed the Supreme commander to meet a Russian conventional attack, firstly on its own level; but if that failed, to conduct a deliberate nuclear escalation if aggression could not be contained or the situation restored by direct defense [McNama-ra: 1967].
It was McNamara who as Kennedy's Secretary of Defence, thought of another approach to raise the level of the flexible nuclear response sufficiently high to prevent it being resorted to and yet to remain below the all-out MAD level. He issued a statement to the effect that the Americans possessed what he termed a "counter force" capacity, that is to say the capacity to target limited yield American missiles accurately onto Soviet missile sites and destroy them in a first strike without inflicting great collateral damage on Russian cities. This was the period during which a whole new set of dialectics sprang up to determine the various steps in escalation - tactical nuclear strikes, "counter - force" strikes, "counter-city" all out strikes all attempted to be orchestrated in some of bizarre escalation mechanics which nobody seemed to be able to clearly enunciate but nevertheless greatly exercised the whiz-kids and think tank specialists on both sides of the Atlantic [J. Peter Scoblic: 2009].
Another Defence Secretary, Schlesinger, who tried to retreat the counter - force concept, but with added force. By the time he came to Pentagon, Kissinger's star had been on the ascendant. Unlike Schlesinger, Kissinger harboured strong doubts about the viability of a controlled "tactical nuclear war" which he felt, would automatically escalate to an all-out war. Schlesinger's policy restated what McNamara had once tried to enforce, that the American posture should switch from a defensive (second strike) threat to an offensive first strike policy, albeit limited to counter force targets [Robert McNamara: 1969].
The Soviet - Warsaw Pact Doctrine
Soviet strategists rejected the Western notion, prevalent especially in the McNamara era, that there would necessarily be a conventional phase in a major conflict before escalation to the nuclear level, the assumption con-
tained in NATO flexible response strategy. The military programs of the Soviet Union since the 1960s, have exceeded the expectations of a large number of Western defence planners. In fact, an analysis of the respective levels of the US and Soviet military effort reveals a continued underestimation of the magnitude of the Soviet arms build-up, especially during the 1960s and early 1970s [Albert Wohlstetter: 1974].
Soviet military strategy and capabilities were designed to underwrite a global political conception in which non-communist industrialized states were weakened relative to the Soviet Union by the gradual loss of positions of influence and power, particularly in the Third World, and by the detachment of allies on the Rimlands of Eurasia, especially European NATO members and the gradual disengagement of American power from an increasingly neutralized Western Europe, also Soviet support for wars of national liberation and for progressive states engaged in the antiimperialist struggle in Third World states and even where feasible Moscow's encouragement of revolutionary and progressive forces within capitalist states themselves [Collin S. Gray: 1977].
In the Soviet conception, war with capitalist states has been transformed from the inevitable prospect postulated during Lenin's time and until nearly the end of Stalin's rule to, in the late twentieth century, a possibility if capitalist states choose to resist the tide of events running in favour of the Soviet Union. Against this contingency the Soviet Union must be prepared in its military planning. One of the purposes of Soviet strategic - nuclear power was to deter an attack that might be mounted by the United States, lashing out against the Soviet Union in a last-ditch effort to forestall the inevitable triumph of communism - a theme of considerable prominence in Soviet military literature. Soviet Union has always had in its strategic - military doctrine an element of deterrence, first against a superior non-communist world and more recently against adversaries, principally the United States. A central component of this aspect of Soviet military doctrine has been the develop-
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit ment of a capability to defend against a US attack by means of air defences and a civil defence program of considerable magnitude and scope [John Erickson: 1978].
The Soviet conception of nuclear weapons as usable instrument of warfare under conditions in which Soviet vital interests are at stake is fundamental to Soviet-Warsaw Pact doctrine in Europe. Nuclear Weapons formed a part of a "combined arms concept" integrated into a broader offensive in Soviet-Warsaw Pact strategy. Not only such weapons were an integral part of Soviet force levels in Europe, but they must have been used on the battlefield without necessarily escalating to a strategic - nuclear exchange with the United States. The Capacity of the Soviet Union to prevail in a NATO -Warsaw Pact war depends upon its possession of superior forces on the battlefield.
The growth of Soviet - Warsaw Pact conventional forces, both in qualitative and quantitative dimensions, enhances the flexibility of their options with respect to the use of weapons against Western Europe. The question has been posed whether the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces were approaching a level in which an attack could be mounted against Western Europe without resort to nuclear weapons. If such weapons could be held in reserve by the Soviet Union, the onus for first use would be placed on NATO [Stewart W.B.: 1978].
Central to Soviet -Warsaw Pact Strategy was the capability to use surprise to minimize NATO warning time, to overrun forward NATO positions in initial phase of a conflict, to cut vital supply lines to US and other NATO forces on the central front, and to prevent resupply from the United States, Canada or Great Britain. Major objectives of Soviet -Warsaw Pact forces would be the destruction of ports needed for resupply, the severing of maritime supply lines by means of large -scale deployments of attack submarines, and the use of airpower, for example the Backfire bomber, to destroy surface shipping [Jacque-lyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr.: 1978].
The most important feature of Soviet -Warsaw Pact combat, the practical application of their concept provided for an assault against
TO in the New Era (1991-2012). Part One. the NATO central front, with the Northern and Southern flanks having been neutralized by demonstrably superior military forces and by political trends, especially on the southern flank that made concerted NATO action difficult, if not impossible.
A vibrant of the frontal assault was the so-called envelopment option, in which an initial surprise offensive would have been mounted across NATO, northern flank either prior to or at the same time as a strike against the central front. Such an attack would have been designed to enhance the Soviet capacity to control the coastal water of Northern and Western Europe, and especially the strategically important Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom gap and the North Atlantic sea lines of communication.
Soviet - Warsaw Pact strategy was designed to strike NATO forces before they can be reinforced to maximum strength, since in the initial stages of a conflict in Europe the Soviet - Warsaw Pact forces would have enjoyed an increasingly qualitative edge over NATO forces, which must be reinforced from outside continental Europe [Robert Close: 1976].
The Gorbachev policy - the era of reduced tensions
United States-Soviet relations began to improve soon after Gorbachev became general secretary. The first summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev took place in Geneva in November 1985. The following October, the two Presidents discussed strategic arms reduction in Reykjavik, without making significant progress. In the late summer of 1987, the Soviet Union yielded on the long-standing issue of intermediate-range nuclear arms in Europe; at the Washington summit that December, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), eliminating all intermediate and shorter-range missiles from Europe. In April 1988, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an accord, with the United States and Soviet Union as guarantors, calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 1989. The Soviet Union subsequently met the accord's deadline
for withdrawal [Harrison, Selig; Cordovez, Diego: 1995].
Soviet relations with Europe improved markedly during the Gorbachev period, mainly because of the INF Treaty and Soviet acquiescence to the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe during 1989-90. Since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union had adhered to the Brezhnev Doctrine upholding the existing order in socialist states. Throughout the first half of Gorbachev's rule, the Soviet Union continued this policy, but in July 1989, in a speech to the Council of Europe, Gorbachev insisted on "the sovereign right of each people to choose their own social system," a formulation that fell just short of repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine. By then, however, the Soviet Union's control over its outer empire already was showing signs of disintegration [Mark Kramer: 1990].
During the Gorbachev years, improvements in United States-Soviet relations were not without complications. For example, in 1991 Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov's attempted mediation of the Kuwait conflict threatened to undercut the allied coalition's demand that Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. After the signing of the CFE Treaty, disputes arose over Soviet compliance with the treaty and the Soviet military's efforts to redesignate weapons or move them so that they would not be subject to the treaty's terms. United States pressure led to the resolution of these issues, and the CFE Treaty entered into force in 1992. The Soviet crackdown on Baltic independence movements in January 1991 also slowed the improvement of relations with the United States.
By the summer of 1991, the United States-Soviet relationship showed renewed signs of momentum, when Bush and Gorbachev met in Moscow to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Under START, for the first-time large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles were slated for elimination. The treaty foresaw a reduction of approximately 35 percent in United States ballistic missile warheads and about 50 percent in Soviet ballistic missile warheads within seven years of treaty ratification. Gorbachev recently had at-
tended the Group of Seven (G-7 summit) to discuss his proposals for Western aid. Gorbachev also established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and in the waning days of the Soviet Union's existence, Israel.
To be continued in №2 of the following journal
REFERENCES
1. 1."Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara, San Francisco, September 18, 1967.
2. Air Marshall Stewart W.B.Menual, "The shifting Theater Nuclear Balance in Europe," Strategic Review, fall 1978.
3. Albert Wohlstetter, "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?' Foreign Policy, no.15 (summer 1974), p.5. See also, by the same author, "Rivals, but nor 'Race',"Foreign Policy, no. 16 (fall 1974), pp. 48-81.
4. Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East European Relations? Mark Kramer, International Security, Winter 1989/90, (Vol. 14, No.3).
5. Collin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Nuclear Era:Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1977), p.46.
6. Daryl G. Kymball, "NATO's Nuclear Decision," Arms control Association, September 2010.
7. Grant Schnieder, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, NATO and Russia" , CSIS (Centre for Strategic Studies), Washington D.C. collection of Papers 2010 Conference Series.
8. Harrison, Selig; Cordovez, Diego (1995). Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet withdrawal. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 34-35. ISBN 0-19506294-9.
9. Igor Ivanov, New Russian Diplomacy: Ten Years of the Country's Foreign Policy, (Moskva: OLMA PRESS, 2001.
10. J. Peter Scoblic, Robert Mcnamara's Logical legacy, September 2009. Arms Control Association.
11. Jacquelyn K. Davis andRobert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr., Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO, USSI Report 78 -
