CC BY
0Алиев Р.К.
Докторант, Бакинский Евразийский Университет.
Сирийский кризис и Иран
Altyev R.K.
PhD student, Baku Eurasian University.
Syria crisis and Iran
Introduction
Iran and Syria are historically, politically and geographically connected states. Diplomatic relations between them were established in 1946, after Syria became officially independent from France. Even during the French mandate, Iran had a consulate in Damascus. In 1975, a Syrian-Iranian agreement on bilateral cooperation was signed [11, p. 42-43]. Since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been an increase in their political interaction. Close cooperation was possible due to the enmity of both countries towards Iraq (competition between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'esh parties continued since 1966, after the left wing of the party took power in Syria as a result of a coup). Since the end of the 1970s, Damascus has started to support the anti-shah forces in Iran, and after the victory of the Islamic revolution there in 1979, it found an ally in the new leadership. Syria was the first Arab country to officially recognize the Islamic Republic and later supported it during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. In addition, after the Islamic revolution, the general anti-Iraq agenda was supplemented with anti-American and anti-Israel [12, p. 40-41]. Then there was a cooling period in the Syrian-Iranian relations.
In 2000, the rapprochement resumed after the death of Syrian President Hafez Assad and the transfer of power to his son Bashar [2, p. 115]. After the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003, "strategic interaction" between Iran and Syria resumed at the official level, because the "anti-American" factor became relevant for them and they perceived it as a threat
to their own state. With the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, the Lebanese Shia Hezbollah organization, which is closely related to Tehran, began to play a more active role in the region.
Gradually, the "Axis of Resistance" known as "Mehvar-e Mogavemat" began to form (this term was first used in Arabic in a Libyan newspaper, and then spread widely in the Iranian media). This axis consisted of an alliance that united Iran, Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi movement [21, p. 212]. Although "Ox" essentially became a situational alliance defined by the general geopolitical ideas of its participants, the leading role is played here by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The common goal of all its participants is to oppose the American-Israeli domination project in the Middle East [18, p. 13].
II. Iran's attitude to the civil war in Syria
The Syrian crisis that started in the spring of 2011 was interpreted as a derivative of American policy in Iran. All Axis members, including the Houthis [19], have expressed support for the government of Bashar al-Assad and sent military units to Syria. The decision to intervene directly in Iran was ot made immediately, and initially Tehran was limited to statements of unconditional support for the current leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic. But as the crisis deepened - the opposition intensified its actions against B. Assad - Iran became an important player in the Syrian arena. This was helped by the strengthening of the terrorist organization ISIS, Al-Nusra and other extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, which led to the interaction of the Syrian government structures between the forces of the Syrian army and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its special unit Al-Quds demanded deepening of its activities [1, p. 3]. Over time, comprehensive bilateral cooperation acquired military-political, economic and territorial dimensions.
Iran's policy in Syria from 2011 to the present period can be divided into four stages, each of which is characterized by Iran's involvement in the Syrian crisis to a certain extent [7, p. 15].
In the first phase (2011-2012), Tehran refrained from overtly intervening in the conflict between the official government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition. Although the support for B. Assad was unconditional, the statements of some high-ranking officials in Iran were mainly limited to diplomatic and military consultations related to the formation and preparation of the Syrian army for the defense of the most important objects.
In the second phase (2012-2015), the basis of Iran's policy was a regional-
ization strategy, according to which fighters from local Shia groups were sent to help the Syrian government ("Liva Zainabiyun", "Fatimiyun", "Harakat al-Nujaba", "Asaib Ahli"). - Right"). In turn, Iranian President Hassan Rou-hani, in his speech dedicated to the inauguration ceremony on August 3, 2013, announced that the relations between the two countries are of a strategic nature and that he intends to deepen cooperation with Syria [8, p. 141].
In the third phase (2015-2018), Iran began to partially coordinate efforts with Russia within the framework of the military operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, which led to ISIS and its affiliates "Jabhat al-Nusra", "Jaish-ul-Islam", and "Ahrar al-Sham" , led to the actual defeat of allied forces such as "Jabhat-ul-Islamiyya" and "Jaish-ul-Fath".
During the crisis, Tehran's military support became one of the most important pillars for Damascus. In particular, the military-technical cooperation between the two states has expanded considerably. As of January 2020, units of the Iranian and IRGC armed forces, as well as Shia militias from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, remain in Syria.
Iran's policy in Syria is determined by the following structures - the Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme National Security Council and the National Security and Parliamentary Commission of the Parliament. At the same time, despite the involvement of a number of representatives of the Iranian security forces in the Syrian campaign, according to many experts, the commander of the Al-Quds special unit of the IRGC, General Qassem Soleimani, played an important role in the implementation of Iran's policy in Syria. Throughout the war, he supported most of the foreign pro-Iranian forces in Syria - Shiite groups allied with al-Quds, including "Hezbollah", Pakistan's "Liva Zainabiyun", Afghanistan's "Fatimiyun", Iraq's "Harakat al-Nujaba", "Asaib Ahli-Haqq" and played an important role in arming others [15, p. 36-37]. According to various estimates, the total number of fighters in such groups was 60-120 thousand [4]. After the death of Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, as a result of the US airstrike on Baghdad airport, the leadership of the Al-Quds Force was transferred to his deputy, General Ismail Qaani. The appointment took place on the same day after the extraordinary meeting of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. This indicated Soleimani's intention to ensure the continuity of the course [14].
Iran's economic relations with Syria have always developed at a certain pace. In the pre-crisis period, economic relations were mainly decreasing in the direction of increasing the volume of trade between Iran and official Damascus.
In 2010, bilateral trade amounted to 800 million euros. In 2011, a memorandum of understanding worth 10 billion US dollars was signed in the field of natural gas trade, and an agreement was concluded on the establishment of a free trade zone. In 2012, the Syrian government signed a contract worth 400 million euros with Iran's MEPNA company for the construction of a power plant [13, p. 3]. In addition, a number of separate agreements on the supply of electricity between Iran, Iraq and Syria have been concluded, indicating the seriousness of Iran's intentions and the partial realization of the Iranian leadership's foreign policy ambitions.
Syria is one of the most promising markets for Iran amid the Western anti-Iranian sanctions. At the same time, Iran's economic interests in Syria collide with the economic interests of other global and regional players (first of all, Russia, Turkey, and the United States). Tehran mainly relies on the official Damascus, as well as some representatives of the Syrian tribes. B. Assad's government is very wary of any economic initiative by Tehran, because Iran's influence in the country is already great. Nevertheless, Iran's increasing participation in the Syrian economy could not be overlooked. According to Ali Akbar Vilayati, adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran on international affairs, since 2012, the amount of annual financial assistance to Syria has been 8 million dollars [13, p. 3]. The main form of Iran's aid to Syria is targeted loans. However, the Iranian side's financial support for local businesses, state-owned companies, and private organizations (for both Syria and Iran) is no less important.
In addition, Iran supplies Syria with military equipment and ammunition, fuel, electricity, and agricultural products, either in exchange for the opportunity to increase Tehran's business in Syria, or in the hope of expanding Iran's political influence in Syrian regions. A number of bilateral cooperation agreements have been signed between the two countries. Of course, such agreements were intended to further deepen the Syrian-Iranian cooperation, because it is obvious that the implementation of these projects will take more than a year. For example, it is planned to synchronize the operation of the electricity grids of the two countries, thereby ensuring the possibility of transferring electricity from Iran to Syria. In the development stage, it is envisaged to implement an infrastructure project for the construction and commissioning of a railway network that will connect the ports of Bandar Khomeini on the coast of the Persian Gulf and Latakia on the Mediterranean Sea in the future. The project also envisages the restoration of the existing railway network in Syria and Iraq at the expense of Iran [6]. The long-term nature
of Tehran's economic plans is also appreciated by the significant increase in demand for Syrian residential and commercial real estate and land among Iranian experts since 2012. Iran has signed intergovernmental agreements on the construction of several hundred buildings in major cities. It should be noted that the number of apartments and private houses in Damascus alone exceeds 200 thousand [10, p. 4].
The military presence of Iranian forces and their allied groups is mainly concentrated in the central and southeastern regions of Syria. In provinces like Aleppo, Latakia, Tartus and Al-Hasakah, there is little or none. As of December 2019, the largest influence of Iran's ground military presence is concentrated in the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Homs [17]. In particular, the forces of the Lebanese and Syrian "Hezbollah", "Al-Quds", "Liva Fatimiyun", as well as the forces of some Iraqi Shia armed groups are represented in Deir ez-Zor and Homs. Attempts to create forces loyal to Iran have led to clashes with pro-government forces in Syria. The strategic importance of the military presence in these provinces is explained by the proximity of the deployment of US troops in Al-Hasaqa province and southeast of Homs (position area located near the international coalition Al-Tanf military base) [9]. In addition, in 2019, clashes between the Iraqi pro-Iranian Shia armed groups "Kataib Ansar al-Hijjah" and "Suraiya Ashura" and ISIS fragments were recorded along the western border of Syria at the Tel Safouk checkpoint and in the areas near the border [20].
Iran's influence also extends to a lesser extent in the provinces of Daraa, Hama, Aleppo and Raqqa. These areas represent the zone of mixed influence of the Syrian official government, Turkish and Iranian forces [16]. In 2018, in the city of Deraa in the south of Syria, SEPAH forces and Shia pro-Iranian armed groups such as "Liva Fatimiyun", "Liva al-Imam al-Hussein", as well as the forces of the Lebanese "Hezbollah" together with pro-government Syrian forces and Syrian Shia groups, against the armed opposition. He participated in the attack that continued until July 2018 [20]. There are still pro-Iranian forces (mainly Hezbollah) in the province and competition for influence. The towns of "Al-Fua and Kefraya in the Idlib region were among several Shia-majority settlements defended by Lebanese and Syrian "Hezbollah" fighters during the 2015-2018 siege [20]. As of December 2019, this region was the last province in Idlib where numerous armed supporters of the Syrian opposition were located. Despite the fact that pro-Turkish Islamist groups and the former Al-Nusra forces have the greatest influence in the province, a significant part of Iran's observation posts are concentrated in the neighboring provinces of Hama,
Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa. Also of potential interest to Iran and pro-Iranian forces is the area of tribal territories in eastern Syria, where the Baggara tribe is loyal to them and representatives of local tribes have repeatedly been involved in Shiite organizations [3, p. 78].
After the beginning of the political crisis in Syria, Iran's position in this country and its place in the regional balance of forces as a whole have improved significantly compared to the first years of the crisis. The Assad government continues to operate and remains the main link in the axis of resistance. Shiite holy sites in Syria and Iraq are protected from the threat of ISIS, and the opening of the border crossing between the towns of Abu Kamal and Al Qaim gives Iran land access to the Eastern Mediterranean. For Iran, these achievements are important, but the more important issue is how to preserve them in the future.
Although B. Assad is the most reliable partner for Iran, there is no doubt that, firstly, B. Assad cannot remain in power forever, and secondly, Iran, in principle, has always supported the idea of national harmony in Syria. This explains why Iran continues its constructive participation in the Astana process and its efforts to form a Constitutional Committee. Unless disasters, propaganda, and external pressure affect the drafting of the new constitution, it is unlikely that pro-Assad forces will be able to retain a significant portion of power in the most democratic way possible. Iran's advisory presence in Syria over the past few years has provided opportunities for Iran to effectively connect with various religious and social groups and prevent the emergence of centers of threats against it. Until peace is fully restored in Syria, all terrorist movements are eliminated, and until the control of the central government covers the entire territory of the country, Iran's interaction with these groups will continue to be one of the tools for ensuring regional security.
III. Iran's relations with B. Asad's government.
Since the start of the war, the Syrian government's sources of income have almost completely dried up, and many production centers have either been destroyed or closed due to shortages of raw materials and other problems. As the political and security situation stabilizes, demands for a better life will begin to rise, and more protests may begin in the country if people's basic needs are not met, but unfortunately, there are still a number of obstacles to rebuilding Syria. Countries that have the means to invest in the reconstruction of Syria are pulling back for political reasons, and those that want to invest in reconstruction do not have the capital. At the same time, individual states
are trying to use the issue of restoration as a lever to achieve political concessions. In addition, Syria faces sanctions challenges, and in recent months, new US sanctions against 39 Syrian individuals and entities under the Caesar Act have made the country's return to normalcy even more difficult. Sanctions apply to foreigners who provide significant financial, material, and technical support to the Syrian government, and in particular, sanctions may be imposed on those who agree to participate in the reconstruction of areas controlled by the Syrian government. Given that any dealings with Syrian institutions and banks have been subject to US sanctions for many years, the latter targets officials who could play a major role in Syria's future, whether in elections or drafting the Constitution [5, p. 6].
Immediately after these sanctions came into force, Iran's first vice president stated that Iran would not hesitate to "do everything possible" to reduce pressure on Syria. However, after the restoration of US sanctions, the economic situation in Iran itself, as well as the American policy of exerting maximum pressure on Iran, give it little room for maneuver. Due to sanctions and internal economic problems, Iran is interested in increasing economic activity in Syria, but does not have sufficient capacity to provide significant assistance to Syria in the reconstruction of the country. At the same time, economic cooperation between Iran and Syria has expanded in recent years. During the visit of the first vice president of Iran to Damascus in early 2020, an agreement on long-term strategic economic cooperation was signed between the two countries. During this visit, a group of Iranian businessmen and producers had the opportunity to closely examine the areas where they can operate in the Syrian market.
Efforts to establish regional cooperation to resolve the Syrian crisis bore fruit, and at the beginning of 2017, tripartite talks between Russia, Iran and Turkey called the "Astana Process" took place in Astana. The process has made significant progress in resolving conflicts and reducing the overall level of armed violence in Syria. This not only restored security in many parts of the country, but also showed that cooperation in the region is possible, although many did not believe in it in principle. These countries have opportunities and interests in the region, which is not reasonable, but also senseless to ignore. Obviously, in addition to solving the Syrian crisis, they have other areas of interest and grounds for extensive bilateral cooperation, but there is currently nothing more important for their strategic dialogue than the Syrian issue.
Since the ideological bases of friendship and enmity disappeared after the end of the Cold War, now strategic cooperation between states is based on either gaining strategic advantage or preventing strategic losses. This concerns
Russian-Iranian cooperation in Syria, and the brief freeze in relations between Russia and Turkey after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian front-line bomber on November 24, 2015 seems to have made Turkey aware of the importance of this issue. The way to start tripartite cooperation to solve the Syrian crisis was opened by the realization of the negative consequences of the severance of relations for the economy of both countries, as well as the excessive efforts of the Turkish leadership to remove Bashar al-Assad from power.
Since the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle is equilateral, it can be expected that all three countries will pay equal attention to the continuation of cooperation. Today, Russia-Iran cooperation is mainly based on political considerations, while Russia-Turkey interaction is based on economic interests. Cooperation between Iran and Turkey is based on the understanding that, despite the obvious and numerous political differences and at the same time extensive economic ties, turning competition into conflict will not benefit either side.
Connecting only three sides of the triangle, these features offer minimal reasons for continued cooperation, but do not eliminate differences. In recent years, Turkey has pursued an ambitious foreign policy at the regional and international level. It actively defends its interests in various regions - from the Caucasus to Syria, Iraq, Libya and even the Persian Gulf. Turkey's October 2019 invasion of Syria met with little serious opposition from Russia and Iran, but its support for terrorist groups in Idlib led to direct conflict between the three countries a few months later. In early March, the think tank issued a statement urging Iranian Turkish forces to stop shelling their positions in northern Syria. It was emphasized in the statement that the Iranian troops received an order from the command to exercise restraint and not to take retaliatory measures against the Turkish soldiers who opened fire. Two days before the clashes, 33 Turkish soldiers who were outside their positions in contact with the terrorists were killed as a result of airstrikes carried out by Syria on the outskirts of Idlib. This is R.T. Despite Erdogan's threat to withdraw from the Astana process, the sixth summit of the three countries, which took place on July 1 at the suggestion of Russia and Iran, testified to the continuation of the Astana process and possibly the solution of the Syrian problem with its help.
As noted, many Iranian institutions are coordinating efforts to manage the country's military and diplomatic presence in Syria. Among the institutions related to the Syrian crisis, the Supreme Leader, who is not only a secular but also a religious leader, plays a key role in defining the general contours of Iran's Middle East policy in general and Syria in particular. Thus, the Supreme Religious Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, considers the Syrian crisis as a
foreign conspiracy against Iran and the Axis of Resistance by the United States and its regional allies. Thus, Damascus's support is vital for Iran. In the Iranian political world, it is explained that the overthrow of the Assad government will deal a heavy blow to the anti-Israel front in the Middle East. At first, Iran did not intend to intervene directly by providing political support to Assad. But Assad's use of violence to quell the opposition has turned the conflict into a military conflict, forcing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to come to the aid of the Syrian government. At a later stage, the emergence of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which have ties to other radical groups in Iraq, increased the risk of terrorist activities spreading to Iran, which subsequently led to the strengthening of the Quds Force in Syria. The elite military units of SEPAH are also related to the activities of the Ministry of Defense. In the political sphere, the transformation of military successes into political and diplomatic achievements was entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the framework of the negotiation process conducted in Astana. Meanwhile, the Supreme National Security Council is responsible for coordinating all aspects of Iran's policy in Syria within the overall political direction of the Islamic Republic. The President of Iran is the Chairman of the Council and he represents the Secretary who is approved by the Supreme Leader. The Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission is another actor that influences Iran's policy in Syria, overseeing both military and political issues [1, p. 5].
Iran's main interests and priorities in the Syrian crisis can be defined as follows: maintaining the Assad government, gaining access to Hezbollah in Lebanon through Syria and Iraq, fighting terrorism and fighting for regional leadership in Syria. From Iran's point of view, the presence of Hezbollah forces on the border with Israel acts as a deterrent against any potential Israeli aggression against Iran. Iran has taken Israel's nuclear threats seriously for decades, and protecting Hezbollah is part of Iran's defense strategy. Iran has concerns about the spread of terrorism in Syria. In the context of the relations of terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria and their activities in the immediate vicinity of Iran, it forms the security vector of Iran after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. This explains Iran's position on the importance of destroying all terrorist groups in Syria. This is due to concerns about the separatist rhetoric of some Kurdish and Arab actors in Iran. Iran considers the fall of the Middle Eastern states as the result of America's policy aimed at weakening the Muslim world by dividing it into smaller state entities. Iran is concerned that changing the regional balance of power will harm its national interests. The Islamic Republic believes that any change in the balance of power in the Levant region will strengthen the posi-
tions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as their Sunni allies.
The fact that Iran currently supports Damascus does not mean that these countries have the same vision about the future of their relations. The Syrian government does not want the Syrian territory to become a battlefield between Iran on the one hand, and the United States and Israel on the other. If Assad retains power after the war ends, Iranian officials do not expect his government to come under the control of the Islamic Republic. The debate is also about the extent to which the Syrian government is willing to cooperate with Iran in the reconstruction of Syria. So far, Damascus has shown a greater willingness to cooperate with Russia than with Iran, particularly in restoring energy infrastructure, where Iran has more experience than in other areas. Currently, Iran and Russia agree that protecting the Assad regime is a tactical goal for both sides, but for Iran it is of more long-term importance. In addition, given Iran's opposition to Washington's presence in the Middle East and Russia's rivalry with the US in the broader international context, the countries have agreed to fight terrorism and reduce the duration of the US presence in Syria. In terms of political structure, Russia is more tolerant of some form of decentralization in Syria, while Iran opposes this idea and perceives it as a threat to the territorial integrity and central control of Damascus. As for the role of Iranian-backed forces, Russia perceives them as an obstacle to the creation of a fully centralized, secular and Moscow-dependent security structure in Syria. However, while maintaining at least a minimal level of ideological orientation in the Syrian military, Iran seeks to maintain its influence through Shia militias and a more decentralized structure of the Syrian military. While Russia defines some opposition groups as moderate and entitled to participate in the transition process, Iran considers them terrorists that must be destroyed. Another point Russia disagrees with is Iran's attempt to maintain an anti-Israel orientation in Syria's future government. Finally, Iran-Russia covert competition for Syrian reconstruction contracts continues, which could further complicate their future relationship.
Current realities have changed Iran's perception of the military and political opposition in Syria. Shortly after the start of the Syrian crisis, Iran recognized all anti-Assad armed groups as terrorists and denied any political role for the opposition outside of Syria. Interaction with Russia and Turkey in Astana helped to partially change this situation. Iran now agrees that the opposition can be an actor in the Syrian political process, while Tehran is trying to contain it.
As for the future political structure of Syria, Iran will probably accept the
formation of a system based on the division of power between different ethnic and religious groups, similar to the situation in Lebanon or Iraq. Thus, if Iran enters various multilateral diplomatic and political structures on the Syrian issue, especially the Geneva peace process, we can expect to work together with the Iranian side on the future of Syria. Otherwise, Iran will likely resort to unilateral actions to protect its interests, both directly and through the groups it supports. This is a scenario fraught not only with worsening the already difficult situation in Syria, but also with the risk of straining relations between Iran on the one hand and the US and Israel on the other.
^ncfaston
Thus, the policies implemented by the Iranian government in Syria have undergone changes throughout the Syrian conflict. Iran's degree of involvement has now gone through several stages, from minimal involvement in the Syrian crisis to a permanent military presence in the country under sanctio-vs by the Assad government. Tehran does not consider the current stage of the conflict final. Unlike non-regional players, Iran's security is more closely linked to the situation in Syria. The only domestic force capable of ensuring compliance with Iran's security interests is the government of B. Assad. The Syrian government and its allies have still not recaptured a number of areas under their control. Therefore, it is in the interests of Tehran and the Shiite groups close to it to strengthen their position in Syria, not to cut ties with friendly Syrian forces, and also not to allow Tehran to be divided in any way. Shiite groups allied with Iran are also unlikely to leave Syria or disband in the near future. They are likely to retain their influence and continue to act as conductors of Tehran's policies.
Thus, in the near future, Iran's priorities and prospects in Syria will depend on the regional situation. In this case, already formed ideas about enemies and potential allies become a determining factor. However, in the future, in addition to its traditional enemies, Iran may have new enemies, whose interests are at least partially at odds with the goals of Ankara and Moscow, which already want to strengthen their influence in Syria.
Список литературы:
1. Азизи Х. Иран в Сирии: лица, принимающие решения, интересы и приоритеты. Материалы дискуссии по итогам семинара "Новая динамика безопасности и политическое урегулирование в Сирии", Сиракуза, Италия, 18-19 октября 2018. 6 c.
2. Ахмедов В.М. Сирия на рубеже столетий. Власть и политика. - Москва, Асти-издат, 2003. 172 с.
3. Богачева А.С. Политика Ирана в Сирии. Анализ и прогноз. Журнал ИМЭМО РАН, 2020. № 1. С. 74-80.
4. Игнатенко А.А. Новый раскол на Ближнем Востоке. Независимая газета, 10.10.2017. // URL: http: //www.ng.ru/ kartblansh/2017-10-10/3_7091_kartblansh. html.
5. Россия и Иран в Сирии и за ее пределами: предстоящие вызовы: рабочая тетрадь. № 59/2020 / Российский совет по между-
народным делам. (РСМД). - Москва: НП РСМД, 2020. 36 с.
6. Субботин И.А. Альянс Ирана и Сирии встает на новые рельсы. Независимая газета, 05.11.2019. // URL: http://www.ng.ru/ world/2019-11-05/1_7718_alliance.html.
7. Ahmadian H., Mohseni P. Iran's Syria Strategy: the Evolution of Deterrence. International AEairs, 2019. Vol. 95. № 2. P. 341-364.
8. Al-Moussawi A.H. Iran and the Syrian Crisis. Journal of US-China Public Administration, 2017. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 136-144.
9. Al-Tanf, Syria. International Crisis Group, 02.01.2020. // URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/ iran-us-trigger-list/Fash-points/al-tanf-syria.
10. Ansari A., Bassiri-Tabrizi A. The View from Tehran. Undestanding Iran's Role in the Syrian ConFict. London, Royal United Services Institute, 2016. P. 3-11.
11. Ganji B. Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran. London, I.B. Tauris, 2012. 320 p.
12. Goodarzi J.M. Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment. Ortadogu Ettleri, 2013. Vol. 4. № 2.
P.31-54.
13. Hatahet S. Russia and Iran. Economic InFuence in Syria. London, Chatham House, 2019. 24 p.
14. Juneau T. Iran's Costly Intervention in Syria: A Pyrrhic Victory. Abingdon, Mediterranean Politics, 2018. 20 p.
15. Katzman K. Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 2019. 68 р.
16. Map of Military InFuence in Syria. 01.01.2020. // URL: http: //jusoor. co/details/Map%20of%20 military%20inFuence%20in%20 Syria%2001-01-2020/532/en.
17. Map of Syrian Civil War. // URL: https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2019/28-december-syrian-oppositionforces-are-launch-ing-a-countera tack.
18. Risseeuw R. The Syrian-Iranian Nexus: A Historical Overview of Strategic Cooperation. Brussels, Brussels International Center for Research and Human Rights, 2018. 16 p.
19. Solomon A.B. Report: Yemen Houthis Fighting for Assad in Syria. The Jerusalem Post, 31.05.2013. // URL: https://www.jpost.com/ Middle-East/Report-Yemen-Houthis-?ghting-for-Assad-in-Syria-315005.
20. The Shia Militia Mapping Project. // URL: https://www.Google.Com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1KanwykNx7VkQUN52zNSmj6qxN-L7IYwsr&ll=33.479132280439664%2C36.32195224195232&z=14.
21. Uzun O.S., Ek§i M. Continuities and Changes in Iran's Foreign Policy: Analysis of Syrian Case. Journal of Regional Studies, 2017. Vol. 1. № 3. P. 205-228.
Bibliography
1. Azizi H. Iran in Syria: Decision Makers, Interests, and Priorities. Discussion Materials Following the Seminar "New Security Dynamics and Political Settlement in Syria", Syracuse, Italy, October 18-19, 2018. 6 p.
2. Akhmedov V.M. Syria at the Turn of the Century. Power and Politics. - Moscow, Asti-publishing house, 2003. 172 p.
3. Bogacheva A.S. Iran's Policy in Syria. Analysis and Forecast. Journal of IMEMO RAS, 2020. № 1. P. 74-80.
4. Ignatenko A.A. New Split in the Middle East. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.10.2017. // URL: http: //www.ng.ru/kart-
blansh/2017-10-10/3_7091_kartblansh. html.
5. Russia and Iran in Syria and Beyond: Challenges Ahead: Working Notebook. № 59/2020 / Russian International Affairs Council. (RIAC). - Moscow: NP RIAC, 2020. 36 p.
6. Subbotin I.A. The Iran-Syria Alliance is Taking New Tracks. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05.11.2019. // URL: http://www.ng.ru/ world/2019-11-05/1_7718_alliance.html.
7. Ahmadian H., Mohseni P. Iran's Syria Strategy: the Evolution of Deterrence. International AEairs, 2019. Vol. 95. № 2. P. 341-364.
8. Al-Moussawi A.H. Iran and the Syrian Crisis. Journal of US-China Public Administration, 2017. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 136-144.
9. Al-Tanf, Syria. International Crisis Group, 01/02/2020. // URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/Fash-points/al-tanf-syria.
10. Ansari A., Bassiri-Tabrizi A. The View from Tehran. Undestanding Iran's Role in the Syrian ConFict. London, Royal United Services Institute, 2016. P. 3-11.
11. Ganji B. Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran. London, I.B. Tauris, 2012. 320 p.
12. Goodarzi J.M. Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment. Ortadogu Ettleri, 2013. Vol. 4. № 2. P. 31-54.
13. Hatahet S. Russia and Iran. Economic Infuence in Syria. London, Chatham House, 2019. 24 p.
14. Juneau T. Iran's Costly Intervention in Syria: A Pyrrhic Victory. Abingdon, Mediterranean Politics, 2018. 20 p.
15. Katzman K. Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 2019. 68 r.
16. Map of Military Infuence in Syria. 01/01/2020. // URL: http://jusoor.co/details/Map%20of%20 military%20inFuence%20in%20 Syria%2001-01-2020/532/en.
17. Map of Syrian Civil War. // URL: https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2019/28-december-syrian-oppositionforces-are-launch-ing-a-counteratack.
18. Risseeuw R. The Syrian-Iranian Nexus: A Historical Overview of Strategic Cooperation. Brussels, Brussels International Center for Research and Human Rights, 2018. 16 p.
19. Solomon A.B. Report: Yemen Houthis Fighting for Assad in Syria. The Jerusalem Post, 05/31/2013. // URL: https://www.jpost.com/ Middle-East/Report-Yemen-Houthis-?ghting-for-Assad-in-Syria-315005.
20. The Shia Militia Mapping Project. // URL: https://www.Google.Com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1KanwykNx7VkQUN52zNSmj6qxN-L7IYwsr&ll=33.479132280439664%2C36.32195224195232&z=14.
21. Uzun O.S., Ek§i M. Continuities and Changes in Iran's Foreign Policy: Analysis of Syrian Case. Journal of Regional Studies, 2017. Vol. 1. № 3. P. 205-228.
