The Arab Spring and the position of the balance of power in the “selective activism” policy of Iran and Russia in the Middle East and North Africa Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

Вестник Томского государственного университета. 2023. № 490. С. 60-73 Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta - Tomsk State University Journal. 2023. 490. рр. 60-73

СОЦИОЛОГИЯ И ПОЛИТОЛОГИЯ

Original article UDC 327

doi: 10.17223/15617793/490/7

The Arab Spring and the position of the balance of power in the "selective activism" policy of Iran and Russia in the Middle East and North Africa

Mehdi Sanaei1, Zahra Atri Sangari2

1 University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran, Msanaei@ut.ac.ir 2 People s Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russian Federation, Msanaei@ut.ac.ir

Abstract. Although the Arab Spring and the resulting developments in the Middle East countries did not bring about a specific change in the political systems of the countries of the region to strengthen democracy, it was the beginning of a large-scale transformation of the foreign policy of Russia and Iran in West Asia and North Africa. In terms of methodology, to understand the foreign policy of Iran and Russia concerning these events and their analysis, in this research, general scientific analysis methods (historical, inductive-comparative methods, event analysis) and some special methods for the direct study of international relations, including the analysis method based on a systemic approach, have been used. Accordingly, it has been found that given the goals and indicators that Iran and Russia have defined for their regional foreign policy, they both followed the policy of "selective activism" based on the principle of balance of power towards the Arab Spring. Therefore, Iran's reaction to the events in the Arab countries is not based only on Shia identity; the benefits of the international norms accepted by Iran have also influenced the actions of this country. Iran selects how to act in the region based on the norms and roles that it defined for itself and ultimately seeks a balance of power in the region against Saudi Arabia and the United States. In the same way, Russia is also seeking a balance of power against the West and America in the region based on its identity as a great power and considering its interests, and therefore Russia's activism towards the internal events of the Arab countries is also selective and different, not following a general approach.

Keywords: Arab Spring, idea of great power, Shia identity, balance of power, Iran's foreign policy, Russia's foreign policy, Middle East and North Africa

For citation: Mehdi Sanaei & Zahra Atri Sangari. (2023) The Arab Spring and the position of the balance of power in the "selective activism" policy of Iran and Russia in the Middle East and North Africa. Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta - Tomsk State University Journal. 490. рр. 60-73. doi: 10.17223/15617793/490/7

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

The Arab Spring is a series of protests that began in 2010 in Southwest Asia and North Africa and still continues in some of these countries. The consequences of these events appeared in form of the dismissal of governments and rulers, widespread political demonstrations and protests, and even a civil war. However, these protests as a whole did not cause a major internal political transformation in the region, but these events led to extensive changes in the foreign policy of actors present in the region. In this regard, each of the actors, both regional and trans-regional, tried to define their interests and new behaviors in the region by considering the goals and indicators of their regional foreign policy. The present study is aimed to explain the foreign policy of Iran and Russia concerning the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria; to find commonalities and differences and reasons for these commonalities and differences. The main question of the current research is what kind of policy did Iran and Russia follow in response to the events known as the Arab Spring? In addition to this question, we can also raise a secondary question, which is what goals and interests explain the foreign policy of Iran and Russia regarding the Arab Spring?

In response to the first question, it should be said that both Russia and Iran adopted the policy of "selective activism" towards these events. In the case of Iran, this policy is influenced by the policy of balance that Iran pursues concerning Saudi Arabia and America in the region. Accordingly, Iran only takes an active policy in the region as it feels that the balance of power in areas strategic for Iran is being disturbed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, and a balance must be created. Russia also selected its policy based on the idea of great power and regional hegemon and based on the level of involvement of the United States and the West regarding these events. In response to the second question, it should be noted that Iran's goals in the region are: opposing the dominance of the West and especially the United States over the region, opposing Israel, expanding the influence of Shia Islam, preventing the influence of Saudi Arabia in the region and creating a balance with this country in the region. Russia's goals in Southwest Asia include: reinforcing economic relations with the countries of the region to find markets for energy, confronting Western sanctions, developing arms trade, maintaining stability in the region, expanding cultural and human influence among the people of the region and, on a large scale, maintaining its position in the international system in line with the realization of the idea of great

© Mehdi Sanaei, Zahra Atri Sangari, 2023

power. In the following, the theoretical foundations of the current research are examined and then the policies of the two countries regarding the events known as the Arab Spring are studied.

Conceptual Framework

To understand and explain the goals and interests of Iran and Russia in Southwest Asia and their behavior towards regional events, a combination of constructivist and neo-realist theories could be effective. Constructivism through the approach of identity policy tries to explain the impact of factors such as nationalism, ethnicity, religion, culture, gender and race in international politics and foreign policy [1]. Trine Flockhart explains the main propositions of constructivism as "belief in the social construction of reality and the importance of social facts; focusing on semantic structures along with material structures and the importance of norms and rules; focusing on the role of identity in shaping political action" [2. P. 82]. Identities are the basis of interests, and countries determine their interests based on the identity defined for themselves. Identities require a set of interests and preferences by specifying what and who the countries are [3. P. 281]. Constructivism analyzes the relationship between interests and identity through the concept of role. Any special identity that a country defines for itself requires a certain national role, which itself includes certain interests [4. P. 320-322].

Although constructivism can express the goals and interests of Iran and Russia in the region, in the final explanation of the actions and reactions of Iran and Russia, the use of defensive realism theory can be more effective. Defensive realism emerged from neorealism. Kenneth Waltz played the most important role in developing this theory. Defensive realism pays less attention to the international system and its effect on the foreign policy of the states, and on the other hand, focuses more on the internal politics of the countries. Therefore, in the present study, defensive realism can be used as a complement to the constructivist theory. Defensive realism, like neo-realism, is based on the assumption that governments are not looking for power, but to maintain security, and their desire to expand their influence does not come from the desire for power, but from a sense of insecurity. In other words, governments develop their political interests when they feel increasingly insecure. In the theory of defensive realism, contrary to the theory of classical realism, gaining power is not considered the ultimate goal, and governments will move towards increasing power when they are in a weak position in terms of security [5. P. 22-26]. According to this theory, the Islamic Republic of Iran is seeking a minimal increase in power to maintain the balance of power and ultimately ensure its security.

For example, the basis of Iran's national identity as a Shia country in the Southwest Asian region is derived from these sources: "nationalism", "Shia Islamism" and "the international value system governing international relations" [6]. According to the authors, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in West Asia is based on the identity of Shia Islamism, according to which it assigns a role beyond the geographical borders of Iran. Therefore, Iran's

national interests are also secured in the region with selective and active activism in areas where the "Shia issue" is considered. However, at the same time as the identity issue, Iran's power balance policy should be also noted. This policy is formed in the Middle East region against Saudi Arabia as a regional actor, but, at the same time, it considers the presence of the United States and the West in the region as major non-regional partners of Saudi Arabia.

In the case of Russia, by reviewing the foreign policy documents during the years after the collapse, it can be concluded that self-perception and understanding of the role and mission play an important role in the foreign policy of this country. The foreign policy document approved in April 1993 emphasizes the position of Russia as a regional superpower, a global superpower, and a nuclear superpower. Later, in June 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the new concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, in which the Russian Federation was presented as a great power and one of the centers of influence of the modern world. Moreover, the foreign policy document approved in 2016 states that, in order to secure national interests and implement the national and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation, the government's foreign policy activity focuses on consolidating the position of the Russian Federation as one of the centers of influence in the contemporary world. In the second chapter of this document titled "Contemporary world and foreign policy of the Russian Federation", attention is paid to the increasing role of power in international relations and the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the unique role of Russia in the whole world have been considered as a balancing factor in international affairs [7-9].

Such an understanding of "self' and "roles", which is derived from the concept of "identity" in Russia, is also effective in determining the national interests of this country. In the years immediately after the collapse, based on the definition of Russia's identity as a democratic state and a member of the international community, national interests were defined mostly with regard to economic issues. Russia's foreign behavior was also determined by such a limited definition of national interests at different regional and international levels. However, after the expansion of rival attitudes (nationalists, communists and Eurasianists) and a different look at the identity, position and role of Russia, the concept of national interests also changed, and the Look East policy was proposed. Accordingly, several discourses dominated Russia's foreign policy, each of which is based on a specific understanding of the concept of identity in Russia. Euro-Atlanticism, Eurasianism and the idea of "Russia as a great powef' are discourses that have been dominant in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in certain periods. According to the authors, the discourse of "Russia as a great powef' and the balance of power (against the West in general and America in particular) has shaped the policy of this country against the Arab Spring.

A Review of Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle East Countries prior and after the Arab Spring

Revolutionary movements in Arab countries had the most direct impact on Iran's domestic and foreign policy,

which led to a change in the balance of power and the shape of former alliances in the region. Over the past two decades, Iran has become one of the most influential powers in the Middle East due to its successes in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. With the weakening of the Taliban in the mid-2000s, the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2007, and Iran's support for Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 33-day war, Iran's power in the region strengthened, and Iran managed to gradually establish a belt of allied governments and organizations in the arab countries. Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Palestinian movement Hamas, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, as well as small organizations in some Arab countries, are part of Iran's influence groups. Therefore, the process of changes in Arab countries cannot be seen separately from the continuous confrontation between Iran and the Arab kingdoms of the Persian Gulf. They were worried that Iran will take advantage of their weakness as a result of the spread of Arab revolutionary movements and used it to strengthen its position in the region. Riyadh was trying to bring Syria and Iraq back to the Arab world and remove them from Iran's influence. On the other hand, the Arab kingdoms could not ignore the fact that Tehran's involvement in the Syrian crisis diverted Iran's resources and weakened Iran's influence in the Shi-ite areas of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain. Therefore, under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, these countries were openly financing and arming the Syrian opposition [10].

In contrast, during the Arab Spring, the main purpose of Iranian elites in the region was to confront political processes that hinder Iran's strengthening and harm its geopolitical interests. Meanwhile, Iran's influence on the trends in the region was limited by the actions of the United States and the international community. The change in the geopolitical situation of the Middle East in connection with the Arab Spring paved the way for new conflicts between the United States and Iran. The Arab Spring was a kind of a new arena for the game between America and Iran with zero points. The Islamic Republic of Iran analyzed the processes taking place in the Arab countries in the framework of a strategic competition with the US and formed its policy based on the need to maintain its influence in the region [11. P. 34]. This was where Iran's policy of selective activism in the region represented its reasons and dimensions.

Upon the beginning of social unrest in Egypt and Tunisia, the Iranian government and its affiliated media remained silent at first, and only a few weeks later this issue was raised in official media and official statements. Here, the issue of Iran's "interests" and "values" in response to popular uprisings known as the "Arab Spring" is very important. Iran's main challenge in facing these regional crises was to create a balance between these two different drivers to implement its foreign policy. Regarding preserving Iran's interests, the importance of these events is mainly due to the effects of the change of current governments on bilateral relations with Iran and regional stability, issues related to the balance of regional forces and the regional role of trans-regional actors in preserving Iran's values [12].

For example, in the case of Tunisia, Rached Ghan-nouchi, the Islamist leader of this country, had a positive

view of the Iranian revolution and its leader after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In 1981, he founded the Islamic Tendency Movement, but in 1987 he was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of having connections with Iran and trying to overthrow the Bourguiba government [13]. Iran's political ties with Tunisia were also cut off in 1988 [14. P. 114]. Although these relations were re-established in 1991, they were not warm and friendly. After the initial silence and given the great role of Islamic movements in overthrowing these regimes, Iran declared that the uprisings were a continuation of Iran's Islamic Revolution, and it was referred to as the "Islamic Awakening" [15]. The supreme leader of Iran stated in the Friday prayer: Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1957, which overthrew Shah's regime, is a good example for those who are under governments similar to Shah's regime. He further asked the people of Tunisia and Egypt to gather around the axis of religion and confront the West [16]. However, Rached Ghan-nouchi, after gaining power in Tunisia, preferred to follow the Turkish government model [17] to avoid tension with the West and other Arab countries. Therefore, Iran also remained indifferent to the events in this country because Iran did not feel a threat to the regional balance of power concerning Tunisia and preferred maintaining the status quo over the benefits of Shia identity.

Regarding Egypt, relations between the two countries have always been cold after the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The history of the disputes between the two countries dates back to the beginning of the Iranian revolution and the stay of the Shah of Iran in Egypt, the signing of the Camp David Agreement by Egypt, and the normalization of relations with Israel. As a result of these disagreements, relations between the two countries were cut off by the order of the leader of Iran Imam Khomeini; however, with the inauguration of Mohammad Khatami's government, relations between the two countries slightly improved [18]. With the beginning of the protests in Egypt and the identification of the role of religious elements in these protests, Iran gave political and media support to it. This policy was under the policy of balance of power with the West and countering the influence of the US and Israel in the region. In a statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran considered the revolution of the Egyptian people to be a promise of achieving true independence [19], and the supreme leader of Iran, referring to Egypt's role in the Palestinian issue, said in Tehran's Friday prayer: "The United States control over the rulers of Egypt will nullify all their past efforts in supporting Palestine and Egypt became the biggest enemy of Palestine and the biggest supporter of Zionists" [16]. In fact, according to the goal of Iran's foreign policy as stated in the introduction, that is, opposing the domination of the West and confronting Israel, Iran hoped that an Islamist, anti-Western and anti-Israel government would be established in Egypt to be an extension of the axis of resistance. Also, for Iran, gaining access to the Society of Muslim Brotherhood, especially the Egyptian branch of this movement, was a proper investment in a group that could help Tehran to expand its influence in the region. At the same time, Egypt was very important in Iran's regional strategy due to its geopolitical position in the Arab world and geographical proximity to Israel [20],

and, considering that Egypt abandoned the leadership of the anti-Iranian coalition in the Arab world after Hosni Mubarak, Iran simply wanted to take advantage of this development, whether the new leadership of Egypt is secular-national or Islamic-ideological [12].

This issue was implemented to some extent and Iran managed to establish more effective and beneficial relations with Egypt. The lifting of the ban on the departure of Hamas leaders from Gaza through Egypt [10], the obtaining of permission for warships to pass through the Suez Canal for the first time since 1979, and the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point with Palestine indicated the closeness of Iran and Egypt [11]. Immediately after the January revolution in Egypt in 2011, Ali Salehi, Iran's foreign minister said Tehran is ready to restore diplomatic relations with Cairo, which were unilaterally severed by Egypt after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iranian President Mohammad Ahmadinejad's visit to Cairo on February 3, 2014, for the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was successful in terms of promoting the rebuilding process of relations between the two countries. They discussed the plans for close economic cooperation between Egypt and Iran, the transfer of several billion dollars from Iran to a special deposit in the Central Bank of Egypt, and the supply of 5 million tons of crude oil per month to Cairo [10].

However, Mohamed Morsi, the president of Egypt, announced his opposition to a religious government in Egypt, but in August 2012 he participated in the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) hosted by Tehran. Although it was not an official visit, Morsi was the first Egyptian president to visit Iran since President Sadat in 1978. Shortly before leaving Cairo, he announced that Egypt welcomes "good relations with Iran"; however, there were differences regarding Syria. He used the opening session of the summit to request the removal of the Assad regime in Syria [21. P. 12; 22]. In April 2013, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced during an official visit in Cairo that Iran would not allow the Assad regime to change in Syria. At the same time, the representative of Iran called for the intensification of the quadrilateral mediation efforts that were established in 2012 at Morsi's initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis, consisting of Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Egyptian president expected to strengthen his position in negotiations with domestic and foreign opponents by engaging with Iran—a regional power that shares a similar, though not identical, ideology about the role of Islam in politics and society—and especially used Iran's support to strengthen its position in Egypt's security institutions to achieve equality in relations with the army in the domestic political arena of the country.

However, the close ties between Iran and Egypt alarmed the United States and its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf. So, during the first three months of 2013 and through John Kerry's trip, the US Secretary of State reminded the Egyptian authorities of the Western economic sanctions against Iran and considered the continuation of financial support to Cairo dependent on the review of Egypt's policy to normalize relations with Iran. Also Qatar announced that it planned to invest 18 billion dollars in the Egyptian economy [23, 24]. Also, during Mohamed Morsi's first

foreign trip to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh promised about three billion dollars to help Egypt's devastated economy after the revolution [25]. If Morsi had unconditionally supported Iran's position, he would have faced the risk of missing vital economic and financial support from the Persian Gulf kingdoms. Perhaps for this reason the Muslim Brotherhood quickly responded to the accusations and described Morsi's visit to Tehran as an initiative to pressure Iran to stop supporting the Assad regime [21]. On the other hand, even after Morsi took office, the judiciary remained intact. The Muslim Brotherhood had only gained power in the executive branch and a part of the judicial branch, and a major part of Morsi's time was spent strengthening the foundations of his government [25]. In general, Egypt's bad economic situation and dependence on financial aid from the United States and Arab countries, the insignificant power of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political structure left over from the Mubarak era, the opposing views of the two countries (Iran and Egypt) in the Syrian crisis, and the strong position of the army in Egypt were serious obstacles for the policy of rapprochement to Iran [11]. But with the end of Morsi's presidency on July 3, 2013, even if Morsi did not meet all expectations, Iran was generally satisfied with the normalization of relations with Egypt and condemned the coup against the "elected president of Egypt" [21]. In this way, Iran once again showed that it chose its activism in the region based on the norms, roles and identities it defined for itself, and it preferred stability in the region until the balance of power in the region was not disturbed to the detriment of Iran.

Iran's view regarding Libya was different. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and then the imposed war, relations between Iran and Libya expanded and reached the level of alliance and coalition. Muammar Gaddafi, the former leader of Libya, supported Iran's international positions and even provided material and weapons assistance to Iran during the imposed war [26]. In the early 1980s, the two countries announced in a joint statement that Iran and Libya would fight against the enemies on the same front toward the goals of the Islamic unity [27. P. 260]. But the issue of Imam Musa Sadr, the prominent Shiite leader who disappeared during a trip to Libya in 1978, harmed Iran-Libya relations.

In sum, Iran's policy was to support the popular uprising in Libya. However, two important challenges for Iran here were the presence of Salafist Islamists and the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Western forces in the Libyan crisis. Iranian leaders felt that the Western policy of linking the security of the region to the security of the world, would continue to justify any preemptive attack aimed at preserving Western democratic values such as strengthening democracy or fighting terrorism, leading to the justification of the use of force in the region, the increased presence of foreign military forces, followed by the spread of extremism and instability, as we see in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq [12]. Therefore, following the events in Libya, Iran acted very cautiously within the framework of its foreign policy goal, which is to confront the West, and only one day after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, while more than thirty countries had recognized the Transitional Council, Iran recognized

this Council [28]. In general, Iran, considering its foreign policy goals in the region, i.e., opposition to the US and the West, did not have a positive opinion on these events, and the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated: "We are completely against the intention of the United States and NATO in military operations against Libya. We have doubts and it seems that the goal is not to save the Libyan people; rather, it is the oil wells and maintaining the contracts of their oil companies with this country" [29]. Although considering the special conditions of Libya, the international consensus, the geographical distance between the two countries and most importantly the inactive policy of Saudi Arabia towards Libya, Iran also sufficed for diplomatic positions.

Unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Bahrain was also important for Iran not only in terms of interests but from a value point of view. The majority of the population of Bahrain are Shiites, who are under the control of the Sunni government of Al-Khalifa. Iran is also a Shiite-majority country, which is naturally sympathetic to this common cultural-religious heritage. This empathy existed even under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, although in the 1970s there was no ideological inclination towards the demands of the Shiites in Lebanon and Iraq [12]. As the most prominent Shiite political organization in Bahrain, Al-Wefaq has received significant influences from the principles and values of the Islamic Revolution, which has positions close to Iran and resistance movements regarding the Bahraini government's attempt to normalize relations with Israel [30]. Among the leaders of the Bahraini revolution, Ayatollah Isa Ahmed Qasim, the spiritual leader of the Bahraini Shiites, and Sheikh Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, were influenced by the ideas and notions of the Iranian revolution. Sheikh Isa Qasim studied for a while in Iran in the city of Qom, and since 2019, after his citizenship was revoked by the government of Bahrain, has lived in the city of Qom [31]. Sheikh Ali Salman also studied for a while in the city of Qom in Iran [32]. Therefore, the political relations between the two countries were not close before the Arab Spring. In December 1981, the government of Bahrain arrested groups of Bahraini Shiites on charges of taking armed action against the government and undergoing military training in Iran, and then closed its embassy in Tehran, and the level of relations between the two countries was reduced to Iran's unilateral diplomacy [33. P. 246]. After that, these relations have always been tarnished due to Bahrain's support for the claim of the United Arab Emirates in the dispute over the three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf.

Upon the beginning of the events known as the Arab Spring in Bahrain, Iran started trying to influence these events in the diplomatic and legal dimensions. Deploying Saudi forces to Bahrain by the decision of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council and the West's lack of reaction to these actions led to a new round of tension in the traditional confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran sought to prevent the strengthening of Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia considered the deployment of forces in Bahrain a logical step to maintain its influence and authority over the Persian Gulf countries. To justify foreign interference in Bahrain's internal affairs, it was claimed that Iran was behind these protests [34]. The geographical proximity of

Bahrain to the Eastern Province (Sharqiya) of Saudi Arabia and especially the cities of Dammam, Al-Ahsa and Qatif, where the largest number of Shiites in this country live, and also the geopolitical importance of this region for the Saudis in terms of the presence of major Saudi oil reserves near it, was alarming for Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Arab coalition. The possible seizure of power by Bahraini Shiites can change the regional balance in favor of Iran. Therefore, these countries, being aware of the role and place of transnational identities in the region, are trying to control protests [15].

Iran strongly protested against the suppression of the opposition and the entry of Saudi and Emirati forces into Bahrain, and in March 2019 it called its ambassador to this country in protest against the suppression of Shiites in Bahrain [35]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran sent letters to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the head of the Security Council and the head of the European Union's foreign policy, and, while comparing the events in Bahrain with the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, demanded that the Security Council take serious and quick measures to stop the killing of the people of Bahrain [36]. But, in general, Iran's reaction to public protests in Bahrain was limited and flexible. Despite statements by Iranian officials that Bahrain is Iran's zone of influence, Iran refrained from military action in the Bahrain crisis and preferred a balanced policy. In this way, Iran followed the events closely, while using what was happening to increase its influence in the region [11].

In fact, during the revolutionary events in Bahrain, Iran tried to use its soft power to influence the events in Bahrain and help the Shiites of Bahrain get their deprived rights. The reasons for adopting this policy were that Iran avoids Shia and Sunni rivalry in the region and supports Islamic unity. Secondly, Iran is careful not to provide an excuse by supporting the public uprisings of the Arab world for these countries to link the demands of their Shia population to the issue of "regime change" with foreign support. Therefore, Iran has always reiterates that it is not trying to establish a Shia government in Bahrain [12]. However, as observed, Iran's policy in Bahrain, unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, was highly dynamic, which was due to Iran's Shiite identity and the roles and interests arising from this identity, and also due to the extensive presence of Saudi Arabia in the issue of Bahrain and the disruption of the balance of power to the detriment of Iran.

Yemen is one of the other countries that has been the area of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in light of the Arab uprisings. North Yemen was among the first countries to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran, but this country, during the Iran-Iraq war, sent troops to Iraq to help Saddam Hussein [37. P. 87], while South Yemen led by Ali Nasser Mohammad supported Tehran. In 1990, two Yemens united with each other. After that, first, the Iranian embassy was degraded to a consulate, and then the consulate was demoted to a representative office. In addition to official relations, the Islamic Republic of Iran also paid attention to the Shiite population of Yemen. For example, several Zaidi Shiites came to Iran between 1999 and 2010 to study Shiite Islam in Qom. Abdul Malik Houthi, the current leader of the Houthis and the founder of the movement, was among them along with his brother Hussein [38. P. 178].

With the beginning of the Arab Spring in Yemen and then the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the gaining of power by the Houthis, Iran tried to expand relations with Yemen by signing economic contracts. These contracts included the expansion of the Hodeidah port and the construction of electricity and gas power plants, which were signed in 2015 [3 9]. But after Riyadh's direct military intervention in Yemen, Iran considered these attacks a strategic threat against its interests in the Middle East. Therefore, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif delivered a four-article plan to the UN Secretary-General, which called for the establishment of a ceasefire and the cessation of foreign military attacks, the immediate delivery of humanitarian aid to the people, and the resumption of the national dialogue with the participation of representatives of all political parties, and finally the formation of an inclusive government and the national unity of Yemen [40]. Moreover, Tehran tried to prevent the presence of other regional countries in the Saudi coalition and the declaration of neutrality and non-participation of countries like Pakistan, Turkey and Oman was the result of this policy [38. P. 178]. At the same time, Iran also indirectly provided military assistance and advice to the Yemeni Houthis [41].

In contrast, Saudi Arabia's attack on Yemen to suppress the country's Shiite minority was a reaction to Iran's regional role. The plan of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, supported by the United States and the European Union, provided the conditions for a peaceful transfer of power from Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in 2012 [42]. Later, operations such as the "decisive storm" and "restoring hope" on March 25, 2015, in Yemen were seeking to limit the Shia Houthis in the political arena of this country. It seems that such an aggressive policy of Saudi Arabia and its allies was a reaction to the US regional policy during the presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2017) and Iran's withdrawal from international isolation with nuclear resolutions, which increased the country's ability to participate in regional conflicts. Accordingly, regional events created the feeling that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, should play their regional role alone and balance Iran's position, unlike in the past [43]. The simultaneous success of the Houthis in Yemen and the presence of the Qods Force in Iraq and Syria created the feeling that Iran is pursuing expansionist policies in the region [15]. But in fact Saudi Arabia's participation in the Yemen war in 2015 and the Houthis' gaining power in Sana'a played an important role in diminishing Saudi Arabia's influence in the region and strengthening Iran's role [44]. In general, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Yemen was more successful than in Bahrain for some reasons because, in Yemen, Zaidi Shiites are the majority. Iran's policy in Yemen after the Arab Spring was the balance of power against Saudi Arabia's power in Bahrain. Before that, Yemen was considered the backyard of Saudi Arabia, and, due to the factor of Shiite identity, Iran found Yemen a suitable place to compensate for Riyadh's superiority in Bahrain, securing its interests and national security, and putting pressure on Saudi Arabia.

Syria is the last country examined in this section. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran's relations with Syria have always been at the best level due to the existence of the Alavi

Shiite government and opposing to Israel. Syria and Libya were Iran's only allies in the imposed war. For this reason, with the Arab Spring, Iran's policy was completely different from other countries. Syria is Iran's closest ally in the Middle East region and is geopolitically important for Iran, especially considering Syria's influence on Lebanon's political scene, the relations between Syria and Iran have never been exclusively bilateral. Syria played an auxiliary role during the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution in 1976 and the mediation in the Lebanese civil war. With the failure of mediation efforts, the Syrian army entered Lebanon and was present in various areas of this country until 2005, and it was only this year that it retreated to the Beqqa Valley in southern Lebanon. Thus, Iran tried to strengthen its influence in Lebanon through Syria and established relations with Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel. During the rule of Bashar al-Assad, Syria was Iran's first line of defense in its policy towards the US and Israel. If there is no government loyal to Iran in Syria, the second line of defense formed by Hamas and Hezbollah will also be weakened. Regime change in Syria means the end of Iran's aid to Hezbollah and the weakening of relations between Hamas and Damascus [11]. The supreme leader of Iran announced in a speech that the Americans and some western countries want to take revenge on Syria for their recent failures in the region. The main purpose of the US conspiracy in Syria is to destroy the resistance front in the region because Syria supports the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese Islamic resistance [45]. Nevertheless, unlike other parts of the Arab world, Iran took a specific position towards the protests in Syria. To preserve the Iranian-Syrian alliance and Syria's ability to resisit against Israel, Iran reacted cautiously to the events in this country.

Moreover, since Iran had formed an anti-Israel front with Syria, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and Syria played the role of a bridge in between, according to Tehran authorities, the goal of overthrowing Assad was to isolate Iran. Isolation not only endangers Iran's national interests, but also national security, and Iran tried to stop the process of confronting its influence in the Western Middle East by keeping Assad. Strategically, the importance of Syria for Iran was so great that the supreme leader of Iran, in a meeting with Bashar al-Assad, called Iran and Syria the strategic depth of each other [46] and, apart from providing financial and logistical support to the Assad government, he also asked Lebanon's Hezbollah to support the Assad government. Tehran believed that the change in Syria means empowerment of the forces closer to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West, and this would be the loss of a key and most important regional ally and, more importantly, a disruption of the balance of power to the detriment of the forces of the axis of resistance.

On the other hand, since the majority of the population of Syria is Sunni, Saudi Arabia was seeking to dethrone the Assad regime to change the balance of power in the region and reduce the role of Iran. However, inside Syria, Saudi Arabia gradually lost its influence among the armed opposition groups. This trend was intensified after 2018, when the only internal armed ally of Saudi Arabia that is Jaysh-al-Islam lost its position completely [44]. Therefore, although the factor of Shiite identity played an important

role in Iran's defense of Syria, confronting the presence of the US and Western powers in the region, the balance of power with Saudi Arabia, confronting the increasing power of Israel, and maintaining the axis of resistance were much bigger goals for Iran. Considering that the Palestinian issue is not limited to Shiites, it can be said that Iran did not pay attention only to this factor in the Syrian crisis.

Russia's Relations with the Middle East Countries before and after the Arab Spring

From 1990 to 2000, Russia was going through its transformation period, and the Middle East and the Arab world were not among Russia's priorities. In June 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. In this document, in the framework of Russian foreign policy priorities, the Middle East was placed on the margins of Russia's interests (before Africa and South America). At the same time, the priority of Russia's foreign policy in this region was to "recover and strengthen" previously lost positions, primarily economic positions. Therefore, relations between Russia and the Arab countries gradually began to move to a new level based on mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. However, the beginning of the new millennium made changes in the foreign policy of many countries in the world, including Russia. With the events of September 11, 2001, Russia tried to prevent the US military action in Iraq. Therefore, during 2002 and early 2003, Putin emphasized many times in various international forums and meetings that Iraq should not be the target of unilateral US military action and that the "Iraq problem" should be resolved only under the supervision of the United Nations [47. P. 46-47]. When the United States started a one-sided military attack on Iraq on March 20, 2003, the Russian president immediately condemned this action and considered it a serious political mistake that could not only complicate the situation in the region but also have the most serious consequences for the whole world. At the same time, significant developments took place in Russia's relations with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic countries. In June 2005, Russia was accepted as an observer member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [48. P. 32]. Also, in April 2005, Putin visited Israel, Egypt, and Palestine, and the Hamas delegation visited Moscow in March 2006, which showed Moscow's efforts to enter into the important issues of the Middle East.

With the beginning of the Arab Spring, Russia first interpreted these events as the West's plan to reduce Moscow's influence in the region. Many in Russia considered these demonstrations as "color revolutions". However, later, in the Russian foreign policy doctrine document in 2013, the protests were mentioned as "Arabs' desire to return to their civilizational roots" [49]. However, until the end of 2011, Russia's position towards the events of the Arab countries was not expressed coherently and clearly. Regarding Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, Russia acted effectively as an observer. In the case of events in Libya, where the conflicts took on a violent aspect and foreign countries were involved, the Russian Federation tried

to adopt a neutral position. However, in all cases, Moscow firmly opposed drawing foreign countries into conflicts and the use of violence in domestic political struggles. At the same time, Russia welcomed the protestors' demands for the formation of new governments and political systems and more freedom in social and political life, but it was also worried about the possibility of the activation of radical Islamist circles [47. P. 58].

The general impact of these events on Russia's foreign policy was seen in the form of an increase in Russia's presence in the Middle East. In this way, Russia entered an area that was previously thought to have nothing to do with it. This change of policy was owing to the role that Russia defined for itself under the influence of its identity as a great power, and, after the Libyan experience, it was seeking to balance of power with the West in the Middle East. In addition, although the components of Russia's power did not grow significantly, the confusion in the region, the obvious weakness of the West in advancing its goals, and the desire of the countries in the region to be a balancing force, provided a platform for Moscow to play a greater role. The manifestation of this desire can be seen in the Russian foreign policy document in 2016. This document states that Russia will continue its help for stabilizing the situation in the Middle East and North Africa region, supporting collective efforts aimed at neutralizing the threats caused by international terrorist groups, as well as continuing efforts to resolve political and diplomatic conflicts in the countries of the region based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right to self-determination without foreign interference [9].

To review Russia's foreign policy in the countries where the Arab Spring took place, we will first look at the relations between Russia and Tunisia. The relations between the two countries were friendly during the presidency of Ben Ali, and the political and economic relations between the two countries were expanding in the years leading to the Arab Spring. When the protests broke out, Russia, like other countries, was somewhat surprised and first demanded an end to the violence and dialogue within the framework of the constitution to resolve the crisis [50]. However, with the departure of Ben Ali from Tunisia, Russia started a new policy based on the beginning of relations with the new rulers of this country. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on January 26, 2011, at the Davos Summit considered the events in Tunisia a great lesson for other governments in the world not to ignore the need of their societies for growth and development. He expressed hope that the situation in Tunisia would stabilize without a negative impact on the general situation of the Arab world [51].

However, even after the change of government in Tunisia, the cooperation between the two countries increased in the fields of fighting terrorism, nuclear energy and tourism. In 2016, Moscow provided Tunisian authorities with satellite images of terrorist groups in Morocco [52]. In the field of tourism, when the arrival of European tourists to Tunisia decreased due to terrorist attacks between 2012 and 2016, the number of Russian tourists in this country increased sharply and reached 600 thousand people in 2016, which was 10 times more than 2015 numbers [53]. That was a great help to the Tunisian government and the

owners of tourism-related businesses in this country. In general, Russia's foreign policy towards Tunisia's events, considering its identity as a great power and also the principle of regional power balance, was more tended to maintain stability and improve relations with the existing governments and not participate in the internal events of this country.

The ties between Russia and Egypt were also very close and developing before the Arab Spring. In the second half of the 1990s, Russia began expanding relations with Arab countries based on economic cooperation, and, while creating a new legal framework for cooperation, signed contracts with Egypt for oil development in the central parts of this country and in the Sinai desert with Russian companies LUKOIL and Kominef. In September 1997, during the visit of Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, to Russia, agreements were signed in the field of scientific and technical cooperation, the resumption of the work of the Russian-Egyptian commission in the area of economic cooperation, holding regular consultations between the two countries, etc. Meanwhile, Russian Airlines (Aviastar) and Egypt signed an agreement on the joint financing of the production and supply of 200 Tu-204 aircraft, as well as the establishment of a joint leasing company for their operation [47. P. 41].

During the visit of the President of Russia to Cairo (in 2005) and the visit of Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, to Moscow (in 2006), Russia made many proposals for bilateral and regional cooperation, not only in the economic area but also in the political and security fields. Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Egypt in April 2005 was the first visit by a Russian head of state to Arab countries since 1964. As a result, a joint statement on further deepening of friendly relations and partnership between the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt was signed. This action showed that the cooperation between the two countries had a strategic nature. Following this in 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the Russia-Egypt Strategic Cooperation Agreement [54].

Before the Arab Spring, more than 500,000 Russian tourists traveled to Egypt annually. However, Egypt was more inclined towards the United States financially and militarily. After the Arab Spring, Russia hoped that Mubarak would overcome this crisis. Through a phone call with Mubarak, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev wished him and his country success to overcome the crisis by resorting to the law [55]. To better understand the situation in the region, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandre Saltanov was sent there; he visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in February 2011 [56, 57]. Of course, Russia had no interference in the Egyptian crisis, and, after the fall of Mubarak, it quickly established relations with the opposition and announced its readiness to cooperate with the new government and improve relations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Sergei Lavrov's visit to Egypt on March 21, 2011, was devoted to this issue, as well as to discussing the situation in Libya. Russia welcomed the implementation of reforms in Egypt and supported the deepening of bilateral cooperation [47. P. 58]. In November 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was ready to cooperate with

the Muslim Brotherhood, which had come to power in Egypt [58]. During the short time Morsi was in power, Putin negotiated with him twice (March and April 2013). After the coup against Morsi, General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi visited Moscow twice: once immediately after the coup and again immediately after winning the elections. In this way, the foundations of relations in the era after Hosni Mubarak were also strengthened. In fact, Russia's policy towards the protests in Egypt was completely defined based on the country's identity as a great power. In the absence of Hosni Mubarak's pro-Western government and the West's concern about the presence of Islamists in Egypt's political arena, Russia tried to strengthen its presence in this country and create a kind of a balance of power against the West in the North African region. With the inauguration of the government of Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and Western criticism of the issue of human rights in Egypt, relations between Russia and Egypt were strengthened, and Egypt became one of the foundations of Russia's active foreign policy during the Arab Spring.

Relations with Libya, which was one of the important importers of Russian weapons during the Soviet era, was variable. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Libya. Russia supported this decision and in the UN Security Council voted in favor of imposing sanctions proposed by the United States against Libya and unilaterally cut off its contacts with Libya in areas including military-technical cooperation and oil production, although some Western countries maintained their presence in Libya. In the second half of the 1990s, intergovernmental agreements were signed between the Russian Federation and Arab countries on commercial and economic cooperation including the creation of intergovernmental commissions in the economic field and military-technical cooperation agreements and contracts between chambers of commerce and industry of Russia and Arab countries. In this framework, in 1998, intergovernmental agreements were concluded on the participation of Russian companies in the implementation of large projects in Libya in the fields of energy, communications, transportation, oil and gas, and infrastructure facilities. However, relations with Libya were difficult in the 2000s. Russia's response to the 1992 anti-Libyan sanctions was still taking its effects, and the volume of mutual trade in 2005 was only about $50 million, although the total number of trade and economic agreements signed that year exceeded $ 1 billion. Russia was clearly lagging behind its rivals in the Libyan market and to some extent missed the opportunity presented to it immediately after the lifting of sanctions [47. P. 55]. In April 2008, Russia forgave Libya's debts of 4.5 billion dollars. In contrast, Russian companies in Libya signed important contracts worth about ten billion dollars. Moscow has been involved in the oil sector as well as the construction of the high-speed railway from Benghazi to Sirte [59; 60]. In the arms sector, Libya was one of the largest importers of arms from Russia along with Algeria and Syria [61].

With the beginning of the crisis in Libya, Russia, affected by its identity as a great power, tried to maintain its economic interests in Libya. Therefore, it tried to act as a mediator, both between the internal warring parties and between the US and Europe with the Libyan government.

Russian authorities tried to prevent European intervention in Libya's internal conflict.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned that "foreign intervention" could lead to the rise of Islamists, and their rise in North Africa could negatively affect other regions, including Russia's North Caucasus [Cited from: 62]. However, finally, on February 26, 2011, Russia joined the Libyan sanctions and also abstained from the March 2011 UN Security Council resolution to establish a no-fly zone over Libya [63]. This resolution allowed NATO to conduct military operations in Libya at the end of March 2011. In June 2011, Moscow attempted to persuade Gaddafi to step down but failed. Russia was the 73 rd country that officially recognized the National Transitional Council of the opposition and this affected Moscow's relations with Libya. In 2012, a military court in Tripoli sentenced Russian citizen Alexander Shadrov to life in prison for "complicity" with Muam-mar Gaddafi, and Tatneft and Gazprom, the two largest Russian energy companies, were eventually forced to abandon their contracts in the country [64. P. 13; 65; 66].

On the other hand, after the United Nations declaration in January 2016 that the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli is now the legitimate authority in the country, Moscow officially recognized this government as the legitimate authority in Libya but also cooperated with General Haftar and Tobruk government. The first real evidence of the interaction between Moscow and the head of the Libyan National Army was Haftar's request to print 4 billion Libyan dinars. The order was executed by Russia's state-owned Goznak, and, in May 2016, a Russian ship delivered a batch of printed banknotes to Libya. Khalifa Haftar also visited Moscow in June and November 2016 [68]. An overview of Russia's foreign policy towards Libya indicates that this country is the second case where Russia has taken a selective activism approach and tried to play a role in the internal events of this country. After the issue of the UN resolution, the intervention of the West in Libya and the overthrow of the Gaddafi government, Russia felt extremely worried about the balance of power with the West in the North African region, and, considering its position and identity as a great power and regional hegemony, tried to be effective in the internal situation of Libya and was successful in this matter to a large extent.

Regarding Bahrain, the position of Russia is also noteworthy. Russia has been silent during the massive political protests by the majority of Shia Arabs in Bahrain against the royal family and the minority Sunni government. As the protests were suppressed by the security forces of Bahrain with the help of the forces of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Russia still did not react. In late March 2011, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that the protests were "an internal matter" that should be resolved "through dialogue" [Cited from: 62], but, when the protests were resolved through violence, Russia again did not object. In 2011, when the United States openly supported protesters in Egypt during the Arab Spring and refused to aid its ally, President Hosni Mubarak, this fact, along with criticism of human rights in Bahrain, raised concerns that in a crisis, Washington could drop support for the current government of Bahrain. In addition, the United States has reduced its presence in the

Middle East in recent years. Therefore, not only Bahrain, even other Arab kingdoms of the Persian Gulf are losing their confidence in Washington's ability and willingness to help prevent Iranian influence.

France and Britain also canceled the permission to send arms to Bahrain after the suppression of mass demonstrations in the kingdom that resulted in casualties. But the government of Bahrain signed a contract with Moscow to supply AK-103 assault rifles and started a program to train the Bahraini army. In January 2012, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov visited Bahrain to discuss the possibility of establishing direct air flights between Moscow and Manama, as well as economic and cultural cooperation [Cited from: 62]. In general, relations with Bahrain are suitable for the beginning of Russia's economic and political influence in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. First of all, Russia is facing a lack of investment due to sanctions, and Bahrain has invested more than $50 million in retail, commercial real estate, mining and logistics services in Russia. Cooperation with Manama also shows Russia's desire to enter the arms market in the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to supplying machinery, Moscow is also executing a contract to supply Cornet antitank complexes to Bahrain, a small success for Russia, as all Gulf kingdoms traditionally focus on purchasing weapons from the United States [68]. However, Russia's passive activism towards the events of the Arab Spring in Bahrain indicated the country's behavior as a major power in the region, which is trying to maintain its regional hegemony. In general, Russia avoids movements that cause instability in the Arabian Peninsula and disrupt energy security in the region, and, taking into account the lack of threat to the regional balance from the United States and the West in the Bahrain issue, Russia also prefers to maintain the current situation and the development of relations with the current government of Bahrain as the best possible option.

In the case of Yemen, in the second half of the 1990s, trade turnover increased based on the intergovernmental agreements between the Russian Federation and the Arab countries on trade and economic cooperation and the establishment of intergovernmental commissions in the economic field (from 3.7 million dollars in 1997 to 4.5 million dollars in 1998). Also, in the same period, the construction of an irrigation system titled the Hajar Owlia project began in Yemen in Hadramaut province (worth more than 5 million dollars) [47. P. 41]. Moreover, in March 1998, an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation between Russia and Yemen was signed in Sana'a. Russia's reaction to the protests and demonstrations in Yemen was in such a way that, since the demonstrations to overthrow Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012 did not take place under the banner of the struggle for democracy and did not resemble color revolutions, Moscow did not feel worried about it [64. P. 10]. In April 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called on the opposing sides in Yemen to reach a solution [Cited from: 62]. However, in early June, Russia called for the acceptance of a solution proposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which would have required Saleh and his entourage to step down in exchange for immunity [Cited from: 62]. Like the West,

Moscow did not want to directly interfere in the situation in Yemen, but, following the departure of Saleh from Yemen to Saudi Arabia after he was injured in an attack by the opposition on June 3, 2011, Russia was willing to accompany Saudi Arabia's efforts to mediate in resolving the conflict. In late February 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry praised the peaceful transfer of power from Saleh to his deputy through elections in which his deputy was the only candidate [Cited from: 62]. Therefore, in Yemen, as in Bahrain, Russia followed the policy of maintaining stability and security and not disrupting the status quo based on its identity as a great power and a regional hegemon.

The last country to be examined in this section is Syria. With the beginning of the 1990s and Syria standing next to Kuwait during Saddam Hussein's invasion of this country, sanctions on Syria were lifted, and Russia was able to establish relatively friendly relations with Syria. In 1993, an agreement on commercial, economic and technical cooperation was signed between the two countries, and, since 1994, Moscow and Damascus resumed military and technical cooperation. In 1998, new contracts for the supply of Russian weapons were signed, which was facilitated by the approval of a five-year plan by the Syrian government in the same year to modernize the country's armed forces. During President Assad's visit to Moscow in 1999, he directly discussed the need for a large-scale military-technical cooperation and a revival of the strategic alliance with the Russian leadership [47. P. 35-36]. In January 2005, during Bashar al-Assad's visit, Syria offered Russia participation in a series of projects in exchange for debt cancellation: the development of Syrian oil and gas fields by Russian companies, the construction of hydroelectric power plants and irrigation systems, renovation of Syrian ports, etc. In 2005, a long-term program of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and Syria from 2005-2010 was finalized and signed [47. P. 5556; 69. P. 11].

Accordingly, from the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia's position was that foreign intervention is unacceptable and the only solution to the crisis is the dialogue between the government and the opposition, and it is not possible to start talking about Assad's departure as a precondition for negotiations [70]. In September 2011, Russia and China submitted a joint draft resolution on Syria to the United Nations, the aim of which was to end the violence "wherever it originates", to put pressure on all sides in the conflict, to separate the political opposition from the extremists, to support the Arab League mission and the immediate start of a national dialogue involving all Syrian groups. In addition, the Russian draft contained another important provision that came directly from the "Libya experience": nothing in the resolution should be "interpreted as authorizing the use of force against Syria". Also, Moscow vetoed three times (in October 2011, February and August 2012) resolutions condemning the actions of the Syrian authorities in the UN Security Council.

The use of the veto was due to the content of the documents, in which the Assad regime was blamed for the bloodshed and the responsibility of the opposition was neglected, and because of the fear that (as in the case of Libya) the resolutions could be interpreted too broadly to

justify foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict [47. P. 58-59]. After abstention (along with China) on a Security Council resolution establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, the US and NATO actively supported the Libyan opposition, which eventually toppled the Gaddafi regime and formed a new government. If repeated, Moscow would lose its closest ally in the Middle East, along with access to naval facilities in Tartus, close arms ties, and investment in oil and other sectors of the Syrian economy [71].

Russia's policy towards Syria, with the aim of preventing the military overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's government, was because Russia was concerned about the coming to power of the Sunni and radical Islamist opposition and its destructive consequences for the entire region [47. P. 59]. According to Moscow, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya left all three of these countries in turmoil. Also, Moscow considered Saudi Arabia and Qatar to be the main motive for overthrowing the Assad regime. Events in Syria revived Moscow's fear of Saudi Arabia, which was common from the mid-1990s until the 2003 rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia. However, the relations between the two countries improved in 2003, especially since Riyadh made it clear that it supported Moscow's solution to Chechnya (Putin himself visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2007) [72]. However, Moscow sees Saudi Arabia as trying to use the Arab Spring for its geopolitical interests by supporting Salafis in Egypt and Libya, suppressing Shiites in Bahrain, and replacing the pro-Iranian Alawite minority regime in Syria with a pro-Sunni Saudi political system.

Therefore, when the West accused the Syrian authorities of using chemical weapons in August 2013, Russia supported the Syrian government fully, since there was a possibility of repeating the Libyan scenario and overthrowing the government. On September 28, 2013, the United Nations Security Council, at the initiative of Russia, adopted a resolution on the transfer of Syria's chemical weapons abroad under international control [73]. In 2015, Russia's foreign policy witnessed an important development, and that was the aerial bombardment of ISIS positions in Syria, which began on September 30, 2015, and was accompanied by an increase in Russia's presence in the Middle East. Therefore, as seen, the case of Syria was a turning point in Russia's foreign policy during the Arab Spring, and Russia opted to be fully active in this country. Until then, Moscow recognized the superiority of the West in the Middle East and adjusted its policy in such a way as to have the least confrontation with the West. But, considering the extensive involvement of the US and the West in the Syrian crisis and taking into account the experience of Libya, Russia behaved completely based on its identity as a great power and regional hegemon and tried to restore the balance of power in the region.

Findings and Conclusions

As it was observed, Iran pursues its foreign policy in West Asia not only based on Shiite identity, but also according to the balance of power policy and to confront global and regional powers, especially the US, Israel

and Saudi Arabia, and its interests are defined accordingly. So as Iran did not feel a threat to the balance of regional forces in the events in Tunisia, it cautiously tried to maintain balanced bilateral relations with this country so as not to damage the stability of the region. In Egypt, Iran also showed that it selected its activism in the region based on the norms, roles and identities that it defines for itself, and prefers stability despite having interests related to its revolutionary and Shiite identity until the balance of power in the region is not disrupted on the detriment of Iran. This policy followed in the case of Libya, so, due to the geographical distance between the two countries, as well as the passive policy of Saudi Arabia towards Libya, Iran was satisfied with diplomatic approaches.

Iran's policy regarding Bahrain has been to protect its interests and values. In terms of values, the presence of the Shiite majority in this country was the driving force behind Iran's position in opposing the Al-Khalifa regime. At the same time, Bahrain is strategically located in the circle of political-security interests of Iran in the sensitive and important region of the Persian Gulf. The military intervention of the Saudis in Bahrain with the support of the United States was mainly aimed at dominating and controlling the political-security processes of this country and, as a result, the entire Persian Gulf region and the containment of Iran. Therefore, if successful, this policy had the potential to shift the balance of power against Iranian interests not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the entire Middle East. At the same time, the intervention of the Saudis gave the necessary excuse to the trans-regional powers to link the regional and global security (international energy security) and in this way prolong their presence. Also this process is likely to lead to military escalation and instability, which is against Iran's national interests [12]. Therefore, unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Iran's policy in Bahrain was highly dynamic. In Yemen, as we have noted, Iran actively pursued regional activism and balance of power policy with Saudi Arabia and managed to make up for its failure against Saudi Arabia in Bahrain.

Finally, it should be noted in the case of Syria that, apart from the factor of Shiite identity, the balance of power policy against Saudi Arabia and even Turkey, confronting the US and Israel and maintaining the axis of resistance playd an important role in Iran's full defense against Bashar Assad. An important issue related to the identity factor in Syria was the entry of Sunni Hamas into the opposition front of Bashar al-Assad. Although Iran was not satisfied with Hamas, after the separation of Hamas from the Syrian armed opposition, Iran not only resumed relations with this Palestinian group but also tried to mediate between Hamas, the Assad government and Hezbollah, so that the axis of resistance against Israel is preserved. Therefore, confronting the United States Middle East plan also caused Iran to seek a balance of power and establish its regional hegemony.

Russia's foreign policy in this period was similarly influenced by the identity factor and also based on the balance of power policy. Russia's understanding of its

identity as a great power led to maximum support for the Gaddafi government and the selection of this country as one of the fields of selective activism in foreign policy. After the UN resolution, the Western intervention in Libya and the overthrow of the Gaddafi government, Russia started a policy of balance of power in Libya, where the opposite side of this balance was NATO and the Western powers.

This kind of perception of Russia's role was effective even in the country's silence policy regarding the events in Bahrain. Like other superpowers, Russia did not want to disrupt the energy market, and, since the Security Council and other world powers were indifferent to the events in this country, Moscow did not feel the need to confront these countries in the framework of the balance of power policy. Regarding Yemen and Tunisia, Moscow did not intervene due to the indifference of other superpowers and international institutions. In the case of these two countries, Russia intended to maintain stability, improve relations with the existing governments and not participate in the internal events of these countries, based on its identity as a great power and also the principle of regional power balance.

While Russia's activism against the events in Egypt was completely defined based on the country's identity as a great power, Russia tried to create a kind of a balance of power against the West in the North African region. This policy was strengthened when the Al-Fattah El-Sisi government came to power, and Egypt became one of the foundations of Russia's active foreign policy in the post-Arab Spring era.

However, the case of Syria was the most obvious example of the influence of identity in Russia's foreign policy. Moscow, like Tehran, in the framework of the policy of balance of power with the West, defended the Assad government from the very beginning and chose fully selective activism towards the events of this country. This behavior was directly related to this country's understanding of its role as a great power. Finally, the evolution of Russia's foreign policy towards more and more effective presence in regional events (including more presence in the events in Libya and Egypt after the Arab revolutions) and even a reflection of this desire in the foreign policy document of 2016 of this country represent Russia's foreign policy regarding the Arab Spring.

Finally, as noted, both Iran and Russia defined their policy towards the Arab Spring events based on their identity and interests, and specifically with an emphasis on maintaining the balance of regional powers and confronting the influence of the West and the United States. At the same time, Iran also seriously pursued the balance of power with Saudi Arabia, and therefore the two countries' options for selective activism did not match in all cases. While Iran's "selective activism" policy brought Bahrain, Yemen and Syria into Iran's field of selective activism, Russia's policy of "selective activism" brought Egypt, Libya and Syria into the field of selective activism of this country.

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Information about the authors:

Mehdi Sanaei, PhD, associate professor of International Relations, University of Tehran (Tehran, Iran). E-mail: Msanaei@ut.ac.ir Zahra Atri Sangari, postgaduate student, People's Friendship University of Russia (Moscow, Russian Federation). E-mail: Msanaei@ut.ac.ir

The authors declare no conflicts of interests. Информация об авторах:

Мехди Санаи - PhD, доцент факультет изучения мира Тегеранского университета (Тегеран, Иран). E-mail: Msanaei@ut.ac.ir Захра Атри - аспирант Российского университета дружбы народов (Москва, Россия). E-mail: Msanaei@ut.ac.ir

Авторы заявляют об отсутствии конфликта интересов.

The article was submitted 12.04.2023; approved after reviewing 23.05.2023; accepted for publication 31.05.2023.

Статья поступила в редакцию 12.04.2023; одобрена после рецензирования 23.05.2023; принята к публикации 31.05.2023.