CC BY
22
Rhetoric. The effective use of language (UDC 808)
DOI: 10.18454/RULB.5.01 Москвин В. П.
Волгоградский государственный социально-педагогический университет СЕМАНТИЧЕСКИЕ ПЕРЕНОСЫ: КРИТЕРИИ КЛАССИФИКАЦИИ
Аннотация
Представлена общая классификация семантических переносов. Как показало исследование, переносы поддаются систематизации по четырём параметрам: 1) по характеру ассоциаций, лежащих в их основе: сходству, смежности и контрасту, причём ассоциации по сходству и контрасту составляют основу таксономических переносов (с рода на вид, с вида на род, с вида на вид и др.); 2) по функциональному параметру: функционально релевантные и иррелевантные; 3) по сфере действия: перенос распространяется как на лексическую, так и на грамматическую семантику; 4) по степени выразительности: так, метонимические ассоциации более предсказуемы, чем метафорические.
Ключевые слова: метафора, метонимия, синекдоха, таксономический перенос, грамматический перенос.
Moskvin V.P.
Volgograd State Socio-Pedagogical University SEMANTIC TRANSFERS: CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION
Abstract
There is represented the general classification of semantic transfers. As the research has shown, transfers can be systematized based on four parameters: 1) the type of associations lying on their basis: similarity, contiguity and contrast, the associations by similarity and contrast being regarded as the basis for taxonomic transfers (from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, etc.); 2) the functional parameter: functionally relevant and irrelevant; 3) the sphere of action: transfer applies both to lexical and grammatical semantics; 4) the degree of ex-pressiveness: thus, the metonymic associations are more predictable than the metaphoric ones.
Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, taxonomic transfer, grammatical transfer.
Introduction
A semantic transfer, which consists in using a nominative unit "to express a meaning which it has not previously expressed", that is, in a "secondary (derived) meaning" (Stern 1968 [1931]: 163 & 5), has been interpreted since antiquity as "[a] turn from the word's own meaning to another one, which is akin to it" (Guarin 1726: 32). The contemporary theory of semantic transfers has always been not only closely connected and interrelated with the theory of tropes (cf. Gr. xponog 'transfer', literally 'turn' < xpsnsiv 'to turn'), but can also be genetically traced back to it: "Speech is decorated, as Greeks believe, if word transfers are used, or, as they name them, tropes" (Cicero 1853: 23). A commentator of Hermogenes of Tarsus (160-225 AD) notes: "Starting with Aristotle and Hermogenes, tropes are seen simply as transfers, or metaphors", as "xpsnsiv means p.exa^epeiv, that is, to transfer, and tropes are nothing else than transfers" (Hermogenes 1614 :108). Classification of tropes is a point of considerable debate in linguistics: starting with antiquity, "among grammarians and philosophers a battle (pugna) has been raging as to what the types and subtypes of tropes are, and also how many of them there are" (Quintilianus 1854 :75). The three issues concerning transfers have not yet been fully resolved too, namely: 1) the separating semantic transfers from adjacent phenomena, in particular, from tropes; 2) the repertoire of transfers, that is, 'how many of them there are'; 3) the classification of transfers (i.e. 'what the types and subtypes of them are'), and therefore the establishing criteria for such classification.
C. Paradis, after having analyzed the classification schemes for types of semantic change suggested by H. Paul, G. Stern, L. Bloomfield, and S. Ullmann, arrived at the conclusion that in all those schemes "[t]he classes are like islands [as the binary oppositions like 'narrowing / widening', 'metaphor / metonymy', etc. are inconnected and so do not form an 'arbor porphyrii'; V.M.], and most classes can be included in one another" (Paradis 2001 :70). The aims of the present paper are: a) to separate transfers from adjacent phenomena; b) to establish a set of logically relevant criteria for a consistent general typology of transfers.
Transfers and adjacent phenomena
A. Blank made a significant contribution to the common theory of the change of meaning, as he separated transfers as 'taxonomically elementary' units from devices, which are either derived from different transfers or cover heterogeneous sets of transfers. Thus:
1. A hyperbole can be created through a number of devices: a) through metaphor: book mountain (metaphoric hyperbole), b) through comparison: sweeter far then honey (comparative hyperbole), c) through transfer finitus numerus pro infinito: two hundredtimes for many a time (numerical hyperbole), and so forth. So, hyperbole (as well as litotes and other instances of overstatement
and understatement, in particular, euphemisms) should be regarded as 'secondary processes of transfer' (Blank 1997: 333; see also Blank 2001: 95).
2. The types of synecdoche "are concerned with the very different relations" (Blank 1997: 254; cf. Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 260-2). One of the broader interpretations of synecdoche is shared by those researchers who, although they clearly see the difference between taxonomy and partonymy, consciously disregard this difference as negligible: "Synecdoche is a transfer from part to the whole or from the whole to its part as well as from species to genus and from genus to species, as species is an instance of part, and genus - of whole" (Hispalensis 1577: 29; cf. Ramus 2010 [1549]: 209); "Firs are a part of the category 'tree', as one says that an arm is a part of the body" (Seto 1999: 94). However, the impossibility of a substitution like 1 proves that it is undesirable to apply the notion of part to the sphere of abstract things.
(1) Arm is a part of the body ^ *Arm is a species of the body.
In this light, it seems advisable: a) to use the notion of part in its narrow, concrete sense, as a constituent element of a material object, which gives the opportunity for separation of transfers pars pro toto and totum pro parte from taxonomic transfers;]!! b) to accept that "it is necessary to tell the difference between the relationship species-genus and the relationship part-whole, as confusing them might lead to some theoretical and practical mistakes" (Barton 1994 :51).
Functional analysis of transfers
All theories of semantic change were developed in historical semasiology and historical semantics, which do not adequately take into account the pragmatics and so the functions, in particular, those which are relevant for taxonomic categorization of semantic transfers. K. Nyrop (1913: 326-336), S. Ullmann (1951: 243-245; 1962: 211-227), A. Blank (1997: 303-308) and other scientists regard the popular etymology, metonymy, metaphor, and other transfers as taxonomically homogeneous phenomena. However, according to the functional criterion, all transfers should be divided into two classes: a) functionally relevant; b) functionally irrelevant ones (i.e. errors), in particular, popular etymology.
Already Aristotle (1837: 146) described a category of "transfers for the eyes (^exa^opai npo o^dxrov)", which make speech more vivid and pictorial, that is, perform a depictive function. Judging by the examples he gives, these include: 1) metaphor in the narrow sense, that is, "transfer by similarity (^exa^opa Kax' avaXoyiav)": "Cephisodotus called warships painted windmills", "The course of my words lies straight through the middle of Chares' deeds"; 2) metonymy: "shed the tears (SaKpteai)" (for the heroes fallen in Salamis), "Till all Hellas shouted aloud". This Aristotelian idea gives rise to the belief that these transfers awaken our imagination, thinking, and reflection, and to the widespread definitions of metaphor and metonymy ("to which synecdoche belongs as well")
as "substituting the direct expression by an indirect one, substituting a thing by its image" (Heinichen 1842: 285-6). However, it should be mentioned that:
1. As is well known now, metaphor in its depictive function can appeal not only to eyesight ("npo o^dxrov"), but also to other senses, that is, metaphor presupposes immediate sensory and (in particular) visual perception, for example: sweet sleep, hot temper .soft breeze, sonorous style.
2. Metonymy is not always depictive and descriptive, for example: As he swung toward them holding up the hand Half in appeal, but half as if to keep The life (= blood; V.M.) from spilling (R. Frost. Out, Out).
According to the analised parameter, all transfers can be divided into two classes: 1) those which are meant for depictive function (descriptive transfers), thus, all kinds of metaphor are always descriptive, hence the traditional opinion that "among all the tropes there is neither an equally colourful one, nor one that lends so much vividness to the speech in particular words" (Cicero 1839: 329); 2) those which are not meant for this aim. Transfers of this class can have abstract character, thus, antiphrasis "can do without any imagery at all" (Potebnia 1990 [1905]: 271), as well as metonymy, synecdoche, taxonomic transfers, and phonetic allusion.
Associative base of transfers
The following two criteria are relevant from this point of view.
1. Degree of predictability. Metaphor in the narrow sense is traditionally seen as a transfer based on similarity - in its semantic aspect, and as a "reduced simile" (Quintilianus 1854: 76) -transformationally. On the other hand, a simile "is an expanded (nXeovdZouaa) metaphor" (Demetrius 1743: 64); thus, metaphor and simile are regarded since antiquity as interconvertible, see 2.
(2) eyes as green as emeralds (simile) ^ emerald eyes (metaphor).[2]
The second subject of comparison, which becomes the vehicle of the corresponding metaphor, varies on a more or less wide range (as green as grass / as bottle / as garden / as toad / as emerald...), therefore simile and so metaphor (cf. emerald eyes) are unpredictable, surprising, and so expressive.
Metonymy consists in transfer "based on a spacial, temporal, or causal connections" (Paul 1995 [1880]: 83), that is, on connections within one frame or script (Blank 1997: 249-253): His face turned pale 'He got a scare' (this transfer follows the metonymic formula 'effecta pro causis', i.e. 'cause ^ effect'). Metonymic associations in contrast to metaphoric ones are traditionally regarded as more realistic and predictable: "Whereas the connection between trigger and target in the case of metonymy tends to be one in a set of favoured relations and so constrained and predictable to some extent, the nature of the connection in metaphors is completely unconstrained" (Warren 1998: 306; cf. Aarts, Calbert 1979: 49). It seems yet that metonymic associations are "constrained and predictable' as they connect the elements within one frame and so they are less expressive, hence the opinion that 'the best specimen of a trope is a metaphor" (Donatus 1553: 101).
Thus, similes and so metaphors are expressive as the connections between the first subject of comparison and its second subject (which becomes the vehicle of the corresponding metaphor) are unpredictable. Metonymic associations, in contrast to metaphoric ones, are relatively predictable and so less expressive as they connect the elements of one frame. On the other hand, predictability of connections within the frame is the base for the use of metonymy in compressive function, as in 3.
(3) All Hellas shouted aloud. ^ All the people living in Hellas shouted aloud.
The connections between the whole object and its parts are predictable, if not trivial, therefore synecdoche, like metonymy: a) is less expressive than metaphor; b) can perform compressive function. Taxonomic transfers are less expressive than metonymic ones as connections between the elements of a taxonomic hierarchy are axiomatic. So, expressivity of transfers can be represented as a gradual scale.
2. Type of association. A. Blank (1997: 133), with reference to Aristotle's thesis that recollection starts "from something similar, from something contrary, or from something closely connected" (Aristotle 2007: 39), distinguishes 'the three principles of associations' as the basis for semantic transfer: 1) the principle of
similarity; 2) the principle of contiguity; 3) the principle of contrast. Let us regard the taxonomic transfers from this point of view.
The first description of taxonomic transfers is found in Aristotle's Poetics: "<A transfer> from genus to species is when I say: There I have put my boat, for to anchor is the same as to put. <A transfer> from species to genus: A myriad of glorious deeds is done by Odysseus. Since a myriad(^upíov) means 'many', this word is used instead of many". The notion 'a myriad' is seen by Aristotle as a species-notion of the genus-notion 'many' (cf. Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 249), that is, this is a finitus numerus pro infinito transfer. Further: "<A transfer> from species to species: pulled out the soul with copper is the same as cut off with longwearing (literally:unerasable; V. M.) copper, as to pull out means 'to cut off, and to cut off means 'to pull out', and they both mean 'remove'" (Aristoteles 1839: 48-9). The analysis of Aristotelian description shows that: 1) the example of transfer from species to genus belongs to finitus numerus pro infinito transfer, which is strictly speaking a subtype of transfer from species to genus; 2) the class of taxonomic transfers is presented as one-level system, which became a characteristic feature of the subsequent descriptions (see Nyrop 1913: 156-82; Bloomfield 1962 [1933]: 426; Blank 1997: 192-217, etc.). Let us analyse the taxonomic transfers as a system including patterns of lower and higher classification levels.
1. Transfer from the abstract to the concrete (abstractum pro concreto, downward semantic shift, narrowing, specialization of meaning): She for beloved woman.
1.1. Transfer from the genus to the species (genus pro specie), which is used, in particular, in euphemistic function, for example, 4 instead of to do a dishonest action.
(4) But tell me definitely, how did the Baron finally persuade you to - well, to do what you did? (O. Wilde. An Ideal Husband).
The nominal periphrases are often based on this type of taxonomic transfer: military person for soldier,
Lat. bucera saecla 'horned tribe' for cows (given as example of periphrasis in: Anonimous 1863: 611).
1.2. Transfer from the species to the individual (species pro individuo), which is based on the substitution of a proper name by: a) a periphrasis: the little corporal instead of Napoleon; b) a common name: the city instead of New York. Since this kind of substitution, which is known as classical antonomasia, is carried out according to the algorithm of the transfer 'species pro individuo' (cf. 'corporal' : 'Napoleon' = 'species' : 'individuum'), it becomes hard to accept the interpretation of antonomasia as a type of metonymy (e.g. Holmqvist, Pluciennik 2010: 373); so, H. Lausberg's point of view seems preferable, as he sees the transfer species pro individuo as the basis for the classical antonomasia (Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 265).
2. Transfer from species to species (species pro specie, horizontal semantic shift), or "cohyponymous transfer" (Blank 1997: 207). A. Blank (1997: 217) restricts this transfer to the relations of the words which only demonstrate "minimal semantic difference between them". In our opinion, there are two different instances here:
2.1. The change of names in the realm of similar concepts, in particular, "of similar plants and animals", for example, "Eur. Sp. leóríjieti > Amer. Sp. 'Puma', Eur. Sp. tigre 'tiger' > Amer. Sp. 'Jaguar'" (Blank 1997: 377), "the history of the change of names for concepts MOUSE and RAT" and the transfer "Old Lat. talpus 'mole' > It. topo 'mouse'" (Blank 1997: 207 & 509); the regular confusion of the concepts 'carrion-crow', 'raven' and 'rook'; 'willow', 'pussy willow' and 'brittle willow (broom)' in the modern Russian speech seems to have the same character. The "co-taxonomic similarity" (Blank 2003: 46) of the concepts causes the possibility for confusion of their names (i.e. for lexical error) rather than for a functionally relevant transfer. So the smaller the taxonomic difference between the concepts is, the more the possibility for confusion of their names rises.
2.2. The change of names in the realm of dissimilar concepts. The bigger the taxonomic difference between the concepts is, the more the possibility for rhetorical play on the change of their names rises, which, in particular, is observed:
a) in the joking euphemism 5, used instead of glutton:
(5) His lunch - (cold pig) - the gourmand quits, The very coocs desert their spits (E. Bulwer. The Siamese twins);
b) in the Russian joking phrase priglasit' na riumku chaja 'to invite somebody to a shotglass of tea' instead of 'a shotglass of vodka', and so forth.
3. Transfer from species to genus (species pro genere, widening, upward semantic shift, generalization of
meaning): daily bread forfood.
3.1. Transfer finitus numerus pro infinito (i.e. using a cardinal numeral to denote an indefinite multitude), as in 6.
(6) Each separate star seems nothing, but a myriad scattered stars break up the night and make it beautiful (B. Taylor. Lars).
A. Blank defines taxonomy as "relations between concepts which are more or less similar exhibiting a number of common features (e.g. TIGER, LION, LEOPARD, PUMA) so that they can be subordinated to a more general concept which logically includes them (FELINE or CAT)" and believes that similarity between "the concepts of DOG and DOG TRAINED TO PURSUE GAME (i.e. HOUND; V. M.) as well as TIGER and JAGUAR ... is much stronger than in the case of metaphor" (Blank 2003: 42 & 46). However, it is well known that not only the similarities, but also the differences ("differentiae specificae"), contrasts, and oppositions are important for the relations within one genus too, that is why: a) the definition of a species "covers the characteristics which the species shares with other member-species of its genus which is implied by giving it and them the same generic name, and those characteristics which distinguish it from these other members, its differentiae" (Stearn 1959: 16); b) systematics (taxonomy), for example with reference to biology, is regarded as "the scientific study of the kinds and diversity of organisms" (Simpson 1961: 7). From this point of view, it becomes obvious that "categorial (or taxonomic) relations" cannot be explained upon "the traditional basis for associations of similarity and contiguity" (Nelson 2002: 235). The relevant issue of debate from this viewpoint is the problem of antiphrasis, which is traditionally defined as "a transfer by contrast" (Knox 1989: 13-4) or "nomination by contrast (nominatio per contrarium)" (Tiberius 1676: 180). This transfer serves to express irony and is sometimes identified with it, for example, when it is interpreted as "one-word irony" (Probus 1864: 402; Susenbrotus 1551: 13). Transfers by contrast include:
1. Charientism, expression of negative evaluation through positively charged words, "sarcasm under the mask of a compliment" (Rufinianus 1863: 39), as in 7.
(7) Donne, the delight of Phrebus and each muse, Who, to thy one, all other brains refuse. (B. Jonson. Epigram 22. To John Donne).
2. Asteism (ironia urbana), expression of positive evaluation under the guise of negative one, "exquisite and sophisticated playfulness, used to praise or flatter somebody in the form of blame or reproof" (Fontanier 1968: 150), for example, a mother calling her own child "little monster" (Dupriez 1991: 49).
It was noted long ago that antiphrasis connects "those words that take their source in a contrast" (Hispalensis 1577: 31): Russ. euph.aromat 'aroma' for von' 'stink', umnik 'smart guy' for durak 'fool'. Since the opposites involved in creating an antiphrasis can be seen as two species within one genus ('aroma' / 'stink' ~ 'smell', 'reproof / 'praise' ~ 'evaluation'), it is quite logical to define antiphrasis as an instance of a transfer from species to species (species pro specie).
K. Reisig treats the understanding of antiphrasis as a device of word-formation with severe criticism, as he believes that calling something "Kax' ävri^paaiv", for example Lat. non lucus instead of lucus 'light', is "entirely senseless (völlig unsinnig)" (Reisig 1839: 287). The only restriction of antiphrasis seems to be bound with the expression of irony; outside of this function antiphrasis becomes "entirely senseless". Antiphrasis does not depend on the degree of precision of contrast, however, A. Blank restricts this figure to inexact ("connotative") contrast: "Although lexical innovation by contrast occurs rarely, we can distinguish two subtypes: cotaxonomic contrast (or antonymic contrast), which designates an association of something directly opposed (as in Eng. bad 'not good' > Eng. (slang) 'excellent'), and antiphrastic contrast for cases of association of more indirectly opposed concepts (as in Fr.pensionnaire 'guest in a boarding house' > Fr. (argot) 'convict')"
(Blank 2003: 47; Blank 2000: 68), Old Fr. oste 'guest' > 'hostage' (Blank 2001: 92). It seems yet that the joking French word pensionnaire in the meaning 'convict' and the Old French word oste in the meaning 'hostage' are metaphors, as the imprisoned convict is like a guest in a boarding house and as the hostage in the enemy's camp is like a guest in the house.
A. Blank admits himself that: a) "the fundamental similarity remains in the highest possible contrast" (Blank 1997: 142); b) the opposites involved in creating contrast "need a common basis": thus, the concept 'colour' is the common basis for the concepts 'white colour' and 'black colour' (Blank 2000: 61). From this viewpoint, it appears logical to accept that opposing concepts are species within one genus and therefore antiphrasis is an instance of a species pro specie transfer.
Semantic scope of transfers
All the modern lists of transfers cover lexical semantics only, but as is well known since antiquity, the transfers affect not only lexical, but also grammatical semantics. Grammatical transfer presented in the medieval grammars as 'enallage' or 'immutatio' (Gr.svaXXayq, Lat. immutatio 'alteration') consists in using one grammatical category in the meaning of another one, that is, in transforming the grammatical semantics of the word (cf. Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 235-6). Enallage is traditionally defined as the grammatical figure that changes the morphological semantics of the word; two transfers fall under this class, conversion (zero-derivation, antimeria) and heterosis: "Enallage est figura grammatica etymologica... Est vel antimeria vel heterosis" (Bengel 1862: 1094). Let us consider these two figures in some of their subtypes.
Conversion
The present research shows that the different schemes of conversion use the different types of semantic transfer, in particular:
1. The scheme "verb > noun" is based on metaphor, as the action is reified (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, Cervel 2008: 263) or personified as a result of this type of conversion and so acquires the features of an object (cf. 8 and reification in 9) or a person (cf. 10 and personification in 11).
(8) to take an axe;
(9) to take a walk;
(10) He gives me books;
(11) Work gives me satisfaction.
2. The schemes "noun > verb", "noun > adjective", and "adjective > verb" are based on metonymy (Dirven 1999, Schonefeld 2005, etc.), for example: to hammer a nail into smth. ^ to drive a nail with a hammer into smth.; stone wall ^ stone-built wall ^ wall built of stone (an element of the frame stands for the action involving this element); to empty a ship ^ to unload a ship <and so to make it empty> (a result for an action that leads to this result).
The analysis shows that the many-sided phenomenon of conversion cannot be reduced to one transfer, for example, to metaphor, as G. Crocco-Galeas (1990) believes.
Heterosis
Heterosis is traditionally defined as using one form of grammatical number, tense, person, gender, and so forth in the meaning of another corresponding grammatical form, that is, as "enallage generum, numerorum, personarum, modorum ac temporum" (Susenbrotus 1551: 37). This figure (see Probus 1864: 393-94; Gerber 1871: 460-596; Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 235-40) includes, in particular:
1. Numerical transfer (enallage numeri, heterosis numerorum):
1.1. Transfer from one to many (ab uno plura, singularis pro plurali), that is, using a singular grammar form instead of a plural one, or "singularisation", as in 12.
(12) Barking dogs seldom bite. ■ Barking dog seldom bites.
1.2. Transfer from many to one (a pluribus unum, pluralis pro singulari), using a grammatical form of plural number instead of a singular form, "pluralisation", for example, "author's we" (pluralis modestiae) and "the royal we" (pluralis majestatis) in the meaning 'I', see 13.
(13) King Richard. Old John of Gaunt, time-honor'd Lancaster, Hast thou, according to thy oath and band, Brought hither Henry Hereford, thy bold son; Here to make good the boisterous late appeal, Which then our leisure would not let us hear, Against the
Duke of Norfolk, Thomas Mowbray? (W. Shakespeare. The life and death of King RichardII).
2. Transfer tempus pro tempore, or enallage temporis pro tempore, in particular, using a present form in the meaning of a past one (praesens historicum, historic present, or the narrative present tense), as in 14.
(14) Freddy rushes in out of the rain from the Southampton Street side, and comes between them closing a dripping umbrella. He is a young man of twenty, in evening dress, very wet around the ankles (B. Shaw. Pygmalion).
Longinus (1837: 38) notes: "If you represent the events of the past as happening right now, your story stops being a narration and turns into reality".
3. Using one grammatical person for another one: thus, "the author often takes on the mask of the hero" and, "changing from one character to another one", speaking in their language and on their behalf, "becomes many-faced (rcoXurcpoarorcov)"; for example, Demosthenes "played out his speech between the third and the second person: 'Does anyone feel disgust or even anger towards this dirty scoundrel (= towards him; V.M.) - oh, you unworthy rascal!..'" (Longinus 1837: 40 & 41).
Secondary functions of grammatical categories develop on the basis of enallage; it leads to "relativisation of norm, a price we pay for widening the potential usage" (Lardet 1988: 313). Grammatical transfer is more relevant for inflectional languages, such as Greek, Latin, and so forth, "for the multiplicitie of their grammaticall accidents. ... We, hauing no such varietie of accidents, haue little or no vse of this figure. They [Greekes; V. M.] called it enallage" (Puttenham 1869 [1589]: 182).
As is well known, "[a]ll approaches to grammatical description necessarily incorporate some taxonomic elements" (Trask 2013: 275), as grammatical notions form the taxonomic subhierarchies, for example, 'number' (genus) ~ 'singular number', 'dual number', 'plural number' (species); 'person' (genus) ~ 'first person', 'second person', 'third person' (species); 'gender' (genus) ~ 'feminine gender' and 'masculine gender' (species), and so forth. L. Valla (2012 [1439]: 270) notes that "tamen per se est tempus prius et per se tempus posterius", as "genus prius specie", that is, "the <notion of> tense is prior to the <notion of> past tense", as "genus is prior to species". From this point of view, heterosis can be regarded as horizontal semantic shift in a grammatical subhierarchy, that is, as a transfer from species to species. B. Westheimer (1535: 441-42) provides 15 as an example of this transfer.
(15) "Et genus pro genere, Genesis uigesimo tertio capite. Sepeliam mortuum meum, ubi masculinum ponitur pro freminino".
'And gender for gender: I should bury my dead <man> (Genesis XXIII: 8), where masculine stands for feminine'.
Conclusion
All transfers can be subdivided according to the following three parameters:
1. According to the functional parameter:
1.1. Functionally irrelevant transfers: a) popular etymology; b) confusion of semantically similar words as the unintentional counterpart of transfer from species to species.
1.2. Functionally relevant (i.e. intentional) transfers: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and taxonomic transfers.
2. According to the associative base of transfer. The following two criteria are relevant from this viewpoint.
2.1. Degree of predictability. The unpredictability of connections between the first subject of comparison and its possible second subject (which becomes the vehicle of the corresponding metaphor) is the source of expressivity of similes (as green as grass / as abottle / as a garden / as a toad / as emerald.), and so metaphors (cf. emerald eyes). Metonymic associations in contrast to metaphoric ones are quite predictable and so less expressive, as they connect the elements of the same frame; on the other hand, predictability of connections within the frame and within the whole is the base for the use of metonymy in compressive function. Since connections between the elements of taxonomic hierarchy are axiomatic, taxonomic transfers are less expressive than metonymy and synecdoche. So, degrees of emotional expressivity of different transfers form a gradual scale.
2.2. Type of association. Metaphor is based on the principle of similarity, metonymy and synecdoche are subdued to the principle of
contiguity, while taxonomic transfers are based both on the principles of similarity and contrast of concepts, which are connected with genus on the principle of similarity and opposed whithin genus on the principle of contrast. From this viewpoint, contrary concepts can be seen as species within one genus, therefore, antiphrasis should be regarded as an instance of transfer from species to species.
2.3. According to the semantic scope of transfers, as they affect not only lexical semantics, but grammatical semantics too.
[1] Taxonomic transfer is regarded as a semantic transfer, which takes place within one genus. The term taxonomic transfer belongs to A. Blank (2001:73).
121 This transformation rule covers the Vossian antonomasia as well, which 'has to be referred to metaphor' (Vossius 1781 [1621]:326): Aphrodite 'a beauty' ^ a girl who is as beautiful as Aphrodite.
References
1. Aarts, J. M. G., and Joseph, P. C. (1979). Metaphor and non-metaphor: the semantics of adjective-noun combinations. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
2. Anonimous. (1863). Carmen de figures vel schematibus. In Halm, K. (ed.) (1863), Rhetores latini minors, 63-70. Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri.
3. Aristotle. (2007). De memoria et reminiscentia. In D. Bloch (ed.), Aristotle on memory and recollection: Text, translation, interpretation, and reception in Western scholasticism, 23-51. Leiden: Brill.
4. Aristoteles. (1839). Poetica. Ad codices antiquos recognitam latine conversam commentario illustratam. Coloniae: Impensis librarii I. E. Renard.
5. Aristoteles. (1837). De rhetorica libri III. In I. Bekker (ed.), Aristotelis opera, 1-168. T. XI. Oxonii: E typographeo academico.
6. Barton, V. I. (1994). Imia. In V. F. Berkov (ed.), Logika, 36-108. Minsk: Vishejshaja shkola.
7. Bengel, J. A. (1862). Gnomon Novi Testamenti, in quo ex nativa verborum vi simplicitas, profunditas, concinnitas, salubritas sensuum cœlestium indicatur. Londini: Apud D. Nutt et Williams & Norgate.
8. Blank, A. (2003). Words and concepts in time: Towards diachronic cognitive onomasiology. In R. Eckardt, K. von Heusinger, and Ch. Schwarze (eds.), Words in time: Diachronic semantics from different points of view, 37-65. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
9. Blank, A. (2001). Einführung in die lexikalische Semantik: für Romanisten. Tübingen: Niemeyer Max Verlag.
10. Blank, A. (2000). Pour une approche cognitive du changement sémantique lexical: aspect sémasiologique. In J. François (ed.), Théories contemporaines du changement sémantique, 59-73. Leuven: Peeters.
11. Blank, A. (1999). Why do new meanings occur? A cognitive typology of the motivations for lexical semantic change. In A. Blank and P. Koch (eds.), Historical Semantics and Cognition, 61-90. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
12. Blank, A. (1997). Prinzipien des lexikalischen Bedeutungswandels am Beispiel der romanischen Sprachen. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
13. Bloomfield, L. (1962). Language. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
14. Cicero, M. T. (1853). Brutus. Cambridge: John Bartlett.
15. Cicero, M. T. (1839). De oratore. Hannover: Im Verlag der Hahn
16. Crocco-Galeas, G. (1990). Conversion as morphological metaphor. In J. V. M. Dosuna and C. Pensado (eds.), Naturalists at Krems: Papers from the Workshop on natural phonology and natural morphology, 23-32. Salamanca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Salamanca.
17. Demetrius, Ph. (1743). De elocutione, sive, dictione rhetorica. Glasguae: Ex officina Roberti Foulis.
18. Dirven, R. (1999). Conversion as a conceptual metonymy of event schemata. In K.-U. Panther and G. Radde (eds.), Metonymy in language and thought, 275-87. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
19. Donatus, A. (1553). Methodus. Tiguri: Apud A. Gesnerum & R. Wyssenbachium.
20. Dupriez, B. M. 1991. A dictionary of literary devices. Toronto and Buffalo: Univ. of Toronto Press.
21. Fontanier, P. (1968). Les figures du discours. Paris: Flammarion.
22. Gerber, G. (1871). Die Sprache als Kunst, vol. 1. Bromberg: Mittlersche Buchhandlung.
23. Guarin, P. (1726). Grammaticae Hebraicae et Chaldaicae, vol. 2: Complectens syntaxim figuratam, sive rhetoricam sacram. Lutetiae Parisiorum: Typis Jacobi Collombat.
24. Heinichen, F. A. ()1842. Lehrbuch der Theorie des lateinischen Stils. Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Köhler.
25. Hermogenes. (1614). Ars oratoria absolutissima, et libri omnes. Cum nova versione Latina e regione contextus Graeci, et commentariis Gasparis Lavrentii. Coloniae Allobrogum: Apud Petrum Aubertum.
26. Hispalensis, I. (1577). Originum libri viginti ex antiquitate eruti. Et Martiani Capellae De nuptijs philologiœ and Mercurij libri nouem. Basileae: Per Petrum Pernam.
27. Holmqvist, K, and Pluciennik, J. (2010). Princess Antonomasia and the truth: Two types of metonymic relations. In A. Burkhardt and B. Nerlich (eds.), Tropical truth(s): The epistemology of metaphor and other tropes, 373-82. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
28. Knox, D. (1989). Ironia: medieval and Renaissance ideas on irony. Leiden: Brill.
29. Lardet, P. (1988). Scaliger lecteur de Linacre. In I. Rosier (ed.), L
30. Lausberg, H. (1998). Handbook of literary rhetoric: A foundation for literary study. Leiden: Brill.
31. Longinus, D. C. (1837). De sublimitate. In A. E. Egger (ed.), Longini quae supersunt. Graece, 1-64. Parisiis: Apud Bourgeois-Maze.
32. McMahon, A. M. S. (1994). Understanding language change. Cambridge: Univ. Press.
33. Nelson, K. (2002). Language in cognitive development: The emergence of the mediated mind. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
34. Nyrop, K. (1913). Grammaire historique de la langue française, vol. 4: Sémantique. Copenhague: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag.
35. Paradis, C. (2001). Metonymization: A key mechanism in semantic change. In A. Barcelona, R. Benczes, and F. J. R. de Mendoza Ibáñez (eds.), Defining metonymy in cognitive linguistics: Towards a consensus view, 61-88. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing.
36. Paul, H. (1995). Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
37. Pompeius. (1820). Commentum Artis Donati. Lipsiae: Apud Fr. Chr. Guil. Vogel.
38. Potebnia, A. A. (1990). Teoreticheskaja poetika. Moskva: Vysshaja shkola.
39. Puttenham, G. (1869). The arte of English poesie. London: A. Murray & son.
40. Probus, D. S. (1864). De arte grammatica libri. Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri.
41. Quintilianus, M. F. (1854). Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim, vol. 2. Lipsiae: Sumptibus et typis B. G. Teubneri.
42. Ullmann, S. (1962). Semantics: An introduction to the science of meaning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
43. Ullmann, S. (1951). The principles of semantics. Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Company.
44. Radtke, G. (1865). De tropis apud tragicos Graecos. Berolini: Typis expressit Gustavus Lange.
45. Ramus, P. (2010). Arguments in rhetoric against Quintilian: Translation and text of Peter Ramus
46. Reisig, K. Ch. (1839). Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft. Leipzig: Verlag der Lehnhold
47. Rufinianus, I. (1863). De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber. In Halm, K. (ed.) (1863), Rhetores latini minors, 38-62. Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri.
48. Ruiz de Mendoza, F., and Cervel, S. P. 2008. Grammatical metonymy within the
49. Schönefeld, D. (2005). Zero-derivation - functional change - metonymy. In L. Bauer and S. V. Hernández (eds.), Approaches to conversion/zero-derivation, 131-59. Münster: Waxmann Verlag.
50. Seto, K. (1999). Distinguishing metonymy from synecdoche. In K.-U. Panther and G. Radde (eds.), Metonymy in language and thought, 91-120. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
51. Simpson, G. G. (1961). Principles of animal taxonomy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
52. Stearn, W. Th. (1959). The background of Linnaeus's contributions to the nomenclature and methods of systematic biology. Systematic zoology 8. 4-22.
53. Stern, G. (1968). Meaning and change of meaning: with special reference to the English language. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
54. Susenbrotus, J. (1551). Epitome troporum ac schematum et Grammaticorum and Rhetorum. Lugduni: Apud Ioannem Frellonium.
55. Sweet, H. (1892). A new English grammar, logical and historical. Part I: Introduction, phonology, and accidence. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
56. Textor, J. R. (1622). Epitheta. Genevae: Ex Typographia Iacobi Stoer.
57. Tiberius, R. (1676). De schematibus apud Demosthenem. In Th. Gale (ed.), Rhetores selecti, 178-97. Oxonii: E Theatro Sheldoniano.
58. Trask, R. L. (2013). A dictionary of grammatical terms in linguistics. London: Routledge.
59. Valla, L. (2012). Dialectical disputations, vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
60. Vossius, G. J. (1781). Rhetorices contractae, sive Partitionum oratoriarum libri quinque. Matriti: Apud Antonium Sancham.
61. Warren, B. (1998). What is metonymy? In R. M. Hogg and L. van Bergen (eds.), Historical linguistics 1995. Vol. 2: Germanic linguistics. Selected papers from the 12th International conference on historical linguistics, Manchester. August 1995, 301-10. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing.
62. Westheimer, B. (1535). Collectanea troporum, Sacrae Scripturae candidatis utilißima. Argentorati: Albrecht.
