Научная статья на тему 'Searching for middle power diplomacy. South Korea’s approach toward Kyrgyzstan'

Searching for middle power diplomacy. South Korea’s approach toward Kyrgyzstan Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

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Ключевые слова
MIDDLE POWER / KYRGYZSTAN / SOUTH KOREA / CENTRAL ASIA / KYRGYZ-KOREAN RELATIONS / KOICA / KOREA-CENTRAL ASIA COOPERATION / СРЕДНЯЯ СИЛЫ / КЫРГЫЗСТАН / ЮЖНАЯ КОРЕЯ / ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ АЗИЯ / КИРГИЗСКО-КОРЕЙСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ / КОИКА / КОРЕЙСКО-ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОАЗИАТСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО

Аннотация научной статьи по социальной и экономической географии, автор научной работы — Varpahovskis Eriks

This study examines the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and South Korea from the perspective of middle power diplomacy. This study has a dual goal: first, to fill in the gap in study of the development of Kyrgyz-Korean relations which are rarely explored, even though South Korea considers Central Asia as a strategically important region in its foreign affairs; secondly, to analyze South Korea’s foreign affairs in terms of following principles of middle power behavior, which is pronounced as one of the major concepts for foreign policies. This study examines the implementation of seven major middle power features by South Korea in relationships with Kyrgyzstan. The author concludes that South Korea gradually developed its middle power approach towards Kyrgyzstan, and it blossomed during Lee Myun-bak and Park Geun-hye’s terms in office. However, even though middle power is considered as a cornerstone concept of South Korea’s foreign affairs, in its relations with Kyrgyzstan South Korea cannot fully implement it. While South Korea efficiently conducts niche diplomacy, contributes to multilateral relations of Kyrgyzstan with other Central Asian republics, South Korea has almost intangible impact on trilateral relations between two great powers (China and Russia) and Kyrgyzstan. Author highlights that Moon’s administration inherited from Park’s administration its approach towards Kyrgyzstan and made some progress in elaboration of its ties with Kyrgyzstan, however, it should not be expected that South Korea will make breakthrough progress to meet missing middle power features in its policies towards Kyrgyzstan.

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В поисках дипломатии «средней силы». Подход Южной Кореи к отношениям с Кыргызстаном

В данной статье рассматриваются отношения между Южной Кореей и Кыргызстаном с точки зрения концепции «средней силы» (middle power). При проведении данного исследования автор преследовал две основные цели. Во-первых, отразить взаимоотношения двух стран, так как тема отношений между Корейской Республикой и Киргизской Республикой представлена крайне скупо в научной литературе. Во-вторых, проанализировать политику Южной Кореи с точки зрения концепции «средней силы», которая до сих пор заявляется как одна из ключевых внешнеполитических концепций страны. Южнокорейские ученые и государственные деятели, подчеркивают, что для того, чтобы считаться «средней силой», необходимо проводить соответствующую политику, т.е. «среднесильность» страны определяется через её внешнеполитическое поведение. Автор данной статьи выделил семь ключевых принципов «среднесильности» государства, которые описывались южнокорейскими специалистами, и проанализировал политику Южной Кореи в отношении Кыргызстана на предмет соответствия данным принципам. Анализ показал, что наиболее активно и успешно Южная Корея стремилась проводить политику «среднесильности» в отношении Кыргызстана во время правления Ли Мён Бака и Пак Кын Хе. Тем не менее, ни при этих двух президентах, ни при Мун Джэ Ине Южная Корея не проводила и не проводит политику, которая полностью соответствовала бы заявленным принципам. Наибольшие затруднения у Южной Кореи при выполнении данных принципов возникают при попытках влияния на многосторонние отношения в центральноазиатском регионе, которые бы включали Кыргызстан и такие сверхдержавы, как Китай и Россию. Автор приходит к выводу, что несмотря на то, что Южная Корея продолжает развивать каналы дипломатии «средней силы» в отношениях с Кыргызстаном, как например нишевую дипломатию, при администрации Мун Джэ Ина не стоит ожидать прорыва, который позволил бы южнокорейской политике в отношении Киргизской Республики соответствовать всем заявленным принципам дипломатии «средней силы».

Текст научной работы на тему «Searching for middle power diplomacy. South Korea’s approach toward Kyrgyzstan»

Постсоветские исследования. Т.2. № 7 (2019) Searching for middle power diplomacy. South Korea's approach toward Kyrgyzstan

E. Varpahovskis

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Abstract. This study examines the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and South Korea from the perspective of middle power diplomacy. This study has a dual goal: first, to fill in the gap in study of the development of Kyrgyz-Korean relations which are rarely explored, even though South Korea considers Central Asia as a strategically important region in its foreign affairs; secondly, to analyze South Korea's foreign affairs in terms of following principles of middle power behavior, which is pronounced as one of the major concepts for foreign policies. This study examines the implementation of seven major middle power features by South Korea in relationships with Kyrgyzstan. The author concludes that South Korea gradually developed its middle power approach towards Kyrgyzstan, and it blossomed during Lee Myun-bak and Park Geun-hye's terms in office. However, even though middle power is considered as a cornerstone concept of South Korea's foreign affairs, in its relations with Kyrgyzstan South Korea cannot fully implement it. While South Korea efficiently conducts niche diplomacy, contributes to multilateral relations of Kyrgyzstan with other Central Asian republics, South Korea has almost intangible impact on trilateral relations between two great powers (China and Russia) and Kyrgyzstan. Author highlights that Moon's administration inherited from Park's administration its approach towards Kyrgyzstan and made some progress in elaboration of its ties with Kyrgyzstan, however, it should not be expected that South Korea will make breakthrough progress to meet missing middle power features in its policies towards Kyrgyzstan.

Keywords: middle power, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Central Asia, Kyrgyz-Korean relations, KOICA, Korea-Central Asia cooperation

В поисках дипломатии «средней силы».

Подход Южной Кореи к отношениям с Кыргызстаном

Э. Варпаховскис

Университет Иностранных Языков Хангук. Сеул, Южная Корея

Аннотация. В данной статье рассматриваются отношения между Южной Кореей и Кыргызстаном с точки зрения концепции «средней силы» (middle power). При проведении данного исследования автор преследовал две основные цели. Во-первых, отразить взаимоотношения двух стран, так как тема отношений между Корейской Республикой и Киргизской Республи -кой представлена крайне скупо в научной литературе. Во-вторых, проанализировать политику Южной Кореи с точки зрения концепции «средней силы», которая до сих пор заявляется как одна из ключевых внешнеполитических концепций страны. Южнокорейские ученые и государственные деятели, подчеркивают, что для того, чтобы считаться «средней силой», необходимо проводить соответствующую политику, т.е. «среднесильность» страны определяется через её внешнеполитическое поведение. Автор данной статьи выделил семь ключевых принципов «среднесильности» государства, которые описывались южнокорейскими специалистами, и проанализировал политику Южной Кореи в отношении Кыргызстана на предмет соответствия данным принципам. Анализ показал, что наиболее активно и успешно Южная Корея стремилась проводить политику «среднесильности» в отношении Кыргызстана во время правления Ли Мён Бака и Пак Кын Хе. Тем не менее, ни при этих двух президентах, ни при Мун Джэ Ине Южная Корея не проводила и не проводит политику, которая полностью соответ -ствовала бы заявленным принципам. Наибольшие затруднения у Южной Кореи при выполнении данных принципов возникают при попытках влияния на многосторонние отношения в центральноазиатском регионе, которые бы включали Кыргызстан и такие сверхдержавы, как Китай и Россию. Автор приходит к выводу, что несмотря на то, что Южная Корея продолжает развивать каналы дипломатии «средней силы» в отношениях с Кыргызстаном, как например нишевую дипломатию, при администрации Мун Джэ Ина не стоит ожидать прорыва, который

позволил бы южнокорейской политике в отношении Киргизской Республики соответствовать всем заявленным принципам дипломатии «средней силы».

Ключевые слова: средняя силы, Кыргызстан, Южная Корея, Центральная Азия, киргизско-корейские отношения, КОИКА, корейско-центральноазиатское сотрудничество.

Introduction

Diplomatic relations between Kyrgyzstan and South Korea1 were established almost three decades ago in early 1992. Even before the collapse of the USSR, Korea had ties with Central Asian republics, which were parts of the Soviet Union at that time. That time there were two significant reasons for it: Korea was looking for new markets and suppliers that could satisfy the growing needs of the economy that experienced rapid growth, and also Korea was seeking to engage with Korean diaspora living in the Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan was one of the Central Asian republics that was approached by Korea, but as Aizharkyn Ormonova indicates, there is minimal attention in the academic literature that is dedicated to relations between two countries [Ormonova 2019].

Even though Korea tends to pay more attention to bilateral relations with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, in the latest available release of the Diplomatic White Paper by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea [MOFA 2018] Kyrgyzstan is mentioned as an essential member of Korea-Central Asian Forum, using which Korea tries to strengthen its presence and influence as a "mutually beneficial cooperation partners in Central Asian countries" [MOFA 2018: 181]. Furthermore, MOFA considers relations with Kyrgyzstan as a contribution to the overall success of New Northern Policy, which aims to "promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Eurasian continent" [MOFA 2018: 91].

Assuming that middle power diplomacy is one of the central concepts for Korea's foreign affairs policy, the author of the research explores the implementation of this concept toward Kyr-gyzstan. The aim of the paper is dual: to see the evolution of the relations between two countries and to learn whether Korea's policies towards Kyrgyzstan can be considered as middle power diplomacy.

Method

To do this research, the author uses the accumulated model of middle power diplomacy based on works of South Korean scholars. This

study also has a chronological nexus: the relations between Korea and Kyrgyzstan are divided into three core periods: when Korea was an "emerging middle power" (Roh Tae-woo till Roh Moo-hyun), "established middle power" (Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye), and the current period (Moon Jae-in).

Korean Middle Power

The first attempts to develop a concept of the middle power are linked with Giovanni Botero, who in the XVI century apart from great powers ranked other countries, which were classified as countries as middle powers (that are capable of supporting themselves) and small powers (that require protection from stronger states to survive). In the XX and XXI century, this concept regained popularity because there appeared many countries that were seeking conceptualization of its foreign policy and status. While there was a set of attempts to classify middle power through geopolitical parameters like territory size, population, economy strength [Holbraad 1984, Ping 2005, Jordaan 2003], there was a proposition to define country type through its behavior, namely, the middle powers should conduct policies within middlepowermanship framework [Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal 1993: 12-17]. According to scholars, middle powers should take specific roles in international relations like conflict moderator, assistant in finding common ground to opposing powers, promoter, a user of non-conventional diplomacy methods, controller of the events [Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal 1993; Hart 1976].

Korean government decided to employ this concept in its foreign policy; however, taking into consideration the specific position of Korea in the region, the existing conceptual developments were not enough. Hence, some Korean scholars put much effort into the development of the middle power concept tailored specifically for Korean case [for example see Kang 2004; Choi, 2009; Kim 2016; Lee 2012; Sohn 2012, 2015; Chun 2014].

After analyzing academic literature on middle power, the author of the research comes up

' Hereafter Korea

with seven major features that describe the behavior of the middle power.

One of the significant middle power's functions is helping bigger powers to find common ground and routes for cooperation and consensus, as well as helping different networks [Choi, 2009; Sohn 2012].

The second behavioral feature of the middle power is using the power of networking, rather than relying on power sources derived from economic and military sources because smaller states have not very much advantage in it in comparison to great powers [Lee 2012].

The third feature touches upon involvement and activity of the middle power in building and designing system of the regional relations between countries [Sohn 2012]

The fourth behavioral feature of the middle power implies a country's active policies as an engaging actor between state and non-state actors [Lee 2012; Chun 2014].

The fifth feature of middle power concerns the source of influence. The middle power should be a strategically important element in the region and should use this advantage in building its relations with bigger and smaller countries in the region [Lee 2012].

The sixth feature is related to the use of nontrivial diplomacy methods or specific niches [Kim S B. 2014; Kim S.J. 2014]. Finally, the seventh important feature of middlepowermanship is the conduction of policies in non-hierarchical mode and the absence of the aim to overtake leadership from the greater powers. Hence, the middle power should consider an approached country as a partner, not a satellite, or sphere of interests [Kang 2004].

Emerging Middle Power Period: from Roh to Roh

Even though Korean-Kyrgyz relations started right after Kyrgyzstan gained its independence, and by that time in Kyrgyzstan, there were many ethnic Koreans (about 20,000), the effective and intensive collaboration was limited. Unlike Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic could not boast with enormous amounts of natural sources that could be exported or that could attract many investments. Simultaneously, due to the population of the country at that time was around five mln people and GDP per capita

2 He visited Daejeon Expo 1993

did not exceed even US$ 400, the market was much less interesting for Korean companies. For example, in the period from 1995 to 2002 Korea was the sixth among foreign direct investment (FDI) sources, with totaling only 6% of investments. While the first place was taken by Canada with 38.1%, and the USA was second with 14.1%. A most significant share of investments concentrated on the mining industry of Kyrgyz-stan (55%), primarily gold mining [Dikkaya & Keles, 2006].

Starting from relations establishment, the Kyrgyzstan government showed some activity in maintaining and improvement of relationships with Korea, which resulted in visits by Prime ministers Chyngryshev (1993)2, Jumagulov (1994) and even president of Kyrgyz republic Askar Akaev visited Korea in 1997. Some Korean business companies also tried to seize the opportunity and start doing business with Kyr-gyzstan and in Kyrgyzstan. Among businesses who tried to enter Kyrgyzstan were LG-Goldstar, however further development was hindered by debt from Kyrgyzstan (about US$ 3 mln), later in 1998, Hanwha launched a telecommunication project in Chuy Region by using a loan given to Kyrgyzstan by the Korean Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF)3 [Saliyev 2011]. Nevertheless, due to a combination of factors, there was a limited scope of cooperative activity occurring between Kyrgyzstan and Korea. Among main factors that hindered Korea's cooperation with Kyrgyzstan for long period were political instability and high level of corruption in Kyrgyzstan [Knottnerus and Satke 2017], financial crisis that led to decrease of investment capabilities of Korea companies, status of Kyr-gyz Republic as ODA recipient was still classified as Other Low Income Country, while Korea tends to focus on Low Middle Income Countries (LMIC) [Kim and Oh 2012; Smart 2011].

Re-activation of the dialogue occurred in 2002 when Kyrgyzstan agreed to host military medical personnel at Manas Air Base as a part of the antiterrorist operation after September 11, 2001. Of 150 personnel, 91 were South Koreans. Furthermore, dialogue between Korea and Kyr-gyzstan intensified because Korea's preparation for hosting EXPO 2010 and Korea was seeking support from Kyrgyzstan, and after recovering

3 EDCF. (2012). EDCF Your Development Partner. History Book 1987-2007.

from the crisis was looking for new investment opportunities [Saliyev 2011]. Samsung was one of companies seeking new partners and investment opportunities and in 2001-2002, Samsung participated in the reconstruction of the road Bishkek-Osh [Saliyev 2011].

Even though business cooperation Kyrgyz-stan and Korea were quite limited in the period when Korea was forming as a Middle Power and Kyrgyzstan was trying to improve its position and transit from Low-Income Country status to Low Middle Income Country the engagement between countries was ongoing. Perhaps, two of the most critical channels for relations maintaining and improvement were diaspora relations and culture- and education-based cooperation.

Despite difficulties and hinders in relations between government of Korea and Kyrgyzstan, financial obstacles that occurred in relations between governments and businesses cultural and education channel of cooperation was active, developed step-by-step and resulted in various projects that contributed to engagement between countries: Korean Education Center was opened in Bishkek in 2001 following agreements that were achieved during President Akaev's visit to Seoul. This Center mentions among its goals assistance to Koryo-saram in self-identification, promotion of Korean language and culture, promotion of education opportunities in Korea, and others. The Center reports about 3000 people currently enrolled in Korean courses in the Center and conduction of Korean language courses in 45 middle schools around Kyrgyzstan (about 4400 students of Korean language in these schools)4.

KOICA's office opened in Bishkek only in 2015 but organization was already providing assistance to Kyrgyzstan for the period of almost 20 years in various matters like providing facilities and electronics needed to educational institutions and administrative bodies, providing study grants to Kyrgyzstan citizens enrolled in various administrative bodies and ministries, consulting government of Kyrgyzstan on

4 Greetings from the Director of the Korean Education Center in Bishkek.

5 KOICA to open Bishkek Office. Press release. 2015 Retrieved from http://www.koica.go.kr/eng-lish/board/press_releases/1319425_353 4.html

6 Bureau of Democracy, H. R., and Labor, US Dep't of

State,. (2007). Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-

tices.

different subjects that aim to contribute to development of Kyrgyzstan administrative system 5 [Saliyev 2011].

Diaspora of Koreans keeps on serving as a bridge between Kyrgyzstan and Korea, and diaspora started organizing itself in different associations from 1989, those organizations and associations aimed to improve and re-store culture and language knowledge among ethnic Koreans living in Kyrgyzstan. In 1998 associations united into an organization for Koreans living in Kyrgyzstan, which is active in the promotion of Korean culture, language and traditions, charity activities, the establishment of business ties with Korea, and between diasporas in other CIS countries [Saliyev 2011, Won 2004].

One of the most critical features in relations between Korea and Kyrgyzstan are migration processes. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan labor migrants started arriving in Korea; however, this process started being regulated following agreements between governments only in 2007. In 2007 Korea issued 2000 people quota for labor workers from Kyr-gyzstan [Saliyev 2011]. Later, governments of countries agreed on the quota of 25006. In 2009 Kyrgyzstan and 14 other countries started sharing quota of 17000 people7.

During the period when Korea was forming as a Middle Power state and when Kyrgyzstan was evolving from the status of Low Income Country to the status of Low Middle Income Country relationship between countries was consistent, but depth of engagement was limited: Korea and Korean chaebols8 were careful in investing to Kyrgyzstan, Korean government was consistently supporting Kyrgyz government and organization through loans and grants, and various projects conducted through KOICA, but amount of this help also was not very generous. However, even in the early stages, Korea demonstrated some features of middlepower-manship in relations with Kyrgyzstan. Korea tried to use niche diplomacy and find sectors that were not yet dominated by great powers. Also,

7 CA-News. (2009). South Korea introduced common quota for foreign labor workers from 15 countries, including Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from http://meta.kz//337620-juzhnaja-koreja-vvela-edinuju-kvotu-dlja.html

8 Korean private corporations and conglomerates.

Korea was treating Kyrgyzstan in a partnership manner, avoiding the imperialist approach. The implementation of middle power diplomacy was not the primary strategy and approach during administrations of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun. Korea started to recognize itself as middle power starting from Lee Myung-bak presidency, the approach towards Kyrgyzstan changed accordingly.

Formed Middle Power: from Lee to Park While the presidency of Lee Myun-bak relations between Korea and Kyrgyzstan reached a new intensity level. In relationships with Kyr-gyzstan, as well as with other Central Asian countries, Korea was strengthening people-to-people diplomacy by providing scholarships to Kyrgyzstan citizens through programs like KGSP, OKF, KF, KOICA and others [Varpa-hovskis, 2017]. Furthermore, during Lee Myun-bak's presidency, Korea intensified cultural exchanges between countries and harvested benefits from Hallyu's9 success.

The Republic of Korea started actively using rhetoric about middle power, identify itself as middle power during the presidency of Lee Myung-bak [Kim S.M. 2016]. On the one hand, it was a conceptualized strategy to approach foreign partner countries; on the other hand, it was needed for self-identification and self-branding at the international arena [Ayhan 2019].

At this stage, cooperation between Kyrgyz-stan and Korea intensified and expanded to different levels of cooperation. At the end of 2007, Korea established a diplomatic mission in Kyr-gyzstan, and an embassy was opened. The same year was opened the employment center of Kyrgyzstan citizens in Korea 10 . Simultaneously business cooperation was growing, and even some investment projects resulted into joint production plants, like potato plant and phone assembling facilities [Sparling, 2009], building of houses by Korean construction companies in Bishkek11, number of Kyrgyzstan citizens visiting Korea growth thanks to improved quota for labor workers and education grants given to

9 Korean cultural wave

10 Shepelenko, A. (2017). Perspectives of cooperation. Slovo Kyrgyzstana. Retrieved from http://slovo.kg/?p=93600

11 AKIPress. (2016). PR: South Korean construction company "Global Artis". Retrieved from https://kg.aki-press.org/news:630341

12 Saemaul Undong

Kyrgyzstan citizens within various educational programs (KOICA, OKF, later KGSP and others). Cultural engagement and cooperation with KOICA were gradually evolving.

The turning point and crucial breakthrough in relations between Korea and Kyrgyzstan occurred in 2012-2013 when Kyrgyzstan was finally recognized as LMIC country, and Korea's focus on Kyrgyzstan increased drastically what resulted into growth of the given help through KOICA. Among KOICA projects in Kyrgyzstan are "The Election Management Capacity Building of the Kyrgyz Republic" (2014-2016), which aimed to help Central Election Commission of Kyrgyzstan to run electoral process in more democratic way; "Establishment of Land Information System (LIS) in the Kyrgyz Republic" (2015-2017) which aimed to help Kyrgyzstan unified land information system what should contribute to economic development and sustainable usage of these lands; establishing an eNID System in the Kyrgyz Republic (20162017), which led to more transparent electoral process and improvement of e-government facilities; "Strengthening the Capacity of Forest Conservation of the Kyrgyz Republic" (2012-2015) aimed to contribute to conservation and cultivation of forests. In addition to it, there are ongoing projects like implementation of "Korean Rural Development Model" 12 (Saemaul Undong) in Kyrgyzstan aiming to improve living conditions of people from rural communities, KOICA's program in cooperation with World Food Program to help vulnerable communities in Osh, Jalalabad, Batken, Talas and Naryn provinces13. Intensification of cooperation between Korea and Kyrgyzstan was also accompanied by some progress in business ties what resulted in opening of Korea Eximbank in Kyrgyzstan, aimed to provide financial support to Kyrgyz-Korean projects 14 , Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP) agreed to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan government in implementing hydraulic sector projects15, construction of small and middle hydropower plants by KEPCO have

13 KOREA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (KOICA) KYRGYZ REPUBLIC OFFICE. Retrieved from http://www.donors.kg/en/agencies/2905-koica#.WtlaKYhuZPY

14 FOR.kg. (2014). Korean bank to open in Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from http://www.for.kg/news-292981-ru.html

15 BusinessKorea. (2015). KHNP to Transfer Hydroelectric Power Generation Expertise to Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved

been discussed by years between government, however, final decision was not yet made16.

Even though Kyrgyzstan reached the LMIC status and started actively support Kyrgyzstan through KOICA, business projects remained small in number and incomparable to joint projects of Korea and Uzbekistan and Korea and Kazakhstan. There were few reasons for it, first of all, is that the gold mining industry is the core industry where international investors are aiming to when dealing with Kyrgyzstan, and this industry is already highly competitive. To enter this industry the potential investor has to prove its intentions with closer work with local government and pledge to contribute to the development of local community [Joo 2013], thus it is relevant to assume that Korean government's efforts oriented on improvement of forestry, ad-ministration17, healthcare18, that are undertaken under the emblem of KOICA and other organizations are a part of strategy to enter mining industry of Kyrgyzstan. Another issue that limited development of business ties between countries is a failure in cooperation between Korean companies which were investing in Kyrgyzstan under the name of "Central Asia Fez Development Corporation" and Free Economic Zone "Bishkek", argument between sides led to opposition between sides in the court and further Kyrgyz-stan experienced reputational damage as an investment destination19. Another big failure for Korean investors and Kyrgyzstan government

from http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/arti-

cleView.html?idxno=11933

16 Vzglyad. (2016). Korean Companies showed interest in investing to construction of small- and middle- hydro power plants in Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from http://www.vzglyad.kg/econom/9085_koreyskie_kom-panii_proyavili_interes_v_investirovanii_malyih_i_sred-nih_ges_v_kyirgyizstane/ .

K-News. (2017). It is planned to build 14 small power plants in Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from http://knews.kg/2017/05/v-kyrgyzstane-planiruyut-postroit-14-malyh-ges/

17 KOREA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (KOICA) KYRGYZ REPUBLIC OFFICE. Retrieved from http://www.donors.kg/en/agencies/2905-koica#.WtlaKYhuZPY

18 KABAR. (2017). South Korean charity fund provided medical equipment to the Ministry of Health of Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved from http://kabar.kg/news/blagot-voritel-nyi-fond-iuzhnoi-korei-peredal-minzdravu-medoborudovanie-v-vide-gumpomoshchi/

19 FOR.kg. (2013). FEZ "Bishkek" takes away from Cen-

tral Asia Fez Development Corporation a part of rented

was a project on construction of POSCO's alu-minum-ferrosilicon plant, which was a secured deal and joint-project between Korea, Kyrgyz-stan, and Kazakhstan, but because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were not able to agree on electricity tariffs this project was frozen after the stage of construction20.

Perhaps such delays in active development of relations were also linked to political instability in Kyrgyzstan what led to two revolutions in 2005 and 2010. Only in December 2011 power transition period after the second Kyrgyz revolution was over, and Almazbek Atambaev became a president. Thus some political and economic stability was an essential factor for fostering ties between Korea and Kyrgyzstan. In favor of this argument speaks that fact that influx of development assistance to Kyrgyzstan from Korea happened after Atambaev's three-days-long visit to Korea in 2013, where he met Park Geun Hye, and they signed "basic agreement on granttype aid" and Memorandum of Understanding "between the two countries on expanding bilateral cooperation in the energy, natural resources, and industrial sectors"21. Thanks to this agreement, the amount of help given by Korea to Kyr-gyzstan within OECD framework grew significantly (see Table 1). This meeting was also expected to contribute to the development of Park's Eurasian Initiative. Thus Korea preferred to brand itself as a unifier for Eurasian Nations than middle power in talks with Kyrgyzstan.

territory. Retrieved from http://www.for.kg/news-220567-ru.html

Isaeva, A. (2013). "Not free FEZ": Republic is on a way to have another international scandal. Retrieved from https://vesti.kg/?op-

tion=com_k2&view=item&id=19170:nesvobodnaya-ekonomicheskaya-zona-kyirgyizstanu-grozit-ochered-noy-mezhdunarodnyiy-skandal-i-millionnyie-sudebnyie-tyazhbyi&Itemid=77

20 Minbaeva, A. (2017). Territory of despair: history of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh frozen plant. Retrieved from https://ru.sputnik.kg/video/20171215/1036854240/terri-toriya-otchayaniya-istoriya-zamorozhennogo-kyrgyzsko-kazahskogo-zavoda.html

Oh, S. (2013). POSCO : Kyrgyzstan aluminum-ferrosilicon secured. Retrieved: http://www.4-traders.com/POSCO-6494927/news/POSCO-Kyrgyzstan-aluminum-ferrosilicon-secured-17039314/

21 BusinessKorea. (2013). Korea, Kyrgyz Sign Agreement on Development Aid. Retrieved from BusinessKorea website: http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/arti-cleView.html?idxno=2242

nocTCOBeTCKHe HCcnegoBaHHa. T.2. № 7 (2019)

Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Kyrgyzstan 0.61 0.15 0.71 0.72 1.83 1.21 1.00 1.33 2.36 7.97 9.32 11.99

Source: OECD QWIDS.

Korean efforts in the popularization of Korean culture among Kyrgyzstan citizens also positively resulted in people-to-people relations, for example, since 2007 to 2017 the number of Kyrgyz people who take Korean language proficiency test increased by more than 400% (from 187 in 2007 to 948 in 2017) (see Table 2). Most people are taking this test to qualify and continue their education in Korean higher education

Table 2. TOPIK test-takers in

institutions. Korea's policy in the promotion of own culture in Kyrgyzstan includes support of Korean diaspora. Diaspora plays dual role, both as a receiver of the support from Korea, mainly through government-sponsored agency Overseas Koreans Foundation, and also Korean diaspora is active in popularizing and spreading Korean culture in the place.

Kyrgyzstan. ^ Total number per year.

Country/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Kyrgyzstan 187 198 153 373 560 534 600 625 750 901 948

Source: NIIED

Separately should be highlighted the progress of Korea in regional diplomacy. At the latest stage of the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun, in 2007, it was introduced the Korea-Central Asian Cooperation Forum, which aimed to strengthen relations of Korea with Central Asian republics and develop multilateral cooperation. Hence Lee Myung-bak's administration inherited from Roh Moo-hyun's administration an instrument of middle power diplomacy. This forum became a platform for meeting between representatives of Korea and Central Asia. Until 2016 countries were meeting annually, and even in 2013 in Bishkek, at the VIIth session of the Forum, sides signed a multilateral agreement enhancing cooperation in forestry1. In 2016, member states established a permanent body - Secretariat of the Forum, which has headquarters in Seoul, and among its goals is the enhancement of the multilateral cooperation between Forum members and launching and management of the joint projects. However, while Kyrgyzstan was a permanent participant of the events organized under the Forum until recent, it was not a part of the Secretariat.

From the middle power diplomacy point of view, Korea made enormous progress during the presidencies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. Korea's foreign affairs policies towards Kyrgyzstan were tailored in a more middle power manner than before. The diversity of niche diplomacy was increased: Kyrgyzstan and Korea started having joint projects in the development of rural and remote areas, forestry, e-governance, education, and culture.

In comparison to the previous period, Korea started trying to approach Central Asian countries as a region and attempted boosting relations between countries of the region. Hence, Korea was trying to take the role of the regional relations system designer and moderator, while not trying to take away the major influence from traditional great powers in the region.

On the other hand, major middle power's goal is to help great powers to find consensus in the region. So far, Korea could not exercise this kind of behavior in the region. It could be explained by the fact that Korea geographically is far away from the region in comparison to China and Russia. Furthermore, China prefers to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian

1 History of Central Asia - Korea Cooperation Forum. Retrieved from https://www.centralasia-ko-rea.org/web/pages/gc29199h.do

republics. On the other hand, Russia also tends to either conduct bilateral relations with Central Asian states or conduct them within the Eurasian Economic Union or the Commonwealth of Independent States, in which Korea does not have membership.

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Rethinking middle power concept: Moon and after

It is too early to evaluate whether Moon Jae-in's administration conducted middle power diplomacy towards Kyrgyzstan, but in the most recent discussion, several scholars expressed skepticism that Korea's middlepowermanship was rather a branding project than the actual foreign policy concept [Ayhan, 2019; Robertson 2016]. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the middle power concept was mentioned by Moon's administration in the White Paper by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea [MOFA 2018]. Korea considers Korea-Central Asian Cooperation Forum as part of its mini-lateral and middle power diplomacy [MOFA 2018]. Using this Forum, Korea tries to expand its niche diplomacy, and one of the common topics that was discussed at the session in 2018 was cooperation and water management.

Furthermore, at this session, Kyrgyzstan became a member of the Secretariat of the Forum.1 It is fair to expect that Moon's administration will maintain some features of middle power diplomacy in relations with Kyrgyzstan. Korea will be using niche diplomacy and agreed on the expansion of these niches in Kyrgyzstan2, namely helping Kyrgyzstan with e-governance and electoral capacity building, issuing electronic resident identity cards, and assisting in the establishment of the national infectious disease hospital. The cultural and education cooperation will also continue to develop, allowing Korea to increase the number of alumni of Korea's higher education programs and courses who are working in governmental structures. The development of rural communities is also continued3.

1 MOFA (2018) 11th Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum Takes Place (November 6-7, Seoul). Press release. Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=32 0189

2 MOFA (2018) Vice Minister Cho Meets Bilaterally with

his Counterparts from Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan on Occasion of 11th Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum. Press release. Retrieved from

Secondly, Moon's administration inherited the multilateral body of the Secretariat of Korea-Central Asian Cooperation Forum, which also functions within a framework of the middle power diplomacy. So far, this body is a platform for 2.0 and 1.5 track diplomacy, but it has the potential to become a more prominent instrument of cooperation.

Thirdly, Korea will not pursue the goal of overtaking leadership in the region from Russia and China.

Fourth, the cooperation between Kyrgyz and Korean non-state actors might reach some progress. Mainly it should be expected from business enterprises representing Korea who are backed by the government and who want to establish themselves at the Kyrgyzstan market. Additionally, taking into consideration that Korea strongly backs education diplomacy in the region, it is fair to expect development in cooperation between private educational institutions and Kyrgyz private and state-owned institutions.

Even though several middle power features can be still observed in Korea's approach towards Kyrgyzstan, it is fair to admit that they were inherited by Moon's administration from previous administrations. Moreover, like previous administrations, Moon's administration also fails to function as a middleman between bigger power in the region, and Korea still lacks to have instruments to influence agenda in relations between Russia, China, and Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, Korea does not fulfill requirements to be considered as a middle power.

In the nearest future, during Moon's presidency, it should not be expected that Korea will make huge progress in the fulfillment of all needed middle power behavioral principles. Furthermore, taking into consideration ongoing instability in Kyrgyzstan caused by the arrest of the previous president, allegations in corruption of several high-ranked people of Kyrgyz government, and drop of Moon's rating in Korea

http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=32 0184

3 Kabar.kg (2019) South Korea to finance construction of social facilities in 12 villages of Batken Oblast. Retrieved from http://kabar.kg/eng/news/south-korea-to-finance-construction-of-social-facilities-in-12-villages-of-batken-oblast/

because of allegations in corruption of a few would prefer maintaining existing status quo, people of his team, and a failure in conduction of instead of expanding its commitment in economic reforms create a situation when relations with Kyrgyzstan. Korea

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About the author: Eriks Varpahovskis, Ph.D.Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Imun-ro, 107, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea (Email: erix.vars@gmail.com).

Об авторе: Эрикс Варпаховскис получил степень Ph.D. (международные отношения) в Университете Иностранных Языков Хангук (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies). В данный момент Эрикс занимается исследованиями в области публичной дипломатии и мягкой силы (Email: erix.vars@gmail.com).

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