CC BY
36DOI: 10.12731/2070-7568-2014-6-14 UDC 327 (470+571)
russian soft power: origins, institutions, effectiveness
sergunin A.A.
Purpose. The paper examines conceptual and institutional aspects of Russia's soft power strategy over the last decade.
Methodology: research is made on the basis of the institutional approach which requires the analysis of both configuration and internal structure of the object. The study of an institution 's behavior and its interaction with the external environment is an integral part of this approach as well.
Results. The sources of Moscow's interest in the soft power strategy are explained. Various methods, techniques and institutional mechanisms that are used by Moscow to exercise its soft power in its geopolitical neighborhood are explored. The effectiveness of Russia's soft power politics is evaluated.
Practical implications: the results of this research can be taken into consideration by the Russian governmental agencies responsible for the soft power strategies (e.g. the Rossotrud-nichestvo and 'Russian world').
Keywords: Russia; foreign policy; soft power.
Introduction
In the post-Cold War era key international players prefer to exercise soft rather than hard power. According to the adepts of the soft power concept, the economic, socio-cultural, institutional and legal instruments are much more efficient now than the military strength or direct political pressure [6; 7; 8]. For many nations, hard power became an exceptional tool and a last resort in their foreign relations rather than a day-to-day practice. The hard power is now mainly applicable to those international actors who violate international law or directly threaten national, regional or global security [2].
Since mid-2000s Russia tries to develop the soft power concept and implementation mechanism of its own. The soft power concept was formally introduced to the Russian foreign policy doctrine of 2013 [1] and the Russian top leaders (including President Putin) have declared that soft power instruments are the most important ones in Moscow's international strategy arsenal.
On the other hand, Moscow has repeatedly used the hard power instruments in the post-Soviet space over the last decade, most recently in the cases of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) which is dissonant with Russia's officially proclaimed adherence to non-violent/peaceful foreign policy methods.
Having in mind this contradiction this study addresses the following interrelated questions:
1) What are the sources of the Kremlin's interest in the soft power concept?
2) What soft power resources and instruments of are available for Russia? Whether the Kremlin's soft power policies are efficient or not?
The sources of Russia's interest in the soft power strategy
There are several explanations why the soft power concept became fashionable among the Russian political elites.
First, there was a need to revisit the foreign policy concept after the presidential election. As followed from President Putin's decree of 7 May 2012 (issued right after his inauguration) the basic goals of the previous concept have not been achieved [10].
Second, there was a need to improve Russian international image which has seriously suffered after the 'five-day war' with Georgia (2008) and public protests against the alleged fraud during the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections.
Third, Russia was lagging behind other major international actors which have already developed and started to implement their soft power doctrines. As estimated by the 2013 Russian foreign policy concept, sometimes the soft power is used by these actors in a rather destructive and illegitimate way [1]. Some countries (for example, the U.S.) are using the soft power as a compliment to the military/coercive instruments rather than the only method of their foreign policies [2; 3; 11].
Fourth, with the help of the soft power concept Kremlin tries to foster the economic, political and socio-cultural integration in the post-Soviet space. The previous policies were mostly elite-oriented that, in practical terms, meant securing local regimes' positions (often) at the expense of Russia's security and economic interests. It appeared, however, that the pro-Russian regimes lost their power in some CIS countries (e.g. Viktor Yanukovych), while potential successors may opt for playing an anti-Russian card to consolidate their
power. It should be noted that even in the most stable and traditionally pro-Russian countries such as Kazakhstan or Belarus, the popular support for integration with Russia is not strong enough. In applying the soft power techniques Russia hopes to improve its international image and increase its attractiveness to both elites and societies in the CIS countries.
Soft Power: Potential and Resources
According to Joseph Nye, the author of the concept, the soft power is, first and foremost, an ability to be attractive. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: «its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)» (9, p. 11). There are also economic dimensions of the soft power albeit they can effectively serve as hard power's instruments.
The Russian political class believes that the country possesses a huge soft power potential but it is often misused or used ineffectively. For example, in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), Russia has a significant economic potential which can be applicable to this area. At the same time, the global financial crisis hit the Baltic economies much stronger than the Russian one. As a result of this Russia has overtaken some of the Baltic States by the GDP per capita indicator. Besides, Russia is returning positions as an export market for the Baltic States. Now Russia is an attractive market for the foreign labour force rather than a source of severe socio-economic problems (e.g. illegal migration or smuggling) for the neighbours. With the introduction of the Baltic
Pipeline System (2001) and Nord Stream gas pipeline (2011) Russia has reinforced its positions of the main energy supplier for Europe.
The 'cultural component' of the soft power based on the assumption that the attractiveness of Russian 'high' culture is world-wide recognized and it is highly respected by Russia's neighbouring countries. For example, the Russian Ministry of Culture sponsors the Annual Theatre Festival The Golden Mask in the Baltic States, the festival that presents the most prominent Russian performances to the Baltic public. The cultural exchanges between Russia and the post-Soviet state tend to grow as well.
The Russian higher education system is still attractive for students from the former Soviet republics because the best Russian universities of Moscow, St. Petersburg and some other provincial cities are still able to provide foreign students with good training both in the 'hard' sciences and humanities.
The Russian diasporas in the post-Soviet states are viewed by the Kremlin as a channel for projecting soft power. For example, in case of the Baltic States Moscow possesses a unique compatriot's resource, having in mind that the Russian speaking population constitutes about 1/3 in Latvia and Estonia. These communities are relatively consolidated (despite some internal controversies). They often feel themselves discriminated by the local regimes. In general, the Russian-speaking minorities in the post-Soviet countries view Moscow as a natural protector and have a rather positive attitude to Russia and the Russian culture.
Political values are one more key soft power's component. As assumed by Nye, soft power increases «when a country's culture in-
cludes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share» (9, p. 11). An attractive domestic model (if any) could potentially become another value-based soft power resource. The attractive foreign policy of a country is a valuable asset for the soft power strategy as well.
If we take again as an example the BSR, prior to the Ukrainian crisis Moscow made great strides in improving its bilateral relations with the countries of the region.. In addition to Russia's traditionally friendly relations with Finland, over the last several years Moscow tried to improve its relations with Lithuania and Sweden as well as to 'repair' its complicated bilateral ties with Denmark (because of the 2002 Chechen Congress in Copenhagen), Estonia (after the 2007 'Bronze Soldier' conflict), Latvia and Poland (both countries had numerous historical conflicts with Russia). The 2009 Medvedev's European Security Treaty (EST) proposal had a 'Baltic dimension' with the aim to strengthen the regional security system. The Russian CBSS presidency programme (2012-2013) was designed in a way to augment the EST proposal with the soft security component. In other words, the BSR has become one of the key regional priorities for testing Russian soft power strategy.
It is interesting to know that the Soviet experience of international propaganda and positive image-making is viewed as useful by the present-day Russian soft power strategists. The Head of Rossotrud-nichestvo Konstantin Kosachev acknowledged, his agency is a logical successor of «the traditions and practical skills which emerged yet in the old Soviet times.» According to him, the Soviet Union actively utilized techniques of soft power, while the international reputation of
the USSR was very high [5]. In practical terms, it has been proposed to re-launch the system of 'friendship societies' with foreign countries, as well as to organize the Festival of Youth and Students in 2017.
Institutions and Mechanisms
The process of the Russian soft power's institutionalization has started even before the term itself became a part of the official vocabulary. In 2007, the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation was established by a presidential decree (although with the NGO status). The Foundation's main function is to promote the Russian language, culture and education system abroad.
For example, the Russkiy Mir has several centres and 'corners' in the BSR: five in Estonia, two in Finland, two in Latvia and three in Lithuania. The Foundation nominates the best teachers and students of the Russian language and culture for the position of 'Professor of the Russkiy Mir' and 'Student of the Russkiy Mir'. It also has fellowship and internship programmes for foreign scholars and students to be hosted in Russia. The Foundation organizes various conferences, competitions and Olympiads on the regular basis.
In 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo, Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, was established with nearly the same purposes as the Russkiy Mir but with the governmental status and being subordinated to the Foreign Ministry.
In addition to these two main institutions, a number of (often state-affiliated) NGOs, such as the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy, Andrei Pervozvanny Fund, International Foundations for
Working with Diasporas Abroad «Rossiyane», International Council of Russian Compatriots, Library 'Russian-language literature abroad', International Association of Twin Cities, etc. partake in the soft power activities.
Historically, the City of Moscow was a pioneer in pursuing its 'foreign policy' in the post-Soviet space. In 1999 the Moscow Foundation for Support of Compatriots named after Yuri Dolgorukiy was established by the Decree of then Mayor Yuri Luzhkov (currently it is a Moscow Foundation for International Cooperation). The foundation has a scholarship programme for the Russian-speaking students, mostly targeted to compatriots in the Baltic States. The Russian capital invested in a network of the Houses of Moscow, which should serve as centres of culture and business cooperation.
The growing activism in the sphere of soft power policy is demonstrated by the Russian north-western regions, which are 'specialized' on developing twinning, humanitarian contacts and support of compatriots abroad. For example, St. Petersburg, the Leningrad Oblast, Kaliningrad and Karelia are traditionally active in twinning with the BSR towns and partaking various Euroregions. The programs of cooperation with compatriots have recently been launched by some of these regions.
The Russian higher education system gradually builds-up its soft power potential as it is increasingly becoming internationalized via the introduction of the Bologna Process and increasing the state quota for foreign students to be trained in Russian universities. The frameworks for academic exchanges are diversifying. The state-funded 'slots' for study in Russian universities are distributed through the Russian
embassies (70-100 slots for each country annually). A number of leading universities (such as Moscow State University, St. Petersburg State University, Higher School of Economics, etc.) organize student enrolment independently through competitions. The leading regional universities, such as Kant Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad), St. Petersburg-based universities, Kuban State University, Voronezh State University, Siberian and Far Eastern universities, etc., have numerous cooperative programmes with the partner universities in the neighbouring countries, including joint undergraduate and graduate programmes and research projects. The Russian academic community is quite active in using professional associations to increase its soft power capabilities. For example, Russia's north-western universities play a prominent role in the BSR University Network being able to promote academic exchanges in the region.
The Limits and constraints of Russia's soft Power
The post-Soviet countries are quite suspicious about Moscow's soft power policies in this region. For example, Moscow's economic strategies were critically evaluated by the regional actors. So, Russia's energy potential was perceived only as 'energy weapons', i.e. a hard rather than soft power instrument. As far as Russia's modernization programs with European countries are concerned the conceptual approaches to modernization applied by the parties actually differ from each other. Whereas Russia has mostly opted for European investments and high-tech transfer, the European side favours developing a more general vision of modernization (including the implementation of profound legal and socio-political reforms) in the context of this
programme. Russia's quite pragmatic interpretation is not fully in line with the broader views on modernization held by the European partners.
As for the 'cultural dimension' of Russia's soft power policies, the valuable asset of the Russian 'high' culture is always difficult to instrumentalize for practical purposes. Besides, Russia's rich cultural traditions are often overshadowed by negative perceptions of current political developments in this country.
It should be also noted that in contrast with 'high' culture the current Russian mass culture, lifestyle and media products seem to be less attractive for foreigners, even for Russia's compatriots. The (excessive) presence of Russia-made entertainment and news in the local media is often viewed as a threat to constructing a 'true' national or European identity. It is often claimed that ethnic minorities in the post-Soviet countries live in the Russian 'information space', which allegedly undermines their loyalty to the states of domicile. In general, one may find that attitude of Russian compatriots towards Russia is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, they express certain affinity with Russia and even with the ruling political regime (e.g. vast majority of the Russian citizens residing in Estonia voted for Putin in 2012). On the other hand, when they have to make a choice between countries where to get education and/or where to migrate they prefer Europe or North America to Russia.
The role of compatriots in Russia's soft power strategy is a subject to criticism as well. The Russian-speaking communities are often perceived by the local political elites as a sort of a Russian «fifth column», working against statehood. The statements about necessity
to consolidate Russian compatriots abroad. On the other hand, some Russian experts believe that opportunities to use compatriots as a soft power instrument used to be overestimated, since the size of Russian communities in the post-Soviet states is decreasing, while their cultural and political orientations are getting more diversified, complicating the task of their consolidation.
Regarding the attractiveness of the Russian political values, as many foreign experts maintain, Russia has problems with harmonizing its traditional and internationally recognized democratic values and standards. On the one hand, Kosachev [4] assumes that «freedom, democracy, rule of law, social stability and respect for human rights have become 'a consumer basket' of the modern world» but, on the other, he insists that «there are differences in their [values] individual manifestation due to national, historical and other specifics.» In other words, Moscow finds it difficult to persuade others that it shares universal values and is ready to disseminate them throughout the world. Equally, Russia is unable to make its domestic socio-economic and political model attractive and sell it to other nations. Even Kosachev admits that Russia cannot export its specific model since «it has not developed any such model yet».
Moscow is also short of efficient foreign policy tools in the soft power domain. None of Russia's large-scale foreign policy initiatives (including the EST draft and the Russian CBSS presidency programme) gained a solid international support.
In its soft power activities the Kremlin sometimes does not take into account the 'local peculiarities'. For example, the three Baltic republics still suffer from a sort of an 'inferiority complex' because the
local statehood and identities are not strong enough and still in their formative phase. The very process of state- and identity-building is often based on negative 'othering' Russia. In this context, any Russian soft power efforts are interpreted as attempts to breach the Baltic statehood, identities and security. Besides, Russia is blamed for having a 'hidden plan' to reintegrate the Baltic States in its sphere of influence.
To continue the analysis of Russia's soft power's shortcomings, it should be noted that Moscow's instruments in this field are predominantly 'statist', i.e. government-based and controlled. The NGO potential and resources are basically not in demand. The NGOs that are 'officially' allowed to participate in the soft power activities, in reality are semi-governmental and perceived by the 'target audiences' in the post-Soviet countries accordingly.
Moscow often tends to forget what Nye wrote about the interaction between the government and non-government sectors in the soft power sphere: governments should «make sure that their own actions and policies reinforce rather than undercut their soft power» (9, p. 17). On a number of occasions the Kremlin undercut what was done by Russian regions, municipalities, private companies, universities and NGOs to promote their cooperation with international partners in the economic and humanitarian spheres.
Duplication is another problem of the Russian soft power policies in the post-Soviet space. For example, there is a lack of clear division of labour between the Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkiy Mir; their partners in foreign countries were often puzzled by rather chaotic activities of these two Russia's leading soft power agencies.
conclusions
To sum up, the soft power concept has deeply embedded in both the Russian foreign policy discourse and machinery over the last decade.
However, the Russian understanding of soft power strongly deviates from either the 'classic' one (Nye-based) or suggested by other Western academics and practitioners. The Russian interpretation of soft power is rather pragmatic and interest-centric. As mentioned, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 defines the soft power as a 'set of instruments' which is helpful in achieving foreign policy aims by means of civil society institutions, ITs and communication, humanitarian and other methods that are different from classical diplomacy. President Putin was even more pragmatic and instrumentalist by defining the soft power as a mere foreign policy tool or technology that helps either to lobby Moscow's interests in foreign countries or improve Russia's international image [10].
Currently, Russia's soft power strategy represents a combination of ideational and material motives. On the one hand, the Kremlin sees soft power as an important instrument in returning and maintaining Russia's status of a great power as well as in shaping the future world order and making the West (particularly the U.S.) abide by the rules of that order. On the other hand, Moscow - in a quite pragmatic way - views the soft power strategy as an efficient tool in promoting its national interests in foreign countries, coalition-building and counter-balancing the West in the global geopolitical game.
Is Russia able to effectively implement its soft power strategy? In general, the answer is «yes» and numerous evidences can be found,
especially in the post-Soviet countries. However, it goes without saying that the above-mentioned shortcomings as well as international crises such as the Georgian and Ukrainian ones make the Russian soft power policies less efficient and sometime undercut the Kremlin's strategies in the neighbouring regions. It is still a long way to go to bring Moscow's soft power strategy to widely-accepted standards and make Russia a really attractive international partner.
References
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DATA ABouT THE AUTHOR
sergunin aleksandr anatolyevich, Professor of the Department of International Relations Theory & History, Ph.D. in Political Science
St. Petersburg State University
1/3 Smolny St., St. Petersburg, 191060, Russia
e-mail: [email protected]
