CC BY
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2. family (15.0%); 3. honor and dignity (10.6%; 4. health (10.3%); 5. kindness, patience (10.2%); 6. friendship (8.5%); 7. intelligence, education (6.4%); 8. Motherland (5.6%); 9. modesty, conscience (5.5%); 10. independence (4.0%); 11. money (2.2%); 12. beauty (1.9%); 13. power (1.0%); 14. luxurious life (1.4%); 15. freedom, disinhibition (1.3%); 16. nature (0.8%).
The results of this surveillance make it possible to suppose that ethnicity and religiousness for Chechens are closely connected, complementing each other, and are inalienable components of identity. Chechen identity today is unthinkable outside the context of the Islamic tradition. Greater attention to the fundamental spiritual values of the Chechen people, which had been formed and accumulated over many centuries, can contribute to strengthening national unity and preserving the ethno-confessional identity of the Chechens. Even in the conditions of the global world it is possible to preserve national originality. The Chechens should strive for mutually enriching cultural coexistence with representatives of other peoples and confessions.
"Sotsiologiya i religiya v obshchestve pozdnego moderna," Belgorod, 2013, pp. 245-250.
Madina Dzhantaleyeva,
Junior instructor, Astrakhan State University,
Astrakhan
RUSSIAN-KAZAKH RELATIONS AS A FACTOR
OF STABILITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION
The interests of Russia and Kazakhstan, the two neighboring countries having a common history, cultural and interregional connections, and common challenges and threats to security, are closely intertwined. This is why the development of relations between our two
states and their role and influence on political stability in the Caspian region cannot be ignored. Good-neighborly relations are indispensable for both Russia and Kazakhstan, moreover, they should become a factor of stability on the strategically important lines along their borders. It should be noted that the Caspian region is important for our two states not only from the point of view of its resources, but it is also a zone of geostrategic significance in terms of national security [1]. The proper examination of Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the Caspian region can contribute to a better understanding of the origin and development of the problem under review.
Modern Russian-Kazakh relations are a successful and effective model of bilateral cooperation in the entire post-Soviet area. During the past years Russia and Kazakhstan have accumulated a wealth of positive experience in the oil-and-gas sphere. The prospects of cooperation and interaction in the fuel-and-energy sphere and oil and gas transportation, as well as the joint development of the hydrocarbon resources in the northern part of the Caspian region can have a positive influence on the economic situation in neighboring countries and also contribute to greater stability or confrontation in the region.
There are two major components in the development of relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region, which determine their general state. In the geopolitical aspect, Kazakhstan depends on Russia as far as Kazakh oil transportation to the world is concerned. The transit of Kazakh oil for export passes mainly on Russian territory. Another aspect which has already had a positive influence on their bilateral relations is solution of the problem of the status of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan hold similar positions on the issue, and they have signed a number of agreements regulating their interaction on the problem. For one, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the delimitation of the bottom of the northern part of the
Caspian Sea with a view to implementing sovereign rights to use its natural riches on July 6, 1998 [2]. Similar agreement was signed by Russia and Azerbaijan in September 2002. Under the agreements "consensus can be reached on condition of a just division of the Caspian Sea bottom along with the preservation and use of the water surface, including freedom of navigation, agreed-on quotas of fishing, and environmental protection. By now the agreements on the delimitation of the sea bottom have been signed by three states -Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In accordance with these agreements Kazakhstan controls 27 percent of the bottom area, Russia -19 percent, and Azerbaijan - 18 percent. Iran is offered 14 percent of the shelf, but it claims 20 percent and insists on transferring the border by 80 kilometers to the north from the line of the former sea border of the U.S.S.R. This position of Tehran is supported by Turkmenistan. Under an agreement the sea bottom with its mineral resources is divided on special agreement between neighboring and other countries, and each state has sovereign rights to use natural riches, but no territorial jurisdiction.
A greater part of water area with its biological resources is in common possession and joint use without borders on the water surface (except two coastal zones of agreed-on width, one of which could be an analogue of a territorial sea, and the other could be a fishing zone envisaged by the bilateral Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1940).
Delimitation of the sea bottom should be made (as in 80 percent of all cases known in world practice) on the principle of medial line. Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed that they will carry on delimitation of their parts of the sea bottom along the modified medial line (with due account of islands, geological structures, other circumstances, and geological expenses already incurred). However, despite rather close positions, the states in question have been unable for quite some time to
resolve the problem due to the presence of certain controversial details. Great progress was reached on May 13, 2002, when Kazakhstan and Russia signed a protocol to the agreement between the two countries on delimitation of the sea bottom in the northern part of the Caspian Sea, with a view to implementing sovereign rights to use natural riches, on July 6, 1998. The Russian side plans to ratify this agreement in the very near future. In this agreement the two sides established the coordinates of the medial line dividing the sea between them and defined the rules of the development of deposits. Thus, Russia and Kazakhstan have become the first Caspian states which have completely solved the problem of division of the sea bottom. Solution of this problem between two big oil-extracting countries will, probably, ensure greater stability and investment appeal of oil projects in the region.
Another aspect, which should be taken into account, is that the greater investment appeal of the Caspian region has entailed greater activity of the world's biggest oil-and-gas companies in this region. This is both positive and negative factors for the development of Caspian states: on the one hand, it is an incentive to economic development, and on the other, it exacerbates foreign political relations.
Leading world powers have of late joined the struggle for influence in the Caspian region. This is due, first and foremost, to the richest natural resources of the region - primarily, oil and gas. According to certain estimates, the oil resource potential of the Russian part of the Caspian region exceeds eight billion tons. The Caspian districts of Turkmenistan and Iran account for about two billion tons [3].
The role of the local deposits of natural riches is growing with every passing year for the Caspian states in solving their economic problems. Against the backdrop of the continuing militarization of the region this can entail an exacerbation of relations between the Caspian states.
In the view of certain experts, by 2015 the Caspian region can become one of the most unstable regions of the world due to quite a few objective and subjective reasons. This problem was discussed at the 2nd conference on paradigms of international cooperation in the Caspian region, which was held in the Kazakhstan city of Aktau on September 12-13, 2012. The main report on challenges and threats to military security of the region was made by the expert of military-strategic research of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defense Rafik Tairov [4].
At present more and more people express the view that wars of the future will be waged for energy resources. The "Arab spring," popular revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, continuing tension in the Caucasian region, growing rivalry for the riches of the shelf of the Arctic Ocean are regarded by analysts and military experts as prerequisites for future wars for energy.
For example, according to research data, 95 percent of available oil resources in the world will be depleted within the next fifty-six years, and the remaining five percent will come to an end in 88 years. This is why it is quite evident that the striving of certain powerful states for having an access to vitally important resources will only increase the number of conflict zones.
The Caspian region is no exception. It is already a center of military-strategic and economic interests of many countries of the world, and not only the Caspian states (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but also the most influential world powers. The region becomes a zone of greater attention simultaneously of the North and South, East and West having their own geopolitical interests. Behind these geographical names stand such countries or groups of countries as the European Union in the North, India and Pakistan in the South, the Middle East countries, the PRC and Japan in the East, and the United States and Canada in the West.
It is possible to single out the following groups of interests in this region:
- First, the Caspian Basin countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran) are trying to resolve their domestic problems through deliveries of fuel and energy resources to the world market;
- Secondly, the countries of the transit zones (Russia, Iran, China, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and others) are striving to draw dividends from transportation of energy raw materials across their territories;
- Thirdly, the subregional leaders (Russia, Iran, China, Turkey) intend to strengthen their strategic positions in the region as much as possible;
- Fourthly, the big world players (the United States, the European Union, Russia, China) regard the Caspian region as an element of geopolitical struggle for control over strategically important regions of the world.
Another distinguishing feature of the Caspian region is that it is not only a source of vital raw materials, but also a transit region which makes it possible to link not only the East and West (recreation of the "Great Silk Route"), but also the North and South ("water way": St. Petersburg - Moscow - Astrakhan along the Volga River, and further on via the Caspian Sea to Iran). It is not for nothing that the Caspian region is called Trans-Caspian [5].
The future transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian region is connected with quite a few difficulties. Economic expediency and effectiveness become a secondary matter in discussing new export routes, because these plans acquire a clearly expressed political nature. Serious discord arises between states and companies and differences emerge in their positions, primarily at the interstate level, concerning the offered routes of transportation.
In this situation Russia has to look for allies for promoting its interests in the Caspian region, as well as among regional states which have influence on it [6]. In the view of some researchers and experts, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could become such allies. For this purpose it would be necessary to continue the development of favorable relations with these countries. These two states are important subjects of Caspian policy, more important than Azerbaijan, because their oil and gas resources are much greater than those of Azerbaijan.
Events of the past several years have shown that geological prospecting for and extraction of fuel and energy resources are only part of the program of joint cooperation in the development of deposits of the Caspian states. Today oil and gas resources have become one of the major factors of world politics. The global processes of modern development are connected, directly or indirectly, with energy resources, and access to them is among the priorities of any country. This is why any major projects to develop oil and gas deposits and transportation of this fuel can be an example of broad international cooperation, as well as discord and confrontation. Practically all oil and gas extracting countries of the world carry on "energy" diplomacy within whose framework a state protects and promotes the interests of its fuel-and-energy complex on world markets.
The United States, Turkey, Iran, Japan, China and other countries show greater interest in creating energy transport corridors in the Caspian region and are striving to get control over them through commercial participation of their companies, credits and political pressure. However, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the countries most interested in creating this and other transportation routes which will pass across their territory [7].
In the view of certain experts, western countries would like to establish control over the energy resources of new Caspian states and
reduce Russian influence in the region [8]. They are ready to ignore economic unprofitability of some Caspian deposits and refusal of some foreign companies to take part in prospecting for hydrocarbon raw materials.
The Caspian region will not become a source of additional volumes of oil and gas to be delivered to foreign markets within the next decade. The obvious reason is that its hydrocarbon reserves have been overestimated. This is confirmed by the data on the extraction level of hydrocarbon raw materials in the Caspian basin countries in recent years, as well as forecasts for the next decade. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose resources are viewed as the main sources for filling new pipelines, are unable to offer the necessary volumes of oil and gas.
The volumes of oil deposits in the Caspian region are estimated differently by experts. Some of them believe the Caspian basin is enormously rich in hydrocarbon resources and can compete with the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, while others maintain that these reserves are too exaggerated and their overstated data are nothing more that the attempts of transnational fuel-and-energy companies to draw additional capital for investments. This was the case during the conflict between Britain and Argentine around the Falkland Islands, disputes between China and a number of Southeast Asian countries concerning parts of the South China Sea, with regard to South Kuriles, and also conformably to disputes and conflicts in Africa [9].
However it can safely be said that the Caspian shelf is one of the world's richest oil-bearing districts. As we have said above, the oil factor is one of the basic ones influencing international relations. This is why the energy resources of the Caspian region strongly influence the alignment of forces on the world energy market [10].
Kazakhstan has all rights to claim the role of a crossroads of transport routes due to its geopolitical and geographical position in the center of Eurasia.
Azerbaijan has not only enormous fuel and energy resources, but also great transport possibilities, inasmuch as it is situated on a junction point of Europe and Asia.
Undoubtedly, cooperation between different countries in these and other joint projects and programs is a necessary condition for inclusion of new independent states in world economic ties, creates prerequisites for the stable development of their economy, and contributes to favorable solution of domestic and international problems.
Russia and Kazakhstan will have to take into account a number of factors, which will determine the situation in the Caspian region in the next decade. First of all, there can be exacerbation of the struggle for transportation routes of resources, which are not yet extracted [11]. At any rate, many countries are striving to diversify the sources of getting natural riches, which resulted in growing rivalry around new projects of building pipelines. With due account of the fact that competition for creating new transportation routes from the Caspian region will be growing, Russia may come across serious rivalry on the part of other Caspian basin states interested in increasing oil and gas deliveries they extract [12].
The growing role of Iran should not be excluded either, for it can become one of the main rivals of Russia and Kazakhstan in the Caspian region. This can take place if the forecasts concerning the growing consumption of hydrocarbon raw materials by the European countries are justified. In this case the role of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are regarded by European countries as the main sources of resources for new pipelines, can become lower [13].
As a result, transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon resources is a central economic and geopolitical problem for the Caspian basin countries, a region of contradicting interests of different states. In the near future the security problem of the chosen transportation routes may arise, inasmuch as transportation of strategic raw materials can become a trigger for separatism. From this follows that the Caspian region is a knot of a whole number of unresolved problems, which include ecological threats and energy terrorism undermining extraction and destroying pipelines and other infrastructural objects. Solution of all problems can strengthen the energy security of the entire region and the countries importing Caspian oil. Russia and Kazakhstan are the most influential states in the region which have a serious economic and political weight in a whole number of regional and international organizations, whose voice is heeded by the peoples and leaders of the countries of the region [14].
Notes
1. E. Katayev, L. Rubin. Kaspii - more vozmozhnostei [The Caspian Sea - Plenty of Opportunities]. Moscow, Academia, 2008, 280 pp.
2. A. Butayev. Kaspii: zachem on Zapadu? [The Caspian Basin: What Is It for the West?]. Moscow, 2004, 435 pp.
3. Yuzhny flang SNG. Tsentralnaya Aziya - Kaspii - Kavkaz: Energetika i politika [Southern Flank of the CIS. Central Asia - Caspian Basin - Caucasus: Energy and Politics]. Issue 2. Moscow, Navona, 2005, 456 pp.
4. R. Tairov. By 2015 the Caspian Region will Become one of the Most Unstable regions of the World. 18.09.2012. www.finka.ru
5. L. Vorodomsky. Tsentralnaya Aziya i Zakavkazye v globalnom i regionalnom kontekstakh politiko-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya [Central Asia and Transcaucasus in Global and Regional Context of Political and Economic Development]. 231 pp.
6. L. Levitsky. Kaspii: udastsya li Rossii sokhranit vliyaniye na "russkom more" [The Caspian Basin: Will Russia be Able to Preserve Its Influence on the "Russian Sea"]. 29.06. 2008.
7. A. Butayev. Op.cit.
8. Ibragimov. Neft i geopolitika v sovremennom mire (na prim ere Kaspiiskogo regiona) [Oil and Geopolitics in the Modern World (on Example of the Caspian Region)]. Nauchno-politichesky zhurnal No 08(71), August, 2012.
9. Yuzny flang SNG... Op. cit.
10. Sredizemnomorye - Chernomorye - Kaspii: mezhdu Bolshoi Evropoi i Bolshim Blizhnim Vostokom [Mediterranean - Black Sea - Caspian Sea: Between Big Europe and Big Middle East] // Moscow, "Granitsa" Publishers, 2006, 216 pp.
11. S. Druzhevsky. K voprosu ob alternativnoi strategii Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sfere energeticheskoi politiki [On Alternative Strategy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Energy Policy].
12. R. Usmanov. Rol truboprovodnykh proektov i etnopoliticheskikh konfliktov v formirovanii geopoliticheskoi kartiny Kavkazskogo - Kaspiiskogo regiona [The Role of Pipeline Projects and Ethno-political Conflicts in Formation of Geopolitical Picture of Caucasian - Caspian Region] // "Vlast", 2011, No 10.
13. G. Chufrin, D. Zhailin. Natsionalnoye informatsionnoye agentstvo "Kazinform" [National Information Agency "Kazinform"]. Www.inform.kz.Lenta.ru.
14. G. Kudryashova. Instituty regionalnogo vliyaniya na federalnom urovne [Institutions of Regional Influence at Federal Level] // "Sotsialno-gumanitarniye znaniya," Moscow, 2011, No 7.
"Kaspiisky region: politika, ekonomika, kultura, " Astrakhan, 2012, No 4, pp. 333-339.
Igor Dobayev,
D. Sc. (Philosophy), South Federal University,
Rostov-on-Don
Alexander Ponedelkov,
D. Sc. (Political sciences), South Russian
Institute, Rostov-on-Don
TRENDS OF EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM
IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
Islam is not monolithic in the North Caucasus, but is divided into two basic currents - Sunni and Shi'ite, and also Khanifite and Shafiite trends, as well as several ideological forms (traditionalism, fundamentalism, modernism). The main dividing line passes between
