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105POLITICAL SCIENCES
RUSSIA, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL ASIA: CLASH OF INTERESTS
Nazirov M.
PhD, Senior lecturer, International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan
Abstract
This article analyzes the interests and influence of the United States, Russia and China on the development of Central Asia, as well as their prospects in the region. Various stages of manifestation of the influence of these centers of power are analyzed. The authors argue that the countries of Central Asia in the post-Soviet period perceived the forces in the USA-Russia-China triangle differently, and this was one of the important conditions for the formation of their multi-vector foreign policy. In this regard, the article notes that the balance of interests of Russia, the United States and China in Central Asia ensures the development and independent foreign policy of the countries of the region.
Keywords: Central Asia, Russia, China, the USA, interests, geopolitics, geoeconomics.
INTRODUCTION
The withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from the world stage had a profound effect on the entire system of international relations. Newly independent states such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have formed a new region in the center of Eurasia - Central Asia. Central Asia has always been a region of geopolitical competition between leading countries. Today Central Asia not only has great development potential, but also faces problems in its implementation. The region is made up of countries with vast mineral resources, demographic potential, limited access to the world's oceans, and a low diversified economy. Proximity to an unstable Afghanistan, weak border protection, and the rise of radical Is-lamism pose a threat to Central Asian states.
The region will primarily attract foreign partners who want to benefit from economic cooperation. However, the aforementioned threats are a destabilizing factor for the Central Asian states, leading to the interference of external players in regional affairs.
It should be noted that many power centers have their own interests in the Central Asian region: Russia, China, the United States, Turkey, Iran, the European Union, India and others. Nevertheless, Russia, the largest country in the post-Soviet space, China, which is gaining more and more economic and political power, and the United States, which pursues global interests, have the greatest influence in the region. The interests of these countries are not only proportional to each other, but also contradictory. Therefore, the problems in US-Russia, China-US relations, the pairing of Chinese and Russian integration projects are reflected in the cooperation of Central Asian countries.
MAIN PART US interests in Central Asia The United States has been focusing on Central Asia since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states in the region. During the 1990s, the main goal of the United States in Central Asia was to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
In general, the change in U.S. interests can be divided into three stages. In 1991-2001, three priorities were identified in the region:
- Addressing the problem of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction;
- Assisting Central Asian countries in strengthening their sovereignty;
- Elimination of traditional infrastructure links with Russia related to pipeline systems.
The second phase began after the events of September 11, when security interests came to the fore. It is almost impossible to separate the interests of NATO and the United States, because "Washington not only determines the practical activities of the Alliance, but also uses it to advance its own interests in the first place." [1]
This is especially evident in the second phase of U.S. policy in Central Asia, which began after the events of September 11, 2001. The need for material and technical support for military operations in Afghanistan required the participation of Central Asian states in these operations, which would allow the United States to deploy military and supply bases. The United States later "intended to establish long-term security ties with Central Asian states, which could include access to bases when needed". [2]
As a result, external interference in the guise of democratization, along with support for military ties and mutual economic cooperation, has negatively affected U.S. relations with countries in the region. For a quarter of a century, these measures have shown that Central Asian states have become closer to Russia and China.
The U.S. soft power in the region was based on the promotion of democratic principles and the Western way of life, aimed at the younger generation seeking opportunities for self-awareness, as well as leaders committed to democratic principles.
A new phase of American interests in the region begins with Barack Obama's announcement in 2013 that he will limit the functions of the International Security Assistance Force. The cooling of relations, the closure of bases in Central Asia, the decline in the num-
ber of troops and military operations have led to a reduction in cooperation with Central Asian countries. Despite the new "Strong Support" operation, which began in 2014, there has been little focus on the region. U.S. scholar F. Starr has criticized U.S. plans to leave Afghanistan, saying it would negatively affect U.S. influence in the region and the Central and South Asian economic integration project.
America's economic interests are driven by factors such as Central Asia's small GDP, limited access to the sea, high levels of corruption, and the region's remoteness from the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. has sought to gain an economic position in the region in the name of geopolitical interests. In the post-Soviet era, American companies quickly began to exploit the region's oil and gas reserves. In order to reduce the influence of Russia, and later China, and to consolidate in the energy segment, the following was done:
- assistance to international development (official assistance to developing countries);
- foreign direct investment, as well as TAPI (gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India);
- CASA-1000 (Electricity Transmission Project from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Pakistan and Afghanistan);
- C5 + 1 (negotiating platform uniting five Central Asian countries and the United States);
- New Silk Road (US plan to integrate Central and South Asia into a single macro-region);
- Trans-Caspian pipeline (gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to the Caucasus and then to Europe), etc.
The United States is currently working to strengthen its presence in the region, as evidenced by the new US Central Asia Strategy for 2019-2025. The main constant interest of the United States in the region is to counter the growing influence of Russia and China in the region.
Chinese interests in Central Asia
China's policy in the 1990s was mainly aimed at establishing friendly relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia and providing them with reliable neighbors, which determined China's next policy in the region. Initially, China was tasked with resolving border issues with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. The establishment of good neighborly relations with all participants in the border agreement laid the foundation for the formation of the "Shanghai Five", which later became the SCO in 2001.
It should be noted that China is interested in friendly and stable relations with Central Asian countries, which will ensure China's national security and the implementation of geopolitical and geoeconomic plans. China has been able to reconcile with its western neighbors on the border issue and deepen security cooperation. The countries of the region and China are interested in cooperating in the fight against radicalism, terrorism, separatism and organized crime. This policy was formalized within the SCO.
China is currently the main economic partner for Central Asian countries. Rapid economic growth, trade
expansion, huge demographic potential, and a significant expansion of foreign direct investment have led to an increase in China's economic and political influence in Central Asian countries.
90 years of bilateral relations between China and Central Asian countries in economic scale and not only in the oil sector. China's growing demand for hydrocarbon resources has led to an increase in the participation of new participants in the global energy market in the oil and gas sector, including the post-Soviet space. Beginning in 2000, started the construction of oil and gas transportation infrastructure. During this period, the energy markets of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan saw the growth of Chinese multinationals, which helped increase China's consumption of resources from these countries. Due to the dependence of the Central Asian countries on Russian infrastructure and Western investment, "China has achieved its goal of diversifying this market." [3]
Since the launch of the Belt and Road initiative in 2013, the importance of Central Asian countries for China has grown significantly. China has begun to invest heavily in infrastructure projects and the transport system to take advantage of transit opportunities through Central Asia.
Another important factor is the financing of projects through linked lending, i.e. "the use of Chinese materials, equipment, technology or manpower in the implementation of projects". China's growing economic influence in Central Asia has been accompanied by a gradual withdrawal of the United States from the region.
The growing Chinese influence in Central Asia is creating both new prospects and new challenges. Both China's economic expansion and historical superstitions have led to growing mistrust and synophobia among the region's population. To overcome these problems, China is using a soft power policy. It is strengthening cooperation with Central Asian countries in the fields of foreign relations, education and science.
Thus, over the entire period of independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the PRC has become an important economic partner for these states. Without Chinese economic projects, the consistent development of the region is unimaginable. It can be observed that the gradual expansion of China's interests in Central Asia is a process that is less dependent on external factors and is focused on China's internal interests.
Russian policy in Central Asia
In the 1990s, Central Asia's dominance in Russian foreign policy declined due to problems such as the deep economic recession and the weakening of the army, and a number of other reasons. The rise of national identity in the newly independent states of the region has also affected relations with Russia. Unsuccessful attempts at economic integration with Central Asia showed that Russia did not have a clear strategy for the region.
The strengthening of the US position in Central Asia due to the counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan has, of course, given a new impetus to Russia to
strengthen its position in the region in the field of security. This led to the institutionalization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2002, that is, the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization based on Russia's clear dominance.
Russia declared in the 2000s that the post-Soviet space, including the Central Asian region, was a zone of Russian interest from both a security and economic point of view. Official Moscow has pursued a policy aimed at strengthening economic cooperation with the countries of the region. Russia's political and economic position in the region has been strengthened through bilateral military-technical cooperation and the deployment of military bases, as well as through US "democratization policies" in Central Asia.
A new phase in Russia's policy in Central Asia began in 2007 with President Vladimir Putin's "Munich Speech." To return to the status of a great power, Russia began to more decisively defend its geopolitical interests in Central Asia, that is, to facilitate the US withdrawal from the region and prevent the diversion of the Central Asian oil and gas infrastructure to the West. In the post-Soviet space, Russia has sought to strengthen the capacity of key institutions, including the CIS, Eur-AsEC and the CSTO." [4]
From a security point of view, Russia's main interests today are to ensure stability and prevent radicaliza-tion in the region, as well as to strengthen the political systems of Central Asian states. For Russia, the region is a security buffer zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in particular plays a special role in eliminating drug smuggling from Afghanistan.
Central Asian countries are of strategic and geoe-conomic importance for Russia's sustainable development. The region is a market for Russian goods and investments, which is of particular importance for the energy strategy and provides the necessary labor resources. Russia's largest oil and gas companies are actively investing in the region's fuel and energy sector. The most important part of Moscow's energy strategy is aimed at maintaining the monopoly of the exporting country for Europe and the transit country for Central Asian countries.
Russia is in the top three among exporters and importers of almost all Central Asian countries. This is mainly due to imports of natural resources and agricultural products from Central Asia. The consistent development of the countries of the region within the framework of Russian integration projects is the most important point for official Moscow. Russia is not interested in enhancing China's economic influence, despite overall cooperation in the region, but cannot compete with China in the region in terms of economic potential.
Russia's soft power is undoubtedly one of the most important parameters of its policy in the region. In this case, the Russian language and culture, as well as the information space in the Russian language can be considered as the main means of influence. Protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking population in the region plays an important role in Russia's soft power policy, as otherwise ties with the region and Russia's position could be lost.
In general, Russia has strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region. The deep intercon-nectedness and long border with Central Asian countries determine Russia's focus on the region. Ensuring stability in the region and preventing radicalization is one of the most important tasks of Russia's foreign policy. There are grounds for economic interests as well, but the level of their implementation is not strong.
Russia-China-US triangle of interests in Central
Asia
It should be noted that the above centers of power compete with each other in the pursuit of interests in the region, and even limiting each other's influence has become a protection of their interests. For example, the US 90-year policy aimed at maintaining a unipolar world.
According to Z. Brzezinski, "the restraint of the dominant and antagonistic power in Eurasia determines America's ability to exercise global supremacy." H. McKinder, a classic of Western geopolitics, noted that control over Central Asia would ensure control over the entire continent. "The West crosses part of the historical rift that separates the Orthodox and Chinese worlds from the Muslim world. Along the way, the 'clash of civilizations' is escalating, according to S. Huntington's prediction." [5]
Thus, it can be seen that the geopolitical interest of the United States in Central Asia in the 1990s was to strengthen control in the region. The strengthening of US military-political ties in the region, especially during the operation in Afghanistan, meant that China and Russia would weaken in the future. China and Russia could not miss the opportunity to take their place in Central Asia, located in the heart of Eurasia. The establishment of the CSTO, the emergence of Russian military bases in Central Asia and the signing of the SCO Charter are indicative of the response of China and Russia during this period.
At this point, the question arises: why did China and Russia act in coordination? Russian scholar D. Ba-bayan believes that Beijing and Moscow have identified "areas of mutual responsibility" to "limit" Western influence, especially the US, in key parts of the world. [13]
In this case, indeed, while China could have significantly increased its economic and political influence in the region in the 1990s, it respected Moscow's sphere of influence and focused only on resolving border issues. It was a good opportunity for China to be responsible for the security of the region in the context of good neighborly relations. China did not doubt Russia's integration projects at all modern stages, recognizing its special ties with the countries of the region.
During the same period, the United States actively promoted projects to remove Russia's monopoly on transit through the oil and gas pipeline system and to divert hydrocarbon flows to Europe. However, due to objective problems in many projects and the cooling of relations, the US position in the region has weakened, and accordingly, China has begun to fight for Central Asian resources. As a result, new pipeline projects between Russia and China have taken full responsibility
for the supply of oil and gas from Central Asian countries. Thus, "pipeline diplomacy" in Central Asia is largely based on the balance of interests within the US-Russia-China triangle.
The next phase of raising the interests of the forces in the region revolved around integration associations. Initially, Russia wanted as many participants as possible, the United States planned to direct Central Asian countries to South Asia as part of the Greater Central Asia and New Silk Road project, and China sought integration within the SCO. All projects were aimed at reducing the influence of the other party in one way or another.
The "agreement" between China and Russia on Central Asia is based on the countries' relations with the United States and the current situation in other regions. Russia wants to prevent China's uncontrolled economic entry into Central Asian countries, which will lead to uncompromising competition with Chinese goods. With further stratification of conflicting interests, "China may decide to abandon its current policy of self-restraint in Central Asia." [6] However, despite China's growing economic influence in Central Asia, Beijing understands the need to move in Central Asia through Moscow, which has more political tools in the region. [7] So, Russia and China pursue their own interests, but act in the context of "collective cooperation" in their relations.
Under the new U.S. Strategy for Central Asia, released to the public in 2020, there could be a new phase in the development of American policy in Central Asia. According to the document, Russia and China are seen as the main "revisionist forces" secretly fighting to turn the world order into a polycentric system. In Central Asia, where geopolitical interests predominate, confrontation is a "zero-sum game" for both the United States and Russia. This is confirmed by the new U.S. strategy in the region, which defines "other external ruling circles as evil forces" and turns them into rivals. [8]
In the context of the Russia-US-China interest triangle, it is important for Central Asian countries to understand the interests of the forces. The preference of US actions by Central Asian countries in the early stages is explained by the need to balance Russia's monopoly presence. Western countries are also seen as more important as a source of investment and assistance in solving regional problems. Subsequently, the U.S. foreign policy of democratization in the region was negatively perceived, and in the process, the countries of the region saw Russia as a balancing force in defending their sovereignty. Today, the international situation is different, with some Central Asian countries viewing the U.S. as an opportunity to control the growing influence of China and Russia.
In Central Asia, China is seen as a source of development and investment, and it is beneficial to take advantage of its economic and technological potential. China does not link credit or investment to the level of democracy in the region. At the same time, however, there is growing "concern" from China that "the minds of the people of some countries in the region may in the future be seen as world hegemons and aggressors." [9] This imbalance is due to the rapid growth of economic
activity of Chinese companies, lack of data and the weakness of China's soft power in the region.
In Central Asia, Russia is seen not as a "big brother" but as a partner and ally. This is explained by the fact that "Russian policy is very sensitive to the conditions of each Central Asian state and demonstrates flexibility in developing individual approaches to them." [10] Russia could help balance China's growing economic influence under political pressure. Political cooperation with Russia now allows the countries of the region to overcome the negative aspects of Chinese expansion.
CONCLUSION
In general, the level of confrontation in Central Asia is much lower than in Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, or the Middle East. Therefore, the Central Asian states have the ability to pursue a multi-vector policy and seek good relations with China, Russia and the United States.
During their independent development, the Central Asian countries have differently perceived the forces in the US-Russia-China triangle. The multi-vector foreign policy pursued by the countries of the region has helped to maintain good relations with these centers of power. Thus, a unique balance has been formed in the region as an effective mechanism for ensuring the dynamics of positive relations.
The balance of interests of Russia, the United States and China is of vital importance for the countries of Central Asia, creating a stable situation and ensuring the development and independent foreign policy of the countries of the region.
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