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11POLITICS
Original article
DOI: 10.31696/2227-5568-2021-03-046-071
RUSSIA AND THE NORTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROSPECTS: THE NORTH KOREA CHALLENGE
Vladimir Sotnikova
a - IOS RAS, Moscow, Russia
a- sotnikov.vladimir@gmail.com. ORCID: 000-002-86655-3517
Abstract. This article examines Russia's larger interests in Northeast Asia, which are shaped by economic developments in the Russian Far East and the Siberia region which are intertwined with the Korean nuclear and missile program challenge. It scrutinizes recent developments in Russia-North Korea relations, focusing on Russia's perception and its efforts in resolving the Korean nuclear program crisis. The paper emphasizes that Russian strategy towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of NEA NWFZ are closely linked to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. It also highlights the active role of Russia in the United Nations for the peaceful resolution of the Korea crisis and the implementation of sanctions against North Korea. Keywords: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons, regional peace, Korean Peninsula, Russia, USA
ПОЛИТИКА
Научная статья
РОССИЯ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ БЕЗЪЯДЕРНОЙ ЗОНЫ В СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ: СЕВЕРОКОРЕЙСКИЙ ВЫЗОВ
Сотников Владимир Ивановичa
a - Институт востоковедения РАН, Москва, Россия a - sotnikov.vladimir@gmail.com. ORCID: 000-002-86655-3517
Аннотация. В данной статье исследуются более широкие интересы России в Северо-Восточной Азии, которые сформированы экономическим развитием российского Дальнего Востока и региона Сибири, и которые переплетаются с проблемами корейской ядерной и ракетной программ. В ней исследуются последние события в отношениях между Россией и Северной Кореей, при этом уделяется особое внимание отношению России к кризису вокруг ядерной программы Северной Кореи и её усилиям по его разрешению В статье особо отмечается, что российская стратегия денуклеаризации Корейского полуострова и создание ЗСЯО в СВА тесно связаны с размещением THAAD в Южной Корее. Статья также раскрывает активную роль России в ООН в деле мирного урегулирования корейского кризиса и применении санкций против Северной Кореи.
Ключевые слова: Северная Корея, зоны, свободные от ядерного оружия, Северо-Восточная Азия, ядерное оружие, региональный мир, Корейский полуостров, Россия, США, THAAD
Foreword
The emergence of a North Korea possessing nuclear weapons is a serious blow to international non-proliferation efforts which undermine regional peace and stability and is causing security concerns around the world. It also poses a serious national security challenge for the US and its regional allies in Northeast Asia. Russia, which borders North Korea, would be affected in case of a large scale war in the region. North Korean leadership thinks that the possession of nuclear weapons is the sole means to guarantee its existence. Pyongyang believes that the presence of US military bases in South Korea and Japan as well as the regular military exercises with South Korean military in the region are a threat to the existence of North Korea. The advancement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile program has intensified debate among the major powers of the region, including Russia, China, and the U. S. Due to historical reasons, the Korean Peninsula is still under the shadow of the Cold War mind-set. The major stakeholders in the Korean Peninsula issues have different views on North Korea's nonproliferation, and achieving the goal of complete denuclearization remains a major challenge.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles in 2018 and started unprecedented diplomatic activities. However, the U.S.-DPRK dialogue and numerous summits yielded no results and expectations for settlement of the Korean Peninsula crisis were never met. After almost a year and a half break the DPRK tested a number of new and previously developed weapon systems including: KN-23 missiles (so-called «Kimskanders» in media, by analogy with Russian Iskander systems with quasi-ballistic SRBMs); KN-24 having some similarities with army tactical missile system (ATACMS); Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) etc. Moreover, last December Kim Jong Un said his country no longer felt bound by its self-imposed moratorium and promised to demonstrate a new strategic weapon. North Koreans conducted static test of what some observers called solid-fuel engine for ICBM last December. At the same time there was no flight test of ICBM or IRBM so far. Despite the rhetoric the DPRK have not yet resumed nuclear and ICBM tests that used to provoke the most negative reactions by the international community. However, it does not mean that the DPRK is ready to abandon its nuclear and missile program [1].
Unlike the U.S., the Russian Federation favors a more balanced approach, which not only relies on restrictions and pressure against Pyongyang but urges that the North Korean nuclear issue must be settled exclusively through negotiations. The Russian government does not accept North Korea's nuclear status. The Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily A. Nebenzia, has maintained that 'Russia does not accept the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's claim to become a nuclear State and has supported all Security Council Resolutions demanding an end to the nuclear and missile programs of Pyongyang, with a view to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' [2].
The idea of creating of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA NWFZ) which has not materialized so far is an important instrument of maintaining the nuclear security in the Korean Peninsula. The official Russian position is of the total support of this instrument as Russia has been vocal in promoting the establishment of NWZs in other parts of the world ever since they came to be existing. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry experts on nonproliferation and arms control, the only precondition for the establishment of such a zone is that the presumed participating states (both Koreas, Japan, and others) should assume their obligations to abandon their non-peaceful nuclear activities such as acquiring the nuclear weapons and in their turn the official five nuclear-weapon states should give the so-called negative nuclear assurances to the stakeholders of NEA NWFZ [3].
This article examines Russia's larger interests in Northeast Asia, which are shaped by economic developments in the Russian Far East and the Siberia region which are intertwined with the Korean nuclear and missile program challenge. It scrutinizes recent developments in Russia-North Korea relations, focusing on Russia's perception and its efforts in resolving the Korean nuclear program crisis. The paper emphasizes that Russian strategy towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of NEA NWFZ are closely linked to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. It also highlights the active role of Russia in the United Nations for the peaceful resolution of the Korea crisis and the implementation of sanctions against North Korea.
Russia's Korean policy
Russia's policy towards Korean Peninsula is intertwined with its economic, political, and strategic motives in the region. Russia's policy toward North Korea is an important component of its general strategy towards Northeast Asia, which is now regarded by Moscow as a crucially important area. For example, The Fourth Eastern Economic Forum, held in Vladivostok on September 11-13, 2018, played a significant role in bringing peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula by integrating Northeast Asia and the Russian regions of the Far East and Siberia into regional economic projects with neighbors. Addressing the session, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the importance of three-way cooperation between Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. He stated that, «I cannot fail but to highlight once again trilateral projects in infrastructure, energy and other spheres involving Russia, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Normalizing the situation around the Korean Peninsula is a key prerequisite for achieving progress on these projects» [4].
Earlier, in 2018, during his visit to North Korea, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also pointed to the economic initiatives concerning trilateral projects involving the two Koreas and Russia in unifying railways, building a gas pipeline, and also in the electric power industry. He stated that, «We discussed certain steps that can be made towards this, including the old idea of launching
trilateral projects between the two Korean states and Russia to link their railway networks and to build a gas pipeline as well as energy projects» [5]. In the last decade, Russia has labored hard towards entering Northeast Asia which is becoming the new center of world politics and economy. This region offers the greatest potential for Russian energy export from the Russian Far East and Siberia region. However, these energy resources largely remain unexploited because of the absence of pipeline infrastructure. After the accomplishment of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Sakhalin in 2009, Russia has entered the Northeast Asian gas markets. In order to export these resources, Russia needs an ice-free port in the Russian Far East and quite recently has shown its interest in the North Korean port of Najin, situated in the remote north eastern corner of Korean Peninsula and which, unlike Vladivostok, is ice free [6].
As part of this approach, Russia aims to significantly expand its political and economic ties with its eastern neighbors, such as China, Japan, and the two Korean states. However, the instability on the Korean Peninsula is an important obstacle to the realization of Russia's strategic program to develop its economic role in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the Russian scholar Andrey Gubin has argued that «Russia is still interested in [the] implementation of Trans-Korean projects within the framework of its new oriental diplomacy, joined with Chinese 'One Belt-One Road' plan and probably Korean 'Eurasian Initiative» [7]. Another report presented in Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow, experts from both Russia and South Korea have pronounced that, «Normalization of the inter-Korean relations would undoubtedly be facilitated by putting the following large Russian -South Korean - North Korean partnership projects into practice: the international rail corridor from Europe to Korea, the construction of a Russia - North Korea -South Korea gas pipeline, and the creation of a unified energy system in Northeast Asia, which includes regions in East Siberia and the Russian Far East» [8].
However, academics in Russia have both complementary and contrasting perspectives on this issue. Most of the analysts prefer the need for greater cooperation among Russia and its neighboring countries in the region. The Russian scholar Maxim Suchkov from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University), has put forward that «increasing cooperation with all states in the region is in the framework of what is deemed as Russia's «strategic pivot to Asia» and constitutes one of the reasons for Moscow's interest in engaging North Korea» [7]. Artyom Lukin contends that Russia is unlikely to become a major political player on the Korean Peninsula without possessing the necessary economic influence. He mentions that Russia is the major participant in three major economic projects. The most important is the laying out gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea via the North Korea. The second group of projects involve the export of Russian electricity to the Korean Peninsula. The third group of projects is the connectivity, to connect the Trans-Korean Railway to the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway [9].
Nonetheless, the perpetuation of North Korea's nuclear program further complicated the situation in Northeast Asia. Thus, Andrey Gubin argues
that «feasible economic and investment activity is possible only after [the] normalization of North Korea's political behavior» [10]. Likewise, prominent Russian expert Fyodor Lukyanov has also stated that, «Any peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula would benefit Russia, because peace will open up new opportunities for important economic projects vital for the region. These may include the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to South Korea and the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting Asia and Europe, all the way to the south of the Korean Peninsula» [11].
Besides pointing to security concerns, there is a common opinion that Russian officials are keen to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and promote stability in the North to integrate Russia better into the prosperous East Asian region. They hope that closer ties with the Koreas and other Asian countries would facilitate Asian investment and technology transfers to Russia that would help modernize their economy and benefit Russian consumers and exporters [12]. Finally, Russian scholar Vladimir Nelidov has asserted that, «the issues of strategic balance in the region in general and the balance of military capabilities between Russia and the U.S. in particular are also of great importance from the point of view of the security situation in Northeast Asia. Therefore, only propelling the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could promote greater economic advantages to the Russian Far East and Siberia. Russia is the only major effective player in Northeast Asia that has a stable and deepening relationship with both Pyongyang and Seoul» [13].
Finally, regarding the relations between Russia and the People's Democratic Republic (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), the new revised edition in section 89 of the «Concept of Russia's Foreign Policies» as of 2016 states that, «Russia is interested in maintaining traditionally friendly relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, and will seek to ease confrontation and de-escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula, as well as achieve reconciliation and facilitate intra-Korean cooperation by promoting political dialogue. Russia has always championed a non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula and will support its denuclearization in every possible way, believing that this objective can be attained through the six-party talks. The Russian Federation will keep up its efforts to establish a mechanism for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia, and will also strive to expand economic cooperation within the region» [14].
Perceptions on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
Historically, North Korea was one of the friendly states of the former Soviet Union, and had extensive economic, political, and military ties with it. The Soviet Union assisted North Korea in training specialists in the nuclear research field, and the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in early 1950 and built nuclear reactor in North Korea. However,
later on, relying exclusively on their own efforts, North Korea modernized this reactor without the participation of Soviet experts [15].
As a result of growing ideological differences with both the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s, the North Korean leadership saw their traditional partners with growing suspicion and decided to pursue the development of a nuclear deterrent in order to secure the state and government from external interventions. Subsequently, in the 1970s, North Korean leader Kim Il Sun started working on the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program. In mid-2000s, North Korea announced that it had developed nuclear weapons for their self-defense and to strengthen its nuclear deterrent conducted six nuclear tests till 2017.
The Russian government advocates for North Korea returning to NPT. The current RF Ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily A. Nebenzia, stated that, «We call on the North Korean authorities to wind down their banned program and return as a non-nuclear State to the non-proliferation regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency» [16].
At the same time, the Russian policy-making elite and academics hold contradictory assessments regarding North Korea's nuclear program. There exist various scholarly schools of thought when defining Russian policy towards North Korea. The first school consists of activists and academics, sympathizers of the left parties and ultra-nationalists, including the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), which support the North Korean government and its policies, and put the blame on the alliance of U.S. and South Korea for instability in the region. Russia's Communist Party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has condemned the U. S. President Donald Trump's statement at the UN General Assembly with a warning of totally destroying North Korea. Zyuganov called to pursue a diplomatic policy to solve the North Korean crisis. He stressed that «I fully support the efforts on searching for a peaceful solution taken by [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and many responsible politicians.' [17]. During a meeting with the Minister Plenipotentiary at the North Korean Embassy to Russia, the LDPR leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, expressed his solidarity with the people and the leadership of North Korea. Zhirinovsky has asserted that, «We are glad that there is such a country as North Korea on the Asian continent, and it is your country that the U.S. is afraid of. We request to convey our profound solidarity to the North Korean leadership; we are with you these days. If necessary, deputies of the LDPR factions will come to Pyongyang and will stay there with the people of North Korea.» [18].
The second group comprising Russian scholars as well as leading policymakers believe that nuclear weapons are a 'powerful deterrent' which guarantee North Korea's sovereignty; however, they also compel North Korea to follow the UNSC sanctions. The Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov, has argued that «they will not attack North Korea because they know without a doubt that the country has a nuclear bomb» [19]. Correspondingly, while answering the questions of Russian
journalists following his visit to China to take part in the BRICS Summit, President Putin stressed that, «...we cannot forget about what I just said about Iraq, and what happened later in Libya. Certainly, the North Koreans will not forget it. What can ensure security? The restoration of international law. We need to advance towards dialogue between all parties concerned.» [20].
Therefore, addressing the general debate within the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, Mikhail Ulyanov, then Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control (DNKV), stated that, «Just like other countries, we strongly condemn Pyongyang's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches in violation of the UN Security Council resolution. We supported the latest sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. However, the sanctions are not a cure-all»[21].
A major section of Russian scholars agree with these perspectives. Russian scholar Artyom Lukin, Assistant Professor at the School of Regional and International Studies of the Far Eastern Federal University, is also of the opinion that, North Korea is driven by the basic instinct of survival in the face of actual and imaginary threats on the part of the U.S. and South Korea. The only way for Pyongyang to safeguard itself against its external enemies and preserve sovereignty is to have nuclear weapons» [22]. Additionally, prominent Russian expert on Korean policies Georgy Toloraya believes that, «DPRK's nuclear weapons are a deterrent. After Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, one can hardly expect the leaders of the Pyongyang regime to sit on their hands and wait to be 'democratized.' The North Koreans make this very clear, saying that 'when a pack of wolves attacks you, only a fool lowers his gun.» [23]. This trend is the most dominant and influential in the Russian domestic political sphere.
The third group of Russian experts and academics blamed the North Korean leaderships for the critical situations in the region. For instance, Russian -American Russian scholar Andrew Korybko argues that, «In the Northeast Asian context, North Korea's missile and nuclear tests are creating the pretext to 'justify' the U.S.'s THAAD deployment to the peninsula, which both Russia and China consider as a latent threat to their nuclear second-strike capabilities with time, so from their perspective, it makes sense why they'd want to put multilateral pressure on North Korea to end these destabilizing activities.» [24].
Equally, a Russian expert on Asian policies, Alexander Gabuev of Moscow Carnegie Endowment Center highlights that, «These developments have negative consequences for Russian security interests, because they give the United States a legitimate pretext to develop its military infrastructure in and around the Korean Peninsula, including the recent deployment of THAAD. This is the major reason why Moscow continues its efforts with other members of the international community to limit DPRK missile and nuclear capabilities» [25].
In resume, we can conclude that the conventional view in Russia is that the North Korean nuclear and missile program in itself does not pose a serious challenge for the security of the Russian Federation, particularly in the Far East
region. The major problem it creates for Russia is perceived in its destabilizing implications provoking the increase of U.S. military presence in the region, overall military build-up of competing regional powers, and an impetus for their nuclear ambitions.
Attitude to the U.S. deployment of THAAD
South Korea and the U.S. agreed on the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in South Korea in 2016, after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapon test and a satellite launch. Russia alleged that the North Korean missile threat was used as a pretext by the U.S. for deploying THAAD systems adjacent to the borders of Russia and China. Russian policymakers perceive the THAAD deployment in South Korea as part of a larger vision of U.S.'s 'pivot' to the Asia-Pacific. It expands the already substantial network of missile defense systems encircling China and Russia. Leonid Slutsky, the Head of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, warned that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea to counter North Korea may endanger Russia's security. According to him, «Washington is creating a new regional segment of the U.S. global missile defence system in Northeastern Asia, close to the Russian border. This may put the security of our country at risk.' [26]. In the same way, Vassily A. Nebenzia considers this deployment as «An additional destabilizing factor in the region... We have repeatedly stated that such moves are not only an irritant but undermine the military balance in the region generally, and jeopardize the security of neighboring states.» [27].
According to Professor Tolstokulakov of the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, «it is the arms race in Northeast Asia fuelled by the U.S. following the deployment of THAAD.which is the main challenge in the region rather than the North Korean nuclear program.» [28]. Correspondingly, Anastasia Barannikova has blamed the U.S. for making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear zone. She asserted that, «US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea [withdrawn in 1991], the inclusion of nuclear weapons in joint exercises, and the nuclear umbrella guarantee extended to South Korea [are responsible for this]. As no country [has] ever offered the same guarantees to North Korea, it [has] decided to develop its own weapons» [29].
In this situation, Russia has taken the positions similar to China against THAAD's deployment in the Korean Peninsula saying that this could further worsen the situation around in the Peninsula. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, also raised concerns, stating that the potential of the US anti-missile complex, which includes the «THAAD systems, is definitely of concern to our strategic forces and is having a negative effect on the security of not just Russia but also China and other countries. This is why we have been acting against the Pentagon's dangerous plans jointly with our Chinese partners» [30].
The Press Statement released by Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Morgulov and Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Kong Xuanyou, after the Russia-China Dialogue on Security in Northeast Asia in May 2017 highlighted the developments on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and expressed mutual concern with the serious deterioration of the situation in the region following Pyongyang's continued pursuit of its missile and nuclear programs, and also the disproportionate military action of the United States and its allies, including the deployment of THAAD missile defense systems on South Korean territory [31].
However, the deployment of THAAD system does seem to pose some threat to Russia which compelled both Russia and China to move closer on the issue in the region.
Position on the UNSC sanctions on North Korea
The UNSC has passed several resolutions condemning North Korea's nuclear activities. The UNSC has passed a number of resolutions since North Korea's first nuclear test. The Resolution 1718 passed in 2006 demanded that North Korea to stop further nuclear testing, and prohibited some military supplies and luxury goods export to North Korea. It highlighted that, «All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms» [32].
The United States has disagreed with Russia and China several times during the debate at the United Nations over their demand for the easing of sanctions against North Korea. Russian diplomats pointed that it would be impossible to settle the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through sanctions and pressure on Pyongyang alone. Sanctions should not be used to strangle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea economically or worsen its humanitarian situation. That applies especially to unilateral restrictions, which affect civilian sectors that have nothing to do with the country's nuclear-missile programs and are one reason for the serious deterioration in the population's living conditions.
Despite their support for the resolution via an affirmative vote, Russia and China have openly questioned the effectiveness of economic sanctions on North Korea. Furthermore, Russia has stressed several times the need in concrete initiatives by the UN to resolve the crisis, rather than tightening sanctions on North Korea. In Russia's view, the solution to the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue cannot be complete unless sanctions against Pyongyang are lifted. Addressing the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly within the General Debate, Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department on Non-Proliferation and
Arms Control, stated that Russia supported the latest sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. However, the sanctions are not a cure-all. The problem can be resolved only politically and diplomatically. The pressure can only be successful if it is backed by active diplomacy and a creative search for effective solutions. Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, echoed the same idea after talks with his North Korean counterpart Ri Yongho: «We assume that a complete resolution cannot be achieved until all the sanctions are lifted. It is up to the negotiators to make this happen, but in any case it would be impossible to achieve this in a single round. The same applies to denuclearization. For this reason, this should be a step-by-step process with reciprocal moves at each of the stages» [33].
In the same way, the Russian scholar, Alexander Gabuev, has argued that, «sanctions do not provide an ultimate solution to the DPRK missile and nuclear problems. Pyongyang will try to secure the possession of nuclear-capable ICBMs, and the international community has no real tools to prevent it since military tools are not applicable, and since China and Russia will not support crippling sanctions on the DPRK that would enable internal regime change» [34].
As a replacement which moved beyond sanctions, Russian diplomats said that they had placed an alternative solution. They proposed a reasonable and realistic alternative to the ultimatum logic of the sanctions, which has proved unworkable time and again. The alternative consisted in the following: beginning implementation of not just the sanctions-related parts of the aforementioned resolutions of the Security Council, but also those of the provisions calling for a peaceful political and diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiations [35].
Hence, there exists a level of consensus among Russia and China within the UNSC Korean crisis. The only solution to currently dormant Korean Peninsula crisis is applying new approaches.
Position on the NEA NWFZ
Russia's official position on the NEA NWFZ is that in general, Russia wholly supports the creation and establishment of nuclear weapons free zones anywhere in the world and contends that the NEA NWFZ is a very important step towards denuclearized Korean Peninsula. In this regard, Anasstassia Barannikova states that «establishing a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA NWFZ) is one of the approaches» to Korean crisis. This mechanism in its initial format assumes that nuclear weapon states - China, Russia and the U.S. will provide negative security assurances to DPRK, Japan, and ROK, which, in turn will undertake obligations to stay non-nuclear. However, today implementation of this idea in its initial format is impossible given the current stance and status of the DPRK [36].
Since the DPRK is a nuclear power and this status is a long-term if not eternal, it should be dealt with as a nuclear power. Prior to any talks about denuclearization new status of the DPRK should be recognized. All talks with this country should
be not about its unilateral disarmament, which is unacceptable and impossible demand. More feasible is negotiating a kind of treaty or agreement on limitation of missiles.
The DPRK status is not the only problem from the point of NEA NWFZ. ROK and Japan cannot be considered non-nuclear states since they have the guarantee of USA's «nuclear umbrella». Ideally, either ROK should abandon US «nuclear umbrella» guarantees or DPRK should be provided such assurances (say, by Russia or China).
In this regard Barannikova suggests that, «The idea of a NWFZ could initiate the creation of a new regional security mechanism in NEA. However, mechanism implying DPRK's participation as a nuclear state seems more realistic. Yes, it would require official recognition of its status. However, it would result in non-aggression guarantees from the DPRK to non-nuclear countries. It alone could significantly reduce tensions in the region and risks of further nuclear proliferation. DPRK's negative security assurances to non-nuclear ROK and Japan would eliminate any threats to these countries, even hypothetical. Another point is that NWFZ would be more efficient in the format 4+3 (nuclear RF, PRC, US and DPRK + non-nuclear ROK, Japan and Mongolia). Mongolia's declared itself a single-state NWFZ in September of 1992. Its unique status and experience could facilitate creation of bigger NWFZ in NEA» [37].
According to Russian expert from Russian Foreign Ministry, there should be used the experience gained from creating of NWFZs in other parts of the world, especially in South -East Asia and also the experience of Mongolia who declared itself a single-state NWFZ. And in this regard there should be taken into consideration that some potential participants of the NEA NWFZ, namely Japan and ROK may have reservations or even object to including North Korea as a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) into the NEA NWFZ, rather it should be treated as a nuclear -weapons state (NWS) and therefore it should undertake obligations as a NWS.[38] As Russian scholar Alexander Zhebin of Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, states that, «Under such circumstances, given the constant rivalry between Pyongyang and Seoul and their unwillingness to yield to each other, the missile programs of North and South Korea should have approximately the same limitations, for which it is advisable to consider the DPRK accession to the international missile technology control regime (MTCR)[39]. And Barannikova concludes that, «Unlike previous decades, when the DPRK was an «object» at the negotiations on its nuclear weapons, the only option which could seem attractive for North Korea now would be multilateral treaty to include all the countries having nuclear and/or strategic weapons on equal basis. But it is the matter of future. Joining any treaty or mechanism would imply putting North Korean nuclear potential under control which is currently not in interests of the DPRK. It has not yet finished creating reliable nuclear deterrent. Moreover, if the US and Russia fail to prolongate Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and another
arms race in the region will start, North Korea will be forced to join this race as any other regional power» [40].
Finally, reviewing Russia's position on nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula it seems appropriate to cite the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov which he said in his speech at the Moscow International Conference on Non-Proliferation on November, 8, 2019. He said that, «The settlement of the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula (YPCP) is possible exclusively by diplomatic methods on the basis of a dialogue between all interested countries. A full-fledged launch of the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will become real only if political negotiations are advanced on the basis of reciprocal steps of the directly involved parties. Specific proposals on how to effectively move towards this goal were formulated by Russia and China, first in the road map, and now in the Action Plan, which we are completing to coordinate with the six members» [41].
Finally we may conclude our research by the words of Alexander Zhebin who argued that, «Taking into consideration the experience of establishing of the NWFZ in other parts of the world and several attempts to discuss the issue for NEA at the Track 2 undertaken by scholars from various countries, there is no doubt that we are bound to face a long windy road to nuclear-free and peaceful NEA» [42].
Russia in Six-Party talks and new Russia-China initiatives
Russia professed that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is possible only through cooperation and coordination with both Korean governments. Russia proposes the diplomacy and consultations the best way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. As the Russian expert on the Asia-Pacific, Alexander Lukin, has said, «Russia is interested in the security of its borders, consequently in the political stability of both Korean states. Any war or loss of control on developments in the peninsula, in consideration of the presence in North Korea of nuclear weapons, could easily directly affect the adjoining Russian territory, capable of causing casualties, an ecological catastrophe, a flood of refugees, and other dangerous consequences [43].
The main purpose of the Six-Party Talks was based on dismantling North Korea's nuclear program launched in 2003. The Six-Party Talks were a sequence of multilateral meetings involving all major regional actors including China, Japan, North Korea, the U.S., South Korea, and Russia. However, the process has been stalled over the years by North Korea's repeated missile and nuclear weapons tests. While answering Russian official Russia-24 news channel question in the meeting of Eastern Economic Forum in September 2018, President Putin argued that, «North Korea was promised security guarantees in exchange for its denuclearization efforts, as you have just pointed out. North Korea has taken certain steps to denuclearize - it blew up its nuclear test site, destroyed it, but it apparently expects something in return. We have the format of six-party talks.
And the international community can give such guarantees, including those secured by the presence of nuclear powers in these agreements. China and Russia are parties to these talks» [44].
Georgy Toloraya has noted that 'Russia would like to see multiparty security and cooperation systems emerge in Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks had provided a unique opportunity to try a multilateral approach to solving the thorny issues that plague the region.' [45]. Professor Igor Tolstokulakov of the Far Eastern Federal University of Russia has argued that sanctions would not work with North Korea and suggested closer cooperation between regional powers including China, Russia, the US, Japan, and South Korea in order to find peaceful and acceptable solution to Korean crisis which also require the active participation of from the side of Pyongyang [46].
However, it is only the Russian Federation which consistently promoted the Six-Party Talks at every forum and, to a certain extent, so did China; but other parties, such as the U.S., Japan, South Korea and, most importantly, North Korea, do not seem to be interested in reviving the process at this moment. This has also been acknowledged by the Russian Ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora. During an interview to the Russian News Channel in February 2018, he stated that the resumption of the Six-Party negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is unlikely at the moment. But it is possible in the future [47].
Besides the Six-Party Talks, the Russian Federation has also put forward the idea of a phased approach to the settlement of the basic issues of the Korean Peninsula. Russia and China signed a joint statement in July 2017 in Moscow on the Korean Peninsula to coordinate efforts in finding a solution to the crisis, and achieving lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The joint call came as a result of the meeting between the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The Joint Declaration, signed on July 4, 2017 with reference to Korean Peninsula, reads as follows: «Our common foreign policy priorities include a comprehensive resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue with a view to ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We have agreed to actively promote our common initiative based on Russia's stage-by-stage plan for a Korean settlement and China's initiatives for a parallel freeze of nuclear missile activities in the DPRK and the large-scale military exercises by the United States and the Republic of Korea [48].
The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wu Haitao, welcomed this proposal and stated that, «The joint proposal of China and Russia is practical and feasible and is aimed at promoting the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula. As such, we hope that the proposal will elicit responses and support from the parties concerned» [49].
Regarding this joint initiative, Russian scholars Mikheev and Fedorovsky argue that, «It is also significant that the Russian-Chinese initiative was developed outside of the framework of preliminary consultations with Pyongyang, for which it was
also a surprise. Such a situation undoubtedly reduces the productivity of joint Russian-Chinese efforts to normalize the situation on the Korean Peninsula [50].
Moreover, peace and stability in Northeast Asia is possible only when appropriate measures are taken on denuclearization of North Korea and, at the same time, restraining large-scale joint exercises by the U.S. and the South Korea. Whatever may be the outline prepared by Russia and China, the main actors-such as the U.S. and North Korea - were not involved. Hence, its implementations does not seem feasible in the near future. Russia continues discussions with North Korea in both bilateral and tripartite (including China) formats. Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Morgulov, along with his Chinese and North Korean counterparts held talks in Moscow in October 2018 in which they insisted that the UNSC reverse its policy of anti-Pyongyang sanctions. This is the first time they have officially raised this issue in the format of a trilateral meeting. A joint communiqué released after the consultations in Moscow stated that, «Taking into account the important steps towards denuclearization made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the sides believe the UN Security Council should start in due time revising the sanctions against the DPRK. There is general understanding that this process, the priority goal of which is to establish mutual trust, should be of a step-by-step and synchronized character and accompanied by reciprocal steps of the involved states»[51].
Russia recognizes the situation in the Korean Peninsula as one of the major global seats of tension, and has always campaigned a non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula, and pledged its support for denuclearization in every possible way.
Attitude to summit diplomacy and the way forward
The situation in the Korean Peninsula has changed since the inter-Korea Summits and the historic meeting between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a press release stating that, «We welcome the successful holding of the meeting between the leaders of the two Korean states in Panmunjom on April 27. We regard it as a significant step by Seoul and Pyongyang to national reconciliation and the establishment of strong relationships of independent value. We have a positive view of the agreements enshrined in the Panmunjom Declaration on the results of the inter-Korean summit. We are ready to facilitate the establishment of practical cooperation between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, including through the development of tripartite cooperation in the railway, electricity, gas and other industries [52].
In an answer to a question from TASS news agency regarding the non-mention of Russia in the declaration, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Igor Morgulov, replied that, «Russia will not drop out of the process; on the contrary, it is determined to continue searching for solutions to all the problems of the Korean Peninsula in the most proactive manner. By the way, the Russian-Chinese roadmap for the Korean peace settlement, drafted in 2017 clearly sets out Russia's
position on this matter. This position implies that the process of signing a peace treaty that would replace the Armistice Agreement is solely the subject of bilateral relations between North and South Korea, and should be conducted by Pyongyang and Seoul. In fact, the Panmunjom Declaration reflects this approach. Russia has no legal grounds or motives to become a party to this treaty» [53].
Similarly, Moscow has always welcomed any steps aimed at the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In a press release, the Foreign Ministry noted, «We welcome the talks of the Chairman of the DPRK State Council Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump on July 12 in Singapore. We proceed from the belief that the normalization of US-North Korean relations, a commitment to which is stated in the final joint statement, is an inalienable part of the comprehensive settlement of the Korean Peninsula issues, including the nuclear issue» [54].
The Vladivostok summit held on April 25, 2019 turned out to be the first face-to-face meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Both leaders thoroughly discussed bilateral relations and their prospects and dwelled on issues linked to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, in particular the denuclearization problem but there was no joint declaration. The meeting came two months after the unproductive summit in Hanoi in February 2019 between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Trump. Addressing at the official reception on behalf of the President of Russia, President Vladimir Putin reiterated that there is no alternative to resolving the Korean Peninsula issue through diplomatic means. He noted «We welcome DPRK's steps to establish direct dialogue with the United States and normalize relations between North and South Korea. We proceed from the premise that there is no alternative to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear and other problems in the region.» [55].
Russia has been one of the main actors on the Korean Peninsula. It continues to be a major partner in wide range of political, economic, and social links with North Korea. While criticizing North Korea for testing nuclear weapons, Russian government representatives have also questioned Western countries for their failure to address with reference to their previous promises to North Korea. Russia is the only major player in Northeast Asia that has a stable relationship with both Koreas. It has constantly and consistently appealed to the global community collectively to resolve the issue through dialogue and consultations. Russia anticipates that the positive tendencies, which have appeared recently in the ongoing negotiating process on regulating the situation on the Korean Peninsula, might gather momentum in the near future. With the new U. S. Administration of President Joseph Biden who earlier in his election campaign promised to significantly improve the relations between U.S. and North Korea and try to positively resolve the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula and in his first days in office opened the door to extending the New START agreement with Russia there is a glim of hope that the Korean nuclear crisis will be tackled in a positive way.
Challenges Russia sees in supporting the policy of establishing a NWFZ in NEA and Korea reunification initiatives
First, Russia has to thoroughly weigh the risky implications of eventual denuclearization process for political and socio-economic stability within the DPRK. The Russian expert and diplomatic community has long been convinced that the North Korean leadership in the foreseeable future will not give up nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Of course, this is not a reason to refuse negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue. But the solution, according to Moscow, may not be so much the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK as control over its existing nuclear arsenal.
In addition, Moscow understands that excessive sanctions pressure on North Korea will most likely lead not to the DPRK leadership's abandonment of nuclear weapons, but to an internal political crisis, which does not correspond to Russian interests. For this reason, Russia prefers to put up with the existence of a nuclear, but stable North Korea.
According to the Russian Foreign Ministry statement on nuclear issue in Korean Peninsula, «As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, one of the architects and depository of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Russia supported this decision, as well as the previous Security Council decisions on the DPRK, guided by the task of stopping Pyongyang's nuclear missile programs, which are an additional factor in the erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, as well as increasing regional tensions and complicating the solution of the problems of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Russia invariably proceeds from the fact that UN Security Council sanctions should be of a purely targeted nature and should not lead to further isolation of the DPRK, up to a complete trade and economic blockade, which is fraught with a large- scale humanitarian catastrophe in the North of the Korean Peninsula» [56].
Second, the Russian leadership is deeply concerned with broader regional political, economic and security implications of any shifts in North Korea's nuclear status. Russia invariably points out that it is necessary to approach the settlement of the problems of the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear one, in the context of a comprehensive solution of the entire range of issues existing between the parties involved, including the long -declared process of Korean unification, which would further create favorable conditions directly for denuclearization. This is impossible without reducing the general military-political tension, refusing to build up military infrastructure, reducing the scale of maneuvers, and creating an atmosphere of trust between the states of the region.
Dr. Alexander Zhebin said that Russia generally welcomes all moves by two Korean states aimed at relaxation of tension and promoting inter-Korean cooperation. «Moscow hopes that inter-Korean reconciliation will remove a threat of military conflict right next to her Eastern border,» Dr. Zhebin said, «and
secondly, promote a more favorable environment for both development of Russia's bilateral economic ties with two Korean states as well as for implementation of multilateral economic projects.» [57].
He assumes that «The fundamental, key issue which any peace process in Northeast Asia should work to resolve is defining an acceptable place for the unified Korea for all 'big countries' in the future regional security system. A neutral, unified Korea with international guarantees from the U.S.A. China, Russia and Japan may be the most acceptable option to all those concerned and interested in an early and peaceful Korean settlement.» [58]. The fundamental, key issue which any peace process in Northeast Asia should work to resolve is defining an acceptable place for the unified Korea for all 'great powers' in the future regional security system» [59]. Zhebin said. «A neutral, unified Korea with international guarantees from the U.S.A. China, Russia and Japan may be the most acceptable option to all those concerned and interested in an early and peaceful Korean settlement. He further concluded that «The fundamental, key issue which any peace process in Northeast Asia should work to resolve is defining an acceptable place for the unified Korea for all 'big countries' in the future regional security system» [60].
«Members of the Big Four (China, Russia, the U.S.A. and Japan) should give formal guarantees of a unified Korea's neutral status. This status could be supported and reinforced by the UN Security Council, which can adopt a special resolution to that effect. It is high time for Korea to take destiny in own hands» [61] - Zhebin concluded.
Dr. Georgy Toloraya represents the dominating view of the Russian expert community when discussing the prospects for denuclearization and inter-Korean relations. He is skeptical about the possibility of a grand deal between North Korea and the U.S., believing that, despite former President Trump's reassuring stance toward Kim Jong-un, the U.S. will not be able to provide credible security guarantees to Pyongyang. Washington will continue to seek to unify the peninsula under South Korean aegis, meaning the end of the DPRK as a state. Even a reformed DPRK will not be acceptable to the American establishment that has demonized North Korea for decades, although there remains a slim chance that Pyongyang could convince Washington that the North could become a second Vietnam and a friend of the US on an anti-China basis. Toloraya is confident that the full denuclearization of North Korea is not achievable. The only realistic scenario is a reduction and limitation of the DPRK's nuclear-missile capabilities, such as by closing its ICBM programs and stopping fissile material production. However, the US is unlikely to agree to partial denuclearization [62].
As regards the specific challenges for Russia, in our opinion when and if the NEA-NWFZ will be agreed upon there would be a situation when Moscow as well as Washington and Beijing as NWS will have to give their negative assurances to North Korea or to unified Korea, which Russia may be willing to give, but it seems problematic whether the U.S. under President Biden's Administration, currently
still in the process of formulating their policy towards North Korea, would give them. Consequently, China most probably would be hesitating to give these assurances to North Korea, especially when the rift and tensions between the U.S. and China continue to increase.
Finally, the major countries of Indo-Pacific region would have to accept the establishing of such a zone at large which seems to create concerns for Australia, Japan and India- not a member to the NPT - with low chances of recognizing the non-nuclear status of North Korea when and if it is denuclearized. It is mainly related to the question of Australia and Japan having US «nuclear umbrella» with the pledge of not developing the NWs by themselves and India's unacceptance of South Asia's nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ South Asia) initiative put forward by Pakistan in UN ever since at least in distant 1980's and after Indian nuclear bomb testing in 1998 when it became clear that India was not going to abandon its nuclear capabilities endeavor. These three countries believe that North Korea would never abandon its quest for «strategic nuclear deterrent» and would become a NNWS in the future. Therefore these States believe that even if North Korea becomes denuclearized it could still possess the so-called «bomb-in-the-basement» potential and it seems to them that it is impossible to establish NEA NWFZ in the near future. In any case establishing the NEA NWFZ would create a completely new security situation in the Indo-Pacific region which Russia should take into consideration for realizing its policies towards NEA and Asia-Pacific region in a broader context.
Challenges that might arise for Russia when/if a NEA NWFZ is established, including with regard to other states.
Russia, as it seems to us, might face a situation, when it may be late in recognizing the new status of North Korea and consequently the new security environment within the framework of a NEA-NWFZ when it is established as China may take the lead in supporting this endeavor. On another note, Moscow might have to deal with the position of the U.S. as it might not recognize the NEA-NWFZ until the complete or partial denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. In both cases should they arise Russia may be facing unfavorable conditions for its stance on NEA NWFZ.
Finally, we can conclude that the denuclearized Korean Peninsula may be existing only in the case of unified Korea which is a distant matter as according to Toloraya, «neither Seoul not Pyongyang is interested in unification at present. The elites in the North and the South do not want to see their powers diminished by transferring authority to some inter-Korean bodies. The ideal scenario for the long term would be co-existence of the two states on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and economic cooperation. In this case, the DPRK would become an economic appendage of South Korea but would keep its political independence, an arrangement that would likely suit Pyongyang» [63].
On the other hand, in the scenario when Korea unification outpaces denuclearization, one would have to deal with the new nuclear status of unified
Korea, potentially a much stronger regional power, creating difficulties for Moscow's diplomatic maneuvering in supporting the establishment a NEA -NWFZ in the U. N. Security Council.
Suggestions and recommendations
In conclusion of this research paper, based on the issues considered above we would like to make the following suggestions and recommendations for policymakers:
• Since the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula is not of temporary nature and some indefinite time will be required to tackle this problem it is advisable to consider the nuclear crisis related to North Korea non-peaceful nuclear and missile activities as the breach of the NPT and a serious threat to global peace and security.
• Since it is reasonable to consider the question of North Korea's status as a NWS it is advisable to conduct any further negotiations and dealings with DPRK on the U.S. or any of the Great Powers side from the position of considering it as a nuclear power.
• Since it is highly unlikely that North Korea would curtail their nuclear and missile programs and denounce their nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future (at least, in the mid-term), and the nature of North Korean military nuclear program is directly connected with Pyongyang desire to have the nuclear deterrent against any possible attack/aggression from the U.S. and/ or South Korea it is advisable to engage North Korea in a comprehensive dialogue on the measures of strengthening the trust between North Korea and the U.S. and South Korea.
• Since the issue of creating and establishment of the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone much depends on the success of functioning of such zones in other parts of the world it is highly advisable when discussing this question in the international fora and on a multilateral level to consider the experience of Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty) and the dismantling of military nuclear programs in South Africa and Latin America (Brazil and Argentina) including the experience of Tlatelolko treaty.
• The abstaining of North Korea from furthering its nuclear and missile activities and any concessions in this regard should be encouraged by economic and political stimuli from the U.S. and other members of «nuclear five». In this regard the question of any possible sanctions against North Korea from the U.S. side should be thoroughly weighed by the U.S. policymakers, and the U.S. should try to significantly improve their relations with North Korea in the near future with expanding economic and trade relations with Pyongyang.
• It is advisable to consider the question of creating the NEA NWFZ in a broader context with participation of the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and
South Korea with providing the negative security assurances to North Korea from Russia, the US and China as a NWS.
• The common position of the Great Powers, all members of UN Security Council and all conscientious participants to the NPT is of paramount importance for the implementation of the above -mentioned principles.
• All nuclear powers, first of all, the members of NPT, should accept the unconditional obligation on no -first use of NWs and their non-use in general against non-nuclear states - members of the NPT.
• It is highly recommended to continue the active discussions on the question of creating of NEA NWFZ at the Track 2 level with the participation of scholars, academics and experts from U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea and other regional stakeholders (e.g. Mongolia) in the near future.
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ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРАХ / INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Сотников, Владимир Иванович - к. и. н., Sotnikov Vladimir - PhD (History), Senior старший научный сотрудник ИВ РАН, Мо- Researcher, IOS RAS, Moscow, Russia. сква, Россия.
