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Section 8. Political science
Section 8. Political science
Kuppayeva Botagoz, Kazakh National Agrarian University, Kazakhstan, Almaty
E-mail: [email protected]
Reflections on the Soviet type of leadership
Abstract: The author’s opinion comes down to the fact that the Soviet type of leadership had deep Russian roots and was a natural result of the development of the whole preceding history of the Russian intelligentsia. Political leadership established under Stalin in 1930s was a logical result of the Bolshevik movement. There are no principal differences or logical discrepancies between Bolshevism and Stalinism, which represent the same politically and ideologically.
Keywords: Bolshevism, Stalinism, Soviet type of leadership, Leader, Khrushchev’s reforms, Secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev epoch, universal human values, pluralism, new ways of thinking.
A few researchers formed a unanimous opinion with regard to the interpretation of the problem of Bolshevism and Stalinism. There are no principal differences or logical discrepancies between Bolshevism and Stalinism, which represent the same politically and ideologically. According to this opinion, Stalinism was a logical, consistent, triumphant and even inevitable result of Bolshevism. Hannah Arendt «Understanding Bolshevism» (1953), Isaac Deutscher «Russia in transition» (1963) and Barrington Moore «Soviet Politics — The Dilemma of Power» (1965) shared this view. The theory connecting Bolshevism and Leninism with the basics of Stalin’s politics became popular due to the performances of A. Solzhenitsyn after he had been expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974 [1, 146].
The Soviet researchers reckon that «Stalinism does not start with either Marxism or Leninism. For Stalin, Marxism and Leninism were just a form, a cover for its true content...» [2, 95]. A few scientists see the roots of Stalinism in the miscounts of the old party guards, who were not able to create the levers of power to prevent the cult and defend the alternative to Stalin’s command-administrative system [3]. The origins of Stalinism are also seen in the Jacobin traditions of terror, psychology of impoverished layers of the population of the country and characteristics of Stalin himself.
However, some researchers emphasize the relation between Leninism and Stalinism. A. Avtorkhanov is one of the representatives of this course. In his work «The origin of partocracy», he concludes that the origins of Stalinism should be searched for, firstly, in the totalitarian «philosophy of power» of Lenin in the form of his teaching about «proletarian dictatorship» as a new type of a state; secondly, in the tyrannical system of organization of this dictatorship, which can be performed not by the very proletariat, but only its avant-garde; thirdly, in the criminal origin of the Stalin’s wing of Bolshevism; fourthly, in the Stalin’s criminal way of thinking [4, 142]. According to Avtorkhanov, Stalin learnt well the leading principle
of Lenin’s «philosophy of power»: «Scientific notion of dictatorship means something else as authority not limited by any laws and not constrained by absolute rules that relies upon violence» [5, 441]. Lenin also pointed Stalin towards the dictatorship of one person: «Soviet socialistic centralism does not contradict single government and dictatorship; sometimes, a dictator, who sometimes does more alone and is often more needed, fulfills the will of the class» [5, 119].
Avtorkhanov rests upon the history of origin of the criminal movement in the Bolshevik party — upon the history of the Caucasian «expropriators» who were shortly called «exes» in the party language. According to Avtorkhanov, Lenin was a «spiritual father» of the formation of a new po-litically-criminal direction that allowed the usage of «exes». One of the shining examples is the Tiflis «expropriation» as consequence of which 3 people were murdered, over 50 people were injured and 250 thousand rubles disappeared. The seeds of transition of Leninist Bolshevism into Stalinist criminal Bolshevism after Lenin’s death were sown by Lenin himself during the years of expropriation [6, 150].
The entire history of Bolshevism, according to Avtorkha-nov’s opinion, is the realization and development of Lenin’s «philosophy of power», i. e. the philosophy of violence. Stalin was Lenin’s heir both in political practice and methodology. Avtorkhanov believes that Lenin bears «the main moral-political and criminal-legal responsibility» before the peoples of the Russian Empire, because the very «Lenin created that totalitarian mechanism of state power using which his heirs immortalized physical and spiritual terror and excluded Russia from the family of civilized and prosperous states for almost a century». Thus, «Lenin’s responsibility for an age-long misfortune ofRus-sia is primary and Stalin’s responsibility is secondary» [7].
A. Tsipko considers the teaching of Marx the original source of all misfortunes incurred by Russia during the period of Soviet power. Tsipko sees the reason of the tragedy that started in October, 1917 in the adherence of Lenin and Stalin
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to the Marxist doctrine. Tsipko believes that: «Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels thought same notions and categories as Vladimir Lenin... Marx was the first and only person in the history of mankind who called to replace the weapon of criticism with the criticism by weapon» [8, 186]. According to Tsipko, Bolsheviks only realized the Marxist social project. «There wasn’t any Russian Marxism. There was only the Marxism that could be conceived among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia after the acquaintance with those works that were recommended for publication in Russia by the founders of scientific socialism themselves, and, primarily after their acquaintance with the «Manifest of the Communist party» that openly called for the destruction of the old world» [8, 187].
In his theory, Tsipko presents Marxism as a drug under the influence ofwhich Bolsheviks took power in 1917. Under the influence of Marxist drug intoxication, they established «military communism» in the country and started creating a Soviet government system. Tsipko believes that the mass terror by Lenin and Stalin originated from the belief in the truthfulness of the Marxist theory about violence as a midwife of revolution. «Stalin, like Lenin, yielded to the advice of Marx not to be afraid of terror when it is required to hold the power» [8, 181]. According to Tsipko, Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism are relative phenomena. He reckons that Bolshevism has Russian roots. Everything that Lenin possessed was inherited from Marx: Lenin’s intolerance to political freedom does not come from a Russian character, but comes primarily from the Marxist teaching about proletarian dictatorship, the Marxist conviction that bourgeois rights and freedoms, bourgeois parliamentarism and freedom of press should be defeated in the course of a victorious proletarian revolution» [8, 178].
On the assumption of the above stated, our point of view comes down to the fact that the Soviet type of leadership had deep Russian roots and was a natural result of the development of the whole preceding history of the Russian intelligentsia. Political leadership established under Stalin in 1930s was a logical result of the Bolshevik movement. There are no principal differences or logical discrepancies between Bolshevism and Stalinism, which represent the same politically and ideologically. Stalinism was a logical, consistent, triumphant and even inevitable result of Bolshevism. Despite the fact that there is no a unanimous opinion about the connection between Bolshevism and Stalinism, most researchers believe that Bolshevism contained the «seeds», «roots» and «buds» of Stalinism. The victory of Bolshevik leaders is a consistent phenomenon, not a casus or accident, related to the mood of the masses during the period of world war and nation-wide crisis that were a reason of revolutionary crisis.
It is stated in the concept of milestones that Bolshevism with its ideology and practice is an heir to the world outlook and political tradition of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia coming from Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov and Mikhailovsky. Bolshevik leaders learnt moral nihilism and organizational party principles from Nechaev and the idea of a crucial role of the initiative minority in the conduct of a social
upheaval from Tkachev. Spiritual roots of Bolshevik leaders can be found in the world outlook tradition, which comes, at least, from Decemberists and, clearly, from Belinsky and Bakunin, from Pestel to Tkachev. The Soviet type of leadership is a natural, logical and even inevitable result of the whole preceding history of the Russian political thinking and intelligentsia.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was a political and state figure, «continuer of the work of K. Marx and F. Engels», organizer of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and founder of the Soviet socialist state.
His personality had a colossal impact on the course of political development of Russia and, indirectly, the entire world. Undoubtedly, V. I. Lenin was one of the most outstanding political leaders. He did not only know how to fight the old order, but could also organize a revolution and steer it in the required direction. The unique quality ofV. I. Lenin as a political leader of our times was the fact that he combined adherence to abstract theoretical program with rare ability to adjust his tactic to the requirements of life. The combination was highly unusual [9]. It often happened in the political life that, having achieved power, radical socialist leaders hid their abstract theories in the archive and addressed the facts of everyday life exclusively. Unlike them, V. I. Lenin didn’t lose the fanatical faith in his ideal even when all power was concentrated in his hands. And only at the end of his career, during the period of New economic policy, the voice of the ideal, which the entire political life of Lenin was built on, started fading giving way to new tendencies of real life.
Lenin was not a blind follower of Marx. He developed his own independent political system, which, ofcourse, was related to the main principles of Marxism. He made substantial additions to the works ofMarx, both in theoretical aspect and in the sphere of political tactic. One of the examples is Lenin’s teaching about imperialism as a new phase of capitalism, a phase of monopolistic capitalism. Another example is his theses for the Communist international about the role of colonial and semicolonial countries in the world revolutionary movement. Lenin also completed the Marxist thought with works on the national problem. Nevertheless, Marxism indeed forms the core of Leninism and gives Leninism content and clarity.
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin
One of the most important problems of political science is the problem of introduction of the highest position of a General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) in the Soviet political system. During the transition from war to peace, there was a keen struggle with regard to the issue about methods of economic management and ways of holding the influence on the Bolshevik party of the mass of workers. Its main front was formed: Lenin on the one side and Trotsky on the other side. Lenin and Trotsky were developing two significantly different concepts of new economic policy. Conducting reorganization of management system, Lenin simultaneously aspired to strengthen the political positions of his supporters in the government bodies of the party and state. Lenin’s health was deteriorating from
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the end of 1920 and he couldn’t take part in the preparation ofXI conference of the RCP (b), particularly, in the work of the Plenary meeting of the RCP (b), where the plant of political report to the conference was discussed. In these conditions, Lenin started thinking of political future and a successor. The only thing he could really do was to ensure the leading condition and solid political positions for a person selected by him.
Lenin wanted Stalin to head the party as General Secretary. This position expanded the political powers of Stalin and cemented his political positions, which relied upon the Central Committee of the party and decisions of the Plenary meeting of the Central Committee. The position of General Secretary became the highest position in the political system of the Soviet state. Lenin himself created a political system that, in case of his death, could ensure the transition of power in the party and state to the hands of that leader who he could rely on and confide the fate of revolution to. The core of the highest power at the moment of establishment of the Soviet power was not a position, but a Leader. The introduction of the position of General Secretary for Stalin became an important stage in the development of the Soviet political system.
Apparently, the realization of forced modernization required the respective system of power and elite capable of realization of this course. Today, the researchers speculate about what the direct reasons of large-scale purges of the end of 1930s were and the motives of elite rotation carried out by Stalin. At ХХ conference of the party, Khrushchev interpreted Great Terror by exclusively personal characteristics of Stalin — cruelty, arbitrary actions, intolerance to a different opinion. This is an emotional point of view. Stalin needed a loyal, effective, homogeneous managerial layer that would determine the success of modernization in the whole. A wide complex of measures taken in 1930-1940 that radically changed the structure of political elite is viewed in this context. Obviously, forced modernization in the conditions of deficit of resources implied the toughening of requirements of the state with regard to economic entities. Establishment of a tough regime of the supreme power and repressions are determined by the formation of effective and obedient elite. Also, repressions had other motives. Among them, there is an urge to rejuvenate government apparatus in order to increase its effectiveness. The motive of elite rotation may include a low level of education of the political elite formed in 1920s. Such motives as measures to increase the education level and rejuvenation of the ruling layer, limitation of its privileges came down to the ensuring of maximal effectiveness of the ruling layer as a tool of modernization. At February-March (1937) Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the party, Stalin called for radical renewal of the structure of the party at the expense of the new replacement of «promoted workers».
Thus, the reasons of large-scale rotation at the end of 1930s were dictated by the need of forced modernization in the conditions of the resource deficit. The result of Stalin’s staff revolution was the formation of a new serving class that fit the task of modernization in the conditions of the resource deficit,
which was loyal to the supreme power and flawless from the point of executive discipline.
Certainly, the peculiarities of Stalin’s personality were the factor that left a dramatic trace on the course of political processes of the Soviet system. In the political-psychological research «Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929. A Study in History and Personality» by R. Tucker, it is noted that the dominating features of Stalin’s character were cruelty and vengefulness, constant need of self-assertion, black and white perception, experience of the environment as immanently hostile. However, the meaning of the psychological peculiarities of Stalin is secondary; if the leader was a different person, possibly, the process could be less extremist. But the main parameters of the course would probably coincide with the ones that were realized in practice. If one wants to explain the peculiarities of political development of the Soviet society in 1930-1950 through demonization of Stalin’s personality, it puts political study at the level of an aphorism of Pascal: if the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the world would be different.
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) was a Soviet party and state figure.
Material level of life of the Soviet people in 1956-1957 improved. The working day that fell for holidays or pre-weekend days was shortened by 2 hours. A shortened working week was introduced for teenagers aged 16-17. The salary was not cut. The leaves with regard to pregnancy and labor were increased. The system of separate education was cancelled in boys and girls’ schools; the payment for high school at secondary schools and higher and secondary special educational institutions introduced by Stalin was also cancelled. The biggest social event was a new Law about pensions for workers. The new Pension Law increased all kinds of pension provision significantly. The results in the industry seemed not bad and the production growth was 11 %. The appearance of Moscow changed due to the rapid civil construction. The appearance of many unique structures is associated with the name of N. S. Khrushchev: Palace of Congresses, Luzhniki stadium, Kalinin Avenue, Ostankino television tower and Moscow ring road [17, 113]. The rehabilitation of «disgraced» peoples illegally expelled from their ancestral territories under Stalin had a special value. On January 9, as per the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Kalmyk ASSR was restored. Soon, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR and Karachaevo-Cherkessk ASSR were restored. It was planned to carry out the moving of big masses of people during 5-6 years [10, 130].
In the first half of 1957, the Presidium of the Central Committee cancelled the system of «packages» under the initiative of Khrushchev, i. e. the issue of special sums in special envelops to responsible workers introduced by Stalin, which sometimes were 2-3 times higher than officially set salary. In 1957, Khrushchev introduced the proposition of a radical change in the structure and nature of management of the national economy of the USSR for consideration of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It was suggested to liquidate most
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industrial ministries and give the management of factories and plants to specially created territorial authorities — Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhoz). By the beginning of 1957, the USSR had over 200 thousand big and small industrial enterprises and about 100 thousand construction sites. It became more and more difficult to manage this production from a single center. The project of N. S. Khrushchev turned the Commission into a simple additional chain and, leaving the real decision-making with regard to long-term decisions to the State Planning Committees, transferred the concrete development of the latter to regional bodies in the form of CNEs. The project even suggested the liquidation of industrial ministries, reduction and decentralization of too numerous central bodies. Proposed by Khrushchev, this system didn’t pass any experimental check anywhere. It could turn out to be rational for such big industrial centers as Leningrad or Sverdlovsk region, but irrational for regions and republics of the North Caucasus, because the number of large enterprises was not more than two-three or even less in any republic [10, 135].
The main achievement of Khrushchev lies in the fact that he destroyed the cult of Stalin’s personality. A courageous decision to rehabilitate many communists and non-party people who underwent repressions and executions during the period of the cult of personality restored justice, wisdom and honor in the life of the party and state.
As a pragmatist, Khrushchev was stronger than not only Malenkov, but other associates of Stalin. This quality let him take the initiative in respect of the cult of personality. The decisions condemning the cult of personality were, as it is known, taken jointly; although, there was never a unanimity of views with regard to this sensitive question in the Presidium of the Central Committee. Malenkov, for instance, considered the cult of personality as a mainly moral problem. «What is accepted to name «the cult of personality», — he wrote later, — implies, first of all, affirmation and self-affirmation of a leader in the position of a man without sins in his actions and behavior regardless whether they are right or wrong or mistaken» [11, 115]. He spoke about the cult ofpersonality of Stalin but never narrowed down the problem of cult to the personality of Stalin. Khrushchev, unlike Malenkov, went the path of personification, giving Stalin in pledge of the public opinion.
The contradiction and superficial nature of Khrushchev’s reforms were largely determined by those circumstances that the reformer himself, according to his own confession, had «arms in blood up to elbows». Some publications show proof that during the period of repressions of 1930-1940 Khrushchev took active part in them, both being the first secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and Moscow City Committee in 1935-1938, and as the head of Ukraine in 1938-1939, when he took direct part in repressions initiating them in some cases [12]. The sentencing practice changed rapidly when he arrived in Ukraine: almost all arrested people were sentenced to the supreme penalty. Such change was also stimulated by the arrival of N. I. Ezhov, a People’s Commissar of the internal affairs of the USSR, in the republic in February, 1938. Same
year, many Ukrainian chekists became the victims of repressions; 1199 people from the management personnel of NKVD were shot dead [13]. The indicated circumstances largely determined the superficial nature of political reformations of Khrushchev, which were an attempt to reform the system in the whole through liberalization, mitigation of the order formed under Stalin without changing the essential components of this system. However, the main reason of the superficial nature of Khrushchev’s reforms was the fact that, essentially, they were not reforms. The problem is that, destined to be the subject of reformations, Khrushchev himself was the «product» of this system. The dramatic effect of Khrushchev’s personal fate and unsuccessful reformations prove that the personality formed as a «cog in the machine» cannot be effective as supreme power, because the functioning in the regime of a «cog in the machine» requires unconditional duty performance, whereas the main quality of the first person of the system takes conceptual role of thinking. Khrushchev was not talentless, which is certified by his path to the supreme power: in the course of rotation, he managed to consistently outplay «triumvirate» Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin. The analysis of Khrushchev’s leadership shows that the successful functioning of the political system is possible provided the conceptual nature of political management and political will of the subject of management. The absence of one of the conditions is fraught with the dysfunction of the system.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (1906-1982) was a prominent Soviet and party figure, marshal and fourfold Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor as well as irreplaceable leader of the Communist party and the Soviet state during the period from October, 1964 to November 1982, General Secretary of the central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.
Brezhnev had common sense, political quick-wittedness and staff cunning. G. Arbatov called him the grand master of staff struggle [14]. To some extent, the country was lucky because the power was taken by not the worst of communists and, as everyone soon understood, a man who was not evil or cruel. Brezhnev was careful. He didn’t go to extremes, avoided personal conflicts and didn’t forget old friends. At sentimental moments, he declared Esenin and Merezhkovsky and did acting. He knew the poem «Shakyamuni» by heart. He knew how to be sociable, communicative and courteous. Brezhnev had two hobbies: hunting and cars. The best natural reserves, hunting fields, villas and saunas in the country were at his service as well as all secret pleasures of nomenclature life. He took a good aim, drove a car well and had a license of a professional chauffeur. He liked gifts, but most of all cars out of which he formed a collection of expensive vehicles. He was not interested in art, culture and sports preserving bourgeois mindset typical for communist leaders in general [15].
In all official documents of Gorbachev’s «perestroika» as well as all media of perestroika period, the years of Brezhnev’s rule were called a «stagnation»; although, one can hardly find such characteristic just. Despite gradual drop in the pace of
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socio-economic development, which is generally typical for developed industrial countries that passed the period of initial industrialization, a colossal growth of economic potential of the country was achieved during the years of Brezhnev’s rule; its material and technical base expanded significantly; important steps in the development of the whole range of the most important and new industries of economy were taken, including the country’s fuel and energy complex. During this period, the reserve of solidity was formed, which allowed Russia as the successor of the USSR withstanding the difficult 1990s. Crisis tendencies were gradually growing in the national economy in 1970-1980. It was mainly related to the decrease of efficiency of the Soviet model of primary industrialization. National economy failed to timely realize a new model primarily built on the usage of achievements of scientific and technical progress. Although, the possibilities for structural reconstruction of national economy were notably more favorable at this time compared with the end of 1980s - the beginning of 1990s.
In centralized economy, the profits of enterprises were taken to the treasury and, then, distributed for all-public aims according to the list of the most important tasks. It was a strong side of Brezhnev’s system that realized a few fantastically big projects. The following should be noted:
- creation of the Unified Energy System of the country that includes gigantic hydro-power plants — Brats-kaya, Krasnoyarskaya, Sayano-Shushenskaya and Ust-Ilimskaya;
- exploration of Tyumen oil and gas and Kansko-Achinsk fuel and energy complexes;
- construction of Baikal-Amur Mainline;
- construction of a branched system of oil and gas pipelines, nuclear-power icebreakers and stations, space stations.
806 higher educational institutions and hundreds of scientific-research institutes functioned in the country [15]. The Soviet social state gained further development under Brezhnev. Important steps in respect of the development of pension system were taken. Its effect covered the villagers. A guaranteed payment for labor was introduced for the members of collective farms. Serious measures on development of free of charge secondary, professional technical and higher education and improvement of its quality were taken. At the turn of1960-1970s, the transition to five day working week and two weekends was carried out. The periods of paid leaves expanded significantly. A large-scale civil construction was performed at the expense of the state as well as personal savings of the citizens. Millions of people received new apartments or improved their existing living conditions considerably. As for the level of material wellbeing and volumes of social programs realized by the state, if one considers all main layers of the society and not its privileged minority, the era of Brezhnev comprises one of the most successful epochs in the Russian history. Finally, another very important social conquest of Brezhnev’s epoch is related to the unprecedented level of social and personal safety of citizens relative to the crime rate, which was due to the attention paid
to the development of the Soviet law-enforcement agencies that made the rule of Brezhnev and his irreplaceable minister of internal affairs of the USSR N. A. Shchelkov a «golden age» in the development of the Soviet militia.
What was done during Brezhnev’s epoch (if one rounds it off to three five-year periods of 1966-1980). Housing facility stock of the country was radically renewed. 1,6 billion square meters of housing space were built, i. e. 44 % of all housing space in the USSR by 1980. 161 million people received new homes during three five-year periods. 2/3 of infrastructure of cities and villages — water pipelines, central heating supply and sewage were built during these three five-year periods. An average salary was 150 «difficult Brezhnev rubles» with a symbolic payment for communal services.
During the very Brezhnev’s epoch the household of the majority of citizens was leveled to the standards of the most developed countries and there was no mass homelessness in the USSR typical for those countries.
During the very Brezhnev’s epoch, economy and other spheres were saturated with highly qualified staff and energy capacities. The plough lands of the country started receiving almost enough fertilizers to compensate for the subtraction of nutritious matters with harvest. The soil started improving. A herd of pedigree cattle was created in the country, but later it was cut out by over a half. People settled down and started eating well. Social opportunities expanded. The number of graduates of the complete secondary school increased by 3 times and the number of students of higher professional institutions rose by 2 times. The population was growing consistently; only in the RSFSR it increased by 20 million people during those 20 years [15].
According to Sergey Kara-Murza, it was a golden age, which will not be repeated [16]. Brezhnev period is some «golden age» of the Soviet socialist order, its «Victorian age», according to S. Chernyakhovsky [17]. It was the period of supreme bloom and power. Not only military-strategic parity was achieved with the USA; at some moment, the fate of American presidents was decided depending on whether they promise their country to improve the relations with the USSR or strive for confrontation. Their visits to Moscow became an integral attribute of internal PR. Local and simultaneously global confrontation in Vietnam turned out triumphant for the Soviet policy and Soviet military power.
The epoch of Brezhnev was the epoch of stability and, primarily, staff stability. Medvedev R. reckons that Brezhnev didn’t seem like a cruel ruler and he was not one, giving reference to nickname «ballerina» gained by Brezhnev during the work in Dnepropetrovsk, which meant his ability to be subj ect to different influences [18]. However, it doesn’t mean that Brezhnev was not a leader. He was the leader. Brezhnev’s behavior is a maximal flexibility that can be afforded by a politician in the conditions of a tough political system. Remembering Brezhnev, a party worker P. Rodionov was convinced that «velvet gloves hid steel fists» [19, 184]. Brezhnev managed to displace most former supporters from the top echelons of
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China and Africa: win-win strategy
power — Shelepin, Shelest, Podgorny, Polyansky, Mazurov, Voronov as well as potential rivals. He did it technically without resorting to repressions. He manipulated power cunningly, keeping everyone where that person was needed. Brezhnev was a grand master in staff games and staff struggle. A distinctive feature of Brezhnev as a leader was a desire to create his own team of faithful people. As for the conceptual strategy of the state, Brezhnev didn’t have abilities for conceptual leadership; he was not able to understand the large-scale problem of a radical reform of management methods.
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev took power in 1985. The only difference was his relative youth and speeches «without a paper note». For some time he continued to flow in the midstream of his predecessors in numerous and wordy performances. Then, he started talking about «socialism with a human face» and «return to late Lenin». Later he started to prolong the ideas of «general human values» and «new thinking». These ideas meant nothing but a refusal of Marxist-Leninist principles. One way or another, approximately by the end of 80s of XX century, a turning point was made. Gorbachev didn’t start his reformation activity with economy, but with politics. For the purposes of internal political address,
Gorbachev introduced interrelated mottos of «general human values» and «pluralism». And there was a «new thinking» for international arena.
Essentially, two powerful bombs were laid, which undermined the Soviet system and, thus, Soviet leadership. If the priority of general human values was proclaimed, it meant that the basics of Marxism-Leninism, so called class approach, were crossed out. And the permitted pluralism of opinions and expressions cast down this principle. But, if the proclamation of a thesis about general human values took the ground out of the system inside the country, the «new thinking» gave a crushing blow to the state ideology of the Soviet Union and the very Soviet state in the international scale. In accordance with the «new thinking», the USSR stopped the confrontation with the capitalist world headed by the USA by way of a few important concessions. The Putsch of the State Committee on the State of Emergency that took place in 1991 shot down the Soviet system and the respective type of leadership. Lenin announced the beginning of the Soviet system of leadership. The end of this system is personified by Gorbachev at a Crimean resort. These are the milestones of the beginning and end of the Soviet, consistent, triumphant and inevitable type of leadership.
References:
1. Solzhenitsyn A. The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956. - 1-2. - Paris, 1973.
2. Tucker in Treadgold, ed. The Development of USSR. - Seattle, 1964.
3. Maslov N. N. Ideology of Stalinism: history of establishment and essence (1929-1956). - M.: Znaniye, 1990. - 64 p.
4. Avtorkhanov A. Origin of partocracy//October. - 1991. - № 2. - P. 135-163.
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10. Medvedev R. N. S. Khrushchev: political biography. - Moscow: Kniga, 1990. - 268 p.
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13. Kozhukalo I. P. Khrushchev N. S. in Ukraine//Questions of the history of the CPSU. - 1989. - № 9. - P. 85-98.
14. Arbatov A. From a recent past//Druzhba narodov. - 1990. - № 9,10.
15. Kats A. S. Jews. Christianity. Russia: from prophets to general secretaries. - M.: AST, 2006 - 525 p.
16. Kara-Murza S. Golden «stagnation»?//Literaturnaya gazeta. - № 43 (6091) - 2006.
17. Chernyakhovsky S. Standing in zenith//Literaturnaya gazeta. - № 43 (6091) - 2006.
18. Medvedev R. Personality and epoch. Political portrait of L. I. Brezhnev. - M.: Novosti, 1991. - Book 1. - 336 p.
19. Rodionov P. A. How the stagnation began//Znamya. - 1989. - № 8. - P. 184.
Smertin Yuri Grigorievitch, Kuban State University (Krasnodar), professor E-mail: [email protected]
China and Africa: win-win strategy
Abstract: The article analyzes the various aspects of China’s policy in Africa in the 21st century. It is concluded that there is a mutual interest of PRC and African countries in multilateral cooperation.
Keywords: China, Africa, politics, economics, influence, diplomacy, interests.
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