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O. Pavlenko
RUSSIA'S MISSION IN THE WORLD: THE GEOPOLITICAL DEBATES
The author analyses the main geopolitical concepts of Russian politicians, scholars, and experts in 1990-2000ss concerning the role of Russia in the Post-Cold War World.
Key words: geopolitics, national identity, zapadniks, antizapadniks, pochvenniks, evraziystvo.
For nearly twenty years debates about Russian/post-Soviet identity have been conducted by different groups in society and have focused on the constant "Russian questions": What are Russia and the "Russian world"? Where are its imagined borders? What does the "virtual national sphere" include? What are the foundations of the Russian polity? What role should Russia play in world affairs and what is its place in the hierarchy of global powers? Who are its allies and foes? Is Russia a "superpower"? What are the resources and the potential of Russia's international influence? The list of such questions is almost endless.
The discussions held by different circles of politicians, academics and experts reveal a diversity of views and conceptions. Still, it is the Soviet geopolitical experience that holds back Russian intellectual efforts. It is not surprising that, while constructing vertical and horizontal hierarchies of the modern global order, the Russian authors proceed from the extremely exaggerated thesis that "Russia is a world power". Yet they often avoid applying functional analysis of its resources and capabilities. This leads to a dominance of state-centric patterns of describing and forecasting international processes.
It is worth noting that due to its history, territory, geopolitical location and nuclear status, Russia does possess significant status in the
© naB^eHKO O.B., 2013
world. But its degree of influence on the international agenda varies in each and every case. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin has been "magically" influencing Russian intellectuals, who have sensibly responded to shifts in the power paradigms. This basic factor has defined the substance of descriptive patterns in Russian foreign policy. Quite often foreign policy expertise has been reduced to mere commentary rather than a constructively critical dialogue between analytical think-tanks and the authorities.
The period of "acquiring the past" was characterized not only by the traditional bias of Russian intellectuals toward state-centric matters but also by the widespread "fashion" of inventing geopolitical theories1. An "ideological pattern of negation" plays a no less important role in the post-Soviet construction of collective identity, having become the most important element of the power projects which started every new cycle of Soviet history.
Over the course of the USSR's existence, official Communist discourse remained stable, despite changes of policy and cabinet reshuffles within the supreme leadership. The result was a paradoxical effect: each time the new party in power had to start from the beginning again. The political discourse was reformulated on the basis of efforts to discredit previous policies and historical experience. The only thing that remained unchanged was the primacy of Communism and general perceptions about it as the highest phase of the Soviet political process.
The Bolsheviks rejected Russia's imperial past and advanced the watchword of Communism. In Joseph Stalin's era, the real history of the revolutionary movement and the october Revolution were condemned to oblivion. The older Bolsheviks, Lenin's compatriots, were eliminated, and Leon Trotsky's role in the formation of the Red Army and the victory of the Communist Party were forgotten. In its place, a cult was created of Joseph Stalin as the leader of nations and as the most "genuine and loyal of Lenin's disciples". Forcible collectivization, industrialization and the Cultural Revolution unfolded in the name of a "forthcoming Communism".
After his death, the cult of Stalin as a "great fighter for Communism" was overturned in the turbulent decade of Nikita Khrushchev. Anti-Stalinism became the major characteristic of the Soviet 1960s. It was important for Khrushchev to persuade the country that he was returning the party and the Soviet state to its origins - i. e., to Lenin -thus purifying it from authoritarian Stalinism2. Never before had the personality of Lenin received such a large-scale cult mythologization as it did in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Lenin's image became a sacred symbol, the oracle of official ideology. The October Revolution and the
Civil War (without Trotsky and almost entirely without Stalin) became the basic mythologems of Soviet statehood3.
All of that, as Khrushchev assumed, should have been sufficient for ousting the cult of Stalin from public consciousness. And it should have provided Soviet citizens with new perspectives. Yet while the effect of mobilization was strong, it did not last long. By the second half of the 1960s, when Khrushchev was deposed from his party, the new leadership under Leonid Brezhnev accused Khrushchev of voluntarism, authoritarian methods of governing and of violating the same "principles of Lenin".
Whenperestroika was launched by M. Gorbachev, Brezhnev's "policy of stagnation" was subjected to criticism. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, Boris Yeltzin and his supporters created the post-Soviet ideological system, in turn accusing Gorbachev of artificially controlling democratic processes. In the 2000s a new discriminatory image had emerged of the "evil, criminal 1990s".
All these "negations" in the Soviet - and then in the post-Soviet - system resulted in a vicious circle, the objective of which was to develop tactics of holding power at any price instead of strategies for modernizing the state system and substantively changing Soviet - or post-Soviet - society. Extraordinarily hierarchical in its structure and communicative practices, Soviet ideology maintained the "Communist" myth unchanged, notwithstanding the transformations which had taken place. The sense of the state and party processes in the USSR needed to be specified - who were we, where were we going, what principles were guiding us? The stability of the system and capacity for mobilization depended on a scheme that was clear and understandable. The illusions and hopes of the public depended on it - another reason why those in power, starting a new cycle each time, attempted to inspire people by discrediting the past.
Historians, philologists and culture scientists are now showing greater interest in deciphering the Soviet party texts and the complex system of the "Soviet political language". For without such analysis, it is impossible to understand both the codes of official Soviet discourse and contemporary post-Soviet rhetoric. Surprisingly, traditional Soviet symbols and perceptions have been continually reiterated, albeit disguised by external nominalization4. There is no overstating the prevalence of geopolitical concepts of "vital space" and "world/regional leadership", or of the idea of centralized, individualistic power.
This vast country with a large population originally had two assets: territory and rich mineral resources. Yet it also suffered from a one-sided resource economy, an outdated infrastructure, and underdeveloped
transportation and communication systems. After the collapse of the USSR, the former mobilization strategies that directed this complex space lost their meaning. Power as well as society needed new ideological constructs that could help unify the diverse regional entities within Russia's territory. But even the first experience of constructing a post-Soviet ideology demonstrated that visions of the "space" and "its historic territories" overshadowed other reasoning on the quality and dynamics of democratic development.
Vladimir Kolosov, a Russian scholar, explained the situation as exemplifying the post-Soviet mentality, thereby implying that the society needed a compensatory ideology. This gap would be filled by the works of the founders of German geopolitics, Haushofer and Ratzel. In the first half of the 1990s, their books were translated several times owing to the increased demand for such literature5.
This process commenced on the threshold of the 1980s and 1990s, and it acquired powerful momentum following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The realization of Russia's geopolitical failure in the Cold War boosted the creation of various compensatory models which served to assign Russia the role of a full-blown and equal actor in international relations. The majority of experts, regardless of politics or methodologies, participated in establishing geopolitical models (A. Gadjiev, S. Kortu-nov, V. Tzimburski, A. Panarin, A. Dugin, K. Sorokin, and D. Trenin)6.
Marina Lebedeva, one of the leading Russian researchers of the world political process, also observes such a trend. In explaining the increased attention of Russian political scientists to state-centred world models, she points at what could be motivating it: 1) Russia's historical tendency toward a strong centralized state; and 2) the psychological reaction of post-Soviet society to weakened state power in the 1990s and the loss of global ("superpower") geopolitical status7.
Threatened by "loss of status", the Russian political class began to accept the theoretical heritage of German and Anglo-Saxon geopolitical schools of the early twentieth century. This led to the formation of entrenched myths of "heartland" and "global conspiracies" as well as perceptions that Russia was the key to global stability. Beginning in the early 1990s, discussions of Russia's role in the modern world were conducted in accordance with the traditional "comparative" pattern elaborated (as early as) in the middle of the nineteenth century. It included the ideas of two groups: "Westerners" ("zapadniki" as they are called in Russia) and "anti-Westerners" ("antizapadniki"). The most widespread group among the latter were "traditionalists" and "Russian communitarians" ("pochvenniki"). It seemed as if history were repeating itself. The debates were no less emotional than in the past but were now
accompanied by the "sweet aftertaste" of historiosophy. As in the nineteenth century, affective accounts prevailed over functional, pragmatic ones. A full range of combinations were constructed between these theoretical extremes.
The descriptive patterns and political analysis directly depended on the "ideological filters" in the minds of the researchers. At the absolute level, such filters controlled the selection of information and determined what kind of comments were made. Apart from the influence of individual and collective preferences, "self-censorship" took place in many cases. There are several models for systematizing the broad flows of ideas and approaches that are a part of the Russian research community.
One generalizing pattern was proposed by Ivan Tyulin, vice-rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He identified two main groups. The first consisted of the proponents of the "conservative approach" while the second included proponents of "liberal" views. A geopolitical paradigm was chosen as the criterion. The conservative approach (here Tyulin cites works by A. Dugin, L. Ivashov, S. Kortu-nov, A. Panarin and E. Pozdniakov) was based on the absolutization of the state-centrist model, of the school of political realism, and of the neo-Eurasianism also being elaborated at that time8.
The second group, representing a liberal approach (according to Tyulin), consisted of researchers who proceeded from the realization that Russia needed closer transatlantic cooperation in business, finance, information technology, communication, environment and security. (Examples cited here are V. Baranovski, A. Zagorski, V. Inozemtsev, V. Kulagin, M. Lebedeva, A. Melvil, A. Piontkovski, V. Sergeev, D. Trenin, E. Fyodorov and L. Shevtsova.) It was impossible to think of Russia in terms of a "superpower". Rather, it became necessary to develop a strategic culture of searching for tools to adapt to globalization. These encompassed "comparative advantage" and strategies of competition with other countries as well as searching for the most advantageous place for Russia in this process. For the liberals, Russia should have joined the process of creating the new Europe, and it should have abandoned the tactics of political and ideological standoff between East and West, instead favouring the framework of a united European civilization9.
But Tyulin's prioritization of the intellectual environment made political rather than academic sense. It expressed the civic position of scholars in lieu of a research methodology. That is why geopolitics in Russia has not yet become a full-scale scholarly topic. A great number of texts and books on geopolitical issues have been produced. Departments and even an academy for geopolitical problems have been opened.
Yet there is still no totality of academic norms, principles and methods for developing professional competence. For geopolitical visions have been too deeply integrated in the historical matrix of collective consciousness, from the concept of "Moscow as a Third Rome" to public discussions of Slavophilism with Westernizers, Pan-Slavic constructs of a "Russian-Slavic world" and N.Y. Danilevski's dichotomy of "Russia/ West". Geopolitical visions in the Russian intellectual tradition are closely connected with perceptions of the state and its territorial or resource imperatives as the main subjects of political action.
Social Studies of International Relations (2006), written by a father and his son - P.A. Tsygankov and A.P. Tsygankov - proposes another type of analysis. Their multi-level research presents a wide spectrum of Russian political thought. They undertake a detailed analysis of trends and identify various groups of authors and directions. In systematizing the views of modern liberals in Russia, the Tsygankovs identify three separate trends: "modernizers", "national democrats" and "institution-alists"10. Among researchers, this analysis has attracted the most attention and (doubtless) sympathy. The book reveals not only consolidated positions but also deep differences surrounding the three key concepts of intellectual-political discourse: the world order, "sovereignty and the national interest" and "foreign policy directions".
Indeed, the liberal ("Western-oriented") approach shaped a system of analysis of Russian democracy in the second half of the 1980s that became especially popular in the first years following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The liberal approach also designated this theory "democratic transit"; it prevailed in the first half of the 1990s as Western descriptive and conceptual patterns were being transmitted to the Russian political domain. To a certain extent, Russian researchers lacked their own definitions since there were only a small number to be found in the deficient methodological base of Marxism-Leninism.
Many theories and ideas of Anglo-American, German or French schools that had appeared belatedly in Russia were now regarded as the latest research. They were not always translated well. New concepts and models of world interaction were based upon such knowledge. But as the Russian academic A. Chubarian put it, a number of Russian scientific schools were appearing, enhanced by these new methods and interdisciplinary methodologies, at a time when freedom of creativity played a central role with new approaches emerging out of the multiple foreign concepts11.
The geostrategic model of the Western approach was based on the perception that Russia belonged to the civilized West on account of its values and experience with modernization. Rapprochement with
the EU and the U.S.A., consensus with them about foreign affairs, development of business cooperation, and enhanced integration into the "superpowers' club" (through applying for membership in NATO and/or the EU) - all these were thought to attract investment and modernize Russia's economy. The protagonists of such Westernization created models for Russia's integration into Atlantic civilization as well as for Westernization within the boundaries of the state (A. Yanov, A. Ahiezer). This blend of "liberal Western approaches" created a public illusion that Russia might be integrated as a full-blown partner into the league of leading countries.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Professor Alexander Ahiezer developed a sociocultural methodology for analysing Russian society. His interpretation applied C. Levi-Strauss' methodology. He introduced the category of the "dual opposition" in order to reflect the historical duality of Russia. For Ahiezer, the dynamism in the country's development could be explained by constant interaction of two paradigms -"constitutional-democratic" and "Slavophile-royalist". This created a specific situation: an inherent sociocultural division of Russian society. Only by analysing the dynamics of these opposing paradigms - their mutual interpenetration and destruction - was it possible to understand the cycle of dominance of one or the other.
In Ahiezer's works, which were unfortunately underestimated in Russia, conceptual categories were used for reflecting social reality (decision, the national catastrophe, archiving, etc.) and methodological ones for applying sociocultural analysis (dual opposition, ambiguity, measurement, interpretation, etc.)12. Despite a certain speculative quality to his research and the absence of a large empirical base, I find that he managed to escape the methodological deadlock resulting from Russian intellectuals' (extreme) enthusiasm for geopolitical imperatives. As an alternative, Ahiezer insisted on extrapolating cultural-scientific methods while introducing the categories of "culture" and "morality" into a broader social context. He was the main opponent of interpretations that were "Slavophilic" or nationalist. Yet he also clearly realized the necessity of overcoming the narrow limits of the opposing paradigms by admitting the inherent nature of their dualist interaction.
In the meantime, however, concepts created under the influence of geographic determinism became more popular. Intellectual foreign patterns became dominant in the middle of the 1990s. By that time the first attempts had been made to formulate a homegrown conceptualization of international relations in which researchers attempted to make use of traditional Russian political thought and archetypes of consciousness. Geopolitics functioned as an antipode in that historical moment to the
political idealism of the Gorbachev era and to B. Yeltzin's first years in power. Indeed, the neo-Eurasianist paradigm had such enormous appeal in the second half of the 1990s that it became the first post-Soviet integration project after the collapse of the USSR. Even the official texts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs deployed the "civilizational" principle of neo-Eurasianism.
The second half of the 1990s was characterized by references to the historical experiences of the Russian diplomatic school, by reevaluations of Soviet diplomatic strategies and by a deep interest in its legacies. Both academic and public discourses revealed the growing significance of "Eurasian civilization" as well as "Russian civilization". This new "civilization" approach was integrated into the former geopolitical system of analysis. Personalities such as Duke A.M. Gorchakov, who had headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1853 to 1855 in the midst of the country's diplomatic isolation, became increasingly popular. The diplomatic strategy of "concentrating resources"13 that he had devised in the middle of the nineteenth century achieved rehabilitation after a one-and-a-half century hiatus.
Russia's integration into the system of international alliances not only gave it great power. Russia was constantly challenged with the task of finding an optimal balance between its international commitments, its own interests and the material resources that it should have been provided with. This gap between Russia's foreign policy strategy and its resource capabilities had triggered grave setbacks in the Crimean War (1853-1855) and later in the Russo-Japanese War (1904) and the First World War (1914-1918). Another analogy might be the way the Soviet Union was overextended in the arms race of the second half of the twentieth century, the consequences of which are well known. Modern Russian "multilateral" diplomacy was enhanced by a strategy of "political equilibrium" and by a concentration of efforts at domestic reform (as formulated by Gorchakov). It was quite normal to emphasize that Russia's objective was not to slow down the implementation of its foreign policy but to make it commensurate with the state's actual resources.
on the one hand, the neo-Eurasianist paradigm targeted the multilateral strategy of foreign policy. on the other hand, it presupposed balanced pragmatic policymaking. It involved piecemeal development, with the state first using its resource-based potential and then embarking on a complex modernization. There were no isolationist strategies in the domain of foreign policy. Freedom of action and pragmatic maneuvering between East and West were presupposed.
only a narrow circle of experts shared the idea of moderation in the second half of the 1990s. In addition to the notion of explicit
loyalty to the West, Russian society was flooded with new views and interpretations of the "Russian national idea". Ideas of interaction and interdependency went into retreat. Geopolitical isolationism, imperial thinking and the syndrome of a weak, humiliated country could all be found in countless debates.
The themes and arguments shifted considerably in political and academic discourses. By that point, most of Russia's political class understood what a great responsibility the process of choosing the paradigm of state development could be. If earlier the debates mostly had a philosophical-theoretical significance, near the end of the century they were of immediate political importance. Discussions were held on the issues of Westernism, Eurasianism, anti-Westernism, and statism. Each of these trends created its own model of geostrategic choice. Authoritative academicians and politicians supported one or the other idea depending on historical traditions as well as methods of guiding and predicting foreign policy.
By then, the general conceptual pattern for Russian research had been established. Globalization had been described time and again in terms of geopolitical imperatives. The other methods of analysis were used indirectly and only in particular situations. The geopolitical approach had prevailed over the views of international realpolitik, creating a specific pattern that included different analyses and forecasts of Russia's role in the world.
The renaissance of "critical geopolitics" in the 1990s and early 2000s was a distinct feature in many nations. This fashionable trend was not unexpected in the academic and the expert communities because it originally corresponded to traditional ways of thinking in the Russian political class. In 1998 the academic L. Abalkin outlined the main features of Russian geopolitical thinking. For modelling the future of international relations, he identified three global scenarios:
1) a dominance of the U.S. "superpower" as the world leader;
2) a dominance of the world elite (the so-called "rich world"), strictly controlling the global markets by means of transnational companies and by political lobbies of the leading economies;
3) a multipolar world with six to eight regional groups in their zones of attraction and influence that could establish the interoperability and diversity of the civilizational areas14.
He considered the third scenario the best for Russia's future. But the development of global processes followed such an intricate and unpredictable path that in essence all three scenarios could be observed. At the same time, the Russian geopolitical tradition, no matter which models of world development had been created, was characterized by a
significant degree of attention to Russia's role and place. Whatever the geopolitical models were, as a rule they integrated three themes:
1) Russia's integration in the world economic and political system, guided by the pattern of basic actor/incorporated member/outsider;
2) the predictable stability of the domestic situation and economic growth;
3) Russia's capacity to ally with other countries and direct its foreign policy strategies.
While a "Western-oriented" geostrategic choice was aimed at achieving an international consensus with the U.S.A., the EU and NATO, anti-Westerners by contrast aimed to apologize for Russia's uniqueness and neo-imperial discourse. A central place was held by conspiracy theories claiming that the West sought the complete collapse of Russia and control over its natural resources. The sole meaning of self-defence would be to counteract any transatlantic policy. Such instinctive anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism were essentially destructive. For did the country have the resources to repeat the Soviet experience of "global confrontation"?
Westernism and anti-Westernism in Russian politics represented two contrasting systems of values. But they involved varying discourses that incorporated a number of concepts, images and myths. Here one might look for neo-Eurasianism15. Its geosophy (a category of "self-development") was inspiring in the 1990s among representatives of the different directions. Nevertheless, it did not become the common theoretical-methodological platform for consolidating the Russian academic expertise. Used by several groups, it shared the notion of the original and "self"-oriented nature of Russian civilization, interpreting P. Savitzki's formula that "Russia is neither Europe, nor Asia, but a specific geographical 'world' that is called Eurasia"16. Neo-Eurasianists did not perceive geopolitics in its new interdisciplinary dimension, as it had started to develop in Europe and the U.S. On the contrary, as before, they continued to regard it as the instrument of reconstruction and Explanation the new "Eurasia Reality".
One can identify certain features of the neo-Eurasianist doctrine: 1) Russia is the synthesis of Europe and Asia, a bridge between East and West; 2) Eurasians are a special cultural-historical type, a super-ethnic group; and 3) Russia, by virtue of its geographical location, represents a centre that integrates the entire system of the continent's periphery, i. e. Europe, Central Asia, Iran, India, Indochina and Japan. One of its protagonists, V. Tzimburzski, viewed Russia as a part of global civilization but considered it a country whose specific role was derived from the border territory with the "great limitrophy" (a
geocultural beltway from Finland to Korea, which united parts of other civilizational entities in the former Soviet sphere, such as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Central Asia)17. The Russians, having created a tradition of dominance in Eurasia, comprised the core of this Russia. Tzimburzski supposed that in order to become competitive in the world, Russia needed to turn to its own geopolitics, exploring and settling its own civilizational sphere.
Panarin and Tzimburzski proposed a theory of the so-called "big cycles" in Russian geopolitics. To find analogies with the methodology of Vernadski and Condratiev, each of them attempted to calculate the cyclical changes of world history and identify Russia's role in them18. The pattern was very interesting, but a thorough examination reveals that it can be considered purely theoretical, with the political process being strictly determined.
Among the large number of geopolitical reflections, the works of Alexander Dugin occupied a specific place. Dugin influenced the creation of post-Soviet Russian nationalism in its extreme forms, shifting his views from National Bolshevism to an attraction with Freemasonry and Fascism. Dugin considered himself an adherent of the Eurasianist doctrine and wrote many works devoted to it. These are not of academic interest but serve as a source for analysing marginal projects of collective identity in modern Russia. One can identify several general theses that Dugin tried to advocate. For him, Russians had to fight constantly for global domination inasmuch as they were prepared "to suffer unthinkable losses and deprivation, only to develop the national idea, the Great Russian Dream"19. Furthermore, he predicted a future "Eurasian Empire" that would include - besides the territory of modern Russia -new independent states and parts of Romania, northern Afghanistan, Mongolia, Manchuria and other territories20.
Dugin developed all these speculative games with maps against the background of statements such as that "the Atlantic West, led by the USA" would be the permanent enemy of Russia. By declaring its commitment to Eurasianist doctrine, Dugin's ideas discredited tendencies in liberal and democratic circles. No wonder that there are many critics of Dugin's theory who point out fundamental differences with neo-Eurasianism21.
Wherever Eurasianist ideas were discussed publicly - ranging from extreme, anti-Western ones (A. Dugin) to perceptions of Russia's necessary trend towards integration in Europe (R. Evzerov) - they were all united in a special worship of the power and will of the state. The entire Eurasian sphere was witnessing dynamic processes of fragmentation and integration.
Currently Russia has three external fronts to manage: a Western one - toward the countries of the Euro-Atlantic consensus; a Southern one - toward the diverse Islamic-Arab world; and an Eastern one - toward Asia and all of the Asia Pacific region. Each of these is of great importance. Eurasianism has preserved only a nominal appeal in modern political discourse. Traditionally it has been projected onto Eurasia's space. According to this definition, Russian politicians started to design different projects for the economic and cultural integration of post-Soviet countries. Hence, Eurasianism was transformed from a sociocultural and geopolitical meta-theory into pragmatic integrational strategies of real policymaking.
In 2001 the first conference was organized of the Russian Association of International Studies, based on the resources of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University). Leading international relations scholars from all over Russia were invited to provide professional expertise on the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policy. It was deemed important to create a professional community and to develop international research on Russia's regions22.
Nevertheless, the situation in the sphere of international relations left much to be desired. T.A. Alekseeva, the leading expert in political philosophy, had to avow that "Russian political society failed to create its own, original political-theoretical project, including the sphere of international relations, perhaps because such a society has not yet been formed in Russia". Russian research remained provincial, but not merely because the Russian language had retreated from its previous position in Russian academia. In addition, "scientific schools" had not yet been formed in Russia, and research strictly adhered to the "patterns" of Western theory and expertise. In addition, Russia was deficient in the index of citation and professional assessment. A system of constant communication, with a culture of dialogue and attention to others' opinions, had not yet been established in the intellectual environment of the early 2000s23.
Nonetheless, various concepts developed by Russian intellectuals can be generally systematized by political-ideological criteria rather than theoretical-methodological foundations24. As P.A. Tsygankov and A.P. Tsygankov emphasized in their book, "Russian scholarship was a testing ground for clashing political positions: competition between supporters of Eurasianism and Westerners, between democrats and etatists, and between ethnic nationalists and defenders of civic identity"25.
The first decade of the new century witnessed a breakthrough in the development of Russian research. Apart from traditional infrastructures (such as universities and think-tanks), a significant growth could
be seen of different centres that specialized in expert analysis and commentary, in the modelling of international processes and in strategies of development. Many of them had been created spontaneously to reflect on international processes, and yet they later ceased to exist, not having the necessary financing. The others, in contrast, represented stable structures, and they were authoritative and influential in the scientific community. They directly defined the agenda in political discussions of modern Russia, but they were structured by their distance or closeness to Kremlin cabinets.
Simultaneously with Eurasianism, a statist trend started to appear. While it only gained ground in the late 1990s, that period saw the emergence of key concepts of "power", "national interests", "nation-state sovereignty", and "order and power". The journal Political Class, in its official profile of June 2005, gave its first full-scale research prognosis: "The place and the role of Russia in the world by 2050 [will be] inevitable, possible, and necessary". Participating in the project were fifty leading experts of Russia and ten young people under the age of thirty who were engaged in politics and political research26. Experts were asked to answer questions of diverse content, including futurist ones ranging from "What will the population of the Earth be by 2050?" and "Will the moon be inhabited?" to those making direct reference to the geopolitical place of Russia in a future world. One can identify several positions revealed in this type of analysis:
- the majority of Russian experts were convinced that the process of disintegration and formation of new states would continue but that the notion of the "state's independence" would be seriously transformed;
- 31 out of the 60 experts asked said that three or four global powers - such as the U.S.A., EU, India and Russia - would dominate. Nine experts referred to two countries: the U.S.A. and China. But views differed as well. In answering the question of how many great powers there would be, 37 experts named Russia; India received the highest number of votes (41), and Italy received six votes - the lowest number. It was generally understood that the traditional notion of "great power" would disappear and that states would be dependent on certain centres or regional (or macro-regional) structures27;
- twenty-six experts tended to think that the forming of a world government was underway28;
- a majority of experts noted dynamic trends such as: an increased role for multinational companies in the world economy and politics; a transformation and expansion of the current
NATO bloc; and a possible enlargement of the number of the nuclear states in the case that uncoordinated actions are taken by the existing "five".
The overall prognosis regarding the future of the hierarchy and roles of states in the world order continued to elicit genuine interest. Fifty-three experts were certain that there would be rapid development of the European Union and - moreover - that it would be enlarged in the future29. Russian experts were no less certain of Israel's future (as affirmed by 51 percent of all the respondents). Israel was regarded as a defensive U.S. stronghold and its existence was considered within the context of American safeguards30. This same unanimity characterized the question of the creation of a united Arab state: 46 experts voted against such a perspective.
This analytical pattern shows that geopolitics continues to play a very distinct role in Russia. It is not only a subject that construes spaces on a map. It also creates key images of collective identity in the post-Soviet period. The state thereby retains its centrality: the traditional monocen-tric model is based on a perception of the state's ability to retain control over its territory and to spread its influence beyond its borders. That is why the issue of Russia being a "superpower" and whether it retains its international influence is so sensitive for the Russian political class. Geopolitical discourse in modern Russia encompasses two groups of concepts. The first one includes the notion of leadership: "world leader" and "world power" are defined by a necessity to focus public opinion on the "high political capital" of the country and its global strategies31. The second group reflects an absolutization of the principle of sovereignty. In particular, politics is interpreted by a concept of "self-sovereignty" that enhances state sovereignty and defends national interests.
Most of the Russian experts thoroughly agree that power is becoming increasingly monocentric32. But the main problem is how efficient the centre has been in utilizing its authority. After deliberate efforts to create vertical channels of power and accumulate all the major economic and political channels in the Kremlin, the reverse process actually occurred. How, then, will the centre's "deconstruction" of authorities' privileges continue?
An increasing number of geopolitical books that project new trajectories of research and of modelling world space have been published in Russia33. But the limits of research, as a rule, are set by "effective geostrategic models" of the future world order. Despite all this, the majority of the researchers have tended to focus only on the idea of "heartland" - a geopolitical mission of Russia as a link between the East and the West.
This situation is not surprising. Even though it is a country with 3% of the world's population, Russia possesses 12,5% of global territory, 22% of global forest resources, 20% of the world's fresh water and 30% of the Arctic shelf. This vast Eurasian space consisting of 17,1 million square meters and eleven time zones has been developed by the Russian state. Only centralized power was capable of organizing a complex set of cultural worlds spreading from the Baltic Sea to the Barents Sea. For each of the large regions - such as Siberia, the Urals, the Volga Region, the Far East and the Northern Caucasus - has its own ethnic-national, confessional, and sociocultural specifics.
Whatever stage of historical development Russia is currently in, "space", "regional territories" and "state power" have always been of vital significance to it. These factors were the means to incorporate the multitude of ethnic-national entities, all of which contrast sharply in their dynamism and level of development. These factors also produce Russia's primary geopolitical fear - the fear that the state's historical territory will be fragmented and disrupted - while also producing the main requirement of all power projects in Russia's history: the impulse to secure the state and territorial integrity of the nation.
The geopolitical contours of Russia, both real and imaginary, have always been characterized by exceptional mobility. Russia has either constantly acquired territories or lost them. For centuries the trend has been towards permanently enlarging its geopolitical sphere by peaceful, economic or military means. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia managed to stabilize its territorial space despite significant strains and serious losses. Currently, state strategy is aimed at preserving the geopolitical status quo within the current balance of powers. It can thus be maintained that geopolitics will retain its dominant position in Russian historical and political studies.
Примечания
1 Pavlenko O. Russia's Foreign Politics in Research: The Themes for the Discussions // Gumanitarnye tschenija RGGU-2008. Plenarnije sessii na mezhdisziplinarnych kruglych stolach. M.: RGGU, 2008. P. 171-184; Zvereva G. Prisvoenie proshlogo v postsovetskoj istoriosofii Rossii // Pavlenko O. (ed.) Modern. Modernizm. Modernizatciya. M.: RGGU, 2004. P. 292-323.
Павленко О.В. Russia's Foreign Politics in Research: The Themes for the Discussions // Гуманитарные чтения РГГУ-2008. Пленарные секции на междисциплинарных круглых столах. М.: РГГУ, 2008. С. 171-184; Зверева Г.И. Присвоение прошлого в постсоветской историософии России // Модерн.
Модернизм. Модернизация / Под ред. О.В. Павленко. М.: РГГУ, 2004. С. 292-323.
Pavlenko O. Zwischen Pragmatismus und Ideologie. Der sowjetisch-amerikanische Verhandlungsprozess in der Chruschtschow-Ära // Karner S., Stelzl-Marx B., Tschubarjan A. (eds.) Der Wiener Gipfel 1961: Kennedy - Chruschtschow. Innsbruck; Wien, 2011. P. 255-258.
See: Abramyann L. Lenin kak trickster // Akhmetova M. (ed.) Sovremennaya rossijskaya mifologiya. M.: RGGU, 2005. P. 75-76; Luzina T. Mif "razvyornu-togo stroitelstva kommunizma" v sovetskom obshhestve v seredine 50 - nachale 60-h gg. XX v. Dis. ... kand. ist. nauk. Izhevsk, 2002; Fokin A. Obrazy' kommunisticheskogo budushhego u vlasti i naseleniya SSSR na rubezhe 50-60 gg. XX veka. Dis. ... kand. ist. nauk. Chelyabinsk, 2007. 199 р.; Trofimov A. Sovetskoe obshhestvo 1953-1964 godov v otechestvennoj istoriografii: politika i e^konomika. Dis. ... d-ra ist. nauk. Ekaterinburg, 1999. 515 р.; Dryndin V. Istoriya propagondirovaniya postulatov gosudarstvennoj ideologii v usloviyax nachala demokratizacii Sovetskogo obshchestva (na materiale Yuzhnogo Urala, seredina 50 - seredina 60-h gg.). Dis. ... kand. ist. nauk. Orenburg, 1997. 253 р.; Kovtun N. Russkaya literaturnaya utopiya vtoroj poloviny' XX v. Dis. ... d-ra filol. nauk. Tomsk, 2005. 471 р.
См.: Абрамян Л. Ленин как трикстер // Современная российская мифология / Под ред. М. Ахметовой. М.: РГГУ, 2005. С. 75-76; Лужина Т.Ю. Миф «развернутого строительства коммунизма» в советском обществе в середине 50 - начале 60-х гг. ХХ в.: Дис. ... канд. ист. наук. Челябинск, 2007. 199 с.; Трофимов А.В. Советское общество 1953-1964 гг. в отечественной историографии: политика и экономика: Дис. ... д-ра ист. наук. Екатеринбург, 1999. 515 с.; Дрындин В.Л. История пропагандирования постулатов государственной идеологии в условиях начала демократизации советского общества (на материале Южного Урала, середина 50 - середина 60-х гг.): Дис. ... канд. ист. наук. Оренбург, 1997. 253 с.; Ковтун Н.В. Русская литературная утопия второй половины ХХ в.: Дис. ... д-ра ист. наук. Томск, 2005. 471 с. See, for example: Serio P. Russkij yazy'k i sovetskij politicheskij diskurs: analiz nominalizacii // Serio P. (ed.). Kvadratura smy'sla: Francuzskaya shkola analiza diskursa. M.: Progress, 1999. P. 352-353; Eliade M. Izbranny'e sochineniya. Mify' o vechnom vozvrashchenii. M.: Ladomir, 2000. 415 p.
См.. напр.: Серио П. Русский язык и советский политический дискурс: анализ номинализации // Квадратура смысла: Французская школа анализа дискурса / Под ред. П. Серио. М.: Прогресс, 1999. С. 352-353; Элиаде М. Избранные сочинения: Мифы о вечном возвращении. М.: Ладомир, 2000. 415 с. Kolosov V. (ed.). Geopoliticheskoe polozhenie Rossii: predstavleniya i realnost. M.: Art-Courier, 2000. 415 p.
Геополитическое положение России: представления и реальность / Под ред. В. Колосова. М.: Арт-Курьер, 2000. 415 с.
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6 See, for example: Kolosov V., Mironenko N. Geopolitika i politicheskaya geografiya. M.: Aspect Press, 2001. 479 p.; Kolosov V. Rossijskaya geopolitika: tradicionny'e koncepcii i sovremenny'e vy'zovy' // Obshhestvenny'e nauki i sovremennost\ 1996. № 3. P. 90-94; Sorokin K. Geopolitika sovremennosti i geostrategiya Rossii. M.: ROSSPEN, 1996. 170 p.; Smirnov A. Urovni geopoliticheskogo vospriyatiya dejstvitelnosti v sovremennoj Rossii // Vestnik MGU. Vol. 12: Politicheskiie nauki. 1999. № 3. P. 49-61.
См., напр.: Колосов В., Мироненко Н. Геополитика и политическая география. М.: Аспект Пресс, 2001. 479 с.; Колосов В. Российская геополитика: традиционные концепции и современные вызовы // Общественные науки и современность. 1996. № 3. С. 90-94; Сорокин К. Геополитика современности и геостратегия России. М.: РОССПЭН, 1996. 170 с.; Смирнов А. Уровни геополитического восприятия действительности в современной России // Вестник МГУ. Т. 12: Политические науки. 1999. № 3. С. 49-61.
7 Lebedeva M. Mirovaya politika i problemy' prepodavaniya mirovoj politiki v rossi-jskix vuzax. Desyat' let vneshnej politiki Rossii. M.: ROSSPEN, 2003. P. 765. Лебедева М. Мировая политика и проблемы преподавания мировой политики в российских вузах. Десять лет внешней политики России. М.: РОССПЭН, 2003. С. 765.
8 Tyulin I. Novy'e tendencii v rossijskix issledovaniyax mezhdunarodny'x otnoshe-nij // Torkunov A. (ed.), Sovremenny'e mezhdunarodny'e otnosheniya i mirovaya politika. M.: MGIMO, 2004. P. 57.
Тюлин И. Новые тенденции в российских исследованиях международных отношений // Современные международные отношения и мировая политика / Под ред. А. Торкунова. М.: МГИМО, 2004. С. 57.
9 Ibid. P. 62-63. Там же. С. 62-63.
10 The author regards the advocates of the pro-Western trend as modernizers (in particular such as Andrey Kozyrev and Egor Gaidar). They are convinced that Russia has no alternative to integration with the West. By contrast, "institutionalists" believe that Russia needs to join international organizations rather than "modernize". This does not rule out criticism of the existing global international organizations. Within this trend, Pavel Tsygankov and Andrey Tsygankov identify two competing groups, the first regarding the sovereign state as an outdated actor (Yuri Krasin, Boris Kapustin, Marina Lebedeva) and the second arguing that international organizations defend and reshape the role of the nation-states (Yuri Davidov). The authors of the book believe that the ideas of the "National Democrats" are close to those of the moderate institutionalists, but contend that "Russia does not need to copy any patterns or rely on the international organizations." Instead it needs to find its own way in order to integrate its cultural peculiarities and move toward the global economic and political system. This group defends the interests of multilateral diplomacy. It includes Kamaludin Gadjiev, Michail Abolin, Leonid Polyakov,
Sergey Kortunov, Boris Makarenko (Tsygankov P., Tsygankov A. Sociologiya mezh-dunarodny'h otnoshenij. M.: MGIMO, 2006. P. 27-31).
Цыганков П., Цыганков А. Социология международных отношений. М.: МГИМО, 2006. С. 27-31.
Tschubarsjan A. Osnovny'e e4apy' vneshnej politiki Rossii // Torkunov A. (ed.). Sovremenny'e mezhdunarodny'e otnosheniya i mirovaya politika... P. 29-31. Чубарьян А. Основные этапы внешней политики России // Современные международные отношения и мировая политика... С. 29-31.
See his main works: Ahiezer A. Dinamika rossijskogo obshhestva: vklad v nauku. M.: Uchitel, 2006. 408 p.; Yanov A, Ahiezer A, Davy'dov A. Kak istoriki ob'yasnyayut' istoriyu? I mozhno li ob'yasnit' istoriyu istoriej? // Znanije-sila. 2001. № 3. P. 21-43.
См. его главные работы: Ахиезер А. Динамика российского общества: вклад в науку. М.: Учитель, 2006. 408 с.; Янов А., Ахиезер А., Давыдов А. Как историки объясняют историю? И можно ли историю объяснить историей? // Знание-сила. 2001. № 3. С. 21-43.
A famous phrase from the 1866 Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was: "Everybody is thinking that Russia is angry, but it's concentrating its resources". See also: Pavlenko O. Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: 1992-2008 gg. // Bezborodov A. (ed.). Otechestvennaya istoriya novejshego vremeni. M.: RGGU, 2009. P. 502-609. Павленко О.В. Внешняя политика России: 1992-2008 гг. // Отечественная история новейшего времени / Под ред. А.Б. Безбородова. М.: РГГУ, 2009. С. 502-609.
Abalkin L. EVolyucionnaya e^konomika v sisteme pereosmy'sleniya bazovy'x osnov obshhestvovedeniya // Abalkin L. (ed.) Evolyucionnaya ekonomika i "mejnstrim": Doklady i vystupleniya uchastnikov mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma. g. Pushhino, 29 maya - 1 iyunya 1998 g. M.: Nauka, 2000. P. 12-14.
Абалкин Л. Эволюционная экономика в системе переосмысления базовых основ обществоведения // Эволюционная экономика и «мейнстрим»: Доклады и выступления участников международного симпозиума, г. Пущино, 29 мая -1 июня 1998 г. / Под ред. Л. Абалкина. М.: Наука, 2000. С. 12-14. Neo-Eurasianist doctrine was formed on the basis of historic Eurasianism, having been developed in the 1920s-1930s by Nikolay Trubetskoy, Piotr Savitzkiy, Lev Karsavin and Lev Gumilev, who called himself the last proponent of Eurasianism in the mid-twentieth century. Yet in a period when there was a disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Eurasianists received a second chance.
Savickiy P. Kontinent Evraziya. M.: Agraf, 1997. P. 283 (Савицкий П. Континент Евразия. М.: Аграф, 1997. С. 283).
Cy'mburskiy V. Ostrov Rossiya // Polis. 1993. № 5. P. 72-80 (Цымбурский В. Остров Россия // Полис. 1993. № 5. С. 72-80).
Dugin A. Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushhee Rossii. Myslit pros-transtvom. M.: ARKTOGEYA-centr, 2002. 928 p.; Panarin A. Iskushenie globa-
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lizmom. M.: Eksmo-Press, 2002. 416 p.; Idem. Rossiya v ciklax mirovoj istorii. M.: MGU, 1999. 288 p.; Cymburskiy V. Sverxdlinnye voennye cikly novogo i nove-jshego vremeni // Polis. 1996. № 3. P. 56-70 (Дугин А. Основы геополитики: Геополитическое будущее России. Мыслить пространством. М.: АКТОГЕЯ-центр, 2002. 928 с.; Панарин А. Искушение глобализмом. М.: Эксмо-Пресс, 2002. 416 с.; Он же. Россия в циклах мировой истории. М.: МГУ, 1999. 288 с.; Цымбурский В. Сверхдлинные военные циклы нового и новейшего времени // Полис. 1996. № 3. С. 56-70).
Dugin A. Op. cit. P. 196 (Дугин А. Основы геополитики. М.: АКТОГЕЯ, 2002. С. 196).
Ibid. P. 415 (Там же. С. 415).
See, for example: Sitnyanskiy G. Geopolitika klassovaya protiv geopolitiki nacio-naTnoj [Elektronny resurs] // Russkij zhurnal,. 2004. 22 okt. URL: www. russ . ru/ publishers/extracts/20041022_sit.html (См., напр.: Ситнянский Г. Геополитика классовая против геополитики национальной [Электронный ресурс] // Русский журнал. 2004. 22 окт. URL: www.russ.ru/publishers/extracts/20041022_ sit.html).
Privetstvennoe slovo prezidenta RAMI Anatoliya Torkunova // Torkunov A. (ed.). Desyat' let vneshnej politiki Rossii... P. 11 (Приветственное слово президента РАМИ Анатолия Торкунова // Десять лет внешней политики России... С. 11). Alekseeva A. Mezhdunarodny'e otnosheniya kak politicheskaya teoriya // Desyat4 let vneshnej politiki Rossii... P. 726 (Алексеева А. Международные отношения как политическая теория // Десять лет внешней политики России. С. 726). Tyulin I. Op. cit. P. 57 (Тюлин И. Указ. соч. С. 57).
25 Tsygankov A., Tsygankov P. Op. cit. P. 13 (Цыганков П., Цыганков А. Указ. соч. С. 13).
26 Rossiya i mir v 2050 godu. Chast' 1. Razdel 1. Obshhie predstavleniya o bu-dushhem // Politicheskij klass. 2005. № 6. P. 27-46 (Россия и мир в 2050 г. Ч. 1. Разд. 1. Общие представления о будущем // Политический класс. 2005. № 6. С. 27-46).
27 The "superpowers" will represent the "major region". The three powers in the Pan-American zone will be North America, Central America and South America. The other three powers will also represent the Euro-African zone: the European Union, the Arab Khalifat and black Africa. The next three states will comprise a Eurasian zone: "lesser" Eurasia (Russia plus the CIS countries), the Islamist (Iran-Turkey-Pakistan) continental empire, and India. Two states in the Pacific zone were mentioned: the two main countries (condominium) of China and Japan plus the separate Pacific "major region" of Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia (Alexander Dugin).
28 "Perhaps the world government will emerge on the basis of the modern Group of Eight (or 'G8') that will be enlarged with new members such as China, India and probably the European Union. Globalization and the problems it created will inevitably demand interstate cooperation and coordination of efforts, from the great
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powers most of all" (Vagif Guseinov). In addition, "[t]he world government will emerge because the global situation will become too complicated and fluid to leave it without permanent control. It implies a constant struggle to limit the sovereignty of small 'problematic' states that will become a source of unpredictability and a threat" (Dmitriy Oreshkin).
"The European Union will remain and it will consist of the territory stretching from Europe to Russia (maybe to Belorussia), with a high level of integration" (Boris Makarenko). "It seems unlikely. Especially if Turkey joins the EU" (Vitaliy Tretyakov). "The EU constitution will continue to exist. But its real significance will be minimal. The reason is the enlargement of the EU that will include Ukraine and Turkey by 2050. Such enlargement will inevitably contradict the deepening integration" (Dmitry Suslov).
"[It is m]ore likely that Israel will be an associated member of the EU or that it will have another status under the patronage of the EU and the U.S.A." (Vjacheslav V. Igrunov).
Konstantin Kosachyov, the chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs: "Now it's highly important for Russia to be the chairman (of the Group of Eight. - O. P.). To show that Russia not only can enter the Group of Eight by a number of objective criteria but can also be there as a world leader, as a world power - that we have never had before. And this leadership should be defined not only by the scale of our economy or military but also by our political potential, our preparedness to act in the interests of the entire world community." Kosachev K. Tak podobaet samodostatochnomu gosudarstvu // Rossijskaya Federaciya segodnya. 2005. № 4. Dek. P. 3.
Косачев К. Так подобает самодостаточному государству // Российская Федерация сегодня. 2005. № 4. Дек. С. 3.
See, for example, the works of Alexei Zudin, the head of the department of political programs of the Center of Political Technologies.
Such research is worth mentioning: Kolosov V., Mironenko N. Op. cit.; Kolosov V. Op. cit.; Gadzhiev K. Vvedenie v geopolitiku. M.: Logos, 1998. 415 p.; Zamyatin D. Vlast' prostranstva i prostranstvo vlasti. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. 352 p. Стоит упомянуть следующие работы: Колосов В, Мироненко Н. Указ. соч.; Колосов В. Указ. соч.; Гаджиев К. Введение в геополитику. М.: Логос, 1998. 415 с.; Замятин Д. Власть пространства и пространство власти. М.: РОССПЭН, 2004. 352 с.
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