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11Research article / Научная статья
Quantative analysis of Ukraine's voting in the UN (1992-2017)
Konstantin P. Kurylev
RUDN University, Moscow Russia ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-30 75-915X, kurylev-kp@rudn.ru
Natalia V. Ivkina
RUDN University, Moscow Russia ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8654-7629, ivkina-nv@rudn.ru
Maxim A. Nikulin
RUDN University, Moscow Russia ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0971-0987, nikulin-ma@rudn.ru
Nadejda G. Smolik
RUDN University, Moscow Russia ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9166-2138, smolik-ng@rudn.ru
Abstract. The article covers quantitative analysis of Ukraine's voting in the United Nations. The rationale of the study is associated, first, with the fact that the conflict in the country's southeast makes it increasingly more difficult to identify key foreign policy and foreign economic priorities. Ukraine is trying to build a multi-vector platform for collaboration with various regions of the globe; however, misalignment in foreign policy does not allow the nation to carry that out. Quantitative analysis of Ukraine's votes in the UN will help define with which of the partner nations there are the fewest antagonisms, who can become the principal trade and economic partner (in the context of the growing animosity with the Russian Federation). The purpose of this analysis is to discover the cause-and-effect relations in the coincidence of Ukraine's votes with those of other state actors in global policies. The authors of the research have used a wide array of sources and academic literature in the Russian, Ukrainian and other European languages.
Keywords: Quantitative Research Methods, Ukraine, CIS, Voting in the UN, Foreign Policy Priorities.
For citation: Kurylev K.P., Ivkina N.V., Nikulin M.A., Smolik N.G. Quantative analysis of Ukraine's voting in the UN (1992—2017). Postsovetskie issledovaniya = Post-Soviet Studies. 2021;4(3):208-218.
Количественный анализ голосования Украины в ООН (1992-2017 гг.)
К. П. Курылев
Российский университет дружбы народов, Москва Россия ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-30 75-915X, kurylev-kp@rudn.ru
Н. В. Ивкина
Российский университет дружбы народов, Москва Россия ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8654-7629, ivkina-nv@rudn.ru
М. А. Никулин
Российский университет дружбы народов, Москва Россия ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0971-0987, nikulin-ma@rudn.ru
Н. Г. Смолик
Российский университет дружбы народов, Москва Россия ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9166-2138, smolik-ng@rudn.ru
Аннотация. Статья включает в себя статистический анализ голосования Украины в ООН. Исследование основано на понимании того факта, что конфликт на юго-востоке страны критическим образом осложняет выстраивание внешнеполитических и внешнеэкономических приоритетов страны на международной арене. Украина пытается выстроить многовекторную платформу для сотрудничества с различными регионами мира; однако, рассогласованность во внешнеполитических шагах не позволяет государству реализовать этот принцип. Статистический анализ голосования Украины в ООН позволит выявить, кто из государств ООН может оказаться в числе немногочисленных партнёров, способных в перспективе стать надёжным торговым союзником (особенно принимая во внимание факт растущей отчуждённости от основного торгового партнёра Украины -Российской Федерации). Задача исследования - выявить причинно-следственную связь между голосованием Украины и тем, какие страны идут на сотрудничество с ней. Авторами использован широкий перечень источников и литературы на русском, украинском языках, а также источники ЕС.
Ключевые слова: Количественные методы исследования, Украина, СНГ, Голосование в ООН, Приоритеты внешней политики.
Для цитирования: Курылев К.П., Ивкина Н.В., Никулин М.А., Смолик Н.Г. Количественный анализ голосования Украины в ООН (1992-2017 гг.). Постсоветские исследования. 2021;4(3):208-218.
For a few years now, the Chair of Theory and History of International Relations of the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) has been involved in applied studies of foreign policies of CIS nations [Degterev et al. 2014; Kurylev et al. 2016]. Those studies are relevant by virtue of the RUDN's participation in the activities of the CIS Network University [Kovalenko and Smolik 2014] under the training program "International Relations." Every year, about 10 students from all countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States study under the master program in international relations at the chair, and an active academic collaboration is pursued with major international relations experts from colleges of the CIS Network University.
In 2016, the Chair of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN, completed a grant-based academic research entitled "Foreign Policy of CIS Nations: Applied Analysis," on the basis of which a joint monograph has been prepared, "Foreign Policy of CIS Nations" [Degterev and Kurylev 2017], in which more than 60 authors from all CIS member nations took part (all sections pertaining to particular countries have been written exclusively by scholars from those countries), and a database on foreign policy of CIS nations has been built on the RUDN expert portal on international relations.
This article presents some of the results of applied studies of the Chair of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN, which are related to Ukraine's foreign policy and have been carried out using the above-mentioned database. They were presented at the 5th International Academic Conference "Russia's Foreign Policy in the CIS Space" that was held in Moscow in December 2017.
The study is based on the rapport of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis of international relations [Degterev 2015].
Quantitative analysis is used as the principal method of research. It is effectively used to analyze the level of voting coincidence across different nations. It is most frequently used in the annual monitoring of the U.S. Department of State, where the percentage of voting coincidence of UN member countries with the U.S. and other nations is examined. Based on its monitoring, the State Department prepares a report called "UN Voting Practices" (Congressional Report 2017). In addition to the applied method of research, a series of qualitative general academic methods were used to describe general principles and priorities in the Ukrainian foreign policy, and to state a hypothesis about the cause-and-effect relations in voting coincidence. In particular, the historical and chronological approach was an important foundation for systematizing the
voting of the Ukrainian delegation to the UN and for pinpointing stages in how it has been approaching foreign policy decision-making. Comparative analysis allowed to evaluate the prospects of Ukraine's cooperation in trade and economy with the countries that displayed the biggest number of voting coincidence with the nation under review. Furthermore, since it would be a complicated mission to develop any predictive scenario of the development of Ukraine's political course, the authors of the study considered it advisable to use the analogical inference method, to avoid using subjective indicators and criteria in the analysis of the situation.
The multi-vector nature of Ukraine's foreign policy is analyzed through the prism of its voting on resolutions of the UN General Assembly during sessions from 47 to 70. While CIS countries became UN members in 1992, most of them voted only on one resolution during the 46th session. Ukraine's votes are juxtaposed to the voting of other CIS nations (including Georgia, which was a member of the Commonwealth until 2009), and also to that of G20 nations. To analyze proximity of foreign policy positions, the mean level of voting coincidence was calculated across sessions 47 to 70 of the UN General Assembly, and the number of sessions in which another country had the biggest level of voting coincidence with the nation under review was considered. The percentage of voting coincidence has been established according to the following methodology: for every resolution on which voting coincided (both nations voted "for," "against," abstained or did not vote), one point was added. If one country voted "for" or "against" a resolution, and the other abstained or did not vote, 0.5 points were added. The result was divided by the total number of resolutions voted during a particular session. The calculation results are presented in Table 1, where the top 3 countries are listed for each indicator in the CIS, and in Table 2, for G20 nations.
Table 11. Proximity of positions with respect to Ukraine's voting at sessions
1 Expert portal of RUDN University on international relations. Accessed May 2018. http://ir.rudn.ru (accessed December 7, 2018).
of the UN General Assembly (sessions 47 to 70).
CIS country Among the other CIS countries
ТОP-3 by average support ТОP-3 by the number of sessions with maximum support
Ukraine Republic of Moldova (91,47%) Georgia (88,69%) Republic of Armenia (83,03%) Republic of Moldova (11 sessions) Republic of Belarus (6 sessions) Georgia (5 sessions)
Ukraine as the UN-member. The history of the issue.
At present, the United Nations is the core of the system of international relations, being a universal supranational organization in which many issues relevant and important for society of today are discussed and addressed. Many countries that do not have opportunities and resources to pursue an active foreign policy use the UN as a platform for implementing their foreign policy ideas. Ukraine is one of those countries.
In 1945, Ukraine, represented then by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, or UkrSSR, was among 51 founding nations of the UN, which was a recognition of the contribution made by the Ukrainian people into the victory in World War II and strengthening of peace worldwide. Its delegation took an active part in the San Francisco conference. Dm. Manuilsky, UkrSSR Foreign Minister and head of Ukraine's delegation at the San Francisco conference, was also chairman of the First Committee, which drafted the Preamble and Chapter 1: "Purposes and Principles," of the UN Charter [Patsoh and Raevich 2008, 41].
Collaboration of Ukraine with the United Nations can be conveniently divided into two stages:
• when Ukraine was a union republic of the USSR;
• after the country became independent in 1991 (Patsoh and Raevich 2008, 42).
Before 1991, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, it de jure had its own representation in the UN, at the level of an independent nation. However, de facto activities of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the UN were limited by the framework of a single foreign policy pursued by the USSR. Despite that fact, for over four decades the UN podium remained almost the only influential international medium for the international community to learn about Ukraine.
The second stage signaled the growing importance of the UN for Ukraine. Since independence was proclaimed in 1991, an essentially new period of the country's activities in the UN began, and those activities were identified as one of foreign policy priorities. Previously, it was the USSR's military power that guaranteed Ukraine's security, and in new circumstances, Ukraine had to turn to international institutions. A resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated July 2, 1993, "On the Main Vectors of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine," sets out that "active participation in the UN and its specialized bodies is a priority vector of Ukraine's activities in global international organizations" [Patsoh and Raevich 2008, 43].
Active efforts of independent Ukraine in the UN are one of effectual means of promoting Ukraine's national interests. At the same time, Ukraine makes a considerable contribution into all areas of the organization's activities, and, among other things, it encourages international peacekeeping and security efforts, disarmament, economic and social development, protection of human rights, reinforcement of international law, etc. [Patsoh and Raevich 2008, 44].
Ukraine is a member of UN main and subsidiary bodies, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Contributions, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Statistical Commission, the Commission on Population and Development, the Executive Board of the World Food Program (WFP), the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Executive Board of the UN Development Program (UNDP)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). In 2006, Ukraine chaired the Executive Board of the UNDP/UNFPA (The activities... 2018).
During the entire period of its UN membership, Ukraine has been elected nonpermanent member of the Security Council four times (1948—1949, 1984—1985, 2000—2001, 2016—2017), and member of the Economic and Social Council six times (its most recent tenure lasted from 2010 to 2012). Ukraine's
representatives have been elected to executive offices in the main committees of General Assembly sessions of the Second (economic and financial matters), Third (social, cultural and humanitarian issues, human rights issues) and Fourth (special political issues and decolonization-related agenda items) Committees. In 1997, Ukraine's Foreign Minister H. Udovenko was elected Chairman of the 52nd session of the General Assembly, the highest executive office in the UN [Degterev and Kurylev 2017, 496].
Ukraine attaches an extremely great importance to the reinforcement of the UN as a center of multilateral efforts in overcoming complicated and complex challenges of the new millennium. An equally big importance is attached to the reform of the Security Council. Ukraine advocates expansion of the UN Security Council membership and upholds an increase of the number of its permanent and non-permanent members.
In connection with the above, it seems quite worthy from the academic standpoint and important, in terms of practice, to take a glance at the nature and peculiarities of Ukraine's voting at UN General Assembly sessions.
Voting on the UN resolutions as a component of the Ukrainian policy towards CIS.
Voting on resolutions of the UN General Assembly is an important indicator of the proximity of foreign policy positions of nations, because oaths in eternal friendship recede into the background, and nations reveal their real standing on certain matters. It is not by chance that every year since 1985 the U.S. Department of State has prepared a report entitled "UN Voting Practices (Congressional Report 2017)." Analysis of voting in the UN is covered in classical works of many international and Russian political scientists, including those by E. Voeten [Voeten 2000], DA. Degterev [Degterev 2017], K.P. Kurylev [Kurylev et al. 2018] and others.
Analysis of the data given in Table 1 shows that Moldova, Georgia and Armenia are the top 3 CIS countries for Ukraine in terms of the mean level of support during voting in the UN General Assembly. Moldova shows the highest figure of coincidence — 91.47%, with Georgia
trailing a little behind, with a coincidence level of 88.69%. These results could be expected, because Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia all embarked on a course towards Euro-Atlantic integration even as far back as in the 1990s. In 1997, they united within the regional GUAM forum. The political vector of that organization was expressed in a statement made by B. Tarasyuk, Ukraine's foreign minister at the time. He said: "We have common approaches to the processes of EU and NATO expansion, democratization of society, European integration, economic development, stability and security in the region. Together we will find it easier to cover the way to integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions [Solovyov 2006]." The countries are brought together by a common viewpoint on the problem of separatism and regional conflicts. At present, those three nations have the lowest level of relations with Russia.
As for Armenia, its high ranking among the top 3 in terms of the mean level of support is determined by several reasons. It seems to us, the key reason is that, historically, there have been quite a lot of Armenians living in Ukraine. First Armenians emerged in what is now Ukraine as far back as in the 11th century and lived in the Crimea, and in the early 12th century, an Armenian community first appeared in Kyiv. The number of Armenians in Ukraine spiked after the disintegration of the USSR, when the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan exacerbated in South Caucasus during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to the 2001 census in Ukraine, the Armenian ethnical minority had 99,894 people. Today, Armenians living in Ukraine are most concentrated in the Donetsk Region (15,700, or 0.33% of the total population, a 2.5-time rise since 1989), with the second biggest Armenian community to be found in the Kharkiv Region (11,000; the number doubled between 1989 and 2001), and the third largest in the Dnipropetrovsk Region. Traditionally, a large Armenian community resides in the Crimea. According to Ukraine's 2001 census, there lived 8,700 Armenians there, or 0.23% of the population (a 3.6-time rise since 1989). During an armed stand-off in Kyiv in late 2013 and early 2014, two Armenians were killed — G.V. Arutyunian and S.G. Nigoyan, who were
posthumously awarded the Hero of Ukraine title. A. Avakov, Ukraine's influential Interior Minister, is also ethnic Armenian. Obviously, the diaspora factor also played its role when Ukraine's independence was being recognized. Armenia was the third republic of the former USSR (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had de jure won independence from the USSR by then), after Russia (Dec. 5, 1991) and Georgia (Dec. 12, 1991), to recognize Ukraine's independence, which occurred on December 18, 1991.
The data on the biggest number of voting coincidence at UN General Assembly sessions differ for Ukraine a little across CIS countries in terms of the mean level of support. Among the top 3, Ukraine's biggest voting coincidence is observed with Moldova (11 sessions out of the 22 under review), with Belarus (6 sessions) and Georgia (5 sessions). And while a high level of coincidence across the Ukraine — Moldova — Georgia triangle is understandable, the situation with Belarus requires explanation. Unlike the Armenia "phenomenon," which is explained by the presence of a wide diaspora, Belarus' high ranking cannot be accounted for only by that factor, even though the Belarussian ethnic minority in Ukraine is second largest, after Russian, while the Armenian minority is only tenth largest. Nevertheless, that factor is also worth mentioning. According to the most recent census in Ukraine, which took place in 2001, there were 275,800 Belarussians among the country's population (Ukrainian Census 2001). While the Armenian ethnic minority had been growing, as it was mentioned above, the number of Belarussians had been on decline and had dropped by 37.3%, according to the 2001 census compared to that of 1989.
There is another important fact. Ukraine was the first country with which Belarus established diplomatic relations, as early as on December 27, 1991. According to statements of Ukrainian and Belarussian politicians, Ukraine and Belarus have very much in common: history, culture, family connections, absence of "imperial ambitions." "Belarus abandoned attempts to draw Ukraine into post-Soviet integration projects, and Ukraine [equally gave up attempts] 'to democratize' or pull Belarus out of the Union State and other post-Soviet associations. Belarus is becoming for Ukraine a
stronghold for promoting its products in the Eurasian Economic Union, and Ukraine is becoming a stable market, a source of missing technology chains, and a political intermediary in the dialog with the West. Back then, the window of opportunities was defined in the Belarussian-Ukrainian relations. Those are, first and foremost, trade, industrial, energy projects, as well as technical cooperation. The political meaning of the relations was limited by the formula 'friendship and good neighborly relations,' which both parties agreed not to overstep. When V. Yanukovich was president, official Minsk did not oppose Ukraine's European Association Treaty, but preferred to expand mutual trade instead. Kyiv, on the other hand, when relations between Belarus and the West worsened once again, did not try to become the driving force for a new loop of 'democratizing' Belarus [Petrovskij 2016]."
The focus on pragmatism in the bilateral relations allowed those relations to become strategic in the economic field. According to Ukraine's State Statistics Service, among Ukraine's trade partners, Republic of Belarus
fourth among all nations of the world (after the Russian Federation, China and Germany) on the back of three quarters of 2017. During the first 9 months of 2017, the total trade volume with the Republic of Belarus amounted to U.S. $3,372.6 million, or was up by U.S. $621.1 million, or 22.6%, year-on-year. Export of goods and services equaled U.S. $892.1 million, having climbed by U.S. $204.4 million, or 29.7%, year-on-year. Import of goods and services was U.S. $2,480.5 million, having risen by U.S. $416.7 million, or 20.2%, year-on-year. The balance was negative for Ukraine (by a margin of U.S. $1,588.4 million). As of October 1, 2017, Ukrainian investments in the economy of the Republic of Belarus totaled U.S. $4,482,300 (a decline of U.S. $13,600, or by 99.7% since the beginning of the year). As of October 1, 2017, Belarus had invested U.S. $31,582,300 in Ukraine's economy (since the beginning of the year, that figure was up by U.S. $789,500, or 102.6%).
Table 2. Trade in products between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus (in million U.S. dollars)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 9 month s of 2017
Export 2228,0 1343,8 2030,9 2076,98 2369,74 2104,64 1714,5 947,51 985,2 892,1
Import 2864,4 1736,1 2630,8 4290,98 5151,87 3704,76 4153,92 2527,91 2852,8 2480,5
Foreig n trade turnov er 5092,4 3079,9 4661,7 6367,96 7521,61 5809,41 5868,42 3475,42 3838,0 3372,6
As for political relations, the 2014 Euromaidan and the beginning of a crisis in Ukraine confronted Belarus with a choice. Should the country have fully sided with Russia's position, it would have meant refusal to recognize "Maidan authorities," loss of the Ukrainian market and turning Ukraine into a stronghold for "feeding" the Belarussian opposition. Belarus' leadership chose a different path. Official Minsk assumed mediatory functions between Kyiv and Moscow and became the actual platform for their interaction since the first days of the power change in Ukraine. Resorting to those actions,
A
exander Lukashen
ko, besides keeping Russia and the West in check from building up tension within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis, is also trying to improve his image in the West, in the relationship with which he, according to many experts, is achieving the maximum within the window of opportunity available to him. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko chose the way of preserving economic, humanitarian and technological ties with Ukraine the best way he could. In that period, the Motor Sich enterprise started its operations in Belarus. During the internal political conflict in Ukraine, many specialists, including those from the hi-tech and
military industries, moved to Belarus [Petrovskij 2016].
In the UN, Belarus voted against Ukraine's resolution on the Crimea, which, in the opinion of official Kyiv, was an unfriendly gesture. However, on the website of the Belarussian Foreign Ministry, the geographical map of diplomatic relations designates the Crimea as Ukrainian territory. Belarussian government bodies do not recommend travel agencies to arrange trips to the peninsula and prescribe to them an obligation to warn clients that their desire to travel in those parts (in particular, to pass through Russia's territory) is a violation of Ukrainian law. Trade relations are evolving, and from the beginning of 2017 to November, three official meetings of the presidents of the two countries took place (not counting unofficial contacts) [Tyshkevich 2017]. In other words, the political component of the bilateral relations is now reduced to Belarus' neutral attitude to the Ukrainian crisis.
Ukraine and the G-20 in the context of UN GA sessions.
And now let us analyze the voting coincidence during sessions of the UN General Assembly between Ukraine and G20 nations (see Table 3).
Table 3.1 Proximity of positions with respect to Ukraine's voting in the UN General Assembly (sessions 47 to 70)
The data in Ukraine provided in the above table are quite noteworthy. National and foreign experts in Ukrainian studies are used to talking about the dualism of Ukraine's foreign policy from 1992 to 2014, characterizing it as a policy of balancing between interests of Russia and the West, with a strong bias towards the West on matters related to regional security and integration. It would seem reasonable to expect that pattern to be reflected in the UN General Assembly voting. However, the results we obtained attest to something different. As it is evident, the top three G20 nations in terms of
1Expert portal of RUDN University on international relations. Accessed May 2018. http://ir.rudn.ru (accessed December 7, 2018).
the mean level of support they give to Ukraine during voting in the UN General Assembly are the Republic of Korea, Japan and Italy. The Republic of Korea displays the highest coincidence of 90.95%, with Japan and Italy somewhat trailing behind with coincidence of 90.21% and 89.56%, respectively. The data on the maximum voting coincidence with Ukraine at sessions of the UN General Assembly among G20 nations are a little bit different from the data on the mean level of support. But they are also indicative and confirm previous findings. In this case, among the top three, Ukraine's voting coincidence with the Republic of Korea was observed at 7 sessions out of 22 ones under review, with Germany during 6 sessions, and with Japan during 5 sessions. If the data obtained are quite self-evident in case of Germany and Italy, two members of the European Union, the situation with the Republic of Korea and Japan requires explaining. We will try to gain insight into the factors behind it.
Ukraine and Germany
The post-Soviet stage of relations between Germany and Ukraine started in 1992, when the first official embassy of Germany in Ukraine was opened [Die Botschaft.,.2018]. Unlike the Soviet period and the beginning of the postSoviet stage, the early 21st century is seeing a whole network of Germany's economic, political and cultural agencies operating in Ukraine.
As for economy, Germany, being a flagship of the European Union's economic integration, has been gradually increasing exports and imports in its trade relations with Ukraine since 1992. Ukraine's exports to European Union members nations were steadily on the rise from 1996 to 2008 (exports expanded from U.S. $3,321.2 million to U.S. $18,265.7 million) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2018). In 2008, a nosedive occurred, but afterwards the situation went back to normal. In contrast, import of EU goods to Ukraine was developing at a slower pace, but it was at its climax precisely in 2008 when it reached U.S. $30,477 million (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2018). In the statistics covering exports and imports of goods exchanged between Ukraine and EU countries, Germany is ranked first. Since 2004, Germany has been Ukraine's
CIS country Among the G-20 Group
TOP-3 by average support TOP-3 by the number of sessions with maximum support
Ukraine Republic of Korea (90,95%) Japan (90,21%) Italy (89,56%) Republic of Korea (7 sessions) Germany (6 sessions) Japan (5 sessions)
second biggest trade and economic partner, after Russia. In 2008, the overall decline of Ukraine's trade with EU nations affected Germany as well, but indicators varied within acceptable ranges (see Table 4), and Germany preserved its status of Ukraine's second most important trade partner in the world.
Table 4.1 Evolution of Ukraine's exports to and imports from Germany, 2008-2016
The data of the table signify that a host of various factors affected Ukrainian product exports to Germany, albeit in a minor way, and on rare occasions exports exceeded imports. After the Ukrainian crisis broke out in 2014, exports and imports have dwindled a little, but, compared to other European countries, Germany has kept trade and economic indicators at a relatively high level. Moreover, in the opinion of American scholars Elizabeth Pond and Hans Kundnani who published an article covering real ties between Germany and Ukraine in the Foreign Affairs magazine, the Ukrainian crisis has had a positive effect on the German-Ukrainian relations because it has "allowed Germany to assume geopolitical leadership of Europe for the first time since 1945" [Pond and Kundnani 2015].
Alongside large export and import volumes within the framework of trade and economic cooperation, there is another important element of the coincidence of the Ukrainian position with the German one at sessions of the UN General Assembly - It is the level of Germany's investments in Ukraine's economy. According to data of Ukraine's State Statistics Service, Germany is ranked fourth in terms of investments made in Ukraine.
As it is evident from the above table, from 2010 to 2014, Germany was ahead of the UK, (which was ranked third in terms of investments in 2017). But the period between 2014 and 2015 saw the peak of a migration crisis in the EU, and Germany had to cover the
1State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 2018b. Geographical structure of exports and imports of goods. Accessed May 2018. http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (accessed December 19, 2018).
biggest part of the expenses associated with Middle East and North Africa refugees, because of which the total amount of investments in Ukraine declined. However, it is still higher than those made by many other EU and non-EU countries.
Ukraine and Italy
While Germany is ranked second in the number of sessions with the maximum support, another European nation, Italy, is ranked third in terms of the mean level of support. Diplomatic relations between Italy and Ukraine were established in 1992. Since then, visits have been exchanged multiple times, and many high-level contacts have occurred. Bilateral economic cooperation between Italy and Ukraine is also strong. Italy is ranked second, after Germany, in terms of economic collaboration with Ukraine. After 2014, Ukraine's trade with Germany has declined, but with Italy it is on the rise. The growth is largely accounted for by an increase in the export of goods (it totaled U.S. $2,468,270,500 in 2014, having climbed by U.S. $11,743,900, or 0.5%, from 2012) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2018), which is profitable for the Ukrainian side. In terms of investments in Ukrainian economy, Italy is ranked only tenth. But, notwithstanding moderate trade volumes, still in trade and economy Italy remains in leading positions worldwide among exporters of ferrous metals from Ukraine (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2018). It makes Italy and Ukraine important economic partners.
However, for the figures showing Ukraine and Italy's voting coincidence in the UN, military and technical cooperation between the two countries is the most significant factor. According to Italy's Defense Ministry, Ukraine is one of the most important partners in the post-Soviet space. There is a legal framework that governs military and technical cooperation between the two countries: in 2000, an agreement between Italy's Defense Ministry and Ukraine's Defense Ministry was ratified; it provides for a closer cooperation both in joint projects pertaining to the upgrade of existing materiel and in research of standards and compatibility of weapon systems (MDD 2018). Joint projects provide an opportunity for allied UN operations, including in Kosovo, Bosnia
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Expor ts 547059 ,2 375500 ,5 333086 410906 ,5 456462 ,3 681022 ,2 672831 ,2 451954 ,4 488444 ,8
Impor ts 511544 ,2 361388 ,1 351664 ,6 432874 ,6 522100 ,5 622431 ,6 591345 ,8 538479 ,9 364093 ,4
and Herzegovina. Every year, high-level meetings are held to confirm readiness for bilateral military and technical cooperation. In 2017, Ukraine and Italy signed a new protocol on expanding cooperation in the most important area of the strategic partnership between the two nations (Interfax-Ukraina 2016). Consequently, we can expect to continue seeing Italy keep its positions as a country to which Ukraine provides support in the UN General Assembly voting.
Ukraine and Japan
Now let us turn to the "Japanese phenomenon." At first sight, it is not easy to explain. The relations between the two countries are in the budding state. Cultural and academic ties between them have not gone so far beyond introductory exhibitions, short-term internships or language courses for beginners. Compared to foreigners from America, Europe or Asia, Japanese do not visit Ukraine very often. Still, there is an area the cooperation in which, we believe, could explain the quantitative data on voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly that we have obtained. Despite being geographically distant, the people in both countries share, unfortunately, an experience of radioactive poisoning because of nuclear disasters that were devastating in their effects. Every year, collaboration between Japan and Ukraine in ecology and energy intensifies and becomes more and more productive. Japan provides financial and humanitarian support in addressing issues caused by the Chernobyl disaster. The Japanese government provides support to the Ukrainian healthcare sector, large-scale infrastructure projects (NTUU "KPI" 2009). Ukraine, in turn, helps the Japanese side in overcoming effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, as a country that has managed to control that issue in a similar tragic experience. Japanese public officials intend to learn from experience of Ukrainian specialists and to use their methods in dealing with agricultural lands around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. For that purpose, they study the measures that were used to decontaminate agricultural lands in the town of Narodychi, which is situated 50 km west from Chernobyl (Scientific.. .2018). One important aspect of scientific and engineering cooperation lies in advanced training courses
for Ukrainian nuclear specialists, which are organized by Japan Electric Power Information Center (JEPIC) and backed financially by Japan's Ministry of Economy. At the same time, Japan, in association with Ukraine's State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate and State Enterprise "National Nuclear Energy Generating Company "Energoatom," regularly dispatches its specialists to Ukrainian nuclear power plants to take part in workshops. Nagasaki University, the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, the National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of the National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine and Japan's Endocrinology Institute carry out programs to study the medical fallout of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Thus, we believe, the "common misfortune" of effects of nuclear disasters caused a rapprochement between the two countries and affected the nature of their respective voting in the UN General Assembly. It is also evident that this assumption requires further research.
Ukraine and the Republic of Korea
As far as the Republic of Korea is concerned, it seems to us its being at the top of both lists related to Ukraine can be explained this way. We believe there is a host of factors that account for this pattern. On one hand, we can speak about the diaspora factor. There are very few Ukrainians in the Republic of Korea, but the number of ethnic Koreans in Ukraine is steadily on the rise. In 2000, there were about 13,000 Koreans in Ukraine. By now, their number has tripled, and, according to various estimates, now there are about 50,000 Koreans living in Ukraine. Most of them have migrated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The past ten odd years have seen a bigger refugee flow from Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, from which people flee to seek a better life.
Despite being relatively small, Koreans are actively involved in the social, political, economic and cultural life of independent Ukraine.
In 1992, the Association of Koreans of Ukraine was set up. Regional associations of Koreans operate in 27 cities across Ukraine. Since 1992, Korean-language Sunday schools and cultural centers have been opened in many
cities, first in Kyiv, national music bands were formed. In 1995, the Korean department was first established in Ukraine at the Kyiv National Linguistics University; it trains specialists in the Korean language and literature, as well as translators. The department has seen five classes graduate by now. In 1996, the Korean department was opened at the Shevchenko Kyiv National University, and a Korean group was established at a school of oriental languages in Kyiv. In 1998, the Korean language was included in the curriculum of the International University of Linguistics and Law. In Kharkiv, at the Chosun culture center, a national boarding school was set up in Ukraine for the first time. Strong Sunday schools operate in Kyiv and Kharkiv, and there were others in Dzhankoy and Krasnoperekopsk before the Crimea was joined to Russia in 2014. Two centers studying Korean culture and the national language have been established at the Korean department of Kyiv National Linguistics University. Every year, the centers organize the Ukrainian National Students Olympiad in the Korean language, workshops for teachers of Korean. To revive Korean culture, music bands have been established and perform in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and other places.
We should make a special remark about Koreans who have arrived in Ukraine from the Republic of Korea. Generally, they run small and medium-sized businesses, but there are business tycoons among them as well — for instance, Vladimir Tsoi. Koreans pursues active operations in Ukraine's market in the automobile or electronics sectors. There are special programs under which Korean expats from the Republic of Korea, who are employed by Korean companies, for instance, KIA, go to Ukraine for a year, travel across the country and study the Russian language, and then work as representatives of their firms or set up their own businesses.
In addition, it should be noted that the Republic of Korea is a closest ally of the U.S.; consequently, we can assume that the voting coincidence of Ukraine and the Republic of
Korea in the UN General Assembly is linked by American interests.
Within the framework of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), the Republic of Korea has frequently helped Ukraine. Since 1991, an amount of U.S. $12,946,000 has been allocated to promote Ukrainian development.
Conclusion
The applied analysis methodologies used by the authors are not a universal instrument; they allow to identify only some peculiarities of Ukraine's foreign policy, to evaluate parameters of its multi-vector nature, which in some cases cannot be achieved by means of historical and descriptive methods.
What are the conclusions that we have arrived at having analyzed Ukraine's voting in the UN General Assembly? The results we have obtained allow us to qualify Ukraine's foreign policy during the period under review as having a multi-vector nature. It is an important conclusion, because, according to the general approach of the Russian literature covering Ukraine's foreign policy, the multi-vector nature of Ukraine's foreign policy is often thrown in doubt, since the entire period of its post-Soviet development the country has been balancing between Russia and Europe. However, that balancing, which has indeed taken place, does not necessarily challenge the fundamental multi-vector nature of Ukrainian foreign policy, but, on the contrary, confirms it, being one of its manifestations. Consequently, we see just another variation of a multi-vector foreign policy, so characteristic of post-Soviet space countries, which attests to various manifestations of that principle from one nation to another, namely in the form of Armenia's complementarity policy, Belarus and Ukraine's multi-vector focus, Russia's Eurasian multi-vector orientation. In other words, over the years of their independent development, the multi-vector tenor has become the key foreign policy principle of former Soviet republics. It speaks about stratification of the post-Soviet space and, as a result, about erosion of the Russian factor that used to dominate that region.
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ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРЕ / INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Курылев Константин Петрович,
д.и.н., профессор кафедры теории и истории международных отношений РУДН, директор Центра исследований постсоветских стран (ЦИПС).
Ивкина Наталья Викторовна, к.и.н., старший преподаватель кафедры теории и истории международных отношений РУДН.
Смолик Надежда Григорьевна,
старший преподаватель кафедры теории и истории международных отношений, РУДН.
Никулин Максим Андреевич,
ассистент кафедры теории и истории международных отношений РУДН
Konstantin P. Kurylev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Theory and History of IR of the RUDN University, Director of the Center for Studies of Post-Soviet Countries (CSPSC).
Natalia V. Ivkina, PhD in History, senior teacher of the Department of Theory and History of IR of the RUDN University.
Nadezhda G. Smolik, Senior Lecturer, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN.
Maksim A. Nikulin, Assistant of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN University.
