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PROJECT PRESENTATION "RUSSIA FUTURES PROJECT" / "MEETING CHINA HALFWAY"
Lyle Goldstein
PhD, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island, USA
Note: This presentation reflects the persona! views of the author and not the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. Government.
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DONC BF1 VAIL'NTAN
MORTHEAST ASIA
contradictions have been transformed into US-China
contradictions.
China has become the 'wail blocking the wind.'"
♦ С-*! Щ4- tr&t*A«t
"DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS CURRENTLY IN THE KEY PERIOD"
denuclearization fails on the Korean Peninsula, China will be harmed
the most."
'stability' has been put in ahead of 'denuclearization' "and a new concept 'no fighting, no chaos, no collapse' has been described as the main principle in China's Korean policy."
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COMPARATIVE POLITICS,
RUSSIA . 2016 Vol.7 No. 4 187
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DEBATE #1: Russia1* Strategic Intentions
Limited in Scope
It is dear that Russia under Vladimir Putin is acrivdy working ro .iJicr the post-Cold Wat ¿settlement. and ii prepared to use force or the threat of force in certain dr-cumstanees, Many now advocate for major increases in U.S. »pending and deployments to counter Russian revisionism. Given that any pivot "back to Europe' would shift resources away from other geostrategic priorities, it is important to conikler whether a renewed foci« on countering Russia b an overre action.
Russian move*—while deeply troubling to Russia's immediate neighbor*—are in rhe large parr limited in scope and are not any effort to restart the Cold War. Russia is seeking the ability to dominate the corc of the Eurasian land m as* and its adjacent coastal waters, Russia does not directly threaten core U.S. interests and it duct not seek to conquer or control Europe but instead ro create a "Eurasian" pole of power that would counterbalance the Western Euro-Atlantic world and a rising China.
Russia mo« directly threatens the interests of posc-Sovki neighbors [lut prefer to be integrated into the West and also seeks to pressure those members of the EU and NATO who fas-or extending tile Western tone into the Eurasian space, Thi* is nor equivalent to the Soviet era when the USSR was committed to spreading Communism and was prepared to send military forces into European states in the event of any major conflict with the West,
It is a problem that it containable with existing U.S. forces working with European allies who can deter Russian adventurism from impacting the European corc. Indent*
A Direct Threat ro the United States
The United Star« is feeing an aggreti'tve ind nevaneh-isr regime in Russia rhar is dercrmined to pursue its objectives not just through economic and political mean* hut al» through Its increasingly capable military. Since Vladimir rutin came to office, Russia h» »ought to rcclaim a sphere of privileged interest along its periphery, In Europe Pttin's rwo principe goals ate (1} ro hollow out the cïUîîng security regime by undermining NATO s ability to act coUectivdy in a crisis; and (21 lo exploit the current crisis in the EU„ eipecially rhe migration crisis, in order to paralyze European Union instinrtions. This strategy directly threatens the interests of the U.S. and our allies. Russia s a revisionist power, as Putin has described the collapse oi the Soviet Union as the "gnateit geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century,"
Since Russian power was significantly degraded in the 1990», Putin ha* played from a position of relative weakness still, before the collapse of energy price*, he nonetheless managed to capitalize on Russia's energy resource* to consolidate stare power and ro modern ire its military. During the past 15 year* Russia has boughr selectively Imo different sectors of Europe's economies, with a spec id focus on energy and banking. On the m ill tan' side. Purins decision to launch a 10-year military modernization program—at a time when Europe has effectively dbarmed and the United State« lias withdrawn assets from Europe—has significantly altered the balauLi1 ol power along NATO's northeastern Hank. Russian deployments in Kaliningrad and more recendy in Crimea constitute a direct challenge to NATO's ability to operate In the Baltic and the Black Sea. This changing strategic landscape poses a direct threat to the
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DEBATE #4 Russia in Syria
A Blunder in the Long Run ...
... A Successful Intervention
"Russia ... will foolishly own Syria's dysfunction for the foreseeable future. In the short six months of the intervention, Russia has strained its bilateral relations with Turkey to the breaking point with significant trade and security implications."
"In 2013, Putin's role as an intermediary allowed Asad to remain in power and avoid US military action ... Russia has positioned itself as an honest broker between the Asad regime, Syrian opposition groups, and the US-led anti-ISIL campaign... Action in Syria plays well for the Russian domestic audience and provide a distraction from events in Ukraine."
DEBATE #5 Russia and China
Unlikely to Form an Effective Coalition...
"A strategically effective Sino-Russian naval coalition is unlikely because they are each other's prime adversaries, while the US is at best only a secondary enemy. Historical tensions over the lengthy Sino-Russian border. Beijing's growing economic clout, plus possible Chinese revanchism in Siberia, prohibit a close alliance."
... Strategic Synergies Are Evident
"[A joint naval] exercise of unprecedented scale (23 surface ships and two submarines} occurred in August 2015 in the Sea of Japan. The tendency in these [bilateral] exercises is toward more complex and realistic war-fighting drills, such as a new focus on anti-submarine warfare. China's tacit diplomatic support has been crucial on such issues as Russia's annexation of
Crimea...."
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"China Should or Should Not 'Rescue' Russia'" GLOBAL TIMES, 19 DEC 2014.
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"At a time when China is seeking to reform the global system... and is
actively implementing the 'One Belt One Road' [Initiative]... Chins requires Russia's support and coordination."
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"What will be the benefit to us? ... we had better not forget Chinese national interests..."
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"We don't have the ability to
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"Realizing unification with Taiwan ... Yes, we can. In the Ukraine Crisis. Putin was able
to extend his security zone all the wav to the south of Crimea,
but NATO had no recourse.
because [Crimea] lay beyond the reach of its power...,"
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"THE MEANING OFTHE UKRAINE EVENTS FOR THE WORLD AND ALSO THEIR WARNING TO CHINA"-ZHANG Wenmu
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