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7POLITICAL SCIENCES
PREPARATION OF THE KEMALISTS FOR THE WAR AGAINST ARMENIA IN 1920
Safrastyan R.
Prof., Dr., Full Member of the Armenian National Academy of Sciences Counselor of the Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7247667
ABSTRACT
The article deals with the preparation of the Kemalists for the war against the Republic of Armenia in 1920. Based on the study of Turkish primary sources, the author concludes that preparations for war began long before the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. Mustafa Kemal played a decisive role in preparing for the war. He was also the author of the text of the 'National Oath', which 'ideologically' substantiated the need for a war against Armenia and its destruction as an independent state.
Keywords: Kemalists, Kemalist Turkey, Republic of Armenia, Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal, 'National Oath,' the Entente, Treaty of Sèvres, Karabekir.
In September of 1920, Kemalist Turkey attacked the Republic of Armenia. This article aims to highlight the problems of the 'ideological' justification of this attack based on the analysis of Turkish sources and the stages of making and implementing the decision to start it.
From the point mentioned earlier, it is crucial to be acquainted with the history and content of the document named 'National Oath' (Turkish: Misak-i Milli) because it became the ideological justification for the attack on Armenia. Its initiator and author were Mustafa Kemal (later Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) - the leader of Turkish nationalistic forces, known as the Kemalist movement. The Kemalists rebelled against the Ottoman government and the Sultan, who was located in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople. The Kema-list movement took control of the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
In modern Turkey, 'National Oath' is characterized as a program expressing the very goals of the Kemalist movement [1, p. 31-48]. The history of the adoption of that document is noteworthy. Kemal's close friend and comrade-in-arms Ali Fuad (later adopted the surname Cebesoy) claims that as early as 1907, Kemal drew and showed him a map of Turkey itself, then part of the Ottoman Empire, which later served almost identically as the basis for the outlined borders of the 'National Oath' [2, p. 316-317]. This long-standing idea of Kemal emphasized the necessity of creating a homogeneous Turkish state.
Developing his idea, on December 28, 1919, Ke-mal made a speech in Ankara, the central city of the Kemalist movement. Addressing the leaders of that city, he mentioned that the territories of the Ottoman Empire were under the control of the Ottoman army in 1918 before the signing of Mudros Truce, which ended the participation of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1, should be included in the territory of the country [3, p. 30]. Actually, during the speech, he already had in his mind the idea of the future 'National Oath'.
Beginning from January 3, 1920, Kemal started to meet in his headquarters in Ankara with the deputies elected to the last Ottoman parliament who were going to Constantinople and, after introducing them in detail to the main provisions of the text of the 'National Oath'
he had already prepared, demanded that they present this document in the parliament and achieve its adoption [2, p. 319].
The deputies who were given a task by Kemal did so. They first initiated informal discussions and later created an informal committee, which developed the document's final text. It was read in an informal closed session of parliament on January 28 and passed but kept secret. For the first time, the public learned about the existence of that document on February 3, when 'Yeni Gün' newspaper, published in Constantinople, came out with a corresponding publication, noting that it is a plan around which deputies with different views have united. On February 17, the Ottoman Parliament officially adopted and published the 'National Oath' [4, p. 77-78]
The 'National Oath' consisted of a preamble and six clauses [5, p. 35-36]. The first point stated that 'the fate of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which are inhabited exclusively by the Arab majority and which in 1918 were occupied by hostile armies at the time of the signing of the truce on October 30, should be decided according to the freely expressed will of the local population', that is, the right of self-determination of the Arabs, who were under the Ottoman rule for centuries. The recognition of reality was the basis of this statement: the Arabs had raised an armed rebellion during the war, had won, were already out of the power of the Turks, and were under the protection of the victorious British army. In other words, the Turks had lost the Arab countries and had no chance to re-conquer them. Under these circumstances, they had to 'recognize' the Arab people's right to self-determination. All the remaining territories of the pre-war Ottoman state, which were not occupied by the Allies on the day of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, were declared part of the indivisible unity of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the existence of Western Armenia and the Armenian Cause, which the Young Turk government had to accept in January of 1914 and agreed to carry out reforms in the Armenian vilayets of the empire under the supervision of foreign states, was excluded.
The third point of the document referred to the status of Western Thrace, and the fourth to the status of the Straits. In both cases, Ottoman rule was intended to
be maintained. The fifth point stated that the preservation of the rights of the minorities living in the Ottoman Empire would be conditioned by the preservation of the rights of the Muslims in the neighboring countries. This wording differed from the version proposed by Mustafa Kemal. It indicated that the members of the parliament, probably at the suggestion of the supporters of the Constantinople government, tried to take a slightly more 'flexible' position, showing the Allies that in the 'National Oath', the rights of minorities were respected. In the meantime, the Kemalists were not missing the opportunity to use the Muslims living in the neighboring countries of the Balkans and the Caucasus as a tool to put pressure on the neighbors.
The last point, the sixth, signaled that the Ottoman Empire not only did not recognize capitulations but would also carry out state debt payments selectively, based on whether they hindered the country's development.
In general, the 'National Oath' was distinguished by its nationalistic character, fully conforming to the ideological and political foundations of the Kemalist movement. It was more like a statement from the parliament of a country that had won the war than it had lost, acting in a capital controlled by the victorious Entente states Great Britain's and France's armed forces.
Expectedly, the 'National Oath' caused dissatisfaction and sharp opposition to the latter. British Prime Minister Lloyd George described it as dangerous, which could become an obstacle to the signing of a planned peace treaty between the Entente and the Ottoman Empire. It was decided to end the parliament's activities and take the capital under stricter control, where supporters of the Kemalists gradually gained strength.
With the consent of the Sultan in 1920, on March 16, Constantinople was officially declared occupied by the Allies. The number of their armed units in the capital and its surroundings was increased to 60 thousand. Martial law was declared; the allies dissolved the parliament and arrested some of the deputies and prominent political figures who supported the Kemalists.
The Entente countries had correctly guessed Ke-mal's intentions: the preparation and acceptance of the 'National Oath' meant that he had already decided in principle to go to war. The measures they took could only be implemented in the capital. However, Kemal's target was not Constantinople. He decided to start the policy of violently implementing the provisions of the 'National Oath' from the opposite side of the empire, the East. He had already chosen the first target of that policy: the Republic of Armenia. The materials published in Turkey, including by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, provide an opportunity to restore the course of preparations for the war against Armenia in conditions of top secrecy in 1920.
On February 5, 1920, a week after the secret adoption of the 'National Oath' by the parliament in Constantinople, Mustafa Kemal announced his conclusion on the need to start a war against Armenia. Thus, the ideological preparation for the war against Armenia ended, and the military preparation for the war began. On that day, Mustafa Kemal, who served as head of the Repre-
sentative Body (government) of the nationalist movement, sent a coded telegram to Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the 15th Corps of Kemalist Army, stationed on the border with Armenia [6, p. 663]. He ordered an 'official or unofficial draft' to start attacking Armenia [7, p. 466].
Kemal's telegram mentioned above is an important document that proves that he initiated the war against Armenia and did so as early as early February of 1920 before the Treaty of Sèvres was signed. Based on that coded telegram, one of the publications of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Turkey characterizes Kemal as the author of 'the main idea of the attack to be carried out in the East' [8, p. 56] It is noteworthy that Karabekir was annoyed by Kemal's 'laurels' as the initiator of the war against Armenia. In the voluminous volume of his memoirs, he writes that he 'thought' about the war a year before Kemal [7, p. 463]...
In response to Kemal's order, Karabekir reports that, on the one hand, the climatic conditions on the front against Armenia are unfavorable, which will complicate the issue of troop supply. On the other hand, until the Bolsheviks cross the Caucasus Mountains and enter Azerbaijan, the Turkish army can be defeated. He particularly mentions that the winter conditions are harsh, there is much snow, and he refuses to comply with the order [7, p. 467-468]. Kemal and the Representative Body consider the Commander's objections justified and accept them [8, p. 57]. The draft is postponed.
However, Mustafa Kemal did not give up his idea of unleashing a war against Armenia, using as an excuse the official capture of the capital city of Constantinople by the Entente countries on March 16, 1920. On the same day, March 16, he turns to Karabekir again. He asks his opinion about the favorable dates for starting a war against Armenia [9, p. 41]. Karabekir's answer proves that he still considers both the military-political situation and the climatic conditions unfavorable from the point of view of launching an attack. He specifically mentions that there is much snow in the region between Erzurum and Sarikamis. Therefore, it will be possible to launch the attack in early April, preferably after mid-April. At the same time, he suggests starting preparations for the attack and waiting for a favorable moment [7, p. 534-535]. Kemal agrees to Karabekir's proposal and informs him about it.
Thus, it becomes clear that already in March 1920, preparations for the war against Armenia began.
Karabekir Pasha, who was closely following the actions of the Red Army of Bolshevik Russia, upon receiving news that the Red Army had defeated Denikin's troops and opened a path to the Caucasus, turned to Mustafa Kemal with a proposal: launch an offensive in the direction of Armenia to meet the Red Army as far forward as possible and capture the provinces of Kars, Artvin, and Ardahan.
In his report addressed to Mustafa Kemal on March 28, 1920, Karabekir, in particular, stated that there would be a great responsibility before the nation and history if the moment were missed to reach the borders of Turkey, as outlined by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,
which was signed with the Russians. His report clearly shows that the attack on Armenia aimed to occupy all the territories up to the Araks River. He also noted that the preparatory works had already started and once again emphasized that winter is too severe, so it is impossible to start operations earlier than April 15. At the same time, he asked to keep the entire already-started preparations secret [8, p. 58-59].
After receiving the report of Karabekir mentioned above, Mustafa Kemal concluded that it was necessary to speed up the preparations for the war against Armenia, ensuring secrecy, in particular, keeping secret the exact date of launching the attack. He concluded that the war being prepared was the only way to save the Turkish state and the Turkish nation [8, p. 59].
The study of Turkish documents gives an idea about the practical steps needed to prepare for the war. In particular, Karabekir, as a first step, published a declaration that aimed to spread anti-Armenian sentiments in the border regions and unite the population against the Republic of Armenia, presenting the latter as a dangerous enemy. The declaration specifically emphasized the need for joint actions of the Muslim population, thus seeking to use the Kurds in the war being prepared [8, p. 59-60].
At the same time, work is being started to prepare the action plan for the attack against Armenia. That plan was ready about two months later, and on May 26, 1920, it was sent to the Corps units under the command of Karabekir. Here, the capture of Igdir and reaching the Araks River were mentioned as the targets of the attack. That operational plan envisaged that the Turkish troops from the north would receive the support of the Bolsheviks, which would facilitate their advance. It specifically stated that the war would aim to secure the borders of Turkey defined by the 'National Oath,' which would include not only Western Armenia but also the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, as well as Nakhichevan and Igdir [8, p. 59].
At the end of April, more precisely on April 26, when the climatic conditions became favorable, and it became known that the Red Army had entered Azerbaijan; Karabekir Pasha addressed Mustafa Kemal with a new report, saying that they had already been formed favorable conditions to start a war against Armenia. He emphasized that his forces had already started preparations for the war ending in two weeks.
Karabekir drew Kemal's attention to two circumstances. First, once preparations were complete and the Corps was ready to attack, keeping troops on standby for extended periods would affect their fighting ability. The second circumstance was political. Karabekir was afraid that the advance of the Red Army in the South Caucasus could confront the Turks because the Red Army could continue to attack in the direction of Armenia. That is why Karabekir suggested that the decision to start a war should be taken immediately [8, p. 79].
The next day, April 27, Kemal, in response to Kar-abekir's report, as outlined above, reports that only the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (parliament) can make the final decision on war and that its decision must be awaited while preparations continue.
The order sent by Mustafa Kemal to Karabekir stated that allied relations were established with Bolshevik Russia. It was planned to conduct joint operations against the British Imperialists and their ally, the Republic of Armenia. Thus, Kemal ordered Karabekir to refrain from attacking Armenia because the cooperation with Russia and the large-scale aid received from Russia were still under discussion [8, p. 80].
Karabekir, assessing first the military-political situation created in the region, addresses Kemal with a new report on May 6, stating that, in his opinion, a favorable situation has already been created for attacking Armenia because the Red Army is located on the border of Armenia. Karabekir emphasizes that the moment cannot be missed [7, p. 705-706].
On the same day, Kemal, responding to Karabekir, stated that it was still too early to start a war against Armenia because the external situation was unfavorable. In particular, he states that it is still unclear based on what specific conditions it will be possible to conclude an alliance with the Bolsheviks. Let us emphasize that the Government discussed, as mentioned in the document signed by Kemal, the issue of 'elimination and destruction' of the Government of Armenia from the middle [9, p. 131].
Kemal's writing, as mentioned earlier, shows that he considered the negative attitude towards Turkey worldwide when considering the war against Armenia. He wrote that the 'Armenian events,' referring to the Armenian Genocide, have turned the entire Christian world against the Turks. If Turkey starts a war against Armenia, it will cause a new wave of anti-Turkish sentiments. For this reason, he orders Karabekir to continue secretly preparing for war and wait for an order that will be given when a favorable situation is created [9, p. 132].
After that, intense correspondence between Kemal and Karabekir takes place for about two months. On June 1, the Government under the leadership of Kemal, responding to another proposal by Karabekir, once again postponed the date of the attack on Armenia, noting that it is necessary to provide such conditions that it is possible to receive military aid from Bolshevik Russia because the forces of the Kemalists alone cannot defeat the Armenian army [9, p. 146-149].
Gradually, the alliance of the Kemalists with the Russian Bolsheviks took on a more evident shape. Under these conditions, on June 6, 1920, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal, decided to launch an attack on Armenia. The capture of the Soganli mountain pass and the annexation of Kars, Artvin, and Ardahan to Turkey are mentioned as targets of the attack. In addition to Kemal, Chief of General Staff Ismet, cabinet members Ismail Fazil, Dr. Adnan, Dr. Riza Nur, Celaleddin Arif, and Camil Bey signed the decision of the Government. The Government's decision implied that the exact timing of the attack would be determined by Karabekir, the Commander of the 15th Corps [8, p. 84].
Starting to implement the decision mentioned above of the Government, Karabekir already two days later, on June 8, 1920, publicly announced military mobilization. It is interesting that, as it can be seen from
the text of the announcement about the mobilization to unite the Muslim population, Karabekir even allowed a falsification of the actual situation, announcing that 'the Muslim armies have approached us and can lend a helping hand.' The statement also emphasized that the Bolsheviks and the Muslim armies were united with the Turks against the Armenians [8, p. 85]. Thus, the Government's decision ends the last stage of preparations for the war against Armenia.
In total, the preparation took about half a year. It was initiated by Mustafa Kemal and was conducted under his direct leadership by the commander of the 15th Corps of Kemalist Army. Mustafa Kemal was also the author of the 'National Oath', which served as the ideological justification for the war against Armenia.
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