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DOI: 10.24411/2470-1262-2018-10014
УДК (UDC) 93+930+930.1+94
Nugzar Zosidze, Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University,
Batumi, Georgia
For citation: Zosidze Nugzar, (2018).
The Geopolitics of Transcaucasia and Relations among the Startes of Georgia, Russia, Turkey between 1920 and 1921.
Cross-Cultural Studies: Education and Science.
Vol.3, Issue II, pp.21-30 (in USA) Manuscript received:04/22/2018 Accepted for publication: 06/13/2018
CC BY 4.0
THE GEOPOLITICS OF TRANSCAUCASIA AND RELATIONS AMONG THE STATES OF GEORGIA, RUSSIA, TURKEY BETWEEN 1920 AND 1921
Abstract
The present paper examines the main concern of the country's foreign policy during the existence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia: the restoration and maintenance of territorial integrity and the international recognition of Georgia's independence.
After the defeat of Germany in World War I, Georgia's outreach to Europe did not slow down. The Georgian delegation did their best for two years to achieve the recognition of the country as de jure at European political congresses at various levels. But in many cases they received only meaningless promises. The attempt of the Georgian delegation to have the country participate in the "League of Nations" was unsuccessful. The foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia failed to achieve the desired result in its approach to Europe.
It should be noted that the victorious Entente States could not correctly evaluate the fairness of their dependence on the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in substantive reverse consequences. From May 1919 the National-Liberation Movement in the Ottoman Empire was headed by the young general, Mustafa Kemal Pasha74, who was elected chairman of the Grand National
74 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Turkish: [mustafa cemal a ta tyrcl; 19 May 1881 (conventional) - 10 November 1938) was a Turkish army officer, revolutionary, and founder of the Republic of Turkey, serving as its first President from
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Assembly and Government in April 1920. Kemal Ataturk's government turned to Soviet Russia in the fight against the Entente States.
What was the situation in Russia? What subjective or objective factors were the reasons for the rapprochement of these states? The answer to this issue gives offers an objective assessment of the national tragedy in Georgia in February-March 1921. In this period, Soviet Russia defeated the enemy White armies, supported by the Entente States. Following the establishment of Soviet power, the radical wing of Bolshevik revolutionaries saw the main goal of further activities in the idea ofpermanent revolution. With the hope of an international proletarian revolution, supporting the Ottoman Empire contributed to strengthening Russian positions in a highly favorable region. In addition, Russia's friendly relations with Kemal Atatürk 's government meant an implementation of a new foreign policy course. At the same time, for the government of Angora (Turkey) the relations with Bolshevik Russia were quite profitable, so it was trying to understand Russia's Transcaucasian goal (one example of this was a Sovietization of Azerbaijan with minor struggles). After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the issue of occupation of Georgia was also on the agenda.
On February 11, 1921, the Red Army invaded Georgia. The chairman of the Government of Georgia N. Zhordania75 had illusions to resolve the problem with Russia with the help of Turkey and urgently informed the Ambassador of Georgia to Ankara, Svimon Mdivani76 to negotiate the issue with the Ataturk government. It is interesting to note the 18 February telegram of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Kote Sabakhtarashvili, sent to Svimon Mdivani, which says that Georgia was ready to give Artaani and Oltisi districts to Turkey in order to save Batumi and its district. Accordingly, this circumstance created a peculiar background in Georgia-Turkey relations. The opposition, together with Artvin and Artaan, requested the holding of a nominal plebiscite in the Batumi District.
With this Turkish addition of a new request: a "nominal" plebiscite and the transfer of Artvin district. Georgia could not really fight on two fronts. Obviously, the fight against Bolshevik Russia was given precedence, so on February 20, the Commander of the Georgian Armed Forces ordered the withdrawal of troops from Artvin and Artaan77.
1923 until his death in 1938. Ideologically a secularist and nationalist, his policies and theories became known as Kemalism.
75 Noe Zhordania born 1868, was a Georgian journalist and Menshevik politician. He played an eminent role in the socialist revolutionary movement in the Russian Empire, and later chaired the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia from July 24, 1918 until March 18, 1921, when the Bolshevik Russian Red Army invasion of Georgia forced him into exile to France. There Zhordania led the government-in-exile until his death in 1953.
76 Svimon Gurgen Mdivani (1876-1937), Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Kemal Ataturk's government. It is noteworthy that during the same period his brother Budu Mdivani was the Bolshevik Russian ambassador in Turkey.
77 Artaan, Oltisi, Artvin - historic Georgian land, currently it is part of the territory of Turkey. 22
The relations of that time between Russia and Georgia and Georgia and Turkey were very complex on the international horizon, which also played an important role in the violation of Georgia's sovereignty.
Keywords: Democratic Republic of Georgia; Russia; Turkey; Mustafa Kemal Ataturk; Noe Zhordania; Great National Pact of Angora
Introduction
On 26 May 1918 Georgia announced its independence. On 28th May, Georgia, with the status of the independent country, signed the first agreement with Germany outlining the priorities of their relations and cooperation. Germany recognized Georgia de facto. Though vague guarantees emerged in regards to preserving territorial integrity, it is worthwhile to note, that Georgian-German relations were determined by the Brest Treaty78, which both parties recognized [6, p.p. 473-474].
Following the agreement signed with Germany, on 4 June 1918 there was another — the Batumi friendship treaty signed between Georgia and Turkey. Based on the treaty, the new territory extended from the river of Choloki to Abastumani (the borderline of Russia-Turkey in 1877) and the Ottoman Empire reverted to the "Grand Vilayet of Guijistan" [14, p.51].
Thus, the agreement reflected a political and diplomatic defeat of Georgia.
The Ottoman government declared that the Brest-Litovsk agreement between Russia and Turkey was canceled [3, p.p. 490-492].
This is the overview of Georgia-Turkish relations in 1918, tightly interwoven with the complicated international situation.
78 In 3 March 1918 Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a peacemaking treaty in Brest-Litovsk, comprised of 13 articles. According to the paragraph 4, the Soviet Russia was obliged to meet all the terms imposed by the agreement. The agreement itself, as already mentioned, imposed too many terms on Russia. Primarily, Russia had to immediately withdraw its army deployed in Eastern provinces of Anatolia, and to return the territory to its previous possessor. "Russian troops must also immediately leave the regions of Ardagan, Kars and Batumi. Russia will not be interfering in the new organization of statehood-legal and international-legal interrelation of those regions, and will give the population the right to establish new regulations in reconciliation with the neighboring state, especially with Turkey" [1, p.121 ].
G. V. Chicherin, deputy public commissar for the international affairs of Russian Federation assessed the Brest-Litovsk agreement regarding Transcaucasia with the following words: "The territories, which can be affected with the worldwide terms are divided into five categories.. .however, there is other quite another category too: these are Kars, Ardagan and Batumi. The agreement does not specifically stipulate that Russia surrenders these territories. Russian troops just leave these territories, and Russia will not interfere in the new arrangement of their statehood. The new state building will be a matter of agreement with the neighboring country, with Turkey, specifically. In this particular case, annexation is more disguised than in the first case, however, its essence remains the same [ibid, p. 667]. (In the first category, the report meant the territories which irreversibly were detached from Russian state - N. Z.). In order to accurately assess this agreement, one should assess the Chicherin's words - "Here it is - the agreement signed forcibly and under pressure, with a gun targeted on the forehead". To sum up, we can say that the conference exposed the actual chaos of the Russian Empire of those times. The Brest agreement - is an example of imposing the unfavorable terms upon a weakened and isolated state.
In spite of the defeat of Germany in the WWI, Georgia's striving towards Europe was still strong. For two years, Georgian delegations did their best, not sparing the energy and time to attend European political meetings at various levels to achieve de jure recognition. In response, there were made promises with no guarantees. The foreign policy of the Georgian Democratic Republic towards the European states was to yield in the hope of desired outcomes. It's necessary to mention, that the victorious states which entered the Entente, failed to give an accurate assessment of the Ottoman Empire, nor were they were able to form a fair relationship. There followed a reaction in response.
The Ottoman Empire bitterly suffered defeat in the WWI. A dangerous policy against the Turkish statehood was launched with the open threat to territorial integrity. The Turkish people, however, would not endure the prospect of enslavement, and resistance developed into their national-liberation fight against the conquerors. The resistance organizers were the patriots, a group of the national bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and officers.
Soon, a young general of the brigade, Mustafa Kemal-Pasha, distinguished himself among the highest ranking officers, and became the leader of the Turkish people in their struggle for independence [13, p.113]. In April 23 1920 Mustafa Kemal-Pasha was elected representative of the Highest National Convocation of Turkey and Head of the Turkish government.
Mustafa Kemal's government took a course towards closer cooperation with the Soviet Russia, as a strategy in the battle with the Entente. On 26 April 1920 three days after the opening of the Great National Convocation of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal formed a cabinet and addressed the Soviet government with a formal letter containing a request for establishment of diplomatic contacts and of assisting Turkey.
The assistance to Turkey by the Soviet Russia that had succeeded in the proletarian revolution meant the establishment of Russian influence in the region. Therefore, the Soviet government attentively approached to the aforesaid request made by Turkish party, and despite the limited resources, decided to immediately assist Turkey with the military and financial support [5, p. 675].
Assistance to the new Turkey meant for Russia, a strengthening of its position and influence in the region with paramount importance. At the same time, the friendship ties, established by the Russia with the Kemal-Pasha's government indicated implementation of the new foreign policy by Russia. At that stage, it was beneficial for the government of Angora to establish close ties with Bolshevik Russia. Not surprisingly, they approached with understanding Russia's plans in the Transcaucasia.
Russian interest in strengthening relations with the strategic partners in Angora was deep enough to ignore a request coming from England (at the initial phase, it signaled the hope that Soviet Russia and Great Britain could negotiate) to introduce a preamble in the draft agreement about cessation assistance to Turkey on Russia's part [12, p.p. 118-119].
We believe, that the union, established between the government of Russia and the government of Mustafa Kemal, was not based solely on the utopian idea of the world social revolution. The
primary meaning of the new foreign policy meant sorting out the Caucasus-related problems in favor of Russia. In particular, it meant the Sovietiation of the Transcaucasian states in order to annex them to Russia. Beyond this, there was a prospect of exporting socialistic ideology under the aegis of proletarian internationalization [15, p. 32]. In this strategic plan Turkey was a specific target, as was reflected in the follow-up events.
In the note sent to the Soviet government in April 1920, the government of Angora dealt with the issue of Batumi region.
In response on 3 June 1920, the Soviet party promised aid to Turkey, which was involved in the military conflict against the Entente, however, they neither agreed nor disagreed to comply with the Turkish claim.
"The Soviet government would with pleasure entertain the basic principles of the new Turkish government foreign policy, which is headed by the Great National Convocation in Angora. These principles are as follows: ...4. The decision made by the Great National Convocation to provide the Turkish regions of Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, Batumi region, East Thrace, the right of self-determination of their future. Naturally, the Soviet government means that in these regions free referenda will be conducted with participation of the refugees and emigrants." [4, p. 554] quote from the response.
In 25 February of 1920 Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Gegechkori applied to Giorgi Makharadze, Georgian Ambassador to Russia. The Georgian Minister reminded the Ambassador about the response note sent by George Chicherin to Mustafa Kemal-Pasha and mentioned, that with that document, the Soviet government had established a relationship with Kemal-Pasha, providing information about Russia's approach to the Batumi region and settling the issue through a referendum.
In Gegechkori's opinion, that ran counter to the Peacemaking Treaty, according to which Batumi and the surrounding territories were considered integral parts of Georgia (it referred the treaty between Georgia and Soviet Russia signed on 7 May 1920 - N. Z.)
George Chicherin, in his response to Sergey Kirov, Russian Ambassador to Georgia, explained that the note addressed to Kemal-Pasha used a quotation extracted from the Great National Pact of Angora which did not reflect the opinion of the Narkomat of Russian Foreign Affairs.
As is seen, the relationships between Russia and the Kemal's government entered the new phase of activities. Subsequently, at that stage, it would be inappropriate on behalf of Turkey to claim the territories from Georgia. There also was a question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states.
On 13 May 1920 Colonel Kazim-Bey79, a formal delegate of the Ankara Government arrived to Georgia. In his interview to the Georgian mass media he said that "the Government of Angora would like to see Georgia integral and strong, Georgia deserves our sympathy" [16].
The Georgian community very optimistically assessed the initiative of the Turkish party, however they did not lose their common sense and a clear vision of the real situation. The basis of the good neighborly relationship between Georgia and Turkey was recognition of Georgia's independence within the borders set through the Russia-Georgian agreement of 7 May 1920. As a result, we must note here, that the Georgian community formulated the following point of view: "We believe in the promises of Angora, and the friendly hand of Mustafa Kemal-Pasha will not hang in the air" [17].
The situation in1920 made Russia rethink its open occupation of Georgia. Moreover, the Soviet government called on Turkey to take into consideration the peacemaking agreement of 7 May 1920 between the Georgian Democratic Republic with the RSFSR, according to which Russia recognized the integrity and independence of Georgia (This agreement identified the Batumi region as an integral part of Georgia - N. Z.)
"The Soviet government would look favorably, for the best interests of Turkey and Russia, the conclusion of a peace treaty between Georgia and Turkey on the basis of the Russia-Georgian agreement" [5. p. 393].
Therefore, the relations between the government of Russia and Mustafa Kemal's Cabinet switched to another phase. Despite the peace initiative of the Turkish government and the first step made towards establishment of diplomatic relations with the neighboring country that were very optimistic, it was clear that another "key" to peaceful relations was in the hands of the Northern neighbor. This was a reality, to which the Georgian government did not give much heed.
On 31 January 1921 the Georgian delegation arrived to Turkey. At the same time, the Consul General of Turkey visited Tbilisi. The Georgian party consisted of many delegates of various ranks. On 8 February 1921 the Georgian Ambassador visited Mustafa Kemal with a formal visit. How did the sons of the future republic of Turkey see the relations with the neighboring country? This was clearly formulated in the Ata Turk's response.
"Georgia and Turkey feel not only mutual empathies, but also see common goals. We need a strong and independent Georgia" [4, p.152; 8, p.p. 56-57]. Unfortunately, consequent events, caused by the objective and subjective factors, did not prove that the good wishes held true. However, it is necessary to mention that there always had been supporters of Ata Turk's approach in the neighboring country (for instance, Bekir Sami80, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Angora
79 Kazim Fikri Ozalp (1880 - 1968) was a Turkish military officer, politician, and one of the leading figures in the Turkish War of Independence. Speaker of the Parliament of Turkey (26 November 1924 - 1 March 1935).
80 Bekir Sami bei (1867 - 1933), Kunduh, Ossetian: was a Turkish politician of Ossetian origin. Deputy of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He served as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.
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government). 8 February 1921 became the date of Georgia's de jure recognition by Mustafa Kemal Ata Turk.
On 11 February 1921 the Red Army invaded Georgia. On 15 February troops of the Red Army headed towards Azerbaijan. The beginning of Georgia's annexation was a conflict in the region of Lore. The besieged Georgian army could no longer resist the siege by the enemy. The Georgian cadets fought a heroic fight in the region of Tabakhmela, Georgia, but they failed to stop the adversary, and they had to surrender Tbilisi. On the second day of the invasion of Georgia by the Red Army, the Ambassador of the Angora government to Georgia, Kazim-Bey, stated decisively:
"It is in our interests to cooperate with the independent Georgia, and in order to reach this goal, we will even fight against the Bolsheviks. This is the opinion of our government".
N. Jordania, the head of the Georgian government had a transient hope that he would settle the Russia-Georgian issue with the aid of Turkey. With this intent, the Georgian Ambassador in Ankara, Svimon Mdivani was assigned to start negotiations with the Kemal-Pasha's government. The following days of the negotiations were very intense. It was becoming clear what Turkey was craving to get from Georgia. It was an unexpected turn in the situation and gave specific hues to the Georgia-Turkish relations. Turkey made the first territorial claims on 18 February, 1921. Turkey demanded from Georgia the Artvin and Ardgan regions.
In that regard Svimon Mdivani pointed out in his note of protest, that "Your planned military deployment of the troops in the Ardagan and Artvin regions without the prior agreement with our party is a repetition of the same historical mistake that made Georgia, as a result, seek protection from Russia [2, p. 65; 7, p. 95].
In a telegram of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kote Sabakhtarishvili, to Svimon Mdivani dated 18 February 1921, we learn that Georgia was ready to surrender the Ardagan and Olti regions in order to protect Batumi and its surrounding areas. The Georgian ambassador was instructed which territories Georgia could give up at that given moment. Ardagan and Oltis were those two regions. However, the Turkish party was not satisfied with the response and claimed not only the rendering of the Artvini region, but also holding of a plebiscite in Batumi [2, p. 2].
Consequently, this circumstance created a specific background in the Georgia-Turkish interrelations. In the note submitted by S. Mdivani to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar-Bey regarding the surrender of Ardagan and Artvin provinces, the Georgian party clearly stipulated that the Eastern Front's commander-in-chief of the military forces "received directives to secure the return of the aforesaid territories to the homeland" [13, p. 103].
Georgia was unable to carry out military operations on two fronts at the same time. The decision was made to throw all the troops to fight with the Bolsheviks. Therefore, on 20 February 1921 the Georgian commander-in-chief issued an order to withdraw military forces from Artvin and Ardagan [7, p. 96]. However, Turkey claimed more.
Alli Fuad Dzhebesoi, the Turkish Ambassador to Russia submitted a note to George Chicherin, explaining the occupation of Ardagan and Artvin by Turkey as naturally issued as a
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result of the National Pact of Turkey regarding the three borderline Sanjaks. In the Ambassador's opinion, "this occupation takes the form of material aid of the Turkish troops to the Georgian workers, in their struggle for freedom against the Menshevik oppression [5, p. 556].
The claims of the Turkish party were continuously increasing. Upon the Red Army annexation of Tbilisi, Kazim-Bey turned to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Karabekir, with the plea of taking Batumi [9, p. 176].
On 9 March 1921 the General Headquarters of Turkey ordered Kazim Karabekir-Pasha81 to occupy Georgian territory and prevent the Red Army's entry to Batumi [ ibid, p. 182].
Despite Moscow's decision, for Batumi to remain within the Soviet Georgia's borders, the Ottoman troops still were moving ahead. On 10 March Artvin and Ardagan were controlled by them. Soon Turkey deployed its troops near Batumi. The city panicked and it became a reason of the adversary's rapid advancement. On 11 March the Turkish army entered Batumi.
Troops appeared in the streets of Batumi, commanded by the Colonel Kazim-Bey. Having overcome the weak resistance, the Turkish army occupied the major government offices and Kazim-Bey proclaimed himself the Governor-General of Batumi and the adjacent regions. The first order of the Governor proclaimed Batumi as a region annexed to Turkey.
On 18 March a bloody battle broke out in the outskirts of Batumi. The military actions in the city developed on two fronts. In the direction of Kakhaberi - headed by the General Varden Tsulukidze and in the direction of Stepanovka, and Fortov Anari, headed by General Data Artmeladze.
The ultimatum sent by General Giorgi Mazniashvili82 to Kazim-Bey, giving one hour to withdraw troops from the occupied fortresses, was left unanswered. The battle resumed again. The Turks were especially intent upon protecting the castle of Bartskhana, which controlled the railway of Batumi. On 19 March the battle resumed to eventually end on 19-20 March with the victory of the Georgians. The courage of the Georgian troops didn't leave the opportunity for Turks to keep the important fortitudes of Batumi. The city was then "purged" of the enemy.
The Kazim-Bey's adventure failed and he, along with the troops deployed there, had to withdraw. On 13 October 1921 the Kars Friendship Treaty was signed by Turkey, on one side, and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia on another side. During the paperwork processing, the Russian factor had a decisive impact to preserve the strongly established North-East borders of Turkey. We adhere to the opinion that exists in the Georgian historiography, that the Kars agreement was a continuation of the Moscow agreement of 16 March 1921.
81 Musa Kazim Karabekir (1882-1948), also spelled Kiazim Karabekir in English; was a Turkish general and politician. He was the commander of the Eastern Army of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and served as Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey before his death.
82 Giorgi Mazniashvili (1870 - 1937) was a Georgian general and one of the most prominent military figures in the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). During the service in the Russian army, he was also known by a Russian transliteration of his surname - Mazniev.
According to the international law this was its defect [16, p. 240]. But the main thing is that Georgia managed to preserve Batumi and the region of Batumi. We share the opinion of the outstanding Georgian historian professor L. Toidze, who justifiable thought that the legal resolution of the Batumi and Batumi region's (as an integral part of Georgia) issue was preconditioned by the strong and unwavering [10, p. 193] position of Soviet Russia.
Conclusion:
Summing up, we can point out that inaccurate political course of the Entente in regards to Turkey which they elaborated following WWI meant the demise of the Turkish statehood. However, it invoked a powerful national-liberation fight with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ata Turk, which encouraged closer cooperation of Turkey with Soviet Russia. The relations between Russia and Georgia, and Georgia and Turkey reflected the difficult international conditions of the aforementioned analyzed period.
References:
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2. Central State Historical Archive of Georgia (TSGIAG), Harvard Fund № 386.
3. Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (1957), Volume One, Moscow, "Nauka".
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10. Toidze L. I. Intervention, Occupation, and Forced Sovietization, and Actual Annexation, Tbilisi 1991.
11. Shalikashvili D. Georgia's Delegation in Turkey in 1921, (1991) magazine "Theater and Art", №1.
12. Yusupov A. R. Istanbul, Moscow1970.
13. Zavriev D. K. Contemporary History of the North-East Vilayets of Turkey, Tbilisi., 1947. p.113
14. Zosidze N. Political Situation and National-Liberation Movement in Adjara in 1918-1920, Batumi 1995.
15. Zosidze N. From the history of the Georgian diplomatic relations with Turkey (letters by Svimon Mdivani) // Historical bulletin, the XIV, Bat., 2005 (in Georgian.).
16. Newspaper ,,Sakartvelos Respublika'', 19.11.1920.
17. Newspaper „Sakartvelo", 24.11.1920.
Information about the author:
Nugzar Zosidze (Batumi, Geogia) - Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Nugzar Zosidze's scholarly research deals with the issues of new and recent history of Georgia. He is the author of 75 scholarly works, including nine monographs and textbooks. His specific period of scholarly research is the Period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). The main component of the research is Russian, Georgian and Turkish relations during this period; First World War and the Transcaucasian Front, Georgia and European states in the 20th century
Address: Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University, Georgia, Batumi, Ninoshvili Street 35, 6010 Mobile Phone: (+995) 595 354 555 E-mail: nug.zosidze@gmail.com
