CC BY
14
Robert Landa,
Dr. Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Chief Researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies
POLITICAL ISLAM AND EAST - WEST RELATIONS
Political Islam is the third wave of the Islamic world resistance to colonialism of the West over the past 200 years. The first wave was pan-Islamism, which sought to unite Sunni Muslims mainly under the auspices of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. But pan-Islamists have not coped with the task and almost went into oblivion after the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The second wave was nationalism, which achieved political sovereignty for the countries of Islam, almost everywhere in the 1920-1960s. They were forced to apply for new technologies to the same countries of the West, from which they got rid of with difficulty. They quickly realized that there was no necessary funding for the development of the economy and overcome the technical, cultural and other retardation, as well as qualified personnel to get rid of the legacy of colonial rule, to ensure the growth of the national economy and spiritual life of people.
It seemed that nothing has changed. But remember that the world of Islam has gone through two world wars, violent social struggles and battles for independence in the first half of the 20th century. Muslims demanded respect for their religion and culture, their rich history and national dignity. The West did not want it, trying to keep the same
balance of forces. In addition, the West simply do not understand the East, entrenched in the imperial arrogance and the belief in the superiority of its own civilization, morals and way of life. The unwillingness and inability to find a common language with the world of Islam gave rise to political Islam, which included experience of pan-Islamism to unite the Muslims, modern forms of political organization of mass, agitation and propaganda, inherited from nationalism, the latest information and military technologies, borrowed from the West, as well as modern methods of missionary, union, party and other activities. They coordinate their activities in different countries and even on different continents, possess technical and other achievements of the West, using their skill against the West. Some adherents of political Islam, realizing their power and influence, began to support the extreme methods of struggle, that is, for the destruction of not only Western countries, but also countries of the East, if they were not guided by the "revelation of Allah"1. Extremists began to emerge among the supporters of political Islam in the process of strengthening its influence.
Muslims are concerned, that there is only per cent of their coreligionists among all scientists of the world. Investments in the field science are 7 times lower than of the global level. The total gross domestic product of 56 countries - members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is less than that of France. Once, in the 9 -15th centuries, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Cordoba and Granada were the beacons of science and culture for the whole world (as centers of the Muslim country Al-Andalus). All this can not help, but give rise to the inferiority complex among Muslims, resentment, nostalgia for past glory and long hegemony of the Arab-Islamic civilization in the world. But it would be wrong to believe that the modern world of Islam is
unwilling or unable to cope with intolerance and extremism, according to the West2.
The majority of Muslims in the world do not support the extremists. Adherents of extreme measures do not prevail among the followers of political Islam even. But no one asks himself in the West: why do more and more Muslims support ideology and practice of political Islam? Why do fresh fighters get in the place of the retired political Islam activists immediately? Because the most peaceful and patient among them see what is happening and realize much better now than before, the essence of political and economic dependence their countries from the neo-colonialists, the mechanisms of social and moral oppression of, the sophistication of new forms of exploitation.
Someone is able to wait patiently for changes for the better, and someone does not want or he has no possibility to wait. Rural and urban social lower strata of the population (more than a third of Muslims from Morocco to Bangladesh) can not simply wait and be patient as they are desperate and prone to the most extreme methods of social and political protest, in many cases, according to numerous observations of witnesses and sociologists. This applies to Pakistan, Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria, and the Palestinians - to a greater extent, two-thirds of whom were indigent refugees in the camps of the United Nations at one time3.
They all support political Islam today. Some of them - morally and through political means (we call them moderate), the other -radically and by force of arms (we consider them extremists), but they all think alike. Extremists may become moderate, and vice versa, depending on the course of events, as we have seen in recent years in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and other countries. The origin of the current crisis of Islamic civilization, are not in the struggle of these movements. It is not necessary to demonize manifestations (or consequences) of
deeper phenomena, rooted in the dark ages, first of all, a thousand-year tradition of the military-religious confrontation, accumulating mutual claims, fears and phobias, all the manifold and the bitter legacy of centuries of uneasy coexistence in the struggle and mutual suspicions of the Muslim East and the Christian West. How can the negative part of this legacy be overcome? It should not be violence, especially war, blockade, the imposition of alien concepts and beliefs to Islam world. People of the West (especially the United States) for centuries can hardly comprehend, and more often they can not comprehend the unacceptability of "Western standards of life" for the world of Islam. All failures are derived from numerous problems in the relations between western and eastern countries, especially Islamic ones.
The Western world looks at the world of Islam with fear and bewilderment, qualifying Islam as a religion of hatred and hostility, as a source of constant threat, without understanding the causes of Islamic extremism and terrorism. This anxiety is beginning to spread to other non-Muslim countries. Hardly the process of globalization will adjust and set all in the places. Moreover, the different countries take part in this process, with the dissimilar problems, interests, different geopolitical position (often opposing). Many countries, especially the Islamic world, see globalism of egocentric neo-colonial policy of the United States and its satellites for the overall picture of globalization4.
Globalism and the imperial ambitions of the West, the neocolonialist approach to solving of almost all problems in bilateral relations are important and actual problems, the essence of social and political life for the people of the East, especially Muslim. Unresolved contradictions and conflicts due to the lack of prospects for a positive outcome gave rise to Islamic extremism. This policy plunges people in frustration, pushes them to desperate acts, as noted by the Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 20015. Al-Hariri was not anti-American or anti-Westerners in general. On the contrary, he was one of the richest billionaires and prominent politicians in the Middle East, closely related with the business community of the West and the Arab world. And that is why he was well aware of the inevitable consequences of short-sighted, irresponsible and selfish policy of, the US and its allies turning the Middle East into a hotbed of constant threat to international security. Political Islam is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, which arose due to the evolution of the world of Islam and the merger of a number of processes of the evolution, politicization of a growing and impoverished Muslim population, assimilation of others revolutionary experience and developing their own one, compounding this experience with traditions of the political culture of the Islamic world (theocracy, jihadism, Sufism, nationalism) and borrowed "Western" forms of struggle (parties, unions, cultural and other associations, charities and other foundations, the media of all kinds, and so on). Islamic fundamentalism appeared at the same time as a natural stage of formation of religious and political consciousness of Muslims, and their reaction to the threat to their socio-cultural identity because of the pressure from the West6.
It represents yet another "return to the roots" of Islam, caused by simultaneous occurrence of the West in the fields of economy, politics, morality, diplomacy, technology, and the "Westernization" of life, customs, social relations between people in the course of its difficult adaptation to the requirements of the update of economic mechanisms and the globalization of the world economic ties. In fact, a direct result of these processes were not only the introduction of new technologies and renovation of production, improving cultural and living standards of local elites, but rapid growth of poverty, high rate of destruction of the peasantry and the abundant growth of the lower classes of the
eastern city by a gigantic mass of the rural marginals. About half of these people remain unemployed or people without specific training, which makes many cities of the East in a social powder keg7.
Social discontent is manifested to a lesser extent in those regions where the modernization and Westernization (and globalization) are less painful on the historical, socio-cultural and other reasons (including religious). But the situation is quite different in North Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, where Islamic fundamentalism has gained foothold in the vast area, from Pakistan and Indonesia (and India, with more than 100 million Muslims) to Morocco and West Africa, and also in the communities of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe and North America.
It will be wrong to equate Islamic fundamentalists and extremists. Islamic extremists condemn the moderate fundamentalists for "political disorientation" concessions to the authorities, "reducing the capacity of revolutionary Islam" (the list of charges of extremist groups, "al-Jihad al-Islam" and "Al Qaeda" in 1970-1980th to the "Brotherhood Muslims "in Egypt and the association" Jama'at al-Tabligh "). The leader of "al Kaide" Ayman al-Zawahiri called the oath of the Muslim Brotherhood to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1987 the "political and ideological suicide", in 1998 he condemned for the lack of "major figures" among freed from prison 7000 Egyptians, who had been accused of Islamism. This was the formal reason, and actual one was the fact that such measures could reduce the tension in the society, improve the image of the government and stimulate the evolution of many Islamist from extremism to moderation, making them forget that the country "is not run according to Sharia", and a peace treaty was signed with Israel8. In contrast to the moderate Muslim fundamentalists defending their religious, ethno-national and socio-cultural identity by peaceful means, the extremists condemn those
who are engaged "only religion", call units of Muslims with other forces as an "alliance with Shaitan." They make unrealistic demands to the West to create an atmosphere of hatred and intolerance. Therefore, right-wing circles and chauvinists of the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands have long been united against Muslims in the West9.
At the same time moderate Islamic fundamentalists may be quite peaceful people who respect law and order, reject violence and fully converted to the protection of traditional Islam, comply with the regulations of the Koran and Sharia, respect and strictly perform all the rites of their religion. Many fundamentalists believe that Muslims who perform multiple and expensive rites prescribed by folk Islam (i.e. Sufi), but do not follow the five pillars of the faith faithfully, moving away from Islam. However, the line between peaceful and non-peaceful fundamentalism is often blurred in this matter. Fundamentalism is sharply politicized, meeting the resistance of the traditional clergy and the ruling political elites. But this does not necessarily lead to Islamic extremism, according to many10.
Political Islam is a reflection and expression of Islamic fundamentalism in political practice. It can be radical and moderate. Many in the West do not bother to such a differentiation by combining all kinds of Islam and encouraging the Islamic world "to get rid of its corrosive cancer." But this is an illusion. Muslim East is experiencing some quite natural phase of historical development, namely political Islam for more than half a century. It can "get rid" not earlier than the tasks of this phase will be carried out. Much depends on the good will of the West to reach an agreement with the trends of modern Islam, willing to achieve their goals in a peaceful way and political (not military) means.
Political Islam can have a great influence without domination in a country today. The ruling elite of any Muslim state is forced to reckon with the factor of its presence and its impact on society from within. "Re-Islamization" of the constitutions in countries such as Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria shows it. The massive influx of young intellectuals and students, physicists and mathematicians, to the relevant organizations testifies to this. They are concerned with the solution of political problems, but with the help of religion, and in line with its logic. It has not been observed earlier, and became possible under the domination of political Islam in the minds of people. Educated Muslims in the late 20th - early 21st centuries denounced "the decline of the state, the corruption and the enrichment of the ruling elite," directly related to the neo-colonialist policy of the West in the Islamic countries11.
The US launched a military operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and at the same time also took a course to expand its military presence where possible, including Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as on the military suppression of Iraq, Syria, Libya and intimidation of such Islamic countries as Iran, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon. Washington actually took a course on a purely military solution (according to its understanding of) all the problems of the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East by giving itself the right to accuse of "supporting terrorism" anyone whose policy does not arrange the US, for whatever reasons. But this course has no prospects, since it does not weaken but strengthens Islamo-extremism, provoking the growth of the relevant moods in the Muslim world, and reinforces the position of those forces that organized the September 11, 2001 in the US and received moral support, if not most, than too many Muslims in different countries. Of course, strikes on Islamic-extremist underground in the West and in the countries where the extremists are
supported (or can find it), will give some results. But the problems are not resolved, diverse and deep roots of Islamic extremism will not be destroyed. In addition, the United States and its closest allies have not shown much interest even to studying and understanding of these roots.
Consequently, the confrontation between the West - East will continue, but its Muslim component will retain its value in full. Some in Western Europe is aware of this. Paris, London and several other European centers are trying to pursue a more soft line of Eastern policy, trying to overcome the "traditionally skeptical" attitude of the peoples of the East, about which Turkish Prime Minister R. Erdogan (the leader of the moderate Islamist party) said in September 2004. France builds relationships not only with the Arab world, but also to Malaysia, a very distant country. A thorough study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations is carried out in the UK, Spain, Germany, efforts are made to improve the mutual understanding of people of East and West. European Union countries take care of education, economic and cultural development of their former colonies, as well as provide the conditions for people from these colonies - migrant workers, students, interns, focusing on formal equality, economic, technical and cultural cooperation. However, even these efforts are not radically change the situation12.
The reason is that a lot of migrant workers from Eastern countries often do not take root in the West, can not adapt to unusual conditions for them, become embittered and marginalized, finding neither habitation, nor job. There is an environment, favorable for the growth of crime, terrorism and Islamo-extremism. Especially that distrust to Muslims and fear of them flared up with particular force in the West again after 11 September 2001, extended not only to the poor and refugees, but also in the more affluent part of the immigrants from Eastern countries - students, employees and entrepreneurs. The
problem of Islamic extremism, as well as relations with the East, is in a different way in Russia and the CIS. The relationship between Islam and the Soviet government largely preserved what was in them for many centuries before 1917, namely a permanent combination of elements of conflict and cooperation, a relatively tolerant nature of interfaith relations (late 18th century), the gradual evolution of hostility and repression of the Stalin period to more calm, loyal and mutually beneficial compromise. Traditional rejection of Western civilization, especially its moral and psychological, ideological and mental aspects that unite Islam and Orthodoxy, has played its role. One should not forget that the "Sovietization" of the East was accompanied by the modernization of the Russian society, the significant growth of the economy, educators and social guarantees, the beginning of the formation of civic consciousness, especially Muslims, and the flowering of their cultures. There was rapprochement of Muslims in personal and socio-cultural plan with the other ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, especially Russian. The proportion of mixed marriages has reached 25-30% of their total number in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union13.
Islam had many common socio-psychological and philosophical systems with the postulates of socialism, particularly those relating to the priority of collectivism over individualism, targeting primarily on social justice, the perception of the authoritarian power of the state as the norm of political culture. There was not even a protest against the collectivization of agriculture, in most cases, (coinciding with the traditional way of life of the community)moreover it was adapted to local conditions mainly, up to the conservation of waqf land in the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. Creating national and state autonomies in Muslim territories (the first time in the history of the majority of Muslims in the USSR), and the
promotion of traditional local identities (albeit with certain limitations) played a significant role. Undoubtedly, that there was integration of the Muslim elite into the social system of the Soviet society for decades. The Muslims of the USSR approved Soviet support to the anti-colonial and anti-Western movements. So the "amazing tolerance of Islam" was quite logical in the USSR14. Moreover, the legacy of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet times continues to live in the post-Soviet space.
In general, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crisis in all spheres of life in Russia and the CIS generated by them, the society has survived, although the process of its revival and strengthening is inhibited. It is surprising that Islamo-extremism has not played a has not taken a more significant role and has not taken a more prominent place, taking into consideration the systemic crisis that struck at the same time the economy, politics, ideology and morality of the entire post-Soviet space, as well as countless conflicts, territorial disputes, quarrels, extracted from the depths of history, and claims between peoples. Nevertheless, its manifestations are observed almost everywhere, and Islamic fundamentalism still has certain positions now (in some places - getting stronger) among the Muslims of the Volga and Dagestan (mostly as an expression of opposition of the younger generation to the more traditional majority). No less serious role of Islamic fundamentalists in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus (called "Wahhabis") is associated mainly with the strongest ideological, financial, military and human support of the relevant international communities, primarily the "Hizb-t-Tahrir al-Islam", "Al-Kaide", "Dzhabhat en Nusra", "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant", as well as their secret allies. There are the ruling elites of some Muslim states and many informal religious structures, some circles in the West, which expected to displace the Soviet Union, and then Russia, from the East
with the help of Islamic extremists, and then to solve their own problems (with their help) in the Balkans (Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro), in Africa ("pushing" France from the Maghreb, Libya and Egypt), and the Middle East (to oppose Islam extremists to Baathists in Iraq and Syria, secular nationalists in Lebanon and Palestine, the Kurdish movement in Turkey, Iran and Iraq15. The international dimension of Islamic extremism dominates today. But it is wrong to ignore the internal causes that have played a role, particularly in Russia. These are environmental disasters (for example, the actual death of the Aral Sea), mass unemployment of the early 1990s and the unprecedented decline in production in a number of areas (in Chechnya - 4/5), the position of the old clergy, loyal to the Soviet party workers and prevented a religious self-expression to young nationalists. Somewhere there was a high level of organized crime as a result of the criminalization of religious and clan system, as well as the persistence of painful memories of the Caucasian War 1817-1861 and the deportation of Muslims of the North Caucasus in 1944-1956.
All these factors, used by opponents and competitors of Russia, pose a threat to its integrity. The socium is tested for strength, and withstands the test for the second time already (after 1917-1922). Forces, opposing Islamic extremists have intensified along with them in Chechnya and neighboring republics (Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia). If the trend of the past years continues, Islamic extremism will have no chance in Russia. Longtime inter-civilization communication and cooperation between Russia and Islam are working on it. Geography, history, economics, politics and geo-strategy, interaction and mutual understanding, based on common work and common interests, mutual learning and mutual respect in the process of living together for nearly 1,000 years pull together Muslims and non-
Muslims in Russia16. The action of these objective factors will largely depend on the subjective factor - the policy of the Russian authorities and all opponents of extremism and terrorism, political skill and their ability to respond adequately to the challenge thrown by history.
The escalation of tension in the world since the beginning of the 21st century, conducted by the US complicated the strengthening of relations between Russia and the Islamic world. The US aggression in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, provoking the Georgian attack on South Ossetia (in fact - to Russia) in 2008, promoting a series of coups in the guise of the "Arab Spring" in 2010-2014 were open the US claim for world domination. Having overthrown the governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (formally via the Islamists), the United States began almost open war against Syria, then against Yemen. This is the final stage, which lasted over half a century and full of intrigues, conspiracies and provocations, the struggle for the elimination of the national Arab regimes created in the era of Nasser, 1952-1963, when almost all the Arab countries freed themselves from colonial regimes. Neither the US nor the traditional European colonizers nor the surviving Arab monarchies wanted this.
Formally, the United States and Western countries deny any involvement in the activities of Islamic extremists. They conduct military operations against them (usually unsuccessful). But these operations only disguise the true goals of the neo-colonialists. Otherwise, why did they destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, which led a relentless struggle with the extremists? Why did they promote the arrival of Islamists to power in Egypt and Tunisia? Why do they support the so-called opposition in Syria, do not hide their links with Islamic extremists? The leaders of these countries "do not listen" to the United States, had good relations
with Russia were a constant threat to the main US allies in the region -conservative pro-Western monarchies. That is why the US is trying to "restructure" the entire Middle East according to its model, which in fact turns into anarchy, ruin, plenty of human victims17 and the main thing - the moral, social and political outrage, while the United States unsuccessfully trying to derive any benefit for the fifth year.
The problem of Islamic extremism is inseparable from the state of relations between East and West today. Full settlement of these relations is possible only as a result of a fundamental resolution of the contradictions that have accumulated as a result of centuries of rivalry, war and colonialism. As for relations between Russia and the East, Russia and Islam, their specificity and uniqueness of different estimates and require a different approach. The main problem in their settlement -is the uncertainty of the consequences of socio-political, economic and ideological crisis experienced by Russia in the 1990th, and the negative impact from the outside. In other words, the resolution of existing problems still largely depends on the correct choice and the future success of the political, socio-economic and foreign policy strategy of Russia.
The future of Islamism, both moderate and extremist, much depends on how the particular situation in each of the Muslim countries will develop, its economy and external relations will be developed, public institutions and mechanisms will be stable in a particular country. As this is about the East, not only ethnic and class conflicts, cultural differences and all sorts of outside interference, but also different degrees of dominance of the traditional factors will influence and influence for a long time, on the nature and outcome of these processes.
The instability of the socio-political and environmental conditions is the norm in the Islamic world today. No wonder that
a number of meetings between the experts of the US and the Soviet Union (until 1991) was devoted to the analysis of the major internal forces motivating for change in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, as well as the balance of the aspirations for change and control systems, strengthening political stability of these countries. Attention was paid to the search for contradictions and stability in Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and the whole Middle East and North Africa18.
The secret of instability of the Islamic East is largely enclosed in instability of the non-Muslim West, affecting the world of Islam and introducing in it (besides the modernization of the economy, modern science, culture and new technologies), racial and religious discrimination, the struggle of classes and groups, ethnic strife, social unrest and political excitement, interstate and civil wars, often ending revolutions, social and political disasters. Introduced from the outside contributes to further destabilizing of eastern societies, distortion, deflection, termination or reverse of many developing processes in the East, connecting with even more rich set of eastern contradictions and conflicts.
Political Islam is practically dominated in the Muslim East today. Its ignoring has led to formation of the extremist wing of this ideology, which seeks to adopt its principles through terror and violence. The longer the hostility continues between the East and the West, the more dangerous and more powerful the extremists are. The West does not understand it, or tries to use that to its advantage, which can be characterized as irresponsible adventure.
This turns our planet into a desperate battle field, which is not conducive to the solution of acute social, political, economic, technological and cultural challenges facing the East in general and the Muslim East in particular. Bases for establishing the new relations between the East and West is impossible without solving these
problems. They can only achieve this by combining their efforts and possibilities for long-term and equitable cooperation in all areas of relations. Political mutual trust is necessary first of all. Otherwise our planet will burn in the flames of inter-religious, inter-ethnic, ideological, geopolitical and other wars in the next century.
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"Islam v sovremennom mire ", Moscow, 2015, Vol. 11, N1, pp. 119-134.
L. Gayazov,
Research associate, Institute of History named after S. Mardzhani, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan FEATURES OF TATAR TRADITIONAL ISLAM IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
The religious component has become increasingly important in the Russian society. It is important to analyze the development of the religious sphere of society. The study of the religious situation in the post-Soviet period can be done using the concepts of M. Epstein. He identified three forms of the concept of "poor religion" for religious reflection of society in the post-Soviet period: traditionalism, neo-paganism and "poor religion" [17].
Islam can be described within the concept so that the main specific of Russian Islam is the extremely low degree of religiosity of the former Soviet Muslims and their level of knowledge of Islam [1, p. 411].
The phenomenon of "poor religion" in relation to the Tatars can be discussed in the context of not the post-Soviet period only, but the whole of the colonial period, which began after the conquest of Kazan in 1552. High Islamic culture was reduced to the level of domestic
