CC BY
14
6. Carnevale C., Isak G., Ritt L., Truxa-Pirierros E., Zellinger S., Zisser B. Kompetenzbeschreibungen für die zweite lebende Fremdsprache. Französisch, Italienisch, Spanisch - A2. Graz: ÖSZ, 2012: 18.
7. Jurkowski S. Soziale Kompetenzen und Lernerfolg beim kooperativen Lernen. Kassel. 2010: 31.
8. Hasselhorn M. Pädagogische Psychologie. Erfolgreiches Lernen und Lehren. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006: 15.
9. Johnson D.W. The state of cooperative learning in postsecondary and professional settings. Educational Psychology Review. 2007: 15 - 29.
References
1. Lersch R. Kompetenzorientiertes Lernen ermöglichen. Lernende Schule, Heft. 2002; № 58: 13.
2. Chulova Yu.S. Kejs-metod kak raznovidnost' interaktivnogo metoda obucheniya. Psihologiya i pedagogika: metodika i problemy prakticheskogo primeneniya. 2016; № 51: 124 - 128.
3. Hessisches Kultusministerium, Bildungsstandards und Inhaltsfelder. Das neue Kerncurriculum für Hessen; Sekundarstufe I - Gymnasium. Moderne Fremdsprachen. 2012: 8.
4. Singer K., Lehrer-Schüler-Konflikte gemeinsam regeln. Unterrichtsstörungen und Erziehungsschwierigkeiten gewaltfrei bearbeiten-Konfliktfähigkeit lernen. 2013: 21.
5. Berkel K. Konflikttraining, Konflikte verstehen, analysieren, bewältigen. 10 Verlag. 2010: 23.
6. Carnevale C., Isak G., Ritt L., Truxa-Pirierros E., Zellinger S., Zisser B. Kompetenzbeschreibungen für die zweite lebende Fremdsprache. Französisch, Italienisch, Spanisch - A2. Graz: ÖSZ, 2012: 18.
7. Jurkowski S. Soziale Kompetenzen und Lernerfolg beim kooperativen Lernen. Kassel. 2010: 31.
8. Hasselhorn M. Pädagogische Psychologie. Erfolgreiches Lernen und Lehren. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006: 15.
9. Johnson D.W. The state of cooperative learning in postsecondary and professional settings. Educational Psychology Review. 2007: 15 - 29.
Статья поступила в редакцию 19.01.21
УДК 355.231.42:355.4"188/192"
Delvig N.A., Cand. of Sciences (Pedagogy), senior lecturer, Sevastopol State University (Sevastopol, Russia), E-mail: natad1313@yandex.ru
Korzh T.N., Cand. of Sciences (Pedagogy), senior lecturer, Sevastopol State University (Sevastopol, Russia), E-mail: korzhtatyana@yandex.ru
PEDAGOGICAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL TACTICAL NAVAL OFFICERS' TRAINING IN LATE 19 - EARLY 20 CENTURIES. The article represents the results of historical and pedagogical analysis of the operational tactical level Naval officers' training concept foundation and development in the late 19 - early 20 centuries. On the basis of studying native and foreign scientific, pedagogical, and publicist literature, the authors provided a comparative description of the operational level Naval officers' training system in Japan, Germany, and France in the context of significant military and political events that took place within the researched chronological period. Special attention is paid to the importance of interdisciplinary relations in the process of creating the unified system of training efficient officers in the Russian Empire military schools of various levels. The article substantiates the causal dependence of the quality of the Naval officers' training and the effectiveness of military campaigns. The reasoning and the conclusions on the quality of training the military personnel in Naval educational institutions are proved by the quotations of the progressive public Russian leaders (N. Klado, F. Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoy, M. Grulev, S. Vitte). On analyzing the academic programs, the advantages and disadvantages of professional and technical commanding officers' training were identified, the influence of military educational reforms on the professional component of their competence was determined. Taking into consideration the interdisciplinary specifics of Naval officers' training process, in the present article, the authors refer to a multidisciplinary approach, based on the principles and methods of various sciences: history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, pedagogy, cultural anthropology and military science. The authors' position is based on the analysis and synthesis of archival and published sources, which provided the opportunity to represent the scientifically actual information on the issue researched in the article.
Key words: operational and tactical training, military art, Naval tactics, Naval officers training concept, higher military education.
Н.А. Дельвиг, канд. пед. наук, доц., Севастопольский государственный университет, г. Севастополь, E-mail: natad1313@yandex.ru
Т.Н. Корж, канд. пед. наук, доц., Севастопольский государственный университет, г. Севастополь, E-mail: korzhtatyana@yandex.ru
ПЕДАГОГИЧЕСКАЯ КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ПОДГОТОВКИ ВОЕННО-МОРСКИХ ОФИЦЕРОВ ОПЕРАТИВНО-ТАКТИЧЕСКОГО УРОВНЯ В КОНЦЕ XIX - НАЧАЛЕ ХХ ВВ.
В статье представлены результаты историко-педагогического анализа процесса формирования концепции подготовки военно-морских офицеров оперативно-тактического уровня в России в конце XIX - начале ХХ вв. В качестве результата изучения отечественной и зарубежной научной, педагогической, публицистической литературы авторы приводят сравнительную характеристику систем подготовки военно-морских офицеров оперативного уровня в Японии, Германии, Франции в контексте происходивших в пределах указанного хронологического периода значимых мировых военно-политических событий. Особое внимание уделяется вопросу значимости междисциплинарных связей в ходе создания единой системы подготовки квалифицированных офицеров в военно-учебных заведениях Российской империи различного уровня. В статье обоснована причинно-следственная зависимость качества подготовки военно-морских офицеров и результативности проведения военных кампаний. Рассуждения и выводы по вопросам качества обучения личного состава флота в военно-морских учебных заведениях подтверждаются цитатами представителей передовой общественности России (Н.Л. Кладо, Ф.М. Достоевшй, Л.Н. Толстой, М.В. Грулев, С.Ю. Витте). В результате анализа учебных программ выявлены преимущества и недостатки профессионально-технической подготовки офицеров командного уровня, обосновано влияние военно-образовательных реформ на профессиональную составляющую компетенции офицеров командного звена. Учитывая междисциплинарный характер процесса подготовки военно-морских офицеров, в данной статье авторы прибегают к использованию полидисциплинарного подхода, опираясь на принципы и методы различных дисциплин: истории, философии, социологии, психологии, педагогики, культурной антропологии и военной науки. Позиция авторов основана на анализе и синтезе архивных и опубликованных источников, что обеспечило возможность изложить научно проверенную фактологическую информацию по исследуемому в данной статье вопросу.
Ключевые слова: оперативно-тактическая подготовка, военное искусство, тактика военно-морского флота, концепция подготовки военно-морских офицеров, высшее военное образование.
Introduction. The period of the late 19th - early 20th centuries is characterized by the rapid development of weapons and military equipment, which became the strong basis for military art concept modernization, which couldn't but cause a significant impact on conducting the military operations and the war in general.
At that time, the Navy actively commissioned new types of ships (armored cruisers, destroyers, gunboats). Simultaneously the new kind of Naval forces - the submarine forces were in the process of its foundation. At the same time the shooting range of weapons was rapidly increasing which automatically expanded the maritime combat space and caused the necessity of diverse forces interaction.
All this required the fundamental changes in the naval officers' professional training system and bringing the Naval strategy and tactics to a scientific basis.
Unlike the Naval officers' training system, based on the practical skills primitive drilling, which proved to be effective in the 19th century, it became clear that it wouldn't be enough for training the efficient personnel capable to operate military equipment of an entirely new level. It became necessary to create a new theoretical platform and include the Naval tactics into the academic process as the basis for conducting military operations.
Objective. Thus the main objective of the present article is to represent the results of historical and pedagogical analysis of the national military educational concept evolution in the aspect of training the officers of commanding operational level. The authors pursued the aim of conducting the comparative pedagogical analysis comparing Russia with such countries as Japan, Germany and France under the reason of
considering these countries being the ones obtaining high military potential contesting the Russian Empire not only in militarization but also in creating the effective system of Higher Naval Education.
Theoretic basis and methodology. Researching the reasons of global changes in the sphere of military education, taking into consideration the multidisciplinary position expressed of the present article, it seems necessary to apply a set of methodological approaches using the principles and methods of various scientific areas the most significant of which should be historical, philosophic, sociological, pedagogical, cultural ones. Thus, the methodological basis of this article is: philosophy statements about the relationship of social development processes; social and historical aspects of the processes taking place in the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th - the beginning of the 20th centuries; the theory of military education development.
Materials and methods. While writing the present article the authors used the materials of the military and historical archives as well as of the authentic publicist literature of the researched period. The authors also referred to the memoirs of the representatives of both the Naval elite and the Russian outstanding intelligentsia of the 19th - the beginning of the 20th centuries. The quotations of such thinkers as N. Klado, F. Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoi, S. Vitte are widely used in order to improve the conclusions of the represented historical pedagogical research.
Analyzing the process of Higher Naval education evolution, taking into consideration the interdisciplinary specifics of the present research the scientific approach was based on using the compound representation of axiological, dialectic, comparative and other methods for studying the Naval education concept development in more details.
Discussion. The Navy has always played an important role in the life of the Russia, whose historical development is closely connected with continuous military struggle for expanding and fortifying its territory, as well as protecting its freedom and increasing its reputation in the international arena.
Over the centuries, the military theory was slowly turning into a separate scientific component, - the strategy, - in which there are two aspects: the first is devoted to the issues and the ways of conducting war actions, and the second one is dedicated to figuring out the war nature as a social phenomenon. Both aspects are undoubtedly interrelated, but, as far as the historical experience demonstrates the reality makes us rely on the first one, since the war has always required practical readiness of personnel and never forgave mistakes and procrastination in the context of preparing for it and conducting it spontaneously [1].
The history witnesses many examples of strategic mistakes. This is evidenced by the battles of the Crimean campaign (1855-56) and the Russo-Japanese war (19041905). The first of these was a pure underestimation example of both the military and psychological enemy potential, which was a consequence of the shallow officers' tactical training, starting from the academic stage of the Naval college.
Nicholas I was convinced in the Russian Empire invincibility. The desire of the Russian emperor to dominate in Europe was caused by successfully conducted military operations in the first half of the 19th century in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Turkey [2].
The outstanding Russian military theorist Nikolai Klado stood on the positions that in the search of the Naval art examples in a particular war, the combat conditions under which the military operations were conducted should never "escape" from the officers' attention. One of the main factors of successful leadership is the orderly and clearly set task, which requires the ability to think quickly and creatively, as well as to express the thoughts clearly and concisely.
At the borderline of the 19th - 20th centuries a new military conflict threatened the Russian Empire - the war between the Russian and Japanese empires for control of Manchuria and Korea, which, after a decades break, became the first war in which the latest weapons such as rapid-firing and long-range artillery, mortars, multi-charged rifles, machine guns, "self-propelled mines" (torpedoes), battleships, destroyers, submarines, telephones, telegraphs, radio and searchlights were represented as combat benefit for which it was necessary to develop a special methodological system for training both officers' and compliment as soon as possible, the creation of which had to be trusted to those who had not only practical combat experience, but also pedagogical talent [3].
Unfortunately, the possibility of the existence of such sciences as the Naval tactics and strategy was doubted and criticized by the majority of the most advanced members of commanding staff, and therefore the officers remained deeply indifferent to studying the scientific issues. In fact, "military equipment, which was rapidly improving from year to year, was given into the hands of militarily ignorant officers" [4, p. 7]. In addition, the situation with highly effective combat training was complicated by the rapid introduction of an entirely new generation of equipment.
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, the new type of rapid-firing guns was introduced to the active troops, but, as General Staff Colonel Grulev wrote in his memoirs, "our gunners went to war, almost completely unaware of the new gun qualities" [5, p. 18].
The Commanding Staff hoped to obtain an easy victory, ready to win any battle not by being skillful, but by the number of soldiers sent into the battlefield. "Until now, the history of Russian wars has preserved the example of power and invincibility, but suddenly mournful lists appeared among this bright galaxy of victories and the Pacific squadron sad death is recorded as the first of them" [6, p. 3].
After the devastating Russo-Japanese war in Russia in October 1906, the article entitled "Some conclusions of the Shantung and Tsushima battles" was published in
the "Kutlin" newspaper, in which one of the war actions participants, a Naval officer, said: "What is the use for the fleet and army to go deep into the wisdom of combat science, when in fact it is much more simple. Would Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Peter the Great, A. Suvorov and the others have passed the exams even at the cadet school, not mentioning the General Staff Academy. But it was them who left behind the immortal examples of military art" [7, p. 6]. It's evident that, the author of the quotation was definitely the representative of that vast majority of military-men who completely rejected the possibility of bringing military tactics to a scientific basis and doubted the need to train military strategy and tactics in a military educational institution.
Trying to entirely change the mentality of the Russian commanders, Nikolai Klado continued to promote the idea of Higher military education, insisting that the main task of any military academy is its work on "turning the way of thinking in the military community into a single whole, as far as it's always difficult to fight. Not a single Commander in any kind of force, even on a separate ship, can foresee and dispose everything on his own - he must provide his subordinates with broad initiative... It is impossible to achieve this without unifying the military mentality" [7, p. 7].
An outstanding Russian literature classic F.M. Dostoevsky, being very far from the principles of combat organization once wrote: "Today, people are fighting not so much with weapons but with minds..." [8, p. 144].
One of the participants of the Russo-Japanese war, officer Kostenko stood up for military theorists' ideas. In his statement he clearly defined the objective of military personnel training the following way: "The contemporary sailor must think quickly. Muscles have lost their primary role. Without technical training and knowledge, a sailor is not able to cope with the weapons he is trusted with" [9, p. 62].
A critical analysis of military operations in the Far East clearly demonstrated that Russia was not prepared for the war, both on land and at sea. "Judging by this war, we can assume that we obviously forgot about transformation of things called the progress, in which everything - from small to great, from useful to useless, from good to evil - is constantly developing, producing some other forms, developing the evolution of nature" [6, p. 4].
In March 4, 1905 N. Klado published an article in "The New Times" newspaper headlined "Could the results of the Far East Naval war be foreseen?". In this article he sincerely confessed that the Naval Ministry had no wish at all to introduce the new subjects to the academic process, which led to a weak professional and technical readiness of the Russian officers in general.
Concerning this article, the famous Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy said: "Many people admire the war, while Klado writes that the reason for the Russian defeat is a reluctance to military education, contempt to military science" [10, p. 40]. N. Klado believed that at a positive stage of development "military science is an highly reliable and orderly knowledge of military phenomena in the context of its logical explanation or invariable order" [11, p. 220].
Moreover, the military sciences being the social ones should be attributed only by the knowledge of the spiritual human nature in war, while the military technical ones correspond to the technical sciences (separate military branches). A group of social military sciences, according to N. Klado consists of military art history, strategy, tactics and combat organization. "Military sciences are united according to their nature and purpose; according to the dominating element being distinctive only in application for these means" [11, p. 40]. N. Klado recognized no other methods of teaching the Navy tactics except from theory to practice. He considered the Naval game, which, in his opinion, was necessary to be started at the training stage in the Naval college, as the main element of the theory during training the Naval combat, strategy and tactics.
The idea of the strategic game was to play a conflict, which, depending on the objective, is either taken from real experience or fictitious. The Naval game is conducted in 3 stages:
1. Preparing for the game (dividing the participants into contesting parties; determining a potential area of combat operations; drawing up a general plan of war, using accurate data from directories, Naval directions and charts for imitating the Naval General Staff actions).
2. Conducting the war actions (comparing combat indexes, implementing the maneuvers).
3. Critical analysis (taking into consideration the level of participants' training as a main criteria - combat officers or Academy students).
Developing the Naval game methodology, N. Klado believed that the first stage is the most important for young officers or college cadets, when it is necessary to collect all information about the enemy forces, determine the area of operations, and take into consideration those facts that need strategic accounting. This stage is positive for the officers of primary positions.
As for training the operational-tactical degree Naval specialists, the final stage is the most important for them. Strategic analysis, statistics of losses and methods of eliminating the consequences were considered by Klado to be the direct duties of higher officers.
In addition, he was able to clearly demonstrate that for any war, one should carefully study not only the geopolitical features and military capabilities of a potential contestant, but also know his mentality. The fact that a certain national psychotype is built up while studying in the primary school as a mean of patriotic upbringing seems to be a real paradox.
Klado relied on the observations of the French Ministry of Education representative, J. Vellers, sent to Japan for researching the Japanese educational system special-
ties [12]. Visiting Japanese schools in 1903, J. Vellers noted that the pupils were highly interested in the arrangement of the railway, telephone, and telegraph.
In schools, gymnastics was the main subject, which indicated the importance of the physical culture for the future warrior. But along with gymnastics, the maximum number of lessons per week belonged to history and geography, which were taught in-details in order to awake the students' feelings of pride for their country and patriotic attitude to their homeland. National history was associated with the Holy Code of Moral. In one of the Japanese history textbooks it was mentioned: "history is a moral example in which there is not a single dark spot" [12, p. 7].
The opinion about the cultural and enlightenment level of the Japanese was rather debatable; it was said that "Japan is just pretending to be an educated and enlightened country, in fact its tastes are still barbaric, the concepts are still childish; although there is much positive and instructive in Japanese views and Japanese code, one cannot help but admit that Japan is still far from Europe" [13, p. 401].
Perhaps such commentaries made the Russians think of Japan as about the primitive nation and underestimate the enemy's military potential.
Nevertheless, whatever was said about the Japanese educational system, the undoubted advantage of their national pedagogic culture was the desire of the teachers to cultivate the respect and teach the younger generation to obey the elders, which shaped the character of the future warrior, because "seniority in Japan is of great importance, and unlike frivolous Frenchmen who say "l'age ne fait pas sage" (age is not a wisdom yet), the Japanese are firmly convinced that "age is the younger sister of wisdom" [14, p. 52].
The Japanese stuck to a totally different point of view on the quality of education in their country. During the events of the Russo-Japanese war, all the world famous newspapers discussed the problems of Russian failures in Japan. The Japanese spoke about this as well, praising the benefit to the Japanese government policy in the sphere of public education. "Little Japan, thanks to school and teachers, smashes Russia the Giant with its dark, multi-million male kingdom. Can we compare our soldier with the Russian one? The Japanese soldier is a true citizen who sincerely loves his country, he is perfectly aware of the reasons of war, he knows the position of the government and he completely agrees with it. Our soldier is smart, perfectly trained militarily, brave, quick-witted, skillful in navigating the chart, knows the rules of providing the first aid, conscious in hygiene and therefore is neat, is able to obey and die; all the orders, no matter how difficult they are, are carried out bravely and vigorously. The Russians expected to meet us, being suppressed by the upcoming difficulties of the war, escaping after their first attack, but we had never retreated and only advanced!" [15, p. 1]. That is how in one of the national newspapers the Japanese explained the reasons of the Russian defeat.
The Japanese accepted learning history as one of the primary subjects. They were positive to the fact that history really helps to awake the patriotic feelings.
In J. Vellers' memoirs about Japan "Le Japon d'aujourd-hui" (Japan today), the author focused on national psychology which, according to the basis of tactics and strategy, was considered to be one of the primary factors in making up a military plan of any campaign. J. Vellers said that the Japanese were deprived of religious feelings, they were not at all bothered by the thought of an afterlife, which potentially characterized them as a ruthless enemy. Since 1881, the Japanese began to look at the peoples of the West not as at the model, but with envy and as at the contestants determining "modern Japanese militarism as an element striving to connect the old concepts and the new views" [12, p. 10].
Reviewing the opinion about teaching the military history as one of the components of tactics and strategy in the cadet colleges of Russia, the leading teachers emphasized the importance of teaching the subjects orderly, which would positively affect making the character; in a textbook of military history there should be the tasks not only for cramming, but also the creative ones for understanding the past for the sake of estimating the present. The German philosopher I. Gerder stated: "We do not learn for school, but for life," which is the undeniable basis of military pedagogical science [16].
In general, teaching history is effective if it is based on the following concept: stating the facts, their analysis, the explanation of reasons and consequences. The idea of using the principle of individual approach to each student.
The events of the Russo-Japanese war convinced the Military Ministry representatives that teaching history both in the cadet colleges and Naval academy should have the same methodology.
The question of the content and quality of teaching the Naval history course in the cadet colleges and Naval schools has repeatedly been raised at St. Petersburg Naval Community assemblies, which by 1909 comprised 33 members - the representatives of Russian military, scientific and pedagogic society.
At the assembly held on March 9 and 16, 1909, the questions of new methods of teaching Naval history, tactics and strategy were once again discussed.
The historical similarities analysis and consequence of events, - the military conflicts preconditions, - clearly pointed to the existence of a potential threat - the beginning of war in the Far East, as some representatives of the Naval intelligentsia repeatedly informed the Russian government about. This position was supported by Grand Duke Alexander Romanov, who also foresaw the inevitable military conflict with Japan. "Our fleet is much weaker than the Japanese one, not to mention the fact that the ships of the Japanese fleet have up to 100 large-caliber rapid-firing guns, and our squadron does not have a single rapid-firing gun. The main element of modern combat
ships is speed and rapid-fire artillery, our squadron does not possess these elements" [17, p. 81].
N. Klado, unlike A. Romanov described conducting combat operations from some certain philosophical positions. "When people invented gunpowder, they thought that there would be no wars any more" [4, p. 7].
However, the gunpowder invention just led to changing the tactics, to a combat and social revolution. Crimean campaign became an example of it - the era of serious technical changes, artillery updates, innovations in the sphere of building fortifications, as well as inventing the underwater telegraph, which for the first time in the military history was used in Crimea.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the method of counting the statistics of losses was introduced into military science, after what it became obvious that " improving the weapons and its destructive power just affects the tactics, but does not increase the statistics of losses" [4, p. 7].
Publishing their thoughts on the pages of popular Russian newspapers, the supporters of introducing tactics and strategy into the academic process bitterly stated the fact that "even now we don't want to know any statistics and historical experience and don't recognize the Naval tactics, strategy, or anything at all would seem to be scientific" [4, p. 8].
Analyzing the consequences of the Russo-Japanese campaign, the participant in the events A. Lehman stated that "it is necessary to have a reliable Navy, controlled by a strong smart feast guided by the officers who know and most importantly love their difficult and dangerous profession, who know their yellow [Japanese] contestants well not by just their appearance, but by their lifestyle, mentality, religion, who know all the yellow waters nooks and who love this distant and often hostile eastern coast as strong as their own Motherland" [6, p. 4].
Indeed, Russia estimated the war with Japan as "just a colonial war" [18, p. 18], but it should have served as a good strategic lesson for entire Russia. It was necessary to learn how to analyze the reasons of defeat adequately, learn lessons for the future, and prevent those events of turning into oblivion. As one of the prominent Russian shipbuilders, public and political leader M.I. Kazi mentioned "you can't reject the benefits of the printing machine, just because it can be used for printing unquotable papers" [19, p. 96].
After the Russo-Japanese war, it became important to take up the Navy moral and material revival. Russia paid the price for neglecting the operational-tactical training of military specialists. The unwillingness of only one state to conduct a war does not guarantee peace. Therefore, there should be a boost to bringing through smart educational reforms in the military sphere, because when undertaking the certain reform, it is necessary to identify educational process disadvantages and possible ways to eliminate them.
In 1902, N. Klado worked out the project of increasing the Naval officers' training. Of course, this demanded certain financial expenses, he considered them to be comparable with one destroyer commissioning price, and the annual maintenance of the Naval Academy would be equal to the cost of its annual voyage. If the question of the Academy was solved positively, it had been logical to separate it from the cadet colleges.
Carrying out the Higher Naval education reform, the following issues had to be discussed by the specialized Academic Board:
1. Did the Russo-Japanese war demonstrate an insufficient level of education among the personnel, especially among the tactical officers? If so, is it really necessary to refuse the idea of arranging the specialized classes for operational-tactical training and to establish a separate educational institution?
2. According to which of the two proposed ways should the Russian fleet be developed: French or German?
In the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries Germany stood on the positions that the army would be significantly increased in the number of compliment and, most importantly, in its defense capability. If the representatives of the ruling classes fall under the general obligatory military service, the quality and the effectiveness of combat training will increase because before the regular troops were staffed only by illiterate representatives of the poorest classes [20].
In Germany, especially in the second half of the 19th century, high requirements were applied to officers' positions. After the Vienna Congress, it was decided to make the officers' staff commissioned both by the representatives of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, without establishing any class barriers. At the same time, the Prussian military reformer, General G. Scharnhorst, rejected the idea of replacing the age criteria by the educational one. In the social hierarchy, the Prussian officer, despite having quite a modest salary, held a high social reputation, proving that all officers were equal.
After 20 years of service, officers had to pass through the procedure of the so-called certification. Having passed it successfully, the officers could be introduced for being appointed to commanding positions; if otherwise the officer was enlisted in his rank to the reserve staff.
The military policy pursued by the French government was totally different from the German system. The French believed that the army couldn't exist without uniting military and spiritual culture, and the power of the army of any state directly depends on its personnel cultural level. All this led to originating the so-called of French military culture phenomenon, which meant acquiring the detailed knowledge about the war in its broadest context, and also formed the ability of the army to apply the achievements
of domestic and world science and culture to carry out the tasks according to its purpose effectively.
The French distinguished the following main components of military culture:
- political culture;
- commanding and executive culture;
- disciplinary culture;
- staff and military-technical culture;
- the culture of military personnel relations.
A historical analysis of military campaigns indicates that it is ideological and political culture that helps to fortify the ideas of national patriotism and national identity as well. In the Russian army it is the faith that is an important component. The Orthodox church has always supported, united, inspired the people to fight during the enemy invasions on Russia. It was the community of the Orthodox Christian faith that played a leading role in protecting the Russian land from the invasions of the Poles and Swedes, the Teutons and Napoleon.
The ethic side of military culture is closely connected with the spiritual image of society but at the same time has a specific character. Spiritually the army is a significant social layer, the image of which is very difficult to be changed by the commanders since it is built in to the subconscious of military personnel [21].
French admiral E. Fournier, commenting on the issues of military moral, stuck to the position that the main indicator of military culture level is the way the warriors defended their Motherland with minimum losses, efforts and time. Thus, this component is the criteria to judge on the cultural condition of the army and the nation as a whole.
The academic military service and reforms are closely related, and therefore should be carried out strictly parallel. Educational reform is the most important one, which is worth to contribute money to, in particular, to organize educational and pedagogical activities to improve the quality of personnel knowledge.
There is no doubt that during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia paid a penalty for its mistake thinking that Higher military education was quite good, while comparatively poor Japan found the financial funds to train its officers abroad. In addition, our libraries were short of specialized maritime literature. The activities of educational institutions
Библиографический список
were not standardized by the Scientific Committee. This ruling organ existed until the 1890s, after which the academic duties and responsibilities were transferred to the Educational Committee and the Naval department of the Main Naval Headquarters, which in a very formal way was granted the status of scientific.
The main question was still what and how to teach. In order to answer this question correctly, the program of officers' classes and Naval colleges had to be brought into strict compliance.
The next point within the upcoming reforms was the question of whether transformations of Higher Naval education were inevitable, because it could only be obtained at Nikolaev Naval Academy. An officer having Higher military education is a person who knows the theory of strategy, tactics, Naval history. But at the end of the 20th century in Russia practice still dominated over theory.
Speaking about the historical lessons, the greatest thinkers of the late 19th -early 20th centuries, being realistic, promoted the idea of a historical analysis of military events, creating an entirely new military pedagogical direction - the strategy and tactics of Naval affairs based on the scientific past and present substantiation. One of the analytical articles claimed: "Glorifying Sinop, we came to Tsushima" [21, p. 23], thereby emphasizing the importance of an efficient analysis of historical lessons, which had to be taught at the stage of secondary military education. This principle was to be used while creating the Naval strategy theory. The new effective types of weapons and equipment introduction, the combat effectiveness of the armed forces were rapidly increasing, which gave the way to solving more complex tactical, operational and strategic tasks and preceded the necessity to improve the quality of officers' training.
Conclusions. The analysis of military historical events once again made both military theorists and practitioners think about the need to demonstrate their skills not only in case of the imminent military threat, but also in peacetime, because it doesn't cheapen the importance of the past war, but on the contrary - in such a way one gains the assurance in the actuality of the views, having passed through hard war experience; and what is more important - become respected in doing the job in peacetime getting assured how fruitful it is.
1. Гусева О.Г Эволюция взглядов военных мыслителей России на войну как общественное явление (последняя четверть XIX - первая четверть XX века): Диссертация ... кандидата исторических наук. Москва, 2003.
2. Ponting C. The Crimean War: The Truth Behind the Myth. Random House. London, 2004.
3. Ransel D. Pre-Reform Russia: 1801 - 1855. Oxford, UK, 2011.
4. Кладо Н.Л. Русско-японская война. Hoeoe eрeмя. 1904; № 10081: 7 - 11.
5. Грулев М.В. Записки генерала-еврея. Москва: Кучково поле; Гиперборея, 2007.
6. Леман А. О морских корпусах. Севастопольский вестник. 1905; № 22 (432): 3 - 4.
7. Ветер А.А. Заметки о Николае Кладо. Трагедия военной мысли. Литературная Россия. 2002; № 28: 4 - 8. Available at: http://www.universalinternetlibrary.ru/book/24430/ ogl.shtml
8. Достоевский Ф.М. Дневник писателя за 1876 г. Ф. М. Достоевского. Санкт-Петербург: Тип. В.В. Оболенского, 1877.
9. Костенко В.П. На «Орле» в Цусиме. Ленинград: Судпромгиз, 1955.
10. Маковицкий Д.П. У Толстого, 1904 - 1910: «Яснополянские записки» Д.П. Маковицкого: в 4 кн. Москва: Наука, 1979.
11. Кладо Н.Л. Введение в курс военно-морского искусства. Санкт-Петербург, 1909.
12. Велерс Ж. Современная Япония. Школы и просвещение. Hoeoe eрeмя. 1904; № 10049: 7 - 11.
13. Esthus R. Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War. Russian Review. 1981; № 4 (40): 396 - 411. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919
14. Nish I. The origins of the Russo-Japanese war. Longman, London-New York, 1985.
15. Гаспринский И.Б. Японская газета. Переводчик. 1905; № 22: 1.
16. Wells D. The Russo-Japanese war in cultural perspective, 1904- 1905. St. Martin's Pres. New York, 1999.
17. Письма и доклады великого князя Александра Михайловича императору Николаю II (1889 - 1917). Москва: Кучково поле, 2016.
18. Wolff D. The Russo-Japanese war in global perspective. World War Zero. Leiden, Biggleswade, 2006.
19. Щеглов Л. О морских реформах. Морской сборник. 1909; № 2: 91 - 101.
20. Streich P. Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. Foreign Policy Analysis. 2016; № 4 (12): 489 - 511. Available at: https: // doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12
21. Кладо Н.Л. Очерки мировой войны. Петроград: издание редакции «Морской сборник», 1919.
References
1. Guseva O.G. 'Evolyuciya vzglyadov voennyh myslitelej Rossii na vojnu kak obschestvennoe yavlenie (poslednyaya chetvert' XIX - pervaya chetvert' XX veka): Dissertaciya ... kandidata istoricheskih nauk. Moskva, 2003.
2. Ponting C. The Crimean War: The Truth Behind the Myth. Random House. London, 2004.
3. Ransel D. Pre-Reform Russia: 1801 - 1855. Oxford, UK, 2011.
4. Klado N.L. Russko-yaponskaya vojna. Novoe vremya. 1904; № 10081: 7 - 11.
5. Grulev M.V. Zapiskigenerala-evreya. Moskva: Kuchkovo pole; Giperboreya, 2007.
6. Leman A. O morskih korpusah. Sevastopol'skij vestnik. 1905; № 22 (432): 3 - 4.
7. Veter A.A. Zametki o Nikolae Klado. Tragediya voennoj mysli. Literaturnaya Rossiya. 2002; № 28: 4 - 8. Available at: http://www.universalinternetlibrary.ru/book/24430/ogl.shtml
8. Dostoevskij F.M. Dnevnik pisatelya za 1876 g. F. M. Dostoevskogo. Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. V.V. Obolenskogo, 1877.
9. Kostenko V.P. Na «Orle» v Cusime. Leningrad: Sudpromgiz, 1955.
10. Makovickij D.P. U Tolstogo, 1904 - 1910: "Yasnopolyanskie zapiski" D.P. Makovickogo: v 4 kn. Moskva: Nauka, 1979.
11. Klado N.L. Vvedenie v kurs voenno-morskogo iskusstva. Sankt-Peterburg, 1909.
12. Velers Zh. Sovremennaya Yaponiya. Shkoly i prosveschenie. Novoe vremya. 1904; № 10049: 7 - 11.
13. Esthus R. Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War. Russian Review. 1981; № 4 (40): 396 - 411. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919
14. Nish I. The origins of the Russo-Japanese war. Longman, London-New York, 1985.
15. Gasprinskij I.B. Yaponskaya gazeta. Perevodchik. 1905; № 22: 1.
16. 'Wells D. The Russo-Japanese war in cultural perspective, 1904 1905. St. Martins Pres. New York, 1999.
17. Pis'ma i doklady velikogo knyazya Aleksandra Mihajlovicha imperatoru Nikolayu II (1889 - 1917). Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, 2016.
18. Wolff D. The Russo-Japanese war in global perspective. World War Zero. Leiden, Biggleswade, 2006.
19. Scheglov L. O morskih reformah. Morskoj sbornik. 1909; № 2: 91 - 101.
20. Streich P. Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. Foreign Policy Analysis. 2016; № 4 (12): 489 - 511. Available at: https: // doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12
21. Klado N.L. Ocherkimirovoj vojny. Petrograd: izdanie redakcii «Morskoj sbornik», 1919.
Статья поступила в редакцию 17.01.21
