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ON THE PROSPECTS FOR SHAPING A CIVIL NATION IN DAGHESTAN
Mustafa BILALOV
D.Sc. (Philos.), Professor, Head of the Department of Ontology and the Theory of Cognition,
State University of Daghestan (Makhachkala, the Russian Federation)
Introd
Russia's integrity depends on ensuring civil identity as a priority factor in the development of society and the individual. Civil identity is fully realized in a civil nation that gradually takes shape within a particular society. The crisis of multiculturalism in the West triggered by the crisis of the European civilization and culture calls for a revision of certain ideas and theories
uction
associated with civil identity. The question is whether the national regions of Russia (including Daghestan) will manage to adjust themselves to Western civilization in the specific conditions of a multinational and multi-confessional society.
This article is intended as an assessment of the general prospects for shaping a civil nation in Daghestan.
The North Caucasian and Daghestani Realities from the Point of View of Shaping a Civil Nation and Common All-Russia Identity
Some analysts think that in Daghestan even the classical ideologies—Marxism (popular among the Lezghian-speaking peoples), liberal (shared by the Darghins, Kumyks, and Laks), and Islamic (the Avars)—are ethnically tinged. The far from favorable combination of ethnic and religious trends and
the related negative political, legal, etc. processes unfolding in the republic insistently demand consistent legal and political measures to smooth out the contradictions, ensure sustainable economic growth, address the environmental and social problems, and remedy the current shortage of trained managers and administrators.
Today, it has become obvious that legal defects frequently trigger conflicts. The ethnic and confessional tension in some of the constituencies of the Russian Federation (particularly in the Northern Caucasus), for example, is caused by certain shortcomings of Russia's federative structure.
Early in 2010, for example, the leaders of the Russian Federation surprised the academic and political community and society with a decree that created a new, North Caucasian Federal District (NCFD) and divided the previously existing Southern Federal District (SFD) into two parts with unequal natural and geographic conditions, population size, and, most important, the problems that have been accumulating there for many decades.
Those who wrote the decree probably looked, with good reason, at the Northern Caucasus as an integral civilization—the new district is home to practically all the Muslims of the Russian Caucasus (nearly 4 million). In fact, by detaching the North Caucasian ethnicities from the more or less flourishing regions (Rostov, Krasnodar, Volgograd, Astrakhan, etc.), they merely lumped together the old problems and made them even worse.
It would have been better, politically and geographically, to divide the SFD (complete with the regions mentioned above) into two large districts adjacent to the Caspian and Black Sea coasts. Each would have had equal populations of about 10 to 12 million and a territory of 200-250 thousand sq km (comparable to some of the U.S. states).
Even though these districts would have demonstrated differently geared social and ethnic evolutionary trends, which means that this consolidation of sorts would have been temporary, it would have laid the foundation for national, linguistic, and religious unity at the level of units larger than republics and regions. This would have supplied the ethnic groups as homogeneous communities with firmer ground in the coming globalization storms.1
In Daghestan, as well as in the other national republics, for that matter, all economic, cultural, and political problems are resolved in the context of national relations. There is no reason to believe that all changes are for the best—some of them might negatively affect Russia's numerous ethnic groups, which makes preservation of ethnic identity of the nationalities of Daghestan a priority.
On the other hand, there is an obvious trend in our day and age: traditional ethnicities are being replaced with developing civil nations (nation-state, political nation, etc.).
Territorial unity and economic integrity, the decisive factors of yesterday, are today being replaced by spiritual factors coming to the fore in national processes. This probably explains why in the latter half of the 20th century, the American neoliberals switched from the melting pot theory to the conception of cultural pluralism and, later, to various models of multiculturalism rightly described as "a direct outcome and instrument of globalization."2
Even in the conditions of consistently realized multiculturalism (which is fairly contradictory as a process and a policy), regional values serve as an indicator of national identity; they push aside the old, extremely localized foundations of ethnic life—language, traditions, behavioral norms, etc.
The above trends (and not only them) call for a revision of the well-established ideas of the administrative-territorial division of the Russian Federation.
1 For more detail, see: M.I. Bilalov, "Regionalizatsia kak alternativa negativam globalizatsii," in: Rossia: mnogoo-brazie kultur i globalizatsii, ed. by I.K. Liseev, Rossiskaia akademia nauk, Institut filosofii, Moskovskoe filosofskoe ob-shchestvo, KANON-PLUS Publishers, Moscow, 2010, pp. 331-349.
2 M.V. Tlostanova, "Multikulturalism: porozhdenie ili alternativa globalizatsii?" Vestnik Rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria "Filosofia," No. 1, 2006, p. 113.
Since many of the legal collisions between RF constituencies develop into ethnic problems, the academic and political communities looking for means and methods to settle ethnic contradictions on the road toward a civil nation inevitably arrive at the legal model of the European Union. The principles of multiculturalism, which presuppose preservation of and respect for different cultural identities, present a special interest for the North Caucasian ethnicities. This model looks at common culture (in which there are no backward or "wrong" cultures) as a starting point for spiritual flourishing based on a dialogue of civilizations rather than as an excuse to ignore other cultures.
There is the opinion in the West that multiculturalism, a brief episode in human history which ends the era of industrial modernization and classical liberal civil society, is in crisis; the most far-sighted politicians have pointed to the "division of the sphere of culture" as a way out. They argue that the public sphere needs cultural uniformity based on unified formalized norms, while cultural diversity should thrive in the spheres of private and spiritual life. Religious ceremonies belong to temples, while the street is a sphere of civilian communication.
When talking about the Northern Caucasus, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev repeatedly criticized multiculturalism and pointed out that it leads to disintegration cropping up in the Northern Caucasus in the form of a clan system, ethnic separatism, and religious radicalism. On many occasions the president referred to civilian integration, which he described as "all-Russia patriotism" and the task of developing an "all-Russia nation" as a means of healing the ills of disintegration.
Some think that multiculturalism dates back to the Soviet period, that is, it is older than the European. It is believed that it was an inalienable part of the Soviet state policy of setting up republics, districts, and regions and was a form of encouraging ethnic and national identity.
It should be borne in mind, however, that there are at least two elements which make Soviet and European multiculturalism different.
■ First, in the Soviet period, the peoples of the national republics permanently lived in their ethnic territories; their cooperation and communication was limited to remote economic and cultural ties.
■ Second, in the Soviet Union, public life was deprived of the religious factor, which ensured primacy of the ethnic culture no matter how divisional and isolationist it was.
This means that we cannot totally agree with President Medvedev's optimism who, while criticizing certain aspects of multiculturalism, describes it as the best possible future for Russia's poly-ethnic and poly-confessional society.
We should bear in mind that in the West the Islamic factor moved to the frontline of public and political life much earlier than in the Russian Federation; this undermined the policy of multiculturalism even in the most advanced civil societies with rich historical traditions and democratic experience.
Ethnic and Religious Factors of the Development of a Civil Nation
Those wishing to grasp the regularities of the development of a civil nation and civil identity should inevitably pay attention to ethnic and religious factors; the logic of historic collisions, which accompanied and still accompany social development, suggests certain conclusions. It seems that the natural desire of man to correlate his life, limited in time and space, with Eternity, transcend the limits of his individual existence, and identify himself with society is primarily realized in the ethnic and religious spheres. Furthermore, "transcending the limits" in the religious sense takes place much later than it occurs in the ethnic sphere and on a much more impressive scale.
The individual quest for a "shared state identity" is closely related to the quest for a "blending" of the national and the ethnic; it is realized in the process of individual socialization and perfection. We should bear in mind that nationality and ethnicity are not one and the same thing.
Today, most Russian philosophers think that sociopolitical unity (agreement on basic social and political values) is the key feature of any nationality and that nationality and the emergence of a civil society cannot be separated.
Ethnicity, on the other hand, is the product of a historical process which created a stable community of people living in the same territory, having similar facial features, speaking the same language, and sharing the same lifestyle and culture. The inner (genetically inherited somatic and physical descriptions) and external (territory, terrain, and climate) features can be described as the determining factors.
This description of ethnicity is typical of a political scientific analysis of the more or less recent past. Post-Soviet Russian society demonstrates two new, opposite trends.
In response to the crisis of common national identity caused by the Soviet Union's disintegration, public consciousness is growing regionalized. By that time, the rest of the world was changing: globalization intensified personal awareness of ethnic and national identity, with ethnic affiliation becoming a matter of personal choice. Everyone is free to join any historically stable whole, even if subjective choice is correlated with certain objective factors, such as common origins, common language, common territory, culture, and religion. Today, however, the objective factors are growing increasingly vague: the individual is merely "aware" of his ethnic identity.
Very soon it will become hard in Daghestan not only to insist on one's ethnic identity, but even to be merely "aware" of it. Contemporary dynamics have diluted the idea of a common ethnic territory; today, many regions are best described as an ethnic patchwork. A shared past, likewise, has lost its importance as a criterion of ethnic identity; in many cases, the past belongs to several ethnicities (many of which know next to nothing about it).
A common language is no longer an indubitable feature of an ethnic group: there is a multitude of social dialects; in some places people acquire a new "mother" tongue (Russian, in the case of Daghestan).
Ethnic culture and folklore are pushed to the side in everyday life (particularly in cities and towns); books, theaters, and museums are almost completely neglected.
Religion is slowly losing its ethno-differentiating role; there are huge numbers of formal believers, unbelievers, and atheists, while affiliation with one of the world religions has become supra-ethnic.
Not infrequently, ethnic affiliation is unrelated to social status: inherited from parents, it is beyond individual control.
Today, ethnonational identity cannot be described as a factor which slows down the advance toward a civil nation and "all-Russia" identity.
There is another, no less obvious trend: an all-Russia civil identity is taking shape, albeit slowly and torturously, with the religious factor playing a considerable role in the process. "Religion... determines extreme abstractions which serve as the foundation of man's basic ideas about the world."3 Religion presupposes that the human soul is dominated by the feeling of dependence on a transcendental secret force which supplies various interpretations of the meaning of evolution of spiritual ties between man and the Absolute.
According to Schleiermacher, religion takes man outside the limits of the finite and creates in him a special awareness of his dependence on the infinite.
Hegel treated religion as an awareness of absolute spirit, which can be interpreted as a special link between man and mankind and which takes the individual beyond the limits of the personal.
3 V.N. Belogortsev, Sotsiokulturnye transformatsii i religia: kontseptualny i kulturno-istorichesky analiz, Abstract of doctorate thesis, Rostov-on-Don, 2010, p. 34.
According to Durkheim, religion is an ideological mechanism which ensures the self-identification of people and social integrity through the sacralization of basic social ties.
Sigmund Freud interpreted religious ties as an expression of the oldest, strongest, and vitally important desires of mankind.
Religion as a certain transcendental-uniform force affects personality by widening and elevating its fundamental vital position. Nikolay Berdyaev wrote that "God is not like a force of nature or power in society and the state"4 when it comes to shaping human personality. Even the most developed biological feelings (self-preservation, physical domination, etc.) that underlie civil nationalism and patriotism cannot express their meanings. Berdyaev asserted that nothing can compete in this sphere with religion and God. Man's desire to achieve the highest determines the "spiritual state of society," "the presence of inner transcendental determination of those who have submitted themselves to the authority of supreme values and dedicated themselves to the service of a certain non-destructible spiritual principle."5
At certain stages of historical development, in multiconfessional societies in which religion is not separated from the state, this principle may take the form of a state civil identity. Today, such states are few and far between.
In the culturally varied context of Russia and its North Caucasian republics, the religious situation is far from simple. While discussing the emergence of an all-Russia civil identity and nationality, we should bear in mind that religion affects public life both positively and negatively. Christianity and Islam (and other religions, for that matter) may disunite ethnic groups living in one country by deliberately adding weight to ethno-national features. In the globalization era of mass migration of people and of coexistence of ethnic groups in national diasporas, when the "colossal inequality of everyday life"6 becomes obvious, the religious factor acquires a conflict-prone charge despite the fact that the culture of post-modernity levels out many of the ethno-cultural specifics.
This is what is going on in Russia; it turns out that religion may postpone the emergence of a civil society and nationality, as well as the development of multiculturalism and a shared national identity. In Russia's recent history, when religion reinstated itself as part of social life, it became clear that the "friendship of peoples" had been much less conflicting and complicated at a distance than in a multiconfessional society in which ethnic and confessional groups come into contact. The 1990s demonstrated that religion, a source of patriotic inspiration and civil identity on a nationwide scale, may breed problems inside confessions, among confessions, and between the state and confessions.7 This could threaten the very foundations of an all-Russia civil identity.
It seems that despite the more or less good prospects for multiculturalism (including its readjusted versions) elsewhere in the world, which, as a conception, perfectly fits the traditions of liberal democracy (which treats human rights and freedoms as an absolute priority), Russia needs a scientifically substantiated theory of harmonization of national relations in its territory (including Daghestan) and a corresponding program of social life for the near and more distant future.
The government of Daghestan never let the problem out of sight; there is a recently enacted republican program called Development of National Relations in the Republic of Daghestan for 20112015, which, however, lacks a conceptual base and strong political support.
4 N.A. Berdyaev, "Tsarstvo dukha i tsarstvo kesarya" (The Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Caesar), in: Dukh
1 realnost, Introduced and compiled by V.N. Kalyuzhny, AST Publishers, Moscow; Folio, Kharkov, 2003, p. 585.
5 K.Z. Hakopian, "Religia i massovaia kultura: problema vzaimootnoshenia," in: Khristianstvo i kultura (k 2000-letiyu Khristianstva): Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii. 15-18 maia 2000 goda, Astrakhan, in
2 parts, Parts I, TsNTEP Publishers, Asktrakhan, 2000, p. 202.
6 V.V. Putin, "Rossia: natsionalny vopros," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 January, 2012.
7 See: E. Kratov, "Religia v sovremennom obshchestve," Gazeta Severnogo Kavkaza, No. 23, 2005.
Are Human Rights and Ethnic Rights Compatible?
What is more important for Daghestan—human rights or ethnic rights? In Daghestan, and in Russia as a whole, it is highly important to ensure human rights, although ethnic rights are even more important. They should be ensured and guaranteed together with the guaranteed preservation of the language and material and cultural values of all ethnic groups. Since Daghestan has not yet come close enough to the standards and ideals of EU civil societies, our projects and programs should be based on the principle of national centrism and democratic federalism rather than on the priority of human rights and freedoms. All peoples and national administrative-territorial regions should become absolutely equal.
To achieve the level of human rights and freedoms that has already been achieved in the West, we should establish mechanisms of legal and real protection of the national and regional interests of each of the federal constituencies. It is highly important to harmonize the powers of the Center and the regions (territory, region, city), delineate them, and master ways and methods of conflict prevention. It should be borne in mind and recognized that in most regions the rights of ethnic groups are infringed upon, while their needs are neglected on a wide scale. If this is not remedied, titular nations and ethnic minorities will rebel: the former will insist on their exclusive rights while the latter on their elementary rights and freedoms. Violence cannot be excluded.
It is equally important to bear in mind that human rights and freedoms should be adequately protected without going to the extreme, the grievous effects of which have already cropped up in Paris, London, Moscow, and some of the regions of Russia.
Once More on the North Caucasian Federal District in the Context of Group Boons and Human Rights
Any discussion of the legal shortcomings of contemporary Russia's nationalities policy inevitably turns to the specific feature of the North Caucasian Federal District. Its problems and ills are largely related to the "new" status of the Russians (about 3 million) living in its territory. The problems of the post-perestroika period hit them more than the other groups; today, the NCFD is moving further away from the rest of Russia.
I have already written above that two larger administrative units (within the confines of region-alization policy) would have helped preserve the cultural diversity of the non-Russian ethnicities and considerably improved the status of the local Russians. They would have rid themselves of their feeling of being detached and separated from Russia. Russians would have consolidated their position when those who left the native lands in the last few decades came back, thus increasing the population in traditional Russian settlements; more than that—specialists on the economy, culture, and other fields would become more evenly dispersed across the district. The Russian language and many other elements of Russian culture, for that matter, as the cornerstone of a regionalized entity or a civil nation, would function in a more adequate, rather than surrogate (this happens today in Daghestan) way. This means that the Krasnodar Territory, historically tied to the Caucasus, would have looked more logical as part of the new Federal District.
This would have created conditions conducive to consolidating several ethnic groups divided by administrative borders (the Darghins, Chechens, Kumyks, Ingush, Ossetians, Tatars, Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, etc.). A large district would have made it easier to bring closer the ethnicities that belong to the Iranian (Ossets, Kurds, Persians, and Tats), Turkic (Kazakhs, Tatars, Azeris, Kumyks, Karachais, Balkarians, and Nogais), and North Caucasian (Chechens, Avars, Lezghians, Dargins, Ingush, Laks, Tabasarans, Rutuls, Tsakhurs, Aguls, Kabardinians, Adyghes, Circassians, and Abazins) families of languages.
The Slavic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians), carriers of a special cultural code, would have also become consolidated. "This civilizational identity is based on the preservation of Russian cultural dominance, which flows not only from ethnic Russians, but from all carriers of this identity regardless of nationality," and presents itself as Russia's "civilizational identity."8
Some experts believe that the two strategies clash when the civilized world formulates and implements a state nationalities policy. In her Khoroshee obshchestvo (Good Society), which deals with the civil societies of the West, Prof. Valentina Fedotova writes that, on the one hand, there is a desire to "impart to human rights local and regional specifics and adjust them to the available human material." This, in turn, leads to a confrontation with the universal nature of human rights, "their nationalization and privatization." On the other hand, however, there are attempts to "adjust the available human material to human rights."
In Daghestan, and in Russia as a whole, there are still no conditions in which the strategy used by the developed counties can be implemented. Local analysts have pointed out that the people living in Daghestan have left the stage of ethnogenesis behind and should, therefore, be described as ethno-cultural nationalities. The republic's socioeconomic development reveals trends toward national consolidation. While being fully aware of their status as an independent entity of social development, the Daghestani peoples (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, etc.) demonstrate well-developed awareness of their nationality and patriotism and are striving for their own statehood, that is, they are seeking the status of a political nation.
Meanwhile, the road of the Daghestani peoples (which belong to different language groups, religious trends, ethnic mentalities, etc.) toward national consolidation is not an easy one.
In the Russian Federation, all the democratic changes should primarily promote ethnocultural pluralism, ethnic parity, the principle of equal importance, and support of the cultures of all peoples. The program of development of national relations in Daghestan mentioned above envisaged financial support of the state—it does not abandon these relations to the mercy of the market.
It goes without saying that human rights are absolute and "do not depend on the group to which the individual belongs, which means that the problem of discrimination by race, sex, language, or religion is prevented not by granting special rights to these groups but by ensuring equal rights to all citizens."9 The latter is a challenging task which defies any prompt solutions and demands that the group rights of societies be observed. This has been corroborated by all sorts of elections when the desire to observe human rights in a multinational region or district gave high posts not to the best representatives of the numerically largest peoples. The "victors" were bitterly disappointed, while the rights of other Daghestani ethnicities were infringed upon.
Many of our liberal-democratically-minded politicians and experts (including those working in Daghestan) who are ashamed of their "backwardness" should bear in mind that guaranteeing group rights (including ethnic rights) has been a target of recent concern for the United States, the leader of
8 [http://www.network54.com/Forum/84302/thread/1327428728/last-1327432635/%ADRussia-+The+national+ question++by+Vladimir+Putin].
9 V.G. Fedotova, Khoroshee obshchestvo, Moscow, 2005, p. 472.
the free world. On the other hand, experts admit that despite the considerable achievements, America's policy of "overcoming unfair inequality, rather than extending quotas or seats in representative bodies of power,"10 that is, resolving the problem of freedom rather than welfare, has developed into practically unassailable problems.
The doctrine of group rights and boons is gaining momentum in the West in the form of the so-called communitarian approach, which destroys the liberal tradition. Today it is the focus of the post-modernity discourse, which is much more aware of the problems of the non-Western world with no experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment behind it. Famous German academic Karl-Otto Apel, who supports this approach, has pointed out that respect for the individual who belongs to a specific cultural tradition can be regarded as acceptance of and respect for the individual rights of man.
The doctrine of group rights and boons, that is, the communitarian approach should replace the priority of human rights and freedoms, a cornerstone of liberal democracy. Respect for a social group (ethnicity, confession, or society as a whole) and the fact of belonging to it can and should be regarded as respect for man's individual rights. In a world where large societies live in dire poverty and are deprived of quality health services and education, while their native language and traditional culture are on the brink of extinction, communitarianism can be seen as an answer to the demands of conscience and an attempt to make freedom more tangible by extending boons to these societies.11
Liberal traditions based on Catholicism and Protestantism stress individual rights and freedoms and, in the final analysis, neglect the national; in this way, they cultivate nationalism in the form of cosmopolitism and chauvinism. The Eurasian spirit (Russian, Daghestani) should regard healthy nationalism, which protects cultural and religious specifics, as moral. In Daghestan and the Northern Caucasus as a whole, we should speak not of ethnic nationalism but of Daghestani or North Caucasian patriotism, which protects the region's civilizational principles and specifics.
The Constitution of Russia should account for the regional politically correct specifics and enforce principles of con-social democracy (proportionate representation of all ethnocultural groups in the government bodies and their access to resources, as well as the mutual right of veto and qualified majority when it comes to important decisions). Furthermore, we can agree that the "principles of con-social democracy only partly resolve the problems of conflicts and extreme forms of nationalism" and "can play a positive role only at a certain stage of 'gathering together' the numerous ethnicities living in any given territory."12
Researchers note that this approach is close to Islamic values, which have much in common with the ideals of civil society. This breeds the hope that the regional models of civil society and multicul-turalism acceptable for Daghestan, the Northern Caucasus, and Russia as a whole will make a dialectical approach to human rights and ethnic rights possible.
We should avoid the errors of the past, not be impatient, try to accelerate the natural course of the process, venerate alien experience, and copy it indiscriminatingly. In the past, we were pushed into the "radiant future" and "prosperity." This was done with the best of intentions but with disregard for our history and culture. Social order and the economy can be changed and even friends can be abandoned, yet no aims, no matter how lofty, can justify rejection of one's own past; the attempts to change a nation's mentality and break its spirit, the beginning and end of its existence and welfare, inevitably dent its national identity.
10 Ibid., p. 476.
11 See: Ibid., pp. 478-486.
12 O.V. Chistiakova, "Etnicheskiy natsionalizm kak politicheskaia problema," in: Nauka. Filosofia. Obshchestvo. Materialy VRossiyskogo filosofskogo kongressa, Vol. II, Parallel, Novosibirsk, 2009, p. 534.
The Civil Nation and Global Civil Society
The civil nation is a healthy opponent of an ethnic nation; it is an entity of citizens united not so much by blood kinship as by the state in which they live, public ideals, and a common cause. A civil nation means that the larger part of population is politically active and can influence the course pursued by the government. The prospects of its emergence have nothing to do with primordialism, constructivism, instrumentalism, etc; in Russia and Daghestan, which is part of Russia, its emergence is associated with global civil society rather than with Western civil societies of the liberal type. We can agree with what Vladimir Putin wrote in his article quoted above that the day a civil nation appears will be "a day of victory over oneself, over internal animosity and strife, when classes and nationalities acknowledge themselves as being one community one nation. We have the right to consider this holiday the birthday of our civil nation."13
In the late 20th century, the Western world became a foundation for the gradually emerging global civil society; some of the contemporary globalization conceptions use this term to describe the infinitely broad non-political human community in which societal communities that belong to the same sociopolitical types are united by common values to address the problems important for all people. Despite the fact that the gap between globalization and specifics (identities) of any community constitutes the main contradiction (and serves as the main driving force) of the emerging global information society based on information networks, there are certain advantages conducive to a civil society in Russia and an all-Russia identity. This is, however, the topic of a separate study.14
Conclusion
I would like to outline a few of the most important conclusions.
■ First, civil identity is completely realized in a civil nation which, in turn, matures within the framework of a civil society.
13 [http://www.network54.com/Forum/84302/thread/1327428728/last-1327432635/%ADRussia-+The+national+question++by+Vladimir+Putin].
14 I offered my point of view on the subject in the following works: "Tsivilizatsionnye perspektivy Rossii i Daghes-tana v epokhu globalizatsii," in: Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie, pravovye i kulturnye problemy regionov v epokhu globalizatsii, Rostov-on-Don, 2004, pp. 261-266; "Evropeyskie tsennosti i stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obshchestva v Rossii," in: Filosofskiy parokhod. Materialy XXI Vsemirnogo filosofskogo kongressa, Istanbul, 10-17 avgusta 2003 goda. Doklady rossi-iskikh uchastnikov, Krasnodar, Moscow, 2004, pp. 33-36; "Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v epokhu globalizatsii," Gumanitarnye i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie nauki (Rostov-on-Don), No. 1, 2005, pp. 169-172; "My ne gotovy. Yavlyaetsya li t.n. grazhdanskoe obshchestvo tsivilizatsionnoy perspektivoy Rossii?" Ekonomicheskaia i filosofskaia gazeta, No. 52, 2005; "K globalizatsii i modernizatsii cherez regionalizatsiiu," Mysl. Obshchestvenno-politicheskiy i nauchno-populiarny zhurnal, No. 2, 2007, pp. 15-19; "Postmodernistskie perspektivy integratsii Rossii v globalnoe grazhdanskoe obshchestvo," in: Vyzovy sovre-mennosti i filosofiia, Bishkek, 2007, pp. 63-69; "Kakoe grazhdanskoe obshchestvo nuzhno Rossii?" VestnikRFO, No. 2, 2009, pp. 88-91; "Rossia v globalnom grazhdanskom obshchestve," in: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kongressa "Glo-balistika-2009: puti vykhoda iz globalnogo krizisa i modeli novogo miroustroystva," MGU im. M.V. Lomonosova, Moskva, 2023 maia 2009 g., ed. by I.I. Abylgaziev, I.V. Ilyin, in 2 vols., Vol. I, MAKS Press, Moscow, 2009, pp. 174-177; "Chto sulit Rossii globalnoe grazhdanskoe obshchestvo?" in: Chelovek—ob'ekt i sub'ekt globalnykh protsessov, Materialy mezhdunard-noy nauchnoy konferentsii, St. Petersburg, 2010, pp. 236-239; "Regionalizatsia kak faktor modernizatsii i sokhraneniia etnokul-turnoy identichnosti severokavkazskikh narodov v epokhu globalizatsii," in: Rossia v protsesse modernizatsii: sotsialno-po-liticheskie aspekty: materialy Vserossiyskoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, RITs AGPU, Armavir, 2010, pp. 21-29; Daghestan v kulture i tsivilizatsii, GU Daghestanskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, Makhachkala, 2010, 192 pp.; Dialektika kultury i tsivilizatsii (region Rossii), LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co. KG, Saarbrucken, 2011, 148 pp., etc.
■ Second, the most developed civil societies of the West are living through a crisis of multicul-turalism, a product of the decline of European civilization and culture.
■ Third, as follows from the above, Russia, its national regions, and Daghestan need a different culture, civilization, civil society, and civil nation to shape an integrated identity in Russia's citizens in the context of a multinational and multiconfessional society.
