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41
Media Culture
On the need to improve approaches to ensuring Russia's national security in the media
sphere
Prof. Dr. Sergey Vorontsov
South-Russian Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration,
70, Pushkinskaya St., Rostov-on-Don, 344002, [email protected]
Dr. Andrey Goloborodko
Rostov State University of Economics, 69 B.Sadovaya St., Rostov-on-Don, Russia, 344002, [email protected]
Prof.Dr. Alexander Ponedelkov
South-Russian Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration,
70, Pushkinskaya St., Rostov-on-Don, 344002, ponedelkov@skags. ru
Aleksei Steinbuk
Analytical Information Department of the holding "RBC", 78, Profsoyuznaya St., Moscow, 117393, e-mail: [email protected])
Dr. Olga Kravets
Rostov State University of Economics, 69 B.Sadovaya St., Rostov-on-Don, Russia, 344002,
Abstract. This article analyzes the organization of work to ensure the safety of the media sphere from the attempts to propagate the ideology of fascism, extremism, terrorism and separatism, damage to the civil peace, political and social stability in society. It is noted that in recent years, the propaganda of Islamists on the Internet, including its Russian-speaking segment, has made a sharp leap in qualitative and quantitative terms. In place of the low-quality content of the North Caucasian terrorist cells appeared almost professional media products of Islamist groups, the most active role among which is played by the ISIL group. There is a stable multi-level system for the development and dissemination of Islamist propaganda. The production of visual content is carried out by specialized media centers such as Al Furqan, Al-Hayat and Al Itisam, and the distribution is realized through the decentralized community of Islamist supporters in social networks with a large number of "opinion leaders" formally unrelated to terrorist groups , which actually perform the functions of "mediators". The "phenomenon" of ISIL, which appeared only three-four years ago and was just one of many small bandit groups in Iraq, is connected with the aggressive use of "new media" for spreading propaganda content. In connection with the need to increase the effectiveness of countering the spread of the ideology of extremism and terrorism in the media sphere, foreign experience is analyzed by the authors, and proposals are formulated to organize a fight against each of the sources of extremist and terrorist threats within the framework of a separate approach involving individually developed strategy and tactics.
Key words: national security, media sphere, Islamist propaganda, content, social networks, clip-on thinking, accounts, resources, blockages, censorship.
Introduction
The head of the Federal Security Service of Russia, A. Bortnikov, in his speech at the meeting of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, said that in 2016 the security forces managed to prevent 16 terrorist attacks in nine Russian cities and to destroy 46 cells of terrorist organizations. Some of the terrorists were trained in militant camps located in Syria and Iraq [Head of the FSB ..., 2017]. At the same time A.Bortnikov drew attention to the fact that the activities of law enforcement agencies do not correspond to the level of the threat from terrorists. We should agree with this statement, as the world experience of counteracting modern terrorism testifies that even the success of "hunting" for the leaders of terrorist networks does not guarantee "victory" in the fight against terrorist network [Kenney, 2003, pp. 187-206].
In the current situation, issues of securing the media sphere are of particular importance. These issues in the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation" have been elevated to the rank of strategic national priorities. There is an increasing confrontation in the global information space due to the desire of some countries to use information and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical goals, including the manipulation of public consciousness and falsifying history. There are new forms of illegal activities, inter alia, employing information, communication and high technologies. Among the main threats to the state and public security there are activities related to the use of information and communication technologies for the propagation and propaganda of the ideology of fascism, extremism, terrorism and separatism, damage to the civil peace, political and social stability in society [On the Strategy ..., 2015].
Taking into account the fact that the media sphere is a non-conceptualized concept, in the context of this article we will rely on the concept given by a number of authors, according to which the media sphere is "a collection of ideas, themes, opinions and other intangible essences, represented by media texts with the following features: importance, significance for different groups, momentary, topical, open for numerous interpretations" [Buryak, 2014, pp. 200-212]. At the same time, we believe that ideas, themes, opinions can be presented not only by media texts, but also by images (slides, films, drawings, etc.)
The purpose of this study is to analyze media content of extremist content, which is a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, formed by the spread of the ideology and practice of extremism and terrorism in the media sphere, as well as the rationale for possible ways of ensuring media security.
Materials and methods
The methodological basis of the study is an institutional approach. A systemic approach and an interdisciplinary approach have also been used, the former ensures the analysis of a complex structural and functional object and the latter allows one to rely on the theoretical principles of jurisprudence, political science, sociology, philosophy, the theory of mass communications and others.
In the course of the research the scientific and special research methods (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, structural-functional, typological, logical analysis, comparative analysis, modeling method) have been used. The solution of the tasks was carried out using qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques, including monitoring and analysis of the sites of communication agencies, analysis of texts posted on agency websites and on social networking sites, analysis of law enforcement materials, expert evaluation.
Discussion
The problems of safety within modern media content represent a broad field of interdisciplinary scientific discourse, which includes scientific research of recent years, presented in the political, psychological, media-pedagogical context.
Jean-Paul Marthoz in his study presented the threats to the modern world, arising from the impact of terrorist content in the media: "Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Many countries have suffered for decades from groups, both internal and external and including both State and non-State actors, wielding violence against civilians as political strategy. In many cases, the local population emerged stronger and more resilient, proving that brutality is no match in the long term for the progress of unity and shared values. In this context, the media are critical in providing verifiable information and informed opinion. During the tense environment of a crisis, with populations on edge and tempers flared, this becomes all the more important. The relationship between terrorism and media is complex and fraught. At its worst, it is a perverse symbiotic relationship - terrorist groups devising spectacles of violence to continue drawing the world's attention, and the media incentivized to provide wall-to-wall coverage due to huge audience interest" [Marthoz, 2017].
G. Weimann is the author of a number of studies on the social impact and influence of the media, political campaigns, new media technologies; influence of mass media on public opinion, analysis of modern media content of terrorist orientation [Weimann 2000, 2004, 2006, 2014]. The author states: "Terrorists have good reasons to use social media. First, these channels are by far the most popular with their intended audience, which allows terrorist organizations to be part of the mainstream. Second, social media channels are user-friendly, reliable, and free. Finally, social networking allows terrorists to reach out to their target audiences and virtually "knock on their doors" — in contrast to older models of websites in which terrorists had to wait for visitors to come to them" [Weimann, 2014].
The problems of media security in India are considered by R. Abraham [Abraham, 2012]. The author presents the analysis of national security in the context of Indian media, examines the problem of understanding and interpretation of the media, its theoretical and practical concepts and approaches; prospects for the development of the media of the 21st century. R. Abraham concludes that «for our better evaluation and inference of media's role in national security, one must view the concept of governance and threat reduction as part of the overall security architecture, and help the media to examine the detection or gathering of intelligence and its proper analysis, prevention or preemption, preparedness and capacity building and disruption of response while covering issues of terrorism and insurgency» [Abraham, 2012].
E. Ibagere works out the mechanisms of interaction between the media and Nigerian legislation in the context of media security, determines the role of the mass media in the strengthening of the national security of Nigeria. The author believes that "first, by effective surveillance of the environment, the mass media would unveil those areas, individuals or entities that may likely constitute a breach of national security. Secondly, by correlation, the mass media assist other agencies to interpret the information so gathered about the environment and contribute in the utilization of such information to take steps to remedy any breach of national security or foster the perpetuation of practices that enhance national security. Thirdly, by transmission of culture, the media enhance the entrenchment of those norms, the defence of which constitutes national security" [Ibagere, 2010].
The issue in question is considered by many Russian researchers, such as E.Y. Bondarenko, who examines the information security of the younger generation in the media education context. The author identifies several important aspects of the information security of the individual, among which "accessibility (the ability to obtain the required information service in a reasonable time); integrity (its protection against destruction and unauthorized change); confidentiality (protection against unauthorized reading)" [Bondarenko, 2013]. At the same time,
E.A. Bondarenko rightly believes that productive interaction with the media sphere that provides a secure dialogue can be carried out on the basis of the formation of "a new information culture that can become an element of the common culture of mankind. It will be realized through the knowledge about the information environment, the laws of its functioning, the ability to navigate information flows, understand other people's messages and create your own" [Bondarenko, 2013].
In her study A.A. Morozova [Morozova, 2012] presents the problems of the media security of the individual in the Internet space, defined by the author as "the state of protection of each individual from unreliable or dangerous information that causes harm to human health, its morality and personal development." Uncontrolled and sometimes contradictory Internet content leads, according to AA. Morozova to the negative consequences, inter alia, the manipulative and negative impact of the media, the propaganda of violence and aggression and other factors. Among the possible ways to ensure media security, the author considers: "state control, creation of a register of prohibited sites and communication channels, independent control of media resources by Internet providers and media editors; Self-education of each individual with regard to the problem of media security, self-control; media education of the population, especially young people on the issue of media security; maintenance of the ethical code of communication" [Morozova, 2012].
Currently, many schools are introducing the practice of conducting special classes that contribute to reducing risks and threats, which are posed by numerous information resources. For example, considering the problems of media security from the point of view of teaching children and adolescents independent methods and technologies to protect themselves from negative and harmful information, O.G. Kovylskaya, I.S. Yakimanskaya, E.V. Logutov rightly believe that "along with the technical means of protecting minors from harmful information, special attention is given today to the development of special lessons on media security for children, at which in the form of a game, taking into account individual and age characteristics, children study potential information threats and challenges, learn to cope with them independently" [Media security in the educational environment, 2013, p. 5]. Undoubtedly, this direction is becoming increasingly popular among educators and psychologists. It is considered to be forward-looking in modern information environment, and certainly it will be developed further in the domestic media education practices.
The problem of media and information security in the Internet space is presented in the scientific research of I.A. Fateyeva. For example, the author states that "social networks have been left out of the direct action of the Federal Law "On the protection of children from information that is harmful to their health and development" (FZ-436 of 29.12.2010), the main regulator of activities to ensure media security of the Russian younger generation. This is due to the fact that this law is only applied to media resources that have the status of media" [Fateeva, 2012].
The study of I.V. Chelysheva presents an attempt to solve the problem of counteracting the dangers and risks of virtual space and providing media security: "In some Russian schools media security classes have become traditional: students are introduced to the basic rules of safe behavior on the Internet, social networking and the use of numerous online programs and etc. Increasingly, information on this subject is placed on school websites, becomes the theme of parent meetings, widely discussed in the press, on TV, on the Internet, etc. However, in our opinion, the complex solution of this problem largely depends not only on timely informing children, adolescents and their parents about the possible dangers of the media, but also on developing strategies for forming the media competence of the younger generation in order to form spiritual, moral determinants of the personality involved in the media space" [Chelysheva, 2018].
The study of E.V. Muriukina is focused on the analysis of the sites of a terrorist orientation [Muriukina, 2017]. The author considers the methods aimed at the young audience: "original design solutions; brightness and attractiveness in the design of the main page, media texts; clear navigation system and easy search for information of interest; availability of hyperlinks, etc. The main forms of information delivery include news digests, "analytical" materials. Often, ideological attitudes are veiled or latent in nature. At the same time, the authors of media texts use information delivery technologies that are characteristic of the official media" [Muriukina, 2017].
Results
The analysis of scientific research carried out in recent years may indicate that the problem of media security is currently highly relevant. Numerous scientific developments on the propagandistic role of media content in Russia and abroad [S.A. Vorontsov, A.G. Steinbuch, 2015; N. Solomon, 2007, etc.], as well as the research of Russian-language media content that we have carried out showed that over the last years the propaganda of Islamists on the Internet, including Russian-speaking segment, has made a sharp leap in qualitative and quantitative terms. In fact, Russia faced a threat to national security of a completely different type: the militants who went to fight in Syria on the side of the Islamists entered the community, which in many respects differs from the Wahhabi underground operating in the North Caucasus. The expression of this phenomenon is most clearly manifested on Internet sites. It can be noted that the low-quality content of North Caucasian terrorist cells was replaced by almost professional media products of Islamist groups operating in Syria, Iraq and other countries. The most active role in the formation of new media represented in the Internet space is played by the ISIL grouping, methods and approaches are the basis for such media materials, positioned by other groups of this kind.
For the first time, Islamist international terrorist organizations began to conduct mass and professional propaganda in Russian social networks, using a wide and almost uncontrolled toolkit of "new media", which poses a threat to the political stability and national security of the Russian Federation, both in the short and medium term.
As is well known in the era of Web 1.0 [Epoch ...], special closed or "semi-closed" forums served as the main tool for communication between members of the Islamist terrorist underground, where close ties between militants from one region and from different countries of the world were established. It is at such forums that the work of the functionaries of the Interpersonal Trust is being launched. By placing video reruns of Al Furqan Media Center and photo reports on their activities on such resources, terrorists undoubtedly won in other media coverage of the events of jihad, which made it possible to create the image of ISIL as the main force acting, for example, in Iraq.
For the first time, Islamist international terrorist organizations began to conduct mass and professional propaganda in Russian social networks, using a wide and almost uncontrolled toolkit of "new media", which poses a threat to the political stability and national security of the Russian Federation, both in the short and medium term.
As is known in the era of Web 1.0 [Epoch ...] special closed or "semi-closed" forums served as the main tool for communication between the members of the Islamist terrorist underground, where close ties between militants from one region and from different countries of the world were established. It is at such forums that the work of the functionaries of the Interpersonal Trust has started. By placing video releases of Al Furqan Media Center and photo reports on their activities on such resources, terrorists undoubtedly won in media coverage of the events of jihad, which made it possible to create the image of ISIL as the main force acting, for example, in Iraq.
As may be seen from the analysis of media content of terrorist orientation, the predominant role belongs to media texts: informational summaries, photo and video materials. Sympathetic
ISIL communities are engaged in forming the Wahhabi worldview in social networks, publishing relevant citations from the writings of the authors who propagandize radical Islam, hadiths, in which calls for unlawful activities sound. In our opinion, such techniques, which correspond to the well-known methods of propaganda used in mass media, can serve as the main tool by which the attempts to radicalize Russian youth are being made - not through the community of ISIL and other groups that radical extremists and terrorists are interested in. Thus, to date, there has been a stable multi-level system for the development and dissemination of Islamist propaganda, the danger of which was pointed out by Solomon N., who investigated the impact of terror on public consciousness and the role of mass communication in the phenomenon of terror [Solomon, 2002].
At present, the specialized media centers such as Al-Furqan, Al-Hayat and Al-Itisam are engaged in the development of terrorist media content, the distribution of which is provided by the decentralized community of Islamist supporters in social networks with a large number of not formally associated with terrorist groups "leaders of opinions," which actually perform the functions of "mediators." Let's try to understand what the phenomenon of ISIL involves and what measures should be taken to prevent and suppress the spread of Islamist propaganda.
It is supposed that the decentralized information network of ISIL in social media can be classified into four levels:
1. Official accounts of the organization authorized by terrorist leaders.
2. Semi-official accounts, which are aggregators of content from "official".
3. Personal accounts of militants.
4. Accounts of "sympathizers", i.e. persons who are not the members of ISIL.
The "official" accounts of ISIL in Twitter are the pages of territorial units on which the "Islamic state" is nominally divided, so called "wilayats". There are 15 of them in total. The pages of "wilayats" were first recorded in December 2013 - January 2014 and since then they have been functioning on Twitter almost continuously until August 2014. After a series of blockages caused by the distribution of the video of the execution of an American journalist, these pages were forced to leave for other social networks, they appeared mainly in VKontakte. At the same time, the transition did not cause any significant changes in their style of work, which in many respects resembles the work of news agencies, where the overwhelming majority of entries are text messages with reports of battles or important events in the life of the organization. These "information tapes" are the only source of news about the activities of the grouping for both other accounts of the ISIL information network, and for researchers specialized in this topic. The percentage of photo reports in the total number of entries does not exceed 10-15%, but they are the most frequently used propaganda tool of ISIL.
The ISIL scheme for building media propaganda is actually copied from the system of dissemination of information in social media in the US. This international terrorist organization has a significant community of supporters and sympathizers on Twitter, which was formed as part of the strategy of ISIL for the decentralization of its information network.
The main focus of ISIL propaganda is on:
- creating the image of the main enemy of all "infidels" and the image of the largest militarized Islamist organization in the world;
- attracting new supporters from all corners of the Arab world and wider than the Islamic world;
- the impact on potential "jihadists" living in European countries in order to engage them in the distribution of propaganda content;
- creating the illusion of having normal conditions for life in the territories controlled by the organization, which became especially relevant after the proclamation of the caliphate and the "invitation" of all supporters to come to the territories controlled by ISIL;
- supression of "competitors", which are represented by the supporters of Bashar Assad and hostile towards ISIL jihadist groups in Syria.
The work of the accounts of the "Wilayats" is, in fact, the propaganda of ISIL in the sense that is described by the media as a well-planned campaign for the dissemination of information directly in new media. The accounts of "Wilayats" do not take part in the "twitter storms", notes about which can be found in almost any major English-language media, but provide very dry summaries. All the rest is the work of a network of supporters whose members almost never belong to ISIL. This confirms the view that the centralized work of ISIL in social networks is minimal - the organization owns only one and a half dozen accounts maintained by specially selected people - the rest of the information background is created by the efforts of outsiders. Similarly, being a kind of "outsourcing", they distribute propaganda materials produced by the media centers of ISIL. Thus, the decentralized distribution of Islamist propaganda greatly reduces the effectiveness of blocking individual Internet accounts. Despite the series of rolling blocking Islamists in social networks Twitter and Facebook, their network is restored within a few days and keeps a tendency to expand.
As for the activities of the segment intended for Russian-speaking users, the main media product of Islamists, including full-length films, has been translated into Russian. At the same time, the Russian-speaking "teams" of ISIL and individual groups currently operating in Syria and Iraq release independent content in Russian, including graphics and video. They also conduct Russian-speaking "training" communities to conduct terrorist activities and urban battles, inter alia, on the Facebook platform.
Concerning the specifics of propaganda content and channels of its distribution (popular social networks), one can state that the main target audience of Islamist propaganda are teenagers and young people from 13 to 25 years old. This conclusion follows from the nature of the production of ISIL media centers (clips, films, video reports, etc.). Today, young people, who grew up in the era of high technology, look at the world differently. Their perception is different from the perception of an adult generation, brought up on books and other texts. Young people see the "picture" as a whole and perceive information according to the principle of the clip [Interview ..., 2015].
It is not surprising that media texts are often presented in the form of computer games or modern action movies which are popular among young people. Considering adolescents and young people as target audience, radical Islamist Internet preachers who support jihad and ISIL have found an attractive format for young people in international video hosting using video blogs with fundamentalist content.
In our opinion, the recent significant improvement in the quality of extremist propaganda is primarily due to the integration of Western media culture elements into it. It can be assumed that the production of media content from ISIL is carried out by the immigrants from the United States, who received a specialized education in this country. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that the US information policy is implemented in the context of a decentralized network information space. The system of interaction of power and society through the media and social media in the US looks like a decentralized structure in which every participant in the network included in it, makes a decision and is guided in how to react to this or that event. The moral, ethical and political attitudes are interpreted in such a way that the decision and behavior of each of the participants in the network will coincide with the overall setting. The information network is not managed from a single center. Network members understand the general plan and formulate a description of what is happening. In the absence of direct orders, a different type of management is realized. The network is informed of the ultimate goal. At the same time there are specialized analytical expert centers, in the form of political technology centers, institutes of political analysis and forecast, etc., developing various strategies. Their activities are open, and the results are available and, seemingly, do not have practical application. At the same time,
there are political technology centers, PR services and media, often existing on the grants from outside financial structures, and not externally connected with the state. But all the information they provide is aimed at forming the same mindset. The work of such system resulted in a sharp increase in the number of so-called "leaders of public opinion". A sharp increase in the amount of information with a corresponding distrust to it led to the emergence of a cohort of interpreters whose faces are familiar to everyone from a television screen or a computer monitor. The question of professionalism and the level of understanding of the topic are secondary. The main thing is the ability to explain the events to the audience in a simple language.
Such information network is capable of self-synchronization - its nodes can operate autonomously from the center. In most cases, network members do not have an idea where the center or decision centers are and who the leaders are. The network is focused on the content. The participants of the network independently think over the technology for implementing what was said by the political leadership, what was read by them from the messages of the "center" forming the agenda. The network itself recognizes "intention" and acts according to the situation. The peculiarity of the American (in particular, the English / Hispanic) network information space is the ability to produce, transmit and receive information in any quantity and at the highest possible speed. In these conditions, the main factor affecting the target audience is the quality of information. The significant amount of the produced information makes it impossible to perceive the whole bulk of information. It is even more impossible to assess it objectively, evaluate critically and use. The perception of information flows is carried out on an intermittent basis, and the emphasis of messages is carried out by the volume of the flow of information on the "given" topic. The effectiveness of such network structure is maximized - both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The dependence of government actions on the availability of information in the media and the Internet, as exemplified by the United States, can be traced to the process of adopting and implementing many well-known solutions or explaining the decisions of the US leadership. Thus, during the events of August 2008, justifying the decision to send military transport aircraft with humanitarian cargo to Georgia, President D. Bush stressed that the US government has numerous pieces of evidence of the invasion of Russian troops, including "television reports about it on CNN". The official position of the US government and the planned actions were based (of course, for the public) on available evidence from the press. The decision of D. Bush, based on the testimonies of the press, at that time was supported by the majority of the Western community. The media's position, not only of CNN, but also BBC and many other Western news agencies, has proved decisive in providing support of not popular military and political decisions by the society.
Besides the United States, the United Kingdom deals with the problems of counteracting extremism and terrorism. The interaction between modern media and social media with the authorities of this country is manifested in the organization of the work of the relevant bodies, special committees, police and other structural institutions of society.
In mid-2013, the UK Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a Joint Cyber Reserve Unit. The main feature of the new unit is not only protecting computer networks, but also dealing with cyber attacks and counteracting the spread of the ideology of extremism. It was in this context that the head of the British General Staff, Nick Carter, set the task of creating a unit consisting of 2,000 people for providing information and psychological events in social media.
The experience of Israel deserves special attention. Unlike state structures that rely more heavily on the use of force, non-governmental organizations, in particular the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, carry out targeted propaganda work. It is a public organization that provides all interested structures, primarily the state, with information about the history of terrorism, the current state of affairs, the level of threat, methods of struggle, as well as decisions taken at the state level. The largest funding in the institute is allocated for the popularization of
anti-extremist information among the public. It is believed that the main emphasis in Israel antiextremist propaganda is on informing the audience about the inadmissibility of helping to terrorists (in Israel case - Arab Muslims) and about the threat of "civil negligence" - the lack of the desire of the population to worry about their safety and the safety of others. The information transmitting mechanisms are all existing types of media and other means of social communication, both direct (on behalf of the organization) and in close cooperation with the media outlets of official authorities. As far as this process is effective, one can judge by the very fact of the existence of Israel.
Conclusions
Thus, the analysis of media content of terrorist and extremist content in the context of identifying the main risks and threats to media security, has led to a number of conclusions:
In an effort to spread the ideology of terrorism and extremism in the media sphere, aimed at the Russian-speaking audience every possible propaganda directions presented in print, audiovideo materials, and social media are used.
The development of modern manipulation and propaganda techniques used by extremist terrorism in media content represented in the media pose a serious threat to media safety of the widest layers of the population. A special group of risk here are teenagers and young people who are the target group for the authors of such media texts, often concealed in the format of fascinating action movies, computer games, etc. The attempts to spread propaganda and aggressive cult, violence, extremism force the authors of such media content to look for more and more sophisticated loopholes to bypass the established rules, developing new ways of underground activity in social networks and the Internet in general. In this regard, it is possible to single out a strategic goal, consisting in ensuring that each of the media sources of extremist and terrorist threats will be counterattacked with the use of individually developed strategy and tactics.
The urgency of the problems of countering Islamist propaganda in Russia requires serious steps to ensure the media security of the younger generation, including the blocking of such media in the media space, as well as monitoring the materials that are presented in the so-called closed groups of social networks. So, for example, after the appearance in one of the Internet editions of "devastating" notes about social networks of jihadists existing in the social network "VKontakte", a campaign began on mass blocking of such pages, both in this social network and in the social network Odnoklassniki. This led to the fact that the authors of the accounts gradually moved to the underground mode of existence in "VKontakte" - closed groups and groups whose name is very indirectly correlated with the content (for example, the official communities of the Russian-language infogroup ISIL "Shamtoday" were called "TEACOFFEE" and "STOP -TERRORISM ») [Vorontsov, Steinbukh, 2015, 100-108].
Obviously, ensuring media security, reducing the risk of media threats and threats, including the spread of media content of a terrorist and extremist character, should be comprehensive, including the formation of a mechanism for correcting the information and propaganda flow, the development of a conscious counteraction to nationalism, religious extremism, territorial separatism and other real threats to Russia's security . As an example, here one can bring documentaries "President" or "Crimea. Way to the Motherland. " The share and rating of these films were approximately the same - about 40% and 14.5% [Share ...]. The work on highlighting major military and political events in the southeast of Ukraine, which is run directly by journalists working there, ensuring the content not only of traditional media, but social media, is well-made and understandable for the ordinary spectator. Thus, the fight against Islamist propaganda should be comprehensive. For doing this, at a basic level, it is necessary:
- to separate Islamist propaganda and propaganda of specific groups;
- to share the struggle directly with propaganda, i.e. with its meanings, and the struggle with the mechanisms of distribution;
- to separate the propaganda of specific Islamist groups from their representatives and propaganda actions of specific media.
In the course of solving the problems of ensuring media security, it is possible to use productive foreign experience in countering the spread of the ideology of extremism and terrorism, combining methods of active measures to curb information dissemination (censorship) and coordinated preventive measures in the information space.
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https://versia.ru/glava-fsb-aleksandr-bortnikov-predupredil-ob-ugroze-novyx-teraktov-v-rossii
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http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2015/03/28/1382125.html
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Weimann, G. (2006). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 309 p.
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Weimann, G. (2014). New Terriorism and New Media. Washington, DC: Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 20 p. https://medium.com/p/17b12f8c455a
