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78ON THE EDGE OF CRISIS: PELOSI'S VISIT TO TAIWAN AND REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY
Xin Qiang* Fudan University ORCID: 0000-0003-3148-5023 © Xin Qiang, 2022
DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2022-2-175-187
Wang Jialin Fudan University ORCID: 0000-0003-4626-7109 © Wang Jialin, 2022
Abstract In recent years, the U.S. has vigorously pursued the policy of "using Taiwan to contain mainland China" to thwart China's rise and maintain its hegemonic position. This policy has further exacerbated the China-U.S. rivalry in the Taiwan Strait. The audacious visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, in August 2022 triggered a systematic countermeasure from China and dramatically exacerbated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. This article first analyzes the purpose of Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, then reviews China's countermeasures against the visit. The author argues that the tensions in the Taiwan Strait have not escalated into the so-called "Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis" because the policies of the mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan are still self-restrained. However, these tensions have negatively affected China-U.S. relations and Cross-Strait relations.
Keywords China-U.S. relations, China-U.S. rivalry in the Taiwan Strait, Nancy Pelosi, the Taiwan issue
Название На грани кризиса: визит Пелоси на Тайвань и его последствия для статьи китайско-американского соперничества
Аннотация В последние годы США энергично проводят политику «использования Тайваня для сдерживания материкового Китая», чтобы помешать подъему КНР и сохранить свое положение гегемона. Эта политика еще более обострила китайско-американское соперничество в Тайваньском проливе. Смелый визит на Тайвань спикера Палаты представителей США Нэнси Пелоси в августе 2022 г. спровоцировал комплекс контрмер со стороны Китая и резко обострил напряженность в Тайваньском проливе. В данной статье анализируется цель визита Пелоси на Тайвань, а затем рассматриваются предпринятые Китаем контрмеры. Автор утверждает, что напряженность в Тайваньском проливе не переросла в так называемый «четвертый кризис в Тайваньском проливе», так как политика материкового Китая, США и Тайваня по-прежнему носит сдержанный характер. Однако
* Xin Qiang (China) is a Deputy Director of Center for American Studies, Fudan University, and Deputy Director of Collaborative Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations.
Синь Цян (КНР) - заместитель директора Центра американских исследований Фуданьского университета (Шанхай) и заместитель директора Совместного инновационного центра мирного развития отношений между двумя сторонами пролива.
** Wang Jialin (China) is a Ph.D candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.
Ван Цзялинь (КНР)- аспирант Школы международных отношений и связей с общественностью Фуданьского университета (Шанхай).
упомянутая напряженность негативно повлияла на китайско-американские отношения и на отношения между двумя сторонами по берегам пролива.
Ключевые китайско-американские отношения, китайско-американское соперничество в слова Тайваньском проливе, Нэнси Пелоси, тайваньский вопрос
mm ■ шт^тттжттртттт • штттп
т^шштйшт-тть-^т'шттшжъ -ти-ятм
As the gap in economic and military power between China and the United States has consistently narrowed in recent years, Washington has significantly increased its alarmism and hostility towards Beijing, increasingly viewing China as a "geopolitical challenge" and "strategic competitor" and eventually promoting a "paradigmatic shift" in the U.S. strategy toward China.1
Against this background, the United States has enhanced its efforts to contain China, utilizing the Taiwan question as the key to suppressing China's rise. Despite Beijing's strong opposition, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei on August 2-3, 2022, becoming the first Speaker of the House to visit Taiwan in nearly 25 years. This provocative act, which seriously violates the one-China principle, has led to decisive countermeasures from China, pushing the situation in the Taiwan Strait to the edge of crisis and remarkably escalating the U.S.-China rivalry.
I. Pelosi's provocative visit to Taiwan
Since taking office in January 2021, the Biden administration has implemented a series of pro-Taiwan political moves to strengthen the "substantive relationship" between the United States and Taiwan and eventually to emasculate the U.S. "one-China" policy. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress, which has always been known for its "pro-Taiwan and anti-China" stance, has more actively engaged in Taiwan-related policymaking by introducing a large number of pro-Taiwan bills and by intensively engaging in congressional diplomacy with Taiwan. Notably, the U.S. Congress has constantly collaborated with and prompted the Biden administration to play the "Taiwan card" to contain the mainland China. Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan has been the latest and undoubtedly the most provocative case.
As a pro-Taiwan figure, Pelosi looked for opportunities to visit Taiwan and made this visit her priority diplomatic trip. In January 2022, during her meeting with a vice leader of Taiwan Lai Ching-te, Pelosi stated that the 2022 mid-term election might be her last election, so she must find a way to come to Taiwan.2 On April 7, Japanese media first disclosed that Pelosi would visit Taiwan on April 10 for the 43rd anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act legislation, following her visit to Japan.3 However, Pelosi was forced to postpone her trip due to her positive COVID-19 test result. Then the "Financial Times" reported on July 19 that Pelosi planned to visit Taiwan in August, stating that the sensitive visit "should be handled carefully".4 In addition, as Taiwan media reported, Pelosi personally called Taiwan's Representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim on July 20, emphasizing that she had planned to visit Taiwan twice, but failed to do so. Although the 2022 U.S. midterm elections was around the corner and there was a lot of legislative work to be promoted in the House, she still planned to visit Taiwan in early August to demonstrate the support for Taiwan. She also claimed that if she could not visit Taiwan that time, there would be "no other more appropriate time". Hsiao Bi-khim responded that Taiwan would certainly welcome Pelosi's visit if she believed that the early August was the best time for it.5
Being aware of the political sensitivity of her planned visit, Pelosi and Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) authority repeatedly refused to acknowledge the visit publicly and intentionally kept the itinerary secret. Even on July 31, the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives still did not include Taiwan in the public itinerary of Pelosi's visit to Asia.6 The executive plane of Pelosi's delegation took off from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at 15:00 on August 2. However, it detoured to the eastern side of the Philippines off the coast instead of choosing the standard route, taking more than seven hours before arriving in Taipei at 10:00 that evening. Pelosi chose a more circuitous route mainly because the organizers were afraid of that the plane would be intercepted by the People Liberation Army's (PLA's) aircraft over the South China Sea, which could lead to a conflict between China and the United States.7
Immediately after arriving in Taiwan, Pelosi issued a statement, alleging that the visit "honors America's unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan's vibrant democracy" and would focus on "reaffirming our support for our partner and on promoting our shared interests, including advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region". She also asserted that the U.S.'s solidarity with Taiwan "is more important today than ever, as the world faces a choice between autocracy and democracy".8 On the morning of August 3, Pelosi and her delegation first went to the Taiwan's Legislative Yuan for a closed-door discussion with leading representatives of the ruling DPP and others from the opposition party. At noon, Pelosi met with Taiwan's leader Tsai Ing-wen, head of the Taiwan's Executive Yuan Su Tseng-chang, and other high-level politicians, claiming that the United States would not abandon its commitment to Taiwan and that "we are proud of our enduring friendship".9 After leaving Taiwan in the evening, Pelosi issued a statement, framing Taiwan as "a key ally for peace and security", "a global leader in economic dynamism", and "a model of democratic governance". She also belligerently stated that the visit "reaffirmed Congress' ongoing commitment to helping Taiwan defend its freedom in the face of aggression" and should be seen as "a strong statement that America stands with Taiwan".10
The U.S. executive branch attempted to dissuade and discourage Pelosi's plan to visit Taiwan, fearing that it would spark a fierce counterattack from China. After the news of Pelosi's visit broke, U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters that "the military think it's not a good idea right now".11 However, Pelosi was not moved and insisted on visiting Taiwan. Her insistence was mainly based on three considerations.
The first factor was her personal political legacy. Pelosi has been an "anti-China activist" and "pro-Taiwan pioneer" in Congress for a long time. The visit to Taiwan, which was paid as she prepared to retire or to step down as the Speaker after the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, not only helped her to demonstrate her identity as a "democracy fighter" and to consolidate her anti-China and pro-Taiwan policy legacy in her political career, but also increased her political capital to benefit both from the Taiwan authority and from the pro-Taiwan forces in the United States.
The second factor was the congressional influence on the Taiwan-related policymaking. Concurrently with deterioration of the China-U.S. relations and the Cross-Strait relations, the pro-Taiwan forces in the U.S Congress have experienced remarkable resurgence in the past few years,12 prompting the Congress to be a "pro-Taiwan vanguard". For example, the 117th U.S. Congress, which can be considered the most pro-Taiwan Congress session in history, introduced at least 70 Taiwan-related bills that aimed at accelerating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan economic cooperation and assisting Taiwan to expand its "international space". Against the backdrop of Congress's reckless interference in the Taiwan issue and its efforts to influence the U.S. Taiwan policy, Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would undoubtedly increase the exposure of pro-Taiwan forces in the Congress and thus enhance its discourse power in the U.S. Taiwan-related policymaking.
The third factor was the Democratic Party's political interests. Through reframing the "China threat" by the anti-China forces in these years, suppressing the mainland China, and supporting Taiwan have become the overwhelming mode of "political correctness" of the U.S. strategic community and of the congressional-executive consensus. Considering the U.S. strategy toward China during the Biden era, Pelosi's visit to Taiwan could demonstrate the Democrats' willingness to confront China while also alleviating the Republicans' criticism of Biden's "weakness" and "submission to China", thereby bolstering the Democratic Party's sluggish midterm election campaign. Meanwhile, to boost his own support, President Biden urgently needed to win the support and cooperation of the top Democrats led by Pelosi and thus did not use all of his leverage to prevent this visit.
II. Beijing's countermeasures to Pelosi's visit
The mainland China consistently opposed Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in an unambiguous and resolute manner. After the news of Pelosi's plan to visit Taiwan became known on July 19, 2020, China repeatedly released diplomatic and military deterrence signals to the United States through various channels and at various levels, emphasizing its tough negative stance concerning this visit. The Chinese Foreign Ministry initially stated that the visit "would seriously violate the one-China principle and the stipulations in the three China-US joint communiqués, seriously undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, have a severe negative impact on the political foundation of China-US relations, and send an egregiously wrong signal to the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces".13 During his July 28 telephone conversation with President Biden, President Xi Jinping urged him to stop Pelosi from visiting Taiwan and warned the United States not to "play with fire" on the Taiwan issue.14
China also issued some military deterrence signals. For example, China's Ministry of National Defense stated on July 26, 2022 that "Should the U.S. side intend to go its own way, the Chinese military will never sit idly by, and will certainly take vigorous measures to thwart any interference by external forces and secessionist attempts for 'Taiwan independence', and firmly defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity".15
Correspondingly, from July 29 to August 2, the People Liberation Army conducted five military exercises in the western waters of the Qiongzhou Strait in the South China Sea and in the waters close to Pingtan-Qiyu area in Fujian, the nearest province to Taiwan, demonstrating the PLA's ability and will to respond to interference by external forces.
However, China's policy efforts mentioned above did not stop Pelosi from visiting Taiwan. Following her arrival in Taiwan on August 2, 2022, mainland China formally characterized the visit as "major political provocation to upgrade U.S. official exchanges with Taiwan" and "major escalation of the negative moves on the Taiwan question". Also, the official Beijing emphasized that "all consequences arising therefrom shall be borne by the U.S. side".16
Subsequently, China launched all-round and multi-dimensional systematic countermeasures against Pelosi's visit to Taiwan to deter pro-Taiwan forces in the United States and "Taiwan independence" separatist forces in Taiwan, as well as to showcase the mainland's capability and resolution to oppose the U.S.-Taiwan collusion and to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
First, these countermeasures involved military deterrence. The PLA's Eastern Theater Command mobilized troops from the Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and other forces from the night of August 2 to August 10 to continuously organize high-intensity and systematic joint exercises around the Taiwan Island in the northern, southwestern, and southeastern seas around the island. The PLA's exercises focused on combat-oriented training sessions, including joint blockade, sea target assault, strike on ground targets, and airspace control operations with the goal of improving the force's integrated combat capabilities. During the PLA's exercise on August 4, the Rocket Force of the Eastern Theater conducted a multi-region, multi-type fire assault on the predetermined waters off the eastern coast of Taiwan island, while the Air Force and the Naval Force dispatched more than 100 fighter sorties to carry out day-and-night joint reconnaissance, air control operations, and other combat training in the predetermined sea and airspace, aiming to enhance the combat capabilities, such as long-term sustained air control and high-intensity strikes with precision. On the same day, 22 fighter sorties of the PLA crossed the so-called Median Line in the Taiwan Strait, and the trajectory of four Dongfeng ballistic missiles was assessed to have flown over Taiwan's main island.17 The intensity of the PLA's military exercises has far surpassed that of the "Third Taiwan Strait Crisis" in 1995-1996, as evidenced by the range of live fire, the number of Dongfeng missile launches, and the number of crossings of "the Median Line in the Taiwan Strait". Furthermore, this PLA's military exercises were far more intense than ever before, achieving several "firsts", such as the first time live-firing missile tests crossed Taiwan island, closest-ever exercises to the island, the first air and naval encirclement and blockade of the island, and the first time a shooting range to the east of the island was set.
The second dimension of countermeasures involved diplomatic retaliation. On the night of Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan on August 2, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng urgently summoned U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns, warning that the United States "must pay the price for its wrongdoings" and urging Washington to "stop its dangerous moves before it's too late".18 Chinese ambassador to the United States Qin Gang lodged a firm protest to the White House National Security Council and the Department of State, urging Washington to "immediately correct its mistake" and to "eliminate the pernicious influence of Pelosi's visit".19 Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made remarks on U.S. violation of China's sovereignty on August 3, warning that the U.S. "should not dream of obstructing China's reunification" and should "stop playing the 'Taiwan card' to disrupt the Asia-Pacific region".20 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China (PRC) subsequently announced eight countermeasures on August 5, including cancellation of the China-U.S. Theater Commanders Talks, Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT), Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings, as well as suspension of the China-U.S. talks on climate change. Through these diplomatic countermeasures, China has sent a clear policy signal to the Biden administration that the erroneous U.S. policy on Taiwan would directly and significantly subvert any constructive cooperation between the United States and China.
The third dimension of countermeasures was focused on applying political pressure. In response to the DPP authority's provocative move to invite Pelosi to visit Taiwan, on August 3 a mainland China's official for the first time publicly criticized Tsai Ing-wen for soliciting foreign support to challenge the mainland, which "gravely undermined the peaceful development of Cross-Strait ties, seriously jeopardized cross-Strait peace and stability, and substantially harmed the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Strait and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation".21 On the same day, the mainland China decided to take disciplinary measures against the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and against the International Cooperation and Development Fund, both of which are affiliated with the diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists. The two funds were prohibiting from cooperating with mainland organizations, enterprises, and individuals, while those who provide funding or services to the foundations from now on would be punished. On August 5, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC announced that China had imposed sanctions on Pelosi and her immediate family members with the aim of pinpointing the Pelosi family's business activities in China. The mainland also issued a new list of diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists on August 16, banning eight Taiwan politicians, including Hsiao Bi-khim, and their family members from entering the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao, as well as restricting their affiliated organizations from cooperating with relevant organizations and individuals on the mainland. The mainland's above-mentioned measures have been aimed at deterring "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and at undermining the DPP authority's efforts to seek U.S. support for the former's independence agenda.
Finally, the fourth set of countermeasures involved economic punishment. To impose pressure upon the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, on August 3 the mainland China's General Administration of Customs announced that the imports of citrus fruits, chilled white striped hairtail, and frozen horse mackerel from Taiwan would be suspended. The mainland has also decided to suspend the export of natural sand, a critical raw material for chips, to Taiwan. Although the total cost of these punishments was only about USD 63.5 million, it has become a clear political warning, given that most of the targeted industries have been located in southern Taiwan, where the pro-independence DDP dominates. Furthermore, the mainland announced sanctions against Taiwan enterprises, such as "SpeedTech Energy" and "Hyweb Technology", that had donated to the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy or the International Cooperation and Development Fund. Also, the mainland prohibited its organizations, enterprises, and individuals from conducting any transactions or cooperation with the mentioned Taiwanese enterprises, so as to deter other enterprises that support "Taiwan independence" separatists and related organizations.
III. On the edge of crisis: trilateral actions and reactions
The political rivalry between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly intense in recent years, raising the possibility of escalation. Pelosi's
visit to Taiwan has exacerbated tensions in the Taiwan Strait and has aggravated the danger of the China-U.S. confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Due to self-restrained stances of the mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan, the confrontation provoked by Pelosi's visit did not escalate into the supposed "Fourth Taiwan Strait crisis" that might trigger a large-scale military conflict.22
First, the mainland China's countermeasures were precise and restrained. In response to Pelosi's visit, China has taken a series of countermeasures while also exemplifying strategic resolve and patience to keep the China-U.S. rivalry in the Taiwan Strait under control. For example, China informed the public about the military exercises ahead of time on the night of Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, leaving enough time for those civilian vessels and aircraft who planned to pass through the Taiwan Strait to adjust their routes. To avoid potential direct engagement with the United States, the PLA officially began holding military exercises on August 4 after Pelosi left Taiwan. While Taiwan has a safe stock of natural gas just for about 10-11 days and that of coal for about 39 days, relying on imports of 70 percent of its food, the mainland China conducted the "lockdown-Taiwan" military exercises only for about three days without taking "maximum-pressure" measures that might result in the Taiwan people getting deprived of gas, electricity, or food. In addition, China did not recall the Chinese Ambassador, as it did after Li Teng-hui's visit to the United States in 1995, but instead maintained communication channels between the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the U.S. government. In spite of the cancellation and suspension of several China-U.S. dialogue platforms, China has kept its communication channels with the U.S. Embassy in China to avoid misunderstandings between the two sides.23
From the above, it is clear that Beijing's countermeasures against Pelosi's visit to Taiwan were fairly restrained, being informed both by the mainland's long-term policy toward Taiwan and by its grand strategy toward the United States. On the one hand, facing the changing situation in the Taiwan Strait, the mainland China has always adhered to the principle of peaceful reunification and tried to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, although it is necessary for the PRC to have the force option to deter the "Taiwan independence" venture. Although the mainland was irritated by Pelosi's trip to Taiwan, it issued a white paper on "The Taiwan question and China's Reunification in the New Era" on August 10, stating that it "will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and efforts".24 Against the backdrop of the "cold confrontation" in Cross-Strait relations since 2016, the mainland's restrained stance on its countermeasures towards Taiwan can help control the "spiral of hostility" between the two sides and prevent the "Fourth Taiwan Strait crisis" from outbreaking. It is not in China's strategic interest to escalate the conflict with the United States, provoked by Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, as it could lead to China being dragged into a "strategic trap" of war in the Taiwan Strait. In the light of multiple domestic pressures, such as COVID-19 prevention and slowing economic development, China's priority remains to wage a restrained struggle against the United States and to maintain "fighting without breaking" in China-U.S. relations.
Second, the U.S. response to the mainland's countermeasures was relatively restrained. Predictably, the Biden administration criticized these countermeasures. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken rebuked China for "overreacting" and "increasing provocative military activity" in and around the Taiwan Strait,25 while U.S. Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs at the National Security Council Kurt Campbell also framed China's countermeasures as "provocative, destabilizing, and unprecedented", "changing the status quo, jeopardizing peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region".26 At the same time, U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Washington
"doesn't seek and will not provoke a crisis" and will seek to maintain communication with China to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States has also reaffirmed its "one-China" policy, repeatedly emphasizing that it does not support "Taiwan independence".27 Following President Biden's intervention, on August 3 the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed the long-planned review of the "Taiwan Policy Act". To avoid further escalation of China-U.S. tensions, on August 4 the White House announced the suspension of the test launch of the intercontinental ballistic missile LGM-30G Minuteman-III.28 During the PLA's "lockdown-Taiwan" exercise, the United States did not deploy its carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, as it did during the "Third Taiwan Strait Crisis" in 1996, but instead ordered the U.S. Ship Reagan aircraft carrier groups to stay away from the Taiwan Strait to avoid strategic miscalculation between the two sides.29 During the PLA's military exercises, the U.S. Armed Forces also did not conduct sensitive military operations (such as ordering its warships to cross the Taiwan Strait or launching military aircraft reconnaissance missions) to prevent unintended military incidents.
As early as the news of Pelosi's visit broke out, the U.S. executive branch expressed its concern of that this visit would infuriate China. Officials attempted to persuade Pelosi to reconsider her plans to visit Taiwan by providing her with relevant "background, factual and geopolitical information" to make her understand the inherent risk of her visit.30 The U.S. executive branch was well aware of the high stakes involved in the Taiwan question and understood that China would inevitably give a tough response to Pelosi's visit, which could potentially trigger the China-U.S. military conflict.
Meanwhile, the Biden administration has faced a triple dilemma in terms of resource allocation, strategic coordination, and balance of interests.
The first dilemma is allocating resources for the "two-front rivalry" against Russia and China. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Eastern Europe in February 2022, the United States provided significant military assistance to Ukraine to confront Russia, which would inevitably have a "crowding-out effect" on its investment of military resources in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States is not powerful enough to wage a "two-front war", being simultaneously involved in two major conflicts in the eastern and western parts of Eurasia.
The second dilemma relates to coordinating the strategies for showcasing political toughness and for trying to avoid any disruptive China-U.S. military conflict. Although the United States regards the Taiwan question as a bargaining chip to exert pressure on China and seeks to dominate the China-U.S. political interaction, it is also fully aware that a military conflict with China would cost it dearly. Furthermore, the U.S. Armed Forces realize that the PLA already has an asymmetrical advantage in the Taiwan Strait and even in the Western Pacific, so it needs to reassure China to prevent tensions in the Taiwan Strait from escalating into a military conflict.
Finally, the third dilemma is the balance of interests between the pro-Taiwan forces at home and the overall state of the China-U.S. relations. The U.S. executive branch has repeatedly made provocations to appease the domestic anti-China sentiments while also winning over the pro-Taiwan forces. However, this would inevitably undermine the already fragile strategic mutual trust between China and the United States and would not help Washington to gain Beijing's support to address various challenges that the United States faces.31 Overall, Pelosi's visit to Taiwan highlighted the White House's insufficient ability to check and balance the anti-China decisions of Congress and to protect the China-U.S. relations from further deterioration.
This triple dilemma has fundamentally limited the ability and the willingness of the U.S. executive branch to confront China in the Taiwan Strait, forcing Washington to exercise self-restraint in reaction to China's countermeasures.
Finally, Taiwan's DPP authority has also been reluctant to escalate the conflict. For the DPP authority, Pelosi's visit to Taiwan could contribute significantly to the DPP's domestic propaganda, providing it with a pretext to argue that "the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock solid" and that "Taiwan-U.S. relationship is at a high-water mark", prompting Taiwan's opposition politicians and the public to be more pro-U.S. and anti-China, which would serve the DPP's political interests. While being "sincerely thankful" to Pelosi for her visit to Taiwan, the DPP authority also "strongly condemned" the mainland's "irrational and non-peaceful actions seeking to undermine our sovereignty, jeopardize the maritime and aviation safety of our region, and threaten the security of people in Taiwan".32 However, facing a series of deterrent actions taken by the mainland, the DPP authority took a self-restrained stance instead of responding vigorously. For example, Taiwan's leader Tsai Ing-wen stated on August 6, 2022 that Taiwan "will neither escalate conflict nor instigate disputes" in response to the mainland's countermeasures.33 Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) has also remained unusually silent regarding the PLA's conventional missiles flying over Taiwan's main island, not only failing to clarify the situation at the first opportunity, but also not employing the Patriot missile defense system to track and intercept the missile. Until the incident was first reported by the Japanese media, Taiwan's MND had to find some excuses, insisting that they were trying to "protect the military's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities".34 Furthermore, Taiwan's armed force just maintained air and sea reconnaissance and completed missile interception preparations, rather than vigorously responding to the PLA's military exercises that were held near the Taiwan's self-claimed "territorial waters" and "territorial air space" and at some points even crossed them.
The reason why Taiwan's DPP authority responded to Beijing's countermeasures in a self-restrained way was primarily the former's limited capability to counter the mainland. Mainland China has an overwhelming advantage over Taiwan in terms of military and economic powers. The DPP authority was well-aware that the Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was an evident violation of the one-China principle, and that "re-countering" the mainland's countermeasures would definitely provoke China's harsher containment measures in the domains of security, political, and foreign affairs.35 Once a crisis breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it would wreak havoc on Taiwan's economy and society, putting the DPP authority under unbearable pressure. Furthermore, given the White House's unsupportive stance on Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, it is believed that the U.S. secretly exerted pressure on the Taiwan authorities who were clearly aware that the United States did not want to destroy the China-U.S. relations, let alone to trigger military confrontation between Taiwan and the mainland China. Therefore, Taiwan had to be relatively self-restrained to avoid irritating the Biden administration and even provoking the White House to impose control on Taiwan's "risky moves" that would put Taiwan in a more unfavorable position.
IV. Conclusion
As a typical "political performance", Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was a planned provocation and blatant disrespect for the sovereignty of China. This move has further enhanced the risk of direct conflict between China and the United States. As Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed out, Pelosi's visit was "part of deliberate, conscious U.S.
strategy to destabilize and deteriorate the situation in the region and the world".36 Although the mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan have all displayed self-restraint during the Pelosi's visit, avoiding the escalation of the crisis, this visit has further weakened the ramshackle strategic trust while aggravating the security dilemma between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait and even in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, this visit has encouraged the DPP authority to strengthen its "pro-U.S. and anti-China" policy, which led to greater polarization between public opinions on different sides of the Taiwan Strait and led to further deterioration of impaired Cross-Strait relations.
In the future, the United States will continue to strengthen special relations with Taiwan while challenging the one-China principle. China has no option but to employ all necessary leverage to fight back. As President Xi Jinping emphasized in his report during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the mainland, while delivering an explicit warning to pro-Taiwan independence forces and their foreign supporters, "will not renounce the use of force and will take all necessary measures to stop all separatist movements".37 The only feasible way for the United States to avoid the U.S.-China military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (that will definitely spill over into the Asia-Pacific region and further into the world) is to adhere to its "one-China" policy sincerely and to refrain from provocations against China.
ENDNOTES
1 United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China. - Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2020. URL: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf9; National Security Strategy. October 2022. -Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2022. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf (both accessed 08.12.2022).
2 Tsui Tzu-ti. Pei luo xi 1 yue ji biaoming yao fang tai fu fang 4 yue jiu ceng yu zuo zhunbei [Pelosi announced her intention to visit Taiwan in January, and the Presidential Office made preliminary plans in April] // China Times. 17.08.2022. URL: https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20220817003101-260407Pchdtv (accessed 08.12.2022).
3 Everington K. Update: US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi reportedly coming to Taiwan Sunday // Taiwan News. 07.04.2022. URL: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4499115?_360safeparam=31060406 (accessed 08.12.2022).
4 Sevastopulo D., Hille K. Nancy Pelosi's plan to visit Taiwan prompts outrage from China // Financial Times. 19 July 2022.
5 Chou Chi-hao, Wang Jia-yuan, Wu Hong-xun. Pei luo xi zhiyi wo che yao reng jianchi fang tai [Pelosi questions Taiwan's decision to withdraw invitation and insists on visiting Taiwan] // China Times. 02.08.2022.
URL: https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20220802000337-260119Pchdtv (accessed 08.12.2022).
6 Pelosi to lead congressional delegation to Indo-Pacific Region. Washington, D.C., 31 July 2022.
URL: https://www.justtherealnews.com/congress/pelosi-to-lead-congressional-delegation-to-indo-pacific-region/ (accessed 12.12.2022).
7 Stevenson A. Pelosi's widely watched flight to Taipei took a circuitous route. Here's why // New York Times. 2 August 2022.
8 Pelosi, congressional delegation statement on visit to Taiwan. Taipei (Taiwan), 2 August 2022. URL: https://www.justtherealnews.com/congress/pelosi-congressional-delegation-statement-on-visit-to-taiwan (accessed 12.12.2022).
9 President Tsai meets US delegation led by House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). News release, 3 August 2022. URL: https://english.president.gov.tw/ NEWS/6292; US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen hold a press conference in Taipei. Press-conference, 3 August 2022 [video] // Channelnewsasia (CNA). URL: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=XH0Vdl6_H_Y (both accessed 12.12.2022).
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11 Mason J., Hunnicutt T. Biden plans talks with China's Xi soon, casts doubt on Pelosi Taiwan trip // Reuters. 22.07.2022. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-he-expects-speak-with-chinas-xi-coming-days-2022-07-20 (accessed 08.12.2022).
12 Xin Q. Meiguo guohui qintai shili de huichao jiqi yingxiang [The resurgence of the pro-Taiwan Force in the US Congress and its impact] // Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]. 2019. № 7. P. 1-9.
13 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's regular press conference. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 19 July 2022. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 665399/s2510_665401/202207/t20220719_10723456.html (accessed 08.12.2022).
14 Mitchell T., White E., Schwartz F. Xi warns Biden not to "play with fire" ahead of potential Taiwan trip by Nancy Pelosi // Financial Times. 28 July 2022; Abutaleb Ya., Pager T. Chinese leader asked Biden to prevent Pelosi from visiting Taiwan // The Washington Post. 20 August 2022.
15 China firmly opposes U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's planned visit to Taiwan: Defense Spokesperson. Ministry of National Defense People's Republic of China. 26 July 2022. URL: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2022-07/26/content_4916547.htm (accessed 08.12.2022).
16 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2 August 2022. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220802_10732293.html; Ambassador Qin Gang lodges stern demarche and strong protest to the US on Pelosi's visit to China's Taiwan Region. Press-statement, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States. 3 August 2022. URL: http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202208/t20220803_10732726.htm; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's regular press conference on August 3, 2022. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 4 August 2022. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202208/t20220804_10733 756. html (all sources accessed 08.12.2022).
17 Johnson J. Japan says five Chinese ballistic missiles landed inside EEZ near Okinawa // Japan Times. 04.08.2022. URL: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/08/04/national/japan-china-missiles-eez (accessed 08.12.2022).
18 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs summons U.S. Ambassador to China to lodge stern representations and strong protests against Nancy Pelosi's visit to China's Taiwan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 3 August 2022. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyhd_663338/ 202208/t20220803_10733167.html (accessed 08.12.2022).
19 Ambassador Qin Gang lodges stern demarche and strong protest to the US on Pelosi's visit to China's Taiwan Region.
20 Chinese Foreign Minister makes remarks on U.S. violation of China's sovereignty. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 3 August 2022. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ 202208/t20220803_10732743.html (accessed 08.12.2022).
21 Tsai Ing-wen, DPP authorities to push Taiwan into disaster by colluding with foreign forces: spokesperson // Xinhua. 03.08.2022. URL: https://english.news.cn/20220803/77cc6165dfd44332ac48a520a5ff4a72/c.html (accessed 08.12.2022).
22 For a discussion of the so-called Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, see: Suorsa O.P., Ang U-Jin A. Makings of the 4th Taiwan Strait Crisis? // The Diplomat. 17 August 2022. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/crossing-the-line-the-makings-of-the-4th-taiwan-strait-crisis;The Military Dimensions of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis [online event transcript]. 22 August 2022. - Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022. URL: https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-dimensions-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis (both accessed 08.12.2022).
23 Wang S., Sidhu S., McCarthy S. China must show it's not an "agent of instability" on Taiwan, US Ambassador to China says // CNN. 19.08.2022. URL: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/19/china/us-ambassador-nicholas-burns-interview-china-intl-hnk/index.html; McFall C. US, China planning Biden, Xi meeting, but "no resolution yet": official // Fox News. 31.08.2022. URL: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-china-planning-biden-xi-meeting-no-resolution-yet-official (both accessed 08.12.2022).
24 Full text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era // Xinhua. 10.08.2022. URL: https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/chtml (accessed 08.12.2022).
25 Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a press availability. Press remarks. Phnom Penh (Cambodia). U.S. Department of State. 5 August 2022. URL: https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-24 (accessed 08.12.2022).
26 On-the-record press call by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific. The White House press briefing. 12 August 2022. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ press-briefings/2022/08/12/on-the-record-press-call-by-kurt-campbell-deputy-assistant-to-the-president-and-coordinator-for-the-indo-pacific (accessed 08.12.2022).
27 Press briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby. The White House press briefing. 1 August 2022. URL: https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/08/01/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-national-security-council-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-2 (accessed 08.12.2022); Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a press availability.
28 Leonard J., Wasson E. White House lobbies Democrats against deepening Taiwan ties // Bloomberg. 04.08.2022. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-03/white-house-lobbies-democrats-against-bid-to-deepen-taiwan-ties?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed 08.12.2022).
29 Press briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby. The White House press briefing. 4 August 2022. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/08/04/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-5 (accessed 08.12.2022).
30 Sevastopulo D., Hille K. China strengthens warning to US about Nancy Pelosi's planned Taiwan trip // Financial Times. 23 July 2022.
31 Xin Q. Baideng zhengfu duitai zhengce shanbian yu kunjing [Transmutation and dilemma of Biden Administration's Taiwan Policy] // Taiwan yanjiu [Taiwan Studies]. 2022. № 3. P. 1-11.
32 President Tsai meets US delegation led by House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi; MAC Strongly Condemns CCP Military Exercises and Ammunition Drills around Taiwan. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Republic of China (Taiwan) press-release no. 010. 4 August 2022. URL: https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_ Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&s=F90EC39C9EAF96DE (accessed 08.12.2022).
33 President Tsai Delivers Remarks on the Live-Fire Military Exercises China Conducting in Areas around Taiwan. Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). News release. 4 August 2022. URL: https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6295 (accessed 08.12.2022).
34 Defense ministry stays quiet on PLA missiles flying over Taiwan // Focus Taiwan. 05.08.2022. URL: https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202208050006 (accessed 08.12.2022).
35 For more detail on the analysis of mainland China's efforts to contain "Taiwan independence", see: Xin Q. Mainland China's Taiwan Policy: From Peaceful Development to Selective Engagement. - London: Routledge, 2022.
36 Putin calls Pelosi's Taiwan trip carefully planned provocation // TASS. 16.08.2022. URL: https://tass.com/ politics/1494189 (accessed 08.12.2022).
37 Full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // China Daily. 25.10.2022. URL: https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202210/25/WS6357e484a310fd2b29e7e7de.html (accessed 08.12.2022).
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