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34КОНДРАШОВА ЯНА КОНСТАНТИНОВНА - студентка Гуманитарного института Владимирского государственного университета имени Александра Григорьевича и Николая Григорьевича Столетовых (yana-condrashova2013@yandex.ru). KOTLETSOV, VLADIMIR V. - Senior Lecturer, Department of History, Archeology and Local Lore, Humanitarian Institute of Vladimir State University named after Alexander Grigorievich and Nikolai Grigorievich Stoletovs (kotletsov1993@yandex.ru). KONDRASHOVA, YANA K. - student of the Humanitarian Institute of Vladimir State University named after Alexander Grigorievich and Nikolai Grigorievich Stoletovs (yana-condrashova2013@yandex.ru)
УДК 94(669+680)«200/210»:327 DOI: 10.24412/2308-264X-2022-6-223-230
ЕГЕЗИ БЛЕССИНГ ЧИМАНПА ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА НИГЕРИИ И ДИНАМИКА ЕЕ ОТНОШЕНИЙ
С ЮЖНОЙ АФРИКОЙ
Ключевые слова: внешняя политика, отношения Нигерии и ЮАР, ксенофобия, ЭКОВАС, САДК, апартеид.
В статье осуществлен анализ внешней политики Нигерии в сфере нигерийско-южноафриканских отношений. Исследуется конструктивная позиция панафриканизма и афроцентризма нигерийской внешней политики. В частности, освещается меняющаяся динамика исторических отношений между Нигерией и Южной Африкой в эпоху апартеида и в постапартеидный период, которые можно рассматривать в свете конфликта/конфронтации, сотрудничества и конкуренции. Отмечается, что, хотя существуют ограничения, подрывающие способность Нигерии и Южной Африки играть эффективную региональную роль, обе страны, возможно, являются наиболее важными государствами в Африке к югу от Сахары, а потому отношения между ними колеблются в диапазоне между напряженностью и сердечностью. Предложен описательный анализ исторических свидетельств и событий, которые свидетельствуют за и против в оценке развития отношений Нигерии и Южной Африки. Автор опирается исключительно на вторичную информацию для генерации и анализа данных. Обоснован вывод о том, что невозможно переоценить необходимость сотрудничества, партнерства и взаимодействия обеих стран. Характер современных отношений Нигерии и Южной Африки, как ожидается, будет отдавать приоритет Африке в ее внешней политике, а также стремиться в равной степени продвигать интересы всего континента. Поэтому, развиваясь, две страны должны воздерживаться от восприятия друг друга как конкурентов, если они хотят наладить плодотворные и мирные отношения. Сохранение напряженности пошло бы во вред обеим странам и Африке в целом.
EGESI BLESSING CHIMANPA
NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW: THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS
Key words: Foreign Policy, Nigeria-South Africa relations, Xenophobia, ECOWAS, SADC, Apartheid.
The paper provides an assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy vis-à-vis the dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa relations. It examines the constructive Pan-Africanism and Afrocentrism posture of Nigerian Foreign policy. Specifically, it explores the shifting dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa's apartheid and post-apartheid historical relations which could be viewed in the light of the 3Cs -conflict/confrontational, cooperation, and, competition. The article noted that though, there are constraints undermining the ability of Nigeria and South Africa to play an effective regional role, both countries are arguably the most important states in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the relations between both countries continue to frequently fluctuate between tension and cordiality. Methodologically, it employs the use of descriptive analysis of historical evidence and events which are for and against Nigeria and South Africa's diplomatic experiences, relations, and developments. It relies solely on secondary information for data generation and analysis. The article concludes that the necessity for cooperation, partnership, and collaboration by both countries cannot be overemphasized. Thus, the context of contemporary relations between Nigeria and South Africa is expected to prioritize Africa in its relations and foreign policy, as well as seek to promote the interests of the whole continent equally. Therefore, going forward, the two countries must desist from perceiving each other as competitors if they want to forge a fruitful and peaceful relationship. Sustained tensions would be to the detriment of both countries - and Africa as a whole.
Introduction
Foreign policy is generally supposed to be responsive to the shifting dynamics of the international system. Foreign policy in itself is that type of action a state embarks upon in its interactions with other member states in the international environment, in the process of striving to attain its goals and objectives. It can also be seen as a set of principles that define the objective or strategy or planned course of action a given state pursues in process of its interactions with other international actors. For the purpose of this paper, foreign policy is viewed as a strategic planned course of action that aims at achieving a particular goal based on specific reasons in the domestic, regional and international arena, at a particular point in time, consequent on the shifting dynamics of the international system [1].
With the shifting dynamics of the international system, the chequered history of Nigeria-Africa relations has experienced the 3Cs - conflict/confrontational, cooperation and, competition [2, 3]. For example, at the end of apartheid, cooperation was restored between the democratic government of South Africa and Nigeria, followed by competition during the killing of the Ogoni 9 and the probable competition of leadership on the continent. This was visible during the nomination and election of the AU Commission chairperson in 2012, the continent voted along regional lines. South Africa received its
overwhelming support from the South African Development Community (SADC) region, while Jean Ping, the Gabonese candidate, received his support from the ECOWAS region [4]. Another incident of conflict of interest was in Ivory Coast. Nigeria had mounted a diplomatic campaign, backed by the United States, the United Nations, and European powers, combining financial sanctions and the threat of military action to dislodge Laurent Gbagbo, the defeated presidential incumbent to yield power, while South Africa pressed for a power-sharing agreement that would preserve a role for Gbagbo in Ivory Coast's government
[5].
Understandably, Nigeria and South Africa are arguably the most important states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking into account the whole set of internal and external factors that has influenced their relations, there is need for both countries to unite their efforts and practical strategies to advance the common goal of Africa's development, peace and security. Thus, pertinent questions that deserve answers are: Could it be true that the apartheid and post-apartheid Nigeria-South Africa relations has done more to African progress than Nigeria? Given the post-apartheid Africa and the current multitude of problems in Africa, how possible can Nigeria and South Africa strengthen their relationship to address challenges facing Africa and serve the interest of the continent?
Method of Study
The Study made use of qualitative research method. This method employs the use of descriptive analysis of historical evidences and events which are for and against Nigeria and South Africa diplomatic experiences, relations and developments. It relies solely on secondary information for data generation and analysis. It assisted in gaining clearer understanding and perspective of the problems, potentials and prospects. The basic reason for its adoption, was to understand what informed Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour in Africa and how such policy has helped to (re)defined its relationship with South Africa.
Development of Nigeria's foreign policy: The Dynamic Process
Understandably, the shaping of foreign policy is a dynamic process involving the interaction between a country's internal and external environments - regional and international. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be considered in isolation from the country's domestic political context which, in turn, cannot be appraised without reference to the role it has played over the years both regionally and internationally. The evolution of Nigeria's foreign policy could be divided into two, namely colonial period and post-colonial period. However, this paper would be focusing on the post-colonial period of Nigerian foreign policy. This is informed by the Independence of Nigeria in 1960. Justifiably, Nigeria's interest as a sovereign state began in 1960 [6].
Plausibly, Nigeria's post-independence foreign policy was centered around Sir Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister who practically dominated the foreign policy machinery. According to Sir. Tafawa Balewa in his speech at the United Nations on October 8, 1960, eight days after Nigeria's independence, "So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organization, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbourhood" (Tafawa Balewa's speech at the UN, Oct., 8, 1960).
With the coming of successive governments since independence in 1960, there have been changes in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation. Notwithstanding, the objective of the country's foreign policy still remain the same. All the governments from independence till date have practically pursued the same goal and objective using different instruments. It is observed that from the administration of Sir Balewa in the First Republic to the present administration of Mohammadu Buhari, the objectives of Nigerian foreign policy have remained the same [1, 6].
By 1957, Nigeria had elected a Prime Minister, and created its first External Affairs Department under the purview of its new leader. This was later elevated to become the country's Foreign Affairs Ministry upon independence [7]. Since then, Nigeria's foreign policy approach has constantly evolved to match the ambitions of its leaders. In spite of some notable achievements along the way, critics argue that the country has failed to achieve success in its foreign relations [8, p. 180]. Several reasons have been pushed as the cause for this. Among the leading arguments for the failure of the country's external relations are Nigeria's persistent domestic challenges [9, p. 137; 10, p. 768; 11, p. 18]. Thus, from the period immediately after independence to the periods that were epochal in the formation of what has become known as Nigerian Foreign Policy thrusts, the policy has undergone successional changes with
exception to its principles, quality and content which remain almost the same with very slight variation [2, 12-14].
Domestic, regional and International determinants have in one way or another influences the projection of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, thus the Afrocentrism posture of the Nigerian Foreign policy. This simply means that Africa continue to take the centre place in Nigeria Foreign Policy thrust. Supporting this assertion, Osuntokun [15] argue that during the first republic, Nigeria Foreign Policy was founded on constructive Pan-Africanism. Similarly, Idahosa, S. O. & Adebayo, K. M. averred that, "the idea of Africa being the centre piece of Nigeria foreign policy is premised on the understanding that Nigeria's engagement in the international system would be looked at through the binoculars of Africa" [1]. The concept of Afrocentrism in Nigeria's foreign policy thought and the enunciation of its philosophical origin was coined by the Adedeji Report "Africa as centre-piece". Idahosa S. O. & Makpah J. O. submitted that the Afrocentrism in Nigeria's foreign policy had been successful in both decolonization of Africa and the fight against apartheid in South Africa [1-2, 4].
Immediately after Independence, the constructive Pan-Africanism of Nigeria was tested following the reoccurring events in Africa. For example, on the 21st of March, 1960, South Africa police shot dead 72 blacks and left 184 injured in the Sharpeville massacre. This incident before Nigeria's independence marked the beginning of Nigeria's confrontational engagement with Apartheid South Africa and decolonization of the continent [2, 16, 17] In a similar vein, Nigeria severed diplomatic ties with France due to French testing of an atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert. Nigeria was barely a year old when she severed diplomatic relations with France. The decision was heavily supported by the Parliament.
Nigeria's disposition in the region was not well received and welcome by major powers in the region and beyond. As averred by Ate, E. Bassey and posited by Lambert Ibe & Patrick Okpalaeke, "Nigeria's disposition towards France sent a signal that if left unchecked, Nigeria would become a major obstacle to France's interest in Africa. Thus, Nigeria's Afrocentric policy (liberating all African states from colonialism) and disposition further threatened France's and other major powers' policies in post-independent Africa" [18, 19]. Following the action of France as regarding the atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert, it is regrettable that Nigeria was the only country that severed diplomatic relations with France. No other country in the continent could muster the courage to support Nigeria in her disposition against France in the protection and defence of the continent, not even Ghana or Ethiopia. The entire continent of Africa sat back to observed. Hence, the exploits and sacrifices in the pursuit of Nigeria's policy towards Africa has had to endure some disappointments and inconveniences [20]).
It has been argued that Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy is motivated by an ambition to become the leading influential state in Africa [21, 22]. In spite of all these, there is limited evidence to prove its success. Domestic challenges, economic challenges, and a lack of policy coherence are some of the reasons for this [8, 23]. This has led to a reboot of the country's external relations, with an approach towards citizen and economic diplomacy in recent decades [21].
The Dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Apartheid and Post-Apartheid Era
From the constructivist belief, international engagements are shaped by national values, norms and belief systems. Over the years, it is observed that with reference to Nigeria's role in Africa, international engagements have over time been sharpened by Afrocentrism policy. Hence, its engagement with South Africa could be viewed in the context of conflict-cooperation and competition (3Cs). An exploration of Nigeria's diplomatic behaviour all down the ages reveals its messianic quest for the socio-economic and political development of Africa [24].
Nigeria and South Africa are both former British colonies, and both countries are members of the Commonwealth of Nations and African Union. On diplomatic representations, Nigeria has a High Commission in Pretoria and Consulate General in Johannesburg while South Africa has its High Commission in Abuja. The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa can be divided into two eras -Apartheid and Post-Apartheid era.
Evidently, the chequered history of Nigeria-South Africa relations can be taken through the lense of the 3Cs [2]. Nigeria's first engagement with South Africa came after the events of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Nigeria, after Independence in 1960, turn out to be one of Africa's leading voices against the apartheid regime in South Africa [25, p. 9], including been one of the foremost supporters of the African National Congress. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria continued to play an important role in championing the international isolation of South Africa. For example, Nigeria played an important
role in establishing the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid in 1963 and for decades chaired the committee which implemented sanctions against the South African government [26].
Furthermore, following the Soweto uprising in 1976, Nigeria introduced a number of initiatives to help black South Africans and the struggle of the African National Congress. For instance, it issued more than 300 passports to South Africans who wanted to flee through its diplomatic office in Botswana, and asked its civil service to financially support the South African Relief Fund through a portion of their salaries [25, 27, 28]. Commemorating the 1976 Soweto uprising against apartheid in South Africa, Sonny Okosun, a Nigerian musician, wrote the hit song "Fire in Soweto" in 1977 [29]. The support for South Africa's liberation was well received and supported in Nigeria.
Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Post-Apartheid Era
Following the fall of apartheid and the general elections of 1994, Nigeria was facing its own political challenges, including the military dictatorship of General Abacha. Following the annulment of the Nigerian elections in June 1993 and the arrest and sentencing of political opponents, including former Nigerian head of state Olusegun Obasanjo as well as Chief Moshood Abiola in 1994, it was umderstood that the Mandela-led ANC sent Archbishop Desmond Tutu and then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki on successive missions to Nigeria to lobby for the release of Obasanjo, Abiola and nine others [30].
The widespread violations of human rights culminated in the killing of Saro Wiwa and other freedom fighters [25, p. 9; 26], and South Africa under President Nelson Mandela was among the leading advocates for the international isolation of Nigeria. South African president Mandela publicly criticised General Abacha for human rights abuses and personally pushed for a two-year suspension of Nigeria's membership in the Commonwealth of Nations [31, p. 264]. At the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland in 1995, President Mandela vigorously campaigned for the expulsion of Nigeria from the bloc [25, 28]. After which Mandela also criticised Royal Dutch Shell for going ahead with a US$4 billion gas project in Nigeria despite its unpopularity within Nigeria and the rest of the world [32]. It was observed that following South Africa stance against Nigeria, the former was isolated in Africa. South Africa was allegedly "manipulated" into taking up an anti-Nigerian position by "the forces of British and American imperialism" [33]. In an attempt to regain regional prestige amongst other African governments at the expense of its international prestige. A rapprochement strategy was said to have been adopted by Alfred Nzo, the then Foreign Minister by taken steps to water down a UN resolution condemning Abacha's atrocity-strewn rule. On 29 March 1995, a conference was initially planned to take place in South Africa by Wole Soyinka, leader of an exiled of the then Nigerian democratic movement. In it response, the South African government refused to issue visas to any Nigerian democrats for six weeks prior to the conference. The conference was later cancelled by the South Africa's ruling political party, the ANC [31, p. 178].
Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 opened new doors in its relationship with South Africa. A relationship that has been described as "edgy" as both countries compete for dominance over Africa [26]. Relations between the two countries became frosty in 2012 when on March 2, 2012, 125 Nigerian travellers to South Africa were denied entry and returned back to Nigeria (75 on board South African Airways) and (50 on board Arik Airways) due to not having valid Yellow Fever certificates [34]. Tamunopubo Big-Alabo & Emmanuel C. Mac Alex-Achinulo (2020) referred to this action as "ill-
treatment of Nigerians,.....violence against diplomatic standards". With justice to reciprocity, Nigeria also
denied entry and returned back "128 South Africans in the space of two days, stating the absenteeism of legitimate documentation" as reasons behind closing them out" (The News Editorials, March 19, 2012).
Following these incidents was the official visit of the former President Goodluck Jonathan to South Africa where he addressed the South African joint parliament. Both countries were also at each other in another development related to arms bargain that was between the two countries. This came on the heels of the incident that led to the death of about 84 South African citizens during the collapse of the Synagogue of All Nations Church, Lagos building. A Nigeria-based religious center. It was the most dishearten in the ranks of diplomatic schism that bedevilled the Nigeria-South relations. According to Kayode [35] in Tamunopubo Big-Alabo & Emmanuel C. Mac Alex-Achinulo [34] "the confiscation of the money in the care of the Nigerian intelligence authorities who had made efforts to purchase arms through the black market ostensibly for the prosecution of war on terror, did not violate any international practice in the field of intelligence and security".
Xenophobic Attacks and Nigeria-South Africa Relations
It should be expressed here that the xenophobic attacks by South Africa on Nigerian inhabitants impelled breakdown of relations between Nigeria-South Africa. This horrific development inescapably pitched South Africa against Nigeria [34]. It is pertinent to recall that in 2000 a Nigerian was attacked and killed in Cape Town. In 2009 Lucky Dube was shot because his killers thought he was a Nigerian [36]. Speaking to the Southern Africa correspondent of the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), Brig.-Gen. Buba Marwa (rtd), former Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa stated that the legendary reggae music icon, Lucky Dube, was killed because he was mistaken for a Nigerian [37]. Since then attacks on Nigerians by South Africans have not abated [36, 38].
In 2014 about 60 Nigerians were killed in different cities in South Africa while 20 Nigerians were reportedly killed in 2016. Arguably, Nigeria has lost at least 137 citizens, between 2014 and 2016 in South Africa, through xenophobic attacks. The most sympathetic ones was the extra judicial killing of Tochukwu Nnamdi, a 34 year old Nigerian. In addition, it is on record that on 18th February, 2017, Nigerians living in Pretoria West were attacked by South Africans. It was reported that Mr. IkeChukwu Ayene, the President of Nigerian Union in South Africa, officially reported the incident to the government of both Nigeria and South Africa [36, 38]. Bello and Tunde (2017) in Ekanem Ekanem A. (2022) stated that "During the attack, 5 buildings occupied by Nigerian businessmen, a church belonging to Nigerians and a garage with 28 cars under repair were looted and burnt by South Africans, leading to the injuries sustained by a Nigerian pastor [36].
Nigerians has also targeted South African investments, perpetuated violence in retaliation for xenophobic attacks carried out against Africans working in South Africa, especially Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) and South African supermarket chain Shoprite. The offices of South Africa telecommunications giant MTN in the southwest city of Ibadan were set ablaze, while the company's office in Uyo in the southsouth was attacked and properties vandalized [39]. Even the Nigerian student body, National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) had also issued a severe warning to MTN in 2016 to leave Nigeria within 48 hours or mount severe pressure on its government in South Africa to stop the xenophobic attacks on Nigerian citizens.
The above situation was a step towards annihilating human and material resources which can scarcely be measured. According to Idahosa S. O. & Makpah J. O., "the increase in threats to Nigerians and attacks on their properties and businesses in South Africa continue to question the relevance of the concept of 'Afrocentrism' as well as present a new dynamic of threat to Nigerians abroad" [2].
Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Schism and Prospects
Nigeria and South Africa are arguably the most powerful and influential Sub-Saharan African states in terms of hard (material) power (see table 1) which is proven by comparison of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores [40, 41]. Nigeria and South Africa are the largest economies in Africa with a combined GDP of around 859.5 billion USD. Nigeria boast of 441.5 billion USD in GDP in 2021, making Nigeria the highest in Africa. While South Africa boast of 418 billion USD in GDP, ranking South Africa as the second-highest on the continent (Fig. 1) [42].
Though, there are constraints undermining the ability of Nigeria and South Africa to play an effective regional role [40], understandably, the relations between both countries has frequently fluctuated between tension and cordiality. The relations have been confrontational with regional leadership hostility underlying their foreign policy (in)actions. Nigeria and South Africa have consistently projected their militaries in furthering the objectives of their regional bodies - ECOWAS and SADC, as well as those of the AU and the UN. While the necessity for cooperation, partnership and collaboration by both countries cannot be overemphasized, both countries are at the same time friends and competitors, which observers believe affect development on the continent [40] and could also create more prospects.
The competition between the two countries have also demonstrated in what Omoruyi I.O. et. al (2020) called "a region-based factor". For example, during the nomination and election of the AU Commission chairperson in 2012, both countries divided the votes of the continent along regional lines. This showcased regional division on the continent. The support for their candidates was divided between SADC and ECOWAS [40, 2]. Since the enthronement of democratic rule in South Africa, Nigeria seems to have adopted the principle of isolationism as it relates to its involvement in the Southern African region, with the understanding that it is within South Africa sphere of influence. However, an incident that Nigeria might tagged interference in its sphere of influence by South Africa was the latter's involvement in Ivory Coast - West Africa, with South Africa's agreement to preserve a role for Laurent Gbagbo in Ivory Coast's
government against Nigeria's position backed by the United States, the United Nations, and European powers [40].
Figure 1. African countries with the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2021
(in billion U.S. dollars) [42].
t . . GDP in billion U.S.
Characteristic , „
dollars
Nigeria 441.54
South Africa 418.02
Egypt 402.84
Algeria 164.56
Morocco 131.47
Kenya 109.8
Ethiopia 99.27
Ghana 76.36
Angola 74.5
Tanzania 70.28
Cote d'lvoire 69.75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 57.09
the
Tunisia 46.48
Notwithstanding the context of contemporary relations between Nigeria and South Africa, both countries are expected to prioritize Africa in its relations and foreign policy, as well as seek to promote the interests of the whole continent equally. Thus, going forward, the two countries must desist from perceiving each other as competitors if they want to forge a fruitful and peaceful relationship. Both countries need to work together for a more productive Africa and the furtherance of the continent. Nigeria is a major player in West Africa while South Africa is a major player in the Southern African Development Community region. Sustained tensions would be to the detriment of both countries - and Africa as a whole [40] Kia, Bariledum & Theodora, T. Obianime 2022).
Conclusion
From the above analysis, it is clear that the historical setting of Nigeria-South Africa relations has wavered among collaboration and discord, as expected they are necessitated by every nation's foreign policy, system type, domestic intricacies and international tact. The study examined the Nigeria Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the dynamics of the Nigeria-South Africa relations, it observed that despite the seemingly good relations there has also been schism between South Africa and Nigeria as a result of competitions, the incessant wave of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa which has one way or another mar the ties of both countries and also impacted negatively on the political and diplomatic, socio cultural and economic development between both countries and on the continent in general.
The study thus concludes that for the relations between Nigeria and South Africa to be considered as one advancing the vision of Africa's political and economic renewal and development: both countries need to unite their efforts, plans and strategies in order to ensure Africa development, and peace and security on the continent; it is important to take into recognition the position of Nigeria and South Africa in the African continent, any attempt to disregard this would be ill thought and disadvantage to the development of other African countries, by extension the continent; and both countries should strengthen their relationship and agree on a broad political, economic, and cultural agenda that would create wealth and opportunity to address challenges facing the continent.
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ЕГЕЗИ БЛЕССИНГ ЧИМАНПА - кандидат исторических наук, кафедра африканистики и арабистики Российского университета дружбы народов (РУДН), ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3075-9950. (blessingegesi1@gmail.com) EGESI BLESSING CHIMANPA - Ph.D. in History, Department of African and Arabic Studies, People's Friendship University Rus.sia (RUDN University), ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3075-9950. (blessingegesi1@gmail.com)
ИСТОРИЯ НАУКИ И ТЕХНИКИ
УДК 94(47)«194/195»:378 DOI: 10.24412/2308-264X-2022-6-230-235
КУЛЯРСКИЙ Д.Д.
ЛЕНИНГРАДСКОЕ ОТДЕЛЕНИЕ ВСЕСОЮЗНОГО ИНСТИТУТА МЕХАНИЗАЦИИ СЕЛЬСКОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА В 1940-е - НАЧАЛЕ 1950-Х ГОДОВ
Ключевые слова: Ленинградское отделение Всесоюзного института механизации сельского хозяйства, Ленинградская область, сельскохозяйственная техника.
В статье осуществлен анализ деятельности Ленинградского отделения Всесоюзного института механизации сельского хозяйства в 1940-е - начале 1950-х годов. Дается краткая историческая справка об институте, рассматриваются основные направления его деятельности. Приводятся конкретные примеры опытно--конструкторских и проектно-технологических работ по созданию новых технических средств механизации сельского хозяйства, исследований и испытаний сельскохозяйственных машин и орудий, работ по модернизации и модификации сельскохозяйственной техники, работ по электрификации сельскохозяйственного производства, проводимых сотрудниками института. Преимущественно в статье используются ранее неопубликованные материалы Центрального государственного архива научно-технической документации города Санкт-Петербурга, посвященные деятельности института.
KULYARSKIY, D.D.
LENINGRAD DIVISION OF THE ALL-UNION INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL MECHANIZATION
IN THE 1940s - EARLY 1950s
Key words: Leningrad branch of the All-Union Institute of Agricultural Mechanization, Leningrad Region, agricultural machinery.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the activities of the Leningrad branch of the All-Union Institute of Agricultural Mechanization in the 1940s - early 1950s. The article gives a brief historical background about the institute, discusses the main directions of its activities. Concrete examples are given of experimental design and design and technological work on the creation of new technical means of agricultural mechanization, research and testing of agricultural machines and implements, work on the modernization and modification of agricultural machinery, work on the electrification of agricultural production, carried out by the Institute staff. The article mainly uses previously unpublished materials of the Central State Archive of Scientific and Technical Documentation of the city of St. Petersburg, dedicated to the activities of the institute.
В годы Великой Отечественной войны материально-технической базе сельского хозяйства Ленинградской области был нанесён колоссальный ущерб. Полностью было разрушено 1892 колхоза [1, c. 3] и 37 из 46 МТС [2, c. 215]. Серьёзно поредел парк крупной сельскохозяйственной техники. Так, из 2278 тракторов осталось только 809 [3, c. 508-521], а из 680 комбайнов
