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MUSTAFA KHALED KHADZH. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST DIRECTION // The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."
Keywords: US foreign policy, US foreign policy strategy, Middle East, US international assistance.
Mustafa Khaled Khadzh,
Master degree student, 2nd year, Department of Political Sciences Moscow State Linguistic University
Abstract. The article reveals certain historical aspects of the U.S foreign-policy strategy toward the Middle East. It gives a brief outline of the U.S. foreign policy evolution and its foreign policy priorities. Attention is turned to the fact that they have undergone substantial changes, yet one can hardly expect U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East, despite the shrinking of room for maneuver.
Instability in the Middle East has an influence not only on regional, but also on global political processes, which calls for an analysis of the role of this region in world politics and determination of the possible scenarios of the development of the situation. This requires examination of certain historical aspects, which would allow us to bring out the factors making the Middle East so significant in the world.
Speaking of the 20th century, in its first half this region was rather an object of world politics: the leading colonial powers of the time rivaled with one another for dividing the spheres of influence on it. The end of World War I and Germany's defeat led to increasing influence of the British Empire in the region (yet, it continued to remain in the periphery of world politics). The discovery of rich oil deposits in Saudi Arabia in the latter half of the 1930 did not change the situation. This could be explained
by the fact that the main oil deposits were situated closer to consumers in the industrial western countries.
On the whole, it can be said that even World War II and its end did not change the state of affairs. It was only the beginning of the Cold war that could be considered one of the factors, which contributed to the begining of the transformation process of the Middle East and its role in the world political process. This was connected with the fact that on March 12, 1947, the U.S. President Harry Truman appeared in the U.S. Congress and spoke of the need to give an urgent financial aid to Greece and Turkey to a sum of $400 mln to fight the spreading of communism (it was called the Truman doctrine). About two months later the Congress adopted a corresponding law.
Generally speaking, this doctrine envisaged Washington's aid of various kind to democratic countries for protection from communism. This meant the reorientation of the U.S. foreign-policy strategy and its foreign-policy course to interference in conflicts which occurred in far-off and strategically unimportant regions of the world. This aid was rendered to developed countries (under the "Marshall Plan") and developing ones, which were regarded important (Greece, Iran, Turkey, and others). The point was not only to give financial aid as such, but also deploy military bases and objects, and train local armed forces.
In this way, one may say that from that moment onwards the Middle East began to play a definite role in the U.S. foreign policy and became part of the system of confrontation with the U.S.S.R., although, as it could be seen from the Marshall Plan and a number of other undertakings, priority was given to Western Europe.
Gradually, the influence of the White House in the region has been growing. The late 1940s - early 1950s could be termed a period of Washington's formation as a Middle Eastern actor. Thus, the initial stage of the train of events included diplomatic recognition of Israel (1947), aid to Turkey and Greece, and Turkey becoming a NATO member (1952). It should be noted that during the 1950s relations with Saudi Arabia were distinguished by
mixed dynamics, however, from the early 1960s bilateral relations were growing on different directions.
In 1953, after Dwight Eisenhower came to power in the United States, the CIA took an active part in preparing and staging a coup d'etat in Iran. From the mid-1950s Washington increased its political and other activity in the region, gradually ousting Britain from there. In 1955, with a view to containing the U.S.S.R. the "Baghdad Pact" was signed, which confirmed that the Middle East was thus included in the U.S. foreign-policy strategy, and its role (just as the role of other regions) was to contain the U.S.S.R., which was also increasing its influence on that direction (which was demonstrated by its support of Egypt and its President Nasser).
It should be noted that the strengthening of the positions of the United States in the region did not have a linear character: along with successes, there were failures, too. For example, a coup attempts in Syria (1957) failed, just as intervention in Lebanon (1958). After a coup in Iraq (1958) the new authorities of the country withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. President Nasser of Egypt carried on a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and Washington was powerless to influence him.
The misbalances accumulated to the early 1960s required a revision of the foreign-policy course. Within the framework of his first State of the Union Message President John Kennedy admitted the presence of crisis tendencies and emphasized the fact that it was precisely non-military aid to countries (primarily developing ones) that will enable the United States to restore the lost geopolitical positions and outstrip the Soviet Union. In order to render such aid a corresponding normative-legal basis, namely, the Foreign Assistance Act was adopted, as well as other legislative acts.[1] This provided the foundation for the formation of the USAID, the Peace Corps, and other bodies, which became the elements of the U.S. "soft power."
The first half of the 1960s was determined predominantly by the Caribbean crisis and the events connected with it. However, in
the latter half of the 1960s the situation in the Middle East exacerbated drastically. One of the key events of the period was the "six-day war" (1967) whose results formed the prerequisites of further instability in the region. The conflict assumed permanent character, passing into a "hot phase" from time to time between Egypt and Israel (1967-1970), and the "Yom Kippur war" (1973). The latter resulted in an oil crisis and the further rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the United States.
In the late 1970s two major changes in the regional political landscape took place. The first was connected with the reorientation of Egypt to the United States. From the mid-1970s American assistance to Egypt was steadily growing. Up to 1978 the White House granted Cairo only economic assistance, but from 1979 (after signing the Camp-David Agreements) it began to render it military assistance, too, whose volumes were growing annually, and by1985 reached $1.2 billion with economic aid remaining the same - about $1 billion.
Another change was connected with the revolution in Iran in 1979. The latter had more serious consequences for the U.S. foreign-policy strategy in the region and outside its boundaries. Thus, the Iranian-U.S. confrontation, despite the conclusion of an agreement on Iran's nuclear program with the Obama administration, continues to influence the foreign-policy strategy of the U.S. in the region, although by now Iran can hardly be included in the number of priority issues for the United States. Apart from that, the CENTO bloc was disbanded, which undermined the global system of American alliances in essence; NATO remained the only multilateral element of U.S. global policy.
The loss of Iran did not lower U.S. activity in the region. From the early-1980s the White House has considerably increased the volumes of both military and non-military aid to Middle Eastern states. With Ronald Reagan coming to power in the U.S., the figure increased from $10.5 billion in 1981 to $14 billion in 1988, and its peak was reached in 1988, when the figure exceeded $18 billion (in current prices). A more detailed analysis shows
that the main recipient of American assistance was Middle Eastern countries: beginning from 1983 the figure always exceeded $5 billion. Thus, the share of the Middle East in the total volume of American assistance comprised 30 percent and more, and the main recipient of it was Israel.
On the basis of the figures cited one can make a conclusion confirming that the Middle East was among the foreign-policy priorities of the United States in that period. This was connected not only with supporting Israel, but also other countries (for example, Egypt). Besides, in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1989) Washington, in accordance with its interests,actively supported both Iraq and Iran, which led to a great scandal in 1986 (the "Iran-contra affair").
The "Desert Storm" operation in 1991 was a major event not only of regional, but also global character, it demonstrated the growing might of the United States and actually proclaimed the formation of a unipolar world, inasmuch as the Soviet Union at the time was at the final stage of disintegration. The collapse of the U.S.S.R opened up new opportunities to Washington and shifted the foreign-policy focus to a new direction, thus placing the Middle East to the background. True, in the 1990s the United States began to worry over it becoming the source of new threats (primarily Iran's nuclear program).[2]
Among major regional initiatives of the United States mention should be made of an attempt to settle the PalestineIsraeli conflict, which began in the late 1980s. In 1991 a Peace Conference in Madrid was held at which the sides agreed to the principle of "territory in exchange to peace," and also agreed to hold direct bilateral negotiations. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the joint Declaration on Principles.
Within the framework of the implementation of a peace process in Washington, a Provisional Palestine-Israeli agreement was signed on September 28, 1995, on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Its realization could not have been stopped even by the
assassination of Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. However, this agreement has not be implemented due to a number of factors, including the growing tension caused by frequent acts of terror, corruption in Palestine, the change of the government in Israel in May 1996, etc. Taking into consideration the continuing conflict, it is hardly possible to talk of a foreign-policy success of the White House in this direction, although the United States declares, as before, adherence to its settlement.
In the 1990s the United States continued to maintain its military-political presence in the Middle East, the volumes of its military and economic aid were stable, and its main recipient was, as before, Israel. However, it is worth noting that the volumes of aid to a number of countries (both military and economic) began to diminish. This concerns, first and foremost, Egypt. In 1990 it was $2.4 billion, in 2000 - $2.07 billion. (in current prices). This trend persisted in the 2000s (in 2009 the figure was less than $2 billion), and the military coup in July 2013 led to a considerable reduction of the U.S. aid. In 2017 its volume was worth only $141 million. [3]
The situation changed in the first half of the 2000s, which was connected with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This increased the significance of the region and aid to it. In that period the main means of the United States were channeled to the rehabilitation of Iraq, which became the main recipient of the U.S. aid. In 2002 the volumes of aid to the region comprised $6 billion, in 2003 the figure was doubled (up to $12 billion), and in the 2004-2008 period it slightly diminished to $12.7 billion.
This tendency continued in 2010, too, which could be explained by the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq. In the financial year of 2010 the total volume of assistance to countries of the region fell to $8.8 billion. It was kept at the level of $9 billion until 2014, when it came down to $7.1 billion. As shown by an analysis, it was connected with the military coup in Egypt in July 2013.
Summing up, it can be noted that from the latter half of the 20th century until the early 21st century the role of the Middle East in the foreign-policy strategy of the United States changed, just as did the role of the countries of the region. Reviewing the foreign-policy strategy and foreign policy of the United States toward the region one can draw the following conclusions:
First, from the latter half of the 20th century, when the United States began to draw countries of the region in its orbit, and until the late-1980s the region played a subordinate role, being part of the foreign-policy strategy aimed at the containment of the Soviet Union. This also explained the growing support of Israel (which is the case both today and at the time of the Obama administration). Despite its subordinate role, the importance of the Middle East was growing considerably, which was especially noticeable in the period of the oil crisis of 1973 and in the middle of the 1980s.
Secondly, the first noticeable transformation of the region took place in the 1970s and it was connected with three major events. The first was the oil crisis of 1973, which became a factor of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia drawing closer (in the mid-1980s agreements between the two sides on the subject of the oil market became one of the reasons for the collapse of the U.S.S.R.). Another event was the inclusion of Cairo (1979) in Washington's orbit, although it was earlier regarded an ally of the U.S.S.R. Egypt remained an important link of the foreign-policy strategy of the United States right up to 2013 and in a greater part of that period was one of the biggest recipients of American assistance (holding second place in certain years).
The third event was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, which brought the overthrow of the Shah's pro-American regime and the establishment of "anti-American theocracy." It largely determines the relations of these two countries to this day, which bear a confrontational character, despite the coming to power of President H. Rouhani (2013), who is believed to be a representative of the national elite adhering to a course aimed at cooperation with the West. Taking into account the fact that allied relations have
been formed between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and that the latter and Iran have been fighting for leadership in the Islamic world, one can speak of the U.S. continuing its course to confrontation with Tehran.
Inasmuch as Washington realizes full well that Saudi Arabia will continue to use the United States for containing Iran, this confrontation will hardly have an acute character. If need be the two sides will be able to resort to harsh rhetoric (for example, on condition of a change of power in Iran in 2021). On the whole, taking into account the domestic problems of the United States and the changed alignment of forces in the Middle East, one should talk of a more narrow space for maneuvering of the White House in that direction, and of a serious opposition to it on the part of the big regional actors (Russia, Iran, Turkey), which joined forces to neutralize U.S. foreign policy in the region.
Thirdly, the "Desert Storm" operation (1991) against Iraq, which did not result in changing the ruling regime there, laid the foundations for the reformation of the Middle East in the mid-2000s, which led to its destabilization, increased influence of Iran, and lowered influence of the United States. On the one hand, the U.S. continued its activity in the region in the 1990s, having made a settlement of the Palestine-Israeli conflict the priority, while the volumes of American aid to countries of the region were kept at the level higher than $5 billion a year (a considerable part of this aid went to Israel). On the other hand, the U.S. elite spent the first half of the 1990s on a thorough analysis of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the new reality. In this period, just as in the latter half of the 1990s, the U.S. efforts were concentrated on Europe, and this was expressed in the expansion of NATO and other anti-Russian undertakings.
Fourthly, the strategic importance of the Middle East for the U.S. considerably increased in 2003, which was due to its antiIraq campaign. Its specific feature was that the rapid military victory did not bring success and after it the White House bogged deep in the conflict. Actually, the United States suffered defeat,
which placed for discussion the question of the need to withdraw from the region at the end of the 2000s.[4] Moreover, this problem came to fore again in 2016-2017.[5] Examining statistical data (for instance, the figures of international aid), one can speak of the lowering of aid during the period of the Obama administration.
In 2009 the figure was $12.7 billion, and in 2010, due to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, it fell to 8.8 billion. The coup in Egypt in 2013 resulted in a further reduction of aid: in 2014 it was only $7.1 billion, which was the lowest figure since 2003. A subsequent increase of assistance was due to the development of the situation and growing importance of such countries of the region as Iraq and Syria. Besides, in 2015 aid to Egypt was partly restored and now it amounts to $1.2-1.3 billion a year. It should be noted that in 2016 the aid by the FMF program of $1.10 billion was postponed, that is, one could assert that the real size of American aid was lower.
On the basis of the analyzed data it can be said that by the mid-2010 the U.S. foreign-policy priorities in the region changed -at present more attention is paid to Israel, Syria and Iraq, and the role of Egypt became less important, and is hardly to grow. It became evident that the complete withdrawal of Washington from the Middle East is impossible. But the positions of the United States there tend to worse.
Literature
1. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 1961 (Pub. L. 87-195).
2. M. Phebe. U.S. - GCC Security Relations, 1: Differing Threat Perceptions. (Gulf Cooperation Council) / / Strategic Forum. 1995. Issue 39-42; P. DeSutter, Deterring Iranian NBC use (nuclear, biological, and chemical) // Strategic Forum. 1997. Issue 108-11.
3. Preliminary data by 01.12.2017. Source: site AMP U.S. explorer. usaid.gov.
4. For Greater Detail See: Haass R., Indyk M. Beyond Iraq: a new U.S. strategy for the Middle East // Foreign Affairs, 2009. Vol. 88, issue 1, pp. 41-50; Bennett R. The Precedents for Withdrawal; from Vietnam to Iraq // Foreign Affairs. 2009. Vol.88, issue 2, pp. 2-8; Brzezinski Z. From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy / / Foreign Affairs. 2010. Vol. 89, issue
2018.02.008
1, pp. 16-24; Drezner D. Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times / / Foreign Affairs. 2011. Vol. 90, issue 4, pp. 57-63; Parent J., MacDonald P. The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Get Back to Move Forward // Foreign Affairs. 2011. Vol.90, issue 6, pp. 32-40; Indyk M. Lieberthal K. O'Hanlon M. Scoring Obama's Forign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History / / Foreign Affairs. 2012. Vol. 91, issue 3, pp. 29-36.
5. For greater detail see: Glaser Ch., Kelanic R. Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy // Foreign Affairs. 2017. Vol. 96, issue 1, pp. 122-131.
2018.02.008. MIKHAIL SLINKIN. SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION WARFIGHTING //
"Konfrontatsiya mezhdu Zapadom i Rossiey: S kem vy, strani Asii i Afriki?" - Moscow, IVRAN, 2016. - P. 28-34.
Keywords: Syria, the Syrian armed opposition, IAG, FSA, radical Islamists.
Mikhail Slinkin,
PhD(Hist.), Associate professor
The author of the reviewed article M. Slinkin notes that one of peculiar features of the majority of wars and armed conflicts of the end of 20 — the beginning of the 21 century is broad participation of irregular armed groups (IAG): groups of guerrilla fighters, insurgents, separatists, terrorists, ethnic and tribal levies. Events in Syria also concern them. Originally armed wing of the Syrian opposition used the principles of waging city guerrilla which main goals are: physical elimination of armed forces heads, police and their assistants; expropriation of the resources belonging to the government and individuals. At the same time the purpose focused on fight financing in Syria pales into insignificance as money for arming and maintenance of opposition groups were granted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar and also some other countries. With that it was transformed to the aspiration to put as great as possible damage to industrial facilities, economic and social infrastructure of the country. In Syria militia groups also
