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Memory, History and Coexistence in Crimea
Greta Lynn Uehling
(University of Michigan, USA)
Abstract. The repatriation of the Crimean Tatars to their historic homeland in Crimea after the disintegration of the Soviet Union created an opportunity to publically commemorate the Crimean Tatar past. At the same time, various practices of commemoration raised tensions. Foucaultian genealogy offers a useful framework for fully appreciating these developments as the emergence of counter-history and counter-memory. The approach of attempting to resolve conflicting perspectives by creating a single, synthesized version of the past is likely to cause more pressure. By contrast, a meliorating one, in which there is a continual reevaluation of multiple perspectives, is more promising.
Keywords: counter-history, counter-memory, cultural memory, truth and reconciliation.
The repatriation of the Crimean Tatars to their historic homeland in Crimea after the disintegration of the Soviet Union created an opportunity to publically commemorate the Crimean Tatar past. Newly independent Ukraine provided a setting where the previously silenced personal recollections could find expression in paintings, books, and documentary films. The indigenous Tatars, who had been ethnically cleansed from the landscape following deportation, not only returned, but were able to erect monuments to political and cultural heroes, tend ancestors' graves, and restore some of the sacred mosques and medrese. Gradually, Crimean Tatars began to fill the «blank pages» in history [6, p. 151] resulting from decades of Soviet silencing. To a certain extent, the government of newly independent Ukraine cooperated in this process: the 1944 deportation was briefly mentioned in Ukrainian history books, historical programs ran on television (Tarih Sedasi) and perhaps most importantly, a day of memory to commemo-
rate the 1944 deportation was permitted each year in Simferopol's Lenin Square.
Foucaultian genealogy offers a useful framework for fully appreciating these developments as the emergence of counter-history and counter-memory [2, p. 7]. This theoretical approach places practices of recollecting and commemorating in the context of power relations and encourages us to think not only about the content of history making, but the surrounding practices: how previously suppressed knowledge is recovered, by whom, and with what effects. The creation of counter-histories brings to light experiences and narratives that have not (yet) been integrated in official histories. While state-sanctioned histories help maintain political unity by imposing a singular interpretation on a shared past, counter-histories undo the silences, suggest alternative interpretations, and have creative, emancipatory potential. As Medina writes, «Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledges, it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices ...» [8, p. 17].
The incorporation of counter-memories and counter-histories in Crimea has not been a smooth or simple process. Not everyone was accepting of the Crimean Tatars' repatriation. In fact, even as Crimean Tatars were able to reinscribe their presence on the landscape, that same landscape was marked with suspicion and distrust. The hostility against Crimean Tatars has included vandalism of Crimean Tatar cemeteries and memorials in Zaprudnoe, Zuya. Saki, Bakhchisaray, Nizhnegorsk and countless other locales. The Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples that monitors these activities concluded vandalism is more the rule than the exception [3].
In this article, I focus on the annual commemoration of the 1944 deportation because it raises important counter-memories, and, as a central commemorative event, is a source of social tension. The commemorative activities bring tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars into the central square on May 18th every year. As Abdulaev notes, in the weeks and days preceding the gathering, anti-Tatar articles become prominent in the mass media [1, p. 1]. Hate speech against Crimean Tatars also infects social media like Facebook. In 2013, the hostility
reached an apex when Russia's General Consul made hostile statements against the Crimean Tatars on public television1. This dialectic, in which public commemoration sparks negative sentiments and the negative sentiments reinforce the desire for commemoration, calls for reflection. What exactly are a society's choices for affording space to groups for public commemoration?
One famous and much-quoted reflection on this topic comes from George Santayana who wrote, «Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it» [9, p. 397]. This is a widespread sentiment in Ukraine. In the social sciences, a great deal of research exploring how acts of commemoration and memorialization help to weave the social fabric has certainly been inspired by this idea. In politics, over 25 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have drawn encouragement from the idea that publically remembering and commemorating can foster societal healing. When we consider protracted tension around the world, however, it is clear that the opposite view deserves scrutiny [10]. Is there a connection between public commemoration and social conflict? If so, how can that tension be broken? In other words, how can a multi-ethnic society such as Crimea practice commemoration peacefully?
Transitional Justice
In the field of transitional justice, which looks at how countries emerging from an authoritarian or war-torn past can transition to democracy, the commemoration of victims is considered an essential step [4; 7; 5]. However, while the field of transitional justice and memory studies celebrates commemoration, they have not yet taken into account findings in the field of conflict resolution [10, p. 241]. This is important in Crimea, which bears the emotional scars of both Stalin-era repression and the Nazi occupation. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions from Argentina to Africa have aimed to bring about societal healing by allowing victims of crimes, as well as perpetrators, to recollect and recount their stories. What is happening in Crimea, however, is the opposite of truth or reconciliation. To illustrate with an example, we can look briefly at two commemorations.
1 http://www.rferl.org/content/russian-consul-crimea-resigns-controversial-remarks /24996499.html
After Crimea was annexed, the pro-Russian Prime Minister who took office substantially reconfigured the spaces afforded to various ethnic groups for public commemoration. In May 2014, he issued a decree that banned all mass gatherings in the region, effectively outlawing the 2014 commemoration of the Crimean Tatar deportation. The square where Crimean Tatars and their supporters gathered to mark the genocide for over two decades was cordoned off and guarded by armored personnel carriers and ranks of Russian riot police. Pro-Russian «self-defense» battalions stood ready. A number of rationalizations were used, primarily based on national security, to explain this decision, which was met with outrage. Wishing to avoid conflict however, Crimean Tatars gathered outside a mosque on the edge of Simferopol instead, holding their commemoration under the whirl of helicopter blades.
Shortly after the Crimean Tatars were banned from mourning their loss, Putin flew to Crimea to publicly commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which like the Crimean Tatar deportation took place 70 years ago. He was met with great pageantry and celebration. Tens of thousands of people flowed freely into the streets, there was a two-hour parade with over 1,000 veterans and 60 military vehicles, and an air show involving 70 aircraft2. One way to look at the ban of the Crimean Tatar commemoration is that it reconfigured the possibilities, contracting the space allowed to Crimean Tatars while maintaining it for Russians. The current authorities' aims with regard to this highly emotional substrate are clear in light of the ample space afforded to Russians wishing to commemorate Victory Day.
The leader's attempt to reorganize relations with the living by banning commemoration of the dead was one way to signal supremacy and begin the process of re-ordering social relations in post-annexation Crimea. The comparison of two commemorations shows the transition is also intervening in matters deeper than politics. These are important questions of how, when, and who to honor, and how, when, and who to [11, p. 12] mourn. A Foucaultian approach suggests that the contraction of commemorative space for Crimean Tatars re-
2 http://www.theguardian.com/world2014/may/09Madimk-putin-arrives-crimea-victory-day-ukraine
veals the very real imbalances of power on the peninsula in spite of official statements to the contrary. Viewed in these terms, we can see the active role that symbolic practices play in reconfiguring or reordering social hierarchies.
It seems clear that in Crimea, public commemoration has a tendency to reactivate tension. But this tension is still vastly preferable to the silences that were imposed in the Soviet past. In exploring the rise of counter-histories and counter-memories, Medina outlined several approaches or levels of acceptance of pluralism in the field of history, two of which are relevant here. The first is termed «converging» [8, p. 22] / In this approach, conflicting perspectives on the past are treated as temporary features that can be minimized or eliminated. This approach to pluralism could only be implemented in Crimea at the cost of enormous symbolic violence, entailing the denial of one or the other group's point of view. This is clear in the words of Lilia Budjurova, a journalist, and TV show host, who warned in a TV broadcast that the ban would be remembered for many years, and can't be compensated for by any amount of government spending on social services or development3.
A preferable approach is what Medina called «meliorating» [8, p. 22]. This is an approach in which contestations are actually valued as opportunities for improving the objectivity of different interpretations of the past. The goal is an evolving or «living» truth that is continually revised and improved upon. Accepting pluralism in this way could be beneficial in Crimea. For example, if Russians revised the narrative frame that places all Crimean Tatars in the category of collaborators, it would also reduce the likelihood that they would object to Crimean Tatar memorialization and commemoration. In other words, efforts to revise and expand the limiting frames of historical interpretation would help break tension.
Does it follow that in addition to Russians better accommodating Crimean Tatar commemorations, Crimean Tatars should also be more accepting of Russian commemorations? It depends on the commemoration. In 2012, an exhibit in honor of Stalin's birth that contained many laudatory comments was placed (with the approval of the autho-
3 http://atr.ua/video/2014-05-16-22-41-51-4040637
rities) in the center of Simferopol, where the descendants of his victims would be sure to look on. This is highly prevocational in light of Stalin's record. This exhibit does not exist as an isolated incident. It ties in to deeper feelings. In interviews on the topic of Stalin conducted in the course of my research, Russians display a veneration for Stalin. Presented with a small black and white image of the leader, some respondents were even moved to tears. They used expressions like «pride for the activities he carried out,» «empathy,» and «this is the image of a good person,» to describe their feelings. Turning the moral universe upside down, interview respondents empathized with the leader, rather than his victims. They made statements like «he was on the cruel side», that reframed massive crimes against humanity as something minor, a mere character flaw. Therefore, assuming all commemoration is good would assume a moral equivalency that simply does not exist.
Conclusion
The notion that opposing interpretations of the past perpetuate tension in Crimea raises challenging issues. However, this dialectic, in which public commemoration sparks negative sentiments and negative sentiments reinforce the impulse to commemorate, holds its own resolution. In a traditional Hegelian dialectic, one opinion (a thesis) counters another functioning opinion (an antithesis). In a conversation involving both thesis and antithesis, it is assumed that both were at least partly accurate and the synthesis reflects something that is superior to both. So too with the «meliorating» approach to historical pluralism described above. Opposing interpretations of history can be improved in a context in which diversity and disagreement are valued for the opportunity they provide to see another's point of view. With this approach, a progressively more accurate vision of the past, and freer path into the future, could be within reach.
REFERENCES
1. Abdulaev I. Pakt-Voyna-Genotsid [Pact-War-Genocide]. Golos Krima [The Voice of Crimea], 20(1010) 17 May, 2013.
2. Foucault M. Society Must Be Defended. New York, Picador, 2003, pp. 7-9.
3. Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, 'Information provided by the Government of Ukraine on the implementation of the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination' (27 August 2007). Available at: CERD/C/UKR/CO/18/Add. 1
4. Galtung Jo. After Violence: reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution in Abu-Nimer, Muhammed (ed.) Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lanham, Md, Lexington Books, 2001, pp. 3-23.
5. Haynor P. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New York, Routledge, 2010.
6. Jones S. Old Ghosts New Chains. In Ruby Watson, ed. Memory, History, and Opposition Under State Socialism. Santa Fe, School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series, 1994, pp. 149-167.
7. Kriesberg L. «Changing Forms of Coexistence», in Muhammed Abu-Nimer (ed.). Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lanham, Md., Lexington Books, 2001.
8. Medina J. «Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism». Foucault Studies, 2011, no. 12, pp. 9-35.
9. Santayana G. Life of Reason. Vol. I. New York. Scribner, 1953.
10. Tint B. History, Memory, and Intractable Conflict. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 2010, vol. 27, no. 3, Spring, pp. 239-256.
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About the author: Greta Lynn Uehling - Doctor of sciences, Professor of political science in the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA); uehling@umich.edu
Память, история и сосуществование в Крыму
Грета Лин Улинг
(Университет Мичигана, США)
Аннотация. После распада Советского Союза крымские татары смогли вернуться в Крым на свою историческую родину и активно участвовать в традиционных мероприятиях, посвященных своему историческому прошлому. Вид и манера проведения этих мероприятий привели к росту напряженности между крымскими татарами и другими национальностями. Генеалогия Фуко дает нам структуру, благодаря которой мы можем оценить рост национальной напряженности, зарождение оппозиции по отношению к истории крымских татар и культурной памяти. Однако попытка сглаживания межнационального конфликта с помощью одной усреднённой версии прошлых событий может привести к еще большему напряжению. Напротив, более многообещающим подходом будет тот, где обсуждаются и непрерывно пересматриваются различные точки зрения.
Kлючевые слова: контр-история, контр-память, культурная память, правда и мирное сосуществование.
Сведения об авторе: Грета Лин Улинг - доктор наук, профессор политологии в Университете Мичигана (Энн Арбор, Мичиган, США); uehling@umich. edu
