CC BY
111
Rauf GARAGOZOV
Ph.D. (Psychol.), Leading Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
Rena KADYROVA
D.Sc. (Psychol.), Assistant Professor, Chair of Psychology, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
MEMORY, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MASSES IN AN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Abstract
In order to explain possible socio-psy-chological mechanism of the intereth-nic conflicts the authors have suggested a theoretical model which links together such factors as historical narratives, collective memory, the media, emotions, group identity, and the behavior of the masses. According to the authors, in most cases, conflicts unfold according to the following scenario: the media circulate very specific narrative templates which fan emotions
("ethnic fears") to instill corresponding social attitudes conducive to ethnopolitical mobilization. These specific narrative templates (not any text that might stir up negative feelings against any other group, but specific texts that interpret the events according to a certain template) are described as powerful instruments for molding mass consciousness for the simple reason that they fully correspond to already existing expectations and attitudes (the collective memo-
ry patterns). The theory is supported by empirical material derived from the conflict
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Introduction
Like any other conflict, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh contains a great share of psychological motivations which (as distinct from political and legal aspects) rarely become an object of scrutiny. Having skimmed the serious problems of lack of understanding between the conflicting sides (riveted to negative stereotypes, hostile attitudes, negative opinions, and negative feelings), most experts hasten to plunge into the conflict's legal and political depths.
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the psychological component deserves a detailed analysis especially in the context of the recently intensified talks. In fact, better knowledge of the psychological factors behind any conflict reveals the roots of potential conflicts, clarifies their course and points to the ways to settle them. This knowledge is no less important in the context of post-conflict reconciliation: today experts in the theory of conflicts, political psychology, and other related disciplines are showing much more interest than before in the psychological aspects of conflicts (perceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, prejudices, and collective memory).
This article offers a model which explains how the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict flared up and analyzes the role of collective memory in its emergence and possible settlement.
Collective Memory and Ethnopolitical Conflict
Many authors admit that collective memory can be used to fan ethnic conflicts as well as to quench them.1 Few political scientists, however, concentrate on the phenomenon of collective memory because the very concept is too vague and too multidimensional to be treated as an analytical category. More likely than not it is treated as a metaphor, which explains why the analysts demonstrate excessive caution when referring to collective memory. To reveal a possible connection between collective memory and ethnic conflicts we should probably specify our understanding of this concept.
Collective Memory: The Sociocultural Model
Several earlier works offer a very detailed description of the collective memory model,2 therefore here we offer an overview of the idea and dwell on the elements without which the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict cannot be correctly assessed.
1 R. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; P. Rich, "Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment," Review of International Studies, No. 25, 1999, pp. 425-437; J. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982; S.J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001; D.R. Smock, Religious Perspectives on War, USIP Press, 2002.
2 R.R. Garagozov, "Collective Memory and the Russian 'Schematic Narrative Template'," Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 55-89; idem, "Collective Memory: Patterns and Manifestations, Part 1," Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, pp. 13-98; idem, "Collective Memory: Patterns and Manifestations. Part 2," Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008, pp. 3-97; idem, Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamyati v Rossii i na Tsentralnom Kavkaze, Nurlan, Baku, 2005.
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Ideas and categories elaborated within the sociocultural approach are very important for our model of collective memory,3 within which collective memory is interpreted as mediated by various sorts of narratives, historical narratives in particular. In this sense, all types of historical narratives (annals, chronicles, history textbooks, etc.) can be considered as cultural instruments that mediate collective memory, while some of their forms affect collective memory in a very specific way. James Wertsch points to the abstract and highly generalized form of narrative that underlies all sorts of narratives, which he calls a schematic narrative template.4
The templates differ from culture to culture; to be identified they demand special approaches and are used as a model according to which narratives of the most important historical events are created (even if they hardly fit the schematic template). J.V. Wertsch has identified the Russian schematic narrative template, which he describes as "triumph over the alien force."5 We have found out6 that templates are the product of a set of intertwined political, religious, sociocultural, historical, and even psychological circumstances; the State and the Religious institutions, which supervise historical studies and the production and consumption of historical texts, have a special role to play in the creation, preservation, and reproduction of templates.
After taking root in the mass consciousness through all types of cultural and historical socialization, templates develop into special forms of collective experience (a pattern of collective remembering)—the groups' sustainable and widespread ideas about its past; its heroes' acts and motivations and the acts and motivations of aliens recorded in historical texts, textbooks, cultural artifacts (literature and art), social institutions (museums, memorial complexes, and exhibitions), and the memory policy.
Patterns blend with other aspects of collective experience and "become explicit in individual and group behavior."7 This explains why narrative templates are invariably reproduced in new conditions and new generations (which avoided the earlier practices of brainwashing) and why patterns remain an inalienable part of group identity.
Collective Memory, Emotions, Social Attitudes, and Mass Behavior
We all know that recollections of the past stir up both positive and negative sentiments in any individual; this has been experimentally established and does not call for further confirmation. The question is whether remembering past events (which took place in the distant or recent past of an ethnic or national group with which the individual associates himself rather than something that happened in his personal past) can affect individual emotions, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior? If it can, then what is the range of emotional impacts? To provide the answers to both questions let us take a look at how psychology understands memory.
It distinguishes between several types of memory, including episodic, procedural, and semantic.8 Episodic memory is remembering individual events; procedural memory deals with habits and skills, while semantic memory preserves knowledge about the social and natural environment.
3 J.V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
4 Ibid., p. 62.
5 "The Russian schematic narrative template consists of the following elements: 1. "An initial situation" ... in which Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others is disrupted by: 2. The initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force, or agent, which leads to: 3. A time of crisis and great suffering, which is: 4. Overcome by triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone" (ibidem.)
6 R.R. Garagozov, "Collective Memory and the Russian 'Schematic Narrative Template'," Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 55-89.
7 A.L. Kroeber, C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology & Ethnography, Harvard University, Cambridge, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1952, pp. 181-198.
8 R.L. Solso, Cognitive Psychology, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1988.
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Collective memory is semantic since events that took place in the past and were not experienced individually cannot be stored in episodic memory. So we can paraphrase the above question by asking what role emotions have to play in semantic memory? Alan Lambert supplied the following answer: "Certainly, we can have positive or negative appraisals of events and objects we have not had any personal experience [with] at all. For example, semantic memory can include knowledge about all sorts of people and historical events (e.g. Adolf Hitler, Mahatma Gandhi, the crash of the Hindenburg, the coronation of King Louis VIII) about which we may have positive or negative feelings, even in the absence of any personal experience. Moreover, depending on the event in question and the type of knowledge that one has acquired about it, the intensity of such emotions can sometimes rival those associated with episodic memories. For example, few people alive at the current time personally experienced the Holocaust. However, knowledge of the event itself and the vivid photographs that document its existence can trigger exceptionally strong reactions in people, even if they were born long after the event took place."9
This means that reproduction (revival) in the (semantic) memory of an individual of certain information may breed (negative or positive) emotions and feelings. The same author has correctly pointed out that emotions of this type create very different contexts when they grip an individual or vast masses of people.10
In his classical work about crowd psychology, Gustave Le Bon described this phenomenon and cited corresponding examples. Here is another example: there is a well-known effect called "rally under the flag": in response to a military threat, the public closes ranks around the president and demonstrates a high degree of support.11 These examples confirm the role of episodic memory; however for the purposes of this article we are more interested in semantic memory. Indeed, how can certain ideas about the historical past stir up identical feelings in vast popular masses? We do not know about studies of processes, the mechanisms of which can transform historical representations of the past into strong emotions in large numbers of people simultaneously. Here is our idea about how this happens.
Modeling the Processes which Reflect the Ties between Collective Historical Representations and Social Behavior
The above suggests that, first, semantic memory may contain information about the past of the group to which an individual belongs and which can or may cause positive or negative emotions. Second, there should be certain mechanisms able to activate certain elements of semantic memory, that is, certain historical representations, perceptions, and reminiscences. This is how, in our opinion, collective memory can contribute to the instigation of an ethnic conflict.
At first, the patterns of collective memory are activated through media representation of specific narratives that reproduce the past or interpret certain contemporary events in line with the traditional schematic narrative templates typical of any given culture.
In fact, specific narrative templates resurface in the public consciousness and group discourse; interpreted according to certain schematic narrative templates, they invigorate the corresponding pattern of collective memory to become a potential trigger of conflicts.
9 A. Lambert, "How Does Collective Memory Create a Sense of Collective?" in: Memory in Mind & Culture, ed. by P. Boyer, J. Wertsch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 204.
10 Ibidem.
11 J. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, Wiley, New York, 1973.
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Waves of nationalism raised by simplified historical interpretations that smack of myths are mainly responsible for the emergence and popularity of similar narratives. Some think12 that nationalism is an ailment of societies immersed, without preparation, into freedom of the press and democracy.
Here is what the same authors have to say: "Historically and today, from the French Revolution to Rwanda, sudden liberalizations of press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism. The most dangerous situation is precisely when the government's press monopoly begins to break down. During insipient democratization, when civil society is burgeoning but democratic institutions are not fully entrenched, the state and other elites are forced to engage in public debate in order to compete for mass allies in the struggle for power. Under those circumstances, governments and their opponents often have the motive and the opportunity to play the nationalist card."13
The policy of glasnost proclaimed in the Soviet Union shortly before its disintegration introduced, for the first time in the country's history, freedom of public discussion to make it a hostage of the nationalist rhetoric and mythologization inevitable in a society with no institutions and regulations of professional journalism, critical approach to opinions, and forum for civilized exchange of opinions.
Any attentive observer will inevitably detect that the nationalist outbursts across former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were predated by wide-scale circulation of specific historical narratives in the media.14 As a rule, similar texts, mainly of the "victim" type, simplify the past, brim with emotions, and rely on myths and old insults.15
This is what can be found on the "surface" of narratives of this type; however, deep inside they reproduce specific schematic narrative templates which actualize the patterns of collective memory of groups eager to join ethnopolitical struggle. We all know that propaganda is most effective if it corresponds to the sentiments of the audience or ties together a new idea and old sentiments.16 For this reason, such narratives affect the minds and feelings of members of ethnonational groups to an extent that cannot but amaze external observers and students of ethnopolitical conflicts.
In other words, this effect stems from two prerequisites: definite patterns of collective memory shared by all members of any given group and the excessive content of narrative templates, which add vigor to these patterns, in the narratives which appear in huge numbers to interpret current situation and/or the past. If any given group has no patterns of collective memory to be actualized through narratives of a certain ("victim") type, it remains immune to any amount of victim narratives put into circulation: they will never produce any noticeable effect.
This means that ethnic entrepreneurs and political elites can transform the collective memory patterns into instruments for fanning ethnopolitical conflicts. They rely on the memory policy to revive old patterns and actualize cultural patterns in order to mobilize the nation by reminding it about old insults, humiliations, and violence. In this way, people are pushed to ethnic dividing lines with a conflict just round the corner.
12 J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, Mass., MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 61-96.
13 Ibid., p. 62.
14 A memorandum on what was described by "genocide of the Serbs" signed by many members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, a specific "victim" narrative, is one of the pertinent examples. It appeared in the press in 1986 and, to an extent, triggered what later developed into a crisis (see: V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, pp. 132-168; J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, op. cit.).
15 S.L. Kaufman, op. cit.
16 D. Kinder, D. Sears, "Public Opinion and Political Action," in: Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey, E. Aronson, Vol. 3, Random House, New York, 1985, pp. 659-741.
Theoretical Aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
As any other ethnopolitical conflict, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a very complicated phenomenon with numerous problems and huge destructive potential in the very heart of one of the world's important geopolitical regions. It differs, probably, from many other ethnopolitical conflicts by the large number of erroneously interpreted facts and misrepresentations caused by several factors. Two of them deserve special mention.
■ First, at its initial stage, when the region was part of the Soviet Union, information was carefully dosed out and distorted by the central and local communist structures, which means that no objective or verified information could be obtained.
■ Second, many of the observers and students knew next to nothing about the region's past and cultural roots.
These were the two most important factors; the actual list is much longer. Here is another important consideration: despite the 22 years that have passed since the conflict began, during which the region changed beyond recognition (the Soviet Union disappeared; the South Caucasian countries became independent, while observers and academics acquired access to first-hand information about the region), many important facts about the conflict and its origins remain vague and highly debatable.
Let us go back to the conflict's earliest stage, which puzzled many in its scope and impacts. We will not discuss events that are well known and described in detail in all sorts of special publications, but shall dwell only on one aspect: ethnopolitical mobilization17 of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. This is the key to a correct understanding of what happened in the past and what is going on now.
There are seven episodes described in various publications18 that adequately describe the pace, scope, and dynamics of the political mobilization of the Armenians:
■ Episode 1 (the beginning): 13 February, 1988, a group of Karabakh Armenians had staged an
unprecedented event in Lenin Square: an unsanctioned political rally. Several hundred people gathered and made speeches calling "for the unification of Ka-rabakh with Armenia" (the Armenian S.S.R.).
■ Episode 2: 15 February, at a meeting of the Armenian Writers Union, one of the more out-
spoken groups in society, the poet Silva Kaputikian spoke up in support of the Karabakh Armenians.
■ Episode 3: 18 February, protests about the environment attracted few people. The environ-
ment was the safest and most "nonpolitical" subject for protest.
■ Episode 4: 20 February, 30,000 demonstrators rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh
Armenians.
■ Episode 5: 22 February, over 100,000 people rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh Ar-
menians.
■ Episode 6: 23 February, 300,000 gathered in Erevan to support the Karabakh Armenians.
■ Episode 7: 25 February, 700,000 rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh Armenians.
17 By ethnopolitical mobilization we mean a process in the course of which an ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations and organizes itself into a collective entity with all the necessary resources for political action (see: M. Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1994, p. 28).
18 Information is borrowed from Th. De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York and London, 2003 and verified, as much as possible, with other sources.
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In less than two weeks, the ethnopolitical mobilization of Armenians in the form of ethnopoliti-cal rallies reached its peak.19 How was the exceptionally high level of political mobilization achieved within such a short time in Erevan, separated from Nagorno-Karabakh by hundreds of kilometers?20 No available publications offer a special analysis of high ethnopolitical mobilization and the vehemence of public response; however, many observers have accepted partially or completely what Pravda, the national Soviet newspaper, wrote at the time.21
Opinions differ: some authors blame "social, cultural, economic, or political discrimination against the Armenian minority in Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azeri majority living side by side with the Armenians" or "the centuries-old hatred" between the Armenians and Azeri, "two incompatible ethnic and religious identities," or a combination of all three factors.22
In an effort to find a theoretical explanation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Svante Cornell has identified several factors behind the conflict, including the struggle of "antagonistic identities" caused by "centuries-old hatred," external support of the Armenian diaspora, the absence of democratic institutions in the U.S.S.R., which deprived the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh of the chance to lodge their complaints and express their dissatisfaction, etc. This puts Cornell's book into a class in itself.
Svante Cornell relied on T.R. Gurr's conception of ethnopolitical action to explain the Armenians' ethnopolitical mobilization (one of the factors behind the conflict) by the high level of their cohesion. However, a high level per se cannot be regarded as sufficient for a group's social or political mobilization. It remains unclear what caused the complaints and dissatisfaction. The author23 has admitted that there was no severe social, economic, cultural, or even political discrimination against the Armenian minority; in fact, the local Armenians lived better than people in many other Soviet regions and had cultural and political autonomy. It can also be said that the conflict was not triggered by "centuries-old hatred": Armenians and Azeri have many common cultural features; until the late 19th century they did not fight and, on the whole, coexisted without much trouble.
The above leaves one wondering whether it was Moscow that fanned the conflict, if the social, economic, and discriminatory factors are excluded? As distinct from Yugoslavia, in which the central communist government in Belgrade was guilty of fanning national hatred, Moscow can hardly be accused of the same. So the question, "What brought a great number of Armenians into the streets of Stepanakert and Erevan?", remains pending.
Thomas de Waal was one of the first researchers of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to point to the inadequacy of the above approaches and explanations. He investigated the sides' widely different ideas about their past and pointed to the official propaganda of hatred, mythologization, etc: "More
19 T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, USIP Press, Washington, DC, 1993.
20 At the earliest stage, the rallies were organized by clandestine or semi-clandestine Armenian nationalist organizations that had become much more active during the past few years (see: Th. de Waal, op. cit.). At that time, however, there organizations did not have enough organizational, administrative, or information instruments to mobilize the people within a very short period. Some think that the rallies were staged by the Armenian authorities, the KGB in particular, to ward off the imminent danger of losing power created by Gorbachev's perestroika (L. Grigorian, "Chto proiskhodit v Ar-menii," Strana i mir, No. 1, 1989, pp. 35-38). This explains the scope and intensity (the republican political elite had enough administrative, organizational, and financial resources). Even if we accept this explanation, the vehemence of the popular rallies and its source remain unexplained.
21 In an article "Emotsii i razum. O sobytiiakh v Nagornom Karabakhe i vokrug nego" (Emotions and Reason. On the Events in Karabakh and Around It) which appeared in Pravda on 21 March, 1988, its authors, answering the question "What brought a great number of Armenians into the streets of Stepanakert (former name of the capital of Karabakh) and Erevan?" wrote: "Obviously, tens of thousands of Armenians were not driven by the desire to be united with Armenia. They were driven into the streets of Stepanakert by their dissatisfaction with the social and economic situation in the Autonomous Region in which their national and other rights were infringed upon."
22 S.E. Cornell, Conflict Theory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political Solution? Triton Publishers, Stockholm, 1997.
23 Ibidem.
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than any others in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, the conflict was all but inevitable because its causes lay in the 'deep structure' of the relationship between its two parties in late Communist times. Four elements—divergent national narratives, a disputed territorial boundary, an unstable security arrangement and lack of dialogue between the two parties—had made fissures that would break Armenia and Azerbaijan apart, as soon as trouble began. Yet because the problem was both so new and so profound, no mechanism was found—or has yet been found—to repair the damage."24
He has answered the above question with: "Uncomfortable as it is for many Western observers to acknowledge, the Nagorny Karabakh conflict makes sense only if we acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were driven to act by passionately held ideas about history, identity, and rights (italics mine.—R.G.). That the vast mass of these ideas was dangerous and delusory does not make them any less sincerely felt. The ideas expanded inside the ideological vacuum created by the end of the Soviet Union and were given fresh oxygen by warfare. The darkest of these convictions, the 'hate narratives,' have taken such deep root that unless they are addressed, nothing can change in Armenia and Azerbaijan."25
His conclusion about a great role of conflicting historical ideas (or even myths) in the emergence of the conflict is very important. He is moving in the right direction, even though he limited himself to very general conclusions. Three points cause objections:
■ first, he left aside the vaster context of the Turkic-Armenian relations (for example, the Ar-menian-Azeri conflicts of the early 20th century), outside which the vehemence of this conflict remains puzzling.26
■ Second, many peoples in the world have "bad narratives" about each other; not all of them, however, start conflicts. It seems that conflicts are started by "bad narratives" of special types in special conditions that have not yet been identified.
■ Third, the "hate narratives" mentioned by De Waal do not date to the Soviet Union's last years, as he erroneously thinks.
They were circulated before the Soviet Union and the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Soviet Socialist republics appeared on the map. We shall demonstrate below that the "hate narratives" continue the old Armenian historiographical tradition that preserves and reproduces the Armenian schematic narrative template rooted in the Middle Ages.
The Armenian Schematic Narrative Template
It has been demonstrated earlier27 that the Armenian historiographic tradition develops its schematic narrative template, "a staunch people surrounded and tortured by enemies," which consists of the following components:
1. The initial situation : the Armenian people are living in glorious times which are disrupted by enemy intrigues, as a result of which
24 Th. de Waal, "The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Origins, Dynamics and Misperceptions," available at [http:// www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/origins-dynamics-misperceptions.php], 2005.
25 Th. De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, pp. 272-273.
26 This context is well represented in: J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, Turks & Armenians. A Manual of the Armenian Question, Committee on Education. Assembly of Turkish American Association, Washington, D.C., 1989.
27 R.R. Karagezov (Garagozov), Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentralnom Kavkaze, Nurlan, Baku, 2005.
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2. the Armenians fall victim to aggression,
3. they have to live through a period of suffering and difficulties,
4. if they remain loyal to their faith, they overcome their enemies; if they betray their faith, they are defeated.
Many of the Armenian historical narratives contain so-called "hate narratives" addressed to peoples of other confessions and cultures because the Armenian Church, the main producer of historical texts and their main custodian, intended to preserve and increase its influence on the minds and hearts of its followers.28
In the course of time (especially between the end of the 18th and the early 20th centuries), this template was persistently planted in the Armenians' collective memory through Armenian historical compositions printed in huge numbers, teaching of history in the Armenian religious schools, etc. Later, having become part of the nation's collective experience, the template developed into a pattern of the Armenian collective memory with its highly specific impact on the nation's collective behavior, perception of neighbors, and thinking.
Still later, in the 19th century with the advent of the secular "epoch of nationalism," the Armenian schematic narrative template was somewhat modified by Armenian intellectuals. They replaced the template's religious foundation with a nationalist one: the "Armenian people" or nation replaced the "Armenian faith"; the Armenian nationalist-minded intelligentsia modified the religious ideolo-geme in which the old formula, "the fate of the Armenians depends on their loyalty to their faith," was replaced with the following nationalist wording: "the fate of the Armenians depends on their loyalty to their people."
In other words, the Armenian schematic narrative template that appeared in the fold of the Armenian Church to be later adjusted by the Armenian nationalists to their political aims and ambitions geared the various layers of Armenian culture (including collective memory), in a very obvious way, toward traumatic experience and instilled a very specific friend/foe perception. The results have been manifested in the psychological makeup of a "siege mentality;" the Armenians see themselves as "an island of civilized Christian 'Europeans' among a hostile sea of Asian Muslims."29 The tragic events that took place in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 supplied the Armenian template with a very specific content. From that time on it reads, "Armenians, a Christian people surrounded and tortured by Turkish Muslims."
Patterns of Collective Memory and Ethnopolitical Manifestations: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
It seems that the presence of this specific pattern of Armenian collective memory was an important factor behind the Karabakh conflict. Here are certain confirmations of the above.
We have demonstrated that "a staunch people surrounded and tortured by enemies" is the central pattern of the Armenians' collective memory and the main national myth they present every time under certain (or, rather, uncertain) circumstances. The tragic events that took place in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 filled the pattern with specific content: the Turks (and the Azeris regarded as Turks)
28 Ibidem.
29 See: S.E. Cornell, op.cit.; E.M. Herzig, "Armenia and the Armenians," in: The Nationalities Question in the
Post-Soviet States, ed. by G. Smith, Longman, London, 1996.
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became the main enemies. In the absence of a similar pattern in their collective memory, the Azeris refused for a long time to regard the Armenians as enemies.
This pattern instilled fear in the Armenians for their future30 and what David Lake and Donald Rothschild described as "ethnic fears"31 in their intergroup strategic interactions conception. They have written that in most cases ethnic conflicts are triggered by group fear of its future:
(a) the fear of assimilation and
(b) the fear of physical extinction.
Intensified in periods of anarchy and weakened state power, these fears create so-called dilemmas of intergroup strategic interaction, which pave the way to conflicts. Ethnic fears can be a product of rational (choice in uncertain situations) and irrational (political myths and emotions) factors. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic fears were fanned by mounting anarchy and weakening central power and were rooted in the specific features of the Armenians' collective memory.
When activated, this pattern of collective memory could produce ethnic fears in the Armenians; it could produce narratives which would reproduce the specific Armenian schematic narrative template multiplied by the media, ethnic entrepreneurs, and leaders. Here is one of the many examples of such narratives, a quintessence of the narratives which appeared in the Armenian public discourse and which accumulated all the key arguments exploited by the Armenian activists at the early stages of the conflict. We have in mind Nagorny Karabakh. Istoricheskaya spravka (Mountainous Gharabagh. Historical Background) prepared by the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R. and edited by G.A. Galoian and K.S. Khudaverdian; 45 thousand copies of it were published in Erevan in 1988.32 This fairly thin leaflet contains five chapters.
This work, described by its authors as a scholarly publication of a reference nature,33 is organized in strict accordance with the main components of the Armenian schematic narrative template.
■ Chapter One ("Mountainous Gharabagh from Ancient Times Until 1917") offers a glimpse into the past; it is intended to prove beyond a doubt that since ancient times the region belonged to the Armenians and Armenia. All historical facts are geared toward the "glorious past" of the area with its predominantly Armenian population, which fully corresponds to the first component of the Armenian schematic template ("the Armenian people are living in glorious times").
■ Chapter Two ("Mountainous Gharabagh from 1918 Until 1923") describes the events which resulted in setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) as part of the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. The authors blamed the "erroneous" decision on the ominous figure of Stalin in full conformity with that part of the Armenian template which says, "the Armenians fall victim to aggression."
■ Chapter Three ("The Problem of Mountainous Gharabagh in Light of the Leninist Understanding of National Self-Determination"), the shortest of the five, does not belong to the Armenian template. In 1988, the authors had to refer to communist rhetoric, ideological pat-
30
0 An Armenian respondent said to De Waal: "Fear of being destroyed, and destroyed not as a person, not individually but destroyed as a nation, fear of genocide is in every Armenian" (Th. de Waal, Black Garden, p. 78).
31 D.A. Lake, D. Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, Mass., MIT Press., Cambridge, 2000, pp. 97-131.
32 For its English version see [http://www.karabakh-online.narod.ru/Artsakh.html].
33 It is not our task to discuss whether the authors were right or wrong; we deem it necessary to point out that since the authors posed themselves the task of justifying the claim to the region of one of the contending sides, this work (as all documents of this type) is inevitably biased and tendentious, while the facts were carefully selected and no less carefully interpreted.
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terns, and the postulates of Marxism-Leninism to remain in the mainstream of the prevailing communist ideology.
■ Chapter Four ("Problems of Demographic and Socioeconomic Development of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Gharabagh") returns to the Armenian schematic narrative template to confirm that "Armenians have to live through a period of suffering and difficulties" draped in the garbs of economic, cultural, social and, most important, demographic decline, namely, shrinking of the Armenian population as compared with the Azeri population.34
■ Chapter Five ("Events in Mountainous Gharabagh and Its Surrounding Regions") fully corresponds to the last element of the Armenian narrative template, "if Armenians remain loyal to their faith, they overcome the enemies; if they betray their faith, they are defeated." The authors insisted that the Armenian rallies in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia "were not incidental, nor were they provoked by outside factors"; they merely spoke of the nation's determination to "correct the injustice." The authors pointed to the cohesion among the Armenians inside and outside the country, who in the face of severe tests were determined to fight to the end.
While the authors adjusted the Armenian schematic narrative template to the rules of academic discussion, many other narratives that appeared at the same time were much cruder and much more direct.35
The narratives that reproduced the specific Armenian schematic template actualized the pattern of Armenians' collective memory ("a staunch people surrounded and tortured by the Turks") accompanied by corresponding ethnic fears.
The actualized Armenian template of collective memory developed into a huge force behind the Armenians' ethnopolitical mobilization: "After the protests in Karabakh, Soviet Armenia rose up in a series of vast street demonstrations. Armenia was one of the most homogeneous and self-confident republics in the U.S.S.R., yet no one, including the leaders of the demonstrations themselves, anticipated what energy they would release. It seemed that the Nagorny Karabakh issue had the capacity to touch a deep nerve inside Armenians. Explaining how Karabakh could suddenly bring hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets, the political scientist Alik Iskandarian uses the term 'frozen potential.' 'The Karabakh factor was frozen, but it needed absolutely nothing to bring it to the surface,' he says. Even those who knew almost nothing about the sociopolitical situation in Karabakh itself felt that they could identify with the cause of Armenians encircled by 'Turks' (a word that in the Armenian vernacular applies equally to Turks and Azerbaijanis)."36 To a certain extent, these imaginary fears served as a powerful catalyst for the Armenians' lightning political mobilization.
This suggests that the conflict was developing according to the following scheme: the media circulate very specific narrative templates which fan emotions ("ethnic fears") among the Armenians to instill corresponding social attitudes conducive to ethnopolitical mobilization. These specific narrative templates (not any text that might stir up negative feelings against any other group, but texts that interpret the events according to a certain template) are highly efficient because they fully correspond to already existing attitudes (the collective memory patterns).
It seems that our model explains the phenomenon of ethnopolitical mobilization of the Armenians and the conflict and offers a range of possible conflict-settlement recommendations.
34 The only table is entitled "Autonomous Region of Mountainous Gharabagh Population Size and Distribution by Nationality (per 1,000 person)", available at [http://www.karabakh-online.narod.ru/Artsakh.html].
35 The book by Armenian journalist Zori Balayan Ochag (The Hearth) published in Erevan in 1987 is the best example of crude and direct representation of the template or, for example, "ten thousand leaflets were printed and flown into Nagorno-Karabakh. On the night of 12-13 February absolutely all post-boxes of Stepanakert received these leaflets" (Th. de Waal, Black Garden, p. 20).
36 Ibid., p. 22.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Changing Narratives, Changing Memory, Changing Emotions and
Attitudes
The above suggests that the collective memory of the Armenians has played an important role in the conflict. The question is: How can collective memory be readjusted to cause a change in or soften up the Armenians' social attitudes to achieve reconciliation? In other words, which of the narratives can bring the desired result? Experts in social policy show us where to move in search for the answers to these questions. They demonstrated that texts which lay the blame for violence and conflict on a third party help to quench hostility and create reconciliatory attitudes.37
More recent studies of public opinion issues demonstrated that even deeply embedded persuasions may change when people answer differently worded questions.38 Confronted with arguments which present the old situation in a new light or when they have to consider new evidence, people might change their opinions. Under certain conditions, differently worded questions may force people to change their attitudes.39 Here is a classic example: "Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance of the Ku Klux Klan. One framed the rally as a free speech issue, while the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story expressed more tolerance of the Klan than participants who watched the public order story."40
By Way of a Conclusion
In the long-term perspective, peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (and all the other conflicts in the Caucasus for that matter) will require a totally new historical discourse, a new history which, as distinct from the old one concerned with nation-building, will bring reconciliation among peoples. The political elites should abandon their old practice of reproducing old templates and place a "social order" for new narratives leading to new historical interpretations and defusing old enmities. The international community, which wants peaceful settlement, can create a special program of action designed to alter the memory policy, to which the conflicting sides are still devoted.
This suggests a question related to both the theoretical and practical aspects of the same problem: What narratives will help to soften up the attitudes of warring sides that have been brainwashed to hate each other over the past few decades? This calls for special research; the authors hope to supply their results in the near future.
37 K. McGraw, "Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, December 1991, pp. 1133-1157.
38 Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, ed. by D. Mutz, P. Sniderman, R. Brody, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996.
39 J. Druckman, "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who can Frame?" Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, 2001, pp. 10411066; A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science, Vol. 211, 1981, pp. 453-458.
40 Th. Nelson, R.Clawson, Z. Oxley, "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1997.
